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Abstract
ABSTRACT
This dissertation reports the results of a study that examined the impact of psychological
variables on household saving and borrowing behaviour. Understanding saving behaviour is
important for policy makers and fmancial institutions, but a comprehensive explanatory
model that can explain individual differences in saving does not yet exist. The aim of this
research has been to contribute towards the construction of such a model.
The study was designed to answer four research questions. The ftrst research question
examined psychological explanations for saving in the existing economic and economic
psychological literature on household saving in order to determine the strength of their
empirical support. Though previous reviews have identifted several theories based on
psychological ideas, they have not systematically evaluated the theories empirically. This is
important because it establishes which theories should be subject to further investigations and
which should be ignored. The reviews show that many of the psychological theories have
been tested only once. In addition, many studies suffer from serious weaknesses with respect
to the measurement of variables. It is therefore appropriate to say that psychological research
on household saving is in its infancy and that the fundamental question - which I role
psychological variables play in household saving - is left unanswered. Consequently l the
second research question concerned the contribution of psychological variables in explaining
variation in household saving. This question was answered by conducting an empirical ~dy
using Dutch data collected for the CentER Saving Survey. The results of the empirical ~dy
demonstrate that psychological variables are well worth considering when trying to describe,
explain. and predict saving and borrowing behaviour. In particular, time horizon and attitudes
towards debt are found to be the most signiftcantly associated with saving and borrow
behaviour.
The third research question addressed the notion that psychological variables influence
different types of saving. If this is the case, these relationships will not necessarily emerge
when total saving is analysed in isolation. Several different measures of saving behaviour
were therefore used. More speciftcally, a distinction was made between discretionary and
contractual saving and between flow (saving during a year) and stock (wealth at a particular
moment in time) measures of saving. Discretionary saving includes saving that is likely to be
a result of discrete saving decisions in the accounting period. Contractual saving, as deftned
here, includes repayment of debt and mortgages, and results from previous borrowing
decisions. The data in this thesis suggest that it is useful to distinguish between different types
of saving and wealth when investigating the effects of psychological variables.
The fourth and ftnal research question concerned the possibility that psychological variables
may have more impact on saving behaviour among high-income households in comparison
with low-income households. As suggested by Katona (1975), the substantial increase and
spread of discretionary income among families in Western economies may increase the
importance of variables other than income when explaining saving and spending decisions.
This discretionary income means that there is income left to spend after necessities and
habitual expenses are paid for, so that a choice between spending and saving can be made. It
is reasonable that the increase in discretionary income alters the relative influence of
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economic, situational and psychological variables on saving in favour of psychological
variables. In order to test this assertion, estimates based on data from three different
discretionary income groups were compared. The results did not support the hypothesis that
the psychological variables were more important predictors for the saving behaviour of the
richer than the poorer part of the sample. Rather, the results suggest that psychological
variables are important for explaining saving behaviour at all income levels.
The thesis closes with a discussion of the strengths and weaknesses of the study, as well as the
implications of the results.
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PREFACE
Tiden ar så kort och det ar så mycket som måste gjoras, så
for mig får gårdagens många misstag game ligga dar 0-
ångrade, på det att jag medfriskt mod kan satte igång och
gora nya! Och dom ska jag - det lovarjag dig - beredvilligt
ångra nåsta år.for jag trorjagfår mera tid då.
Astrid Lindgren (1907 - 2002)
During the many years I have worked on this thesis, I have often wished that I had proceeded
differently. I might have chosen to study a less complex behaviour with a more easily-
surveyed body of literature, or at least a topic covered in any of my PhD courses at NHH. I
might have collected my own data so that it would be more accessible and easier to work with
than was the CentER database in the beginning of this project. But today, looking back at the
process, I do not regret these choices. These years have been exciting and rich both
professionally and socially. Despite having studied saving behaviour for so long, I still find
household economic behaviour interesting. My research has taken me to many exciting
places, where I have been working together with skilful and motivating colleagues, and where
I have made many friends.
I have worked on this thesis in three different places. First, I held a position as a grant holder
at the Department of Marketing at NHH in Bergen. I would like to thank associate professor
Ingeborg A. Kleppe for recruiting me as a research assistant for her project on the bank-client
relationship. This lead to my decision to study household economic behaviour. She and
Professor Kjell Grønhaug also managed to fund my attendance at the 1991 IAREP/SASE
conference in Stockholm. There, I first heard about the CentER for Economic Research at
Tilburg University, Netherlands, and the project that would be so important for my further
work: the VSB-CentER Savings Project, which was succeeded by the TMR-project on
savings and pensions. That was also the fust of many IAREP conferences I attended. Since
then, I have participated at all but one IAREP conference. This has represented a yearly and
vital source of inspiration and encouragement. For this, I am grateful to the members of the
IAREP. I particularly want to thank Jack Knetch and Paul Webley for useful discussions and
helpful comments on my work.
I have visited the CentER for Economic Research at Tilburg University several times, and
each time I have been impressed and moved by their hospitality. I treasure every day I spent
there. Thanks to the workshops and visiting researchers connected to the CentER Savings
Project, I have met a large number of the authors in my reference list personally and heard
them present their work. This has been a rich source of stimulation. My last visit lasted for
two years. I accepted an offer as a Marie Curie Fellow and took my 16-month-old son with
me to live in the Netherlands. It is not hard to do that when a team of helpers is waiting: Trea,
Dietmar, Josette, Marjoleine, Martin, Eline, Arno and Marian lent me furniture and utensils,
babysat when I had deadlines to meet, cooked dinners for us, took Thomas to kindergarten in
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their car when the weather was bad and much more. I am very grateful for their help and
friendship. And thank you Tom, for letting us go. Living apart for two years was hard for us
all.
I would like to thank my dissertation committee members, Professors Kjell Grønhaug, Arie
Kapteyn, and Karl-Erik Wårneryd for their insightful comments and suggestions, support and
patience. Professor Kjell Grønhaug has been supervising my project since I was an
undergraduate student and has been interested and supportive throughout. I asked Professor
Karl-Erik Wiimeryd to be my supervisor at the IAREP conference in Frankfurt in 1993, which
he immediately agreed to. He has always encouraged me to continue my work and has
provided very useful comments on drafts within a few days of their delivery. I am also
grateful to Professor Arie Kapteyn for initialising the Saving Projects and for encouraging
interdisciplinary research. I am glad that he always held the door open for me at CentER and
the Savings Project workshops.
Writing a PhD thesis is a long and demanding process: not only for the person who is writing
it. I'm grateful to my family, friends and colleagues who have supported me both morally and
by offering their help. I would also like to thank all my colleagues at the Norwegian School of
Economics and Business Administration, at CentER. and at Agder University College, for
interesting discussions and assistance, and for many valuable memories. In particular, I would
like to thank Trea Aldershof, Rob Alessie, Otto Andersen, Herman Camphuis, Bas Donkers,
Jonas Gunnarsson, Stefan Hochguertel, Adriaan Hoogendoorn, Jochen Jungeilges and
Maarten Ketelaars, for their comments and assistance.
I acknowledge economic support from The Norwegian School of Economics and Business
Administration, the TMR grant project "Savings and Pensions" (ERB 4061 PL 95- 0274) and
the European Community Marie Curie Fellowship (ERB FMBICT 961080), and the SIS-
programme at Agder University College. I am also indebted to the three institutions for their
hospitality and the use of their facilities.
I am grateful to Ian Hocking for his great effort in making this thesis readable. I am entirely
responsible for any remaining mistakes and deficiencies.
Kristiansand, March 2002
Ellen Katrine Nyhus
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Chapter I: Introduction
Chapter 1
Introduction
One wiry to describe the current state of knowledge about
savings is that a great deal is known at a theoretical level
about saving determinants taken one at a time. Much less is
known about the interactions of these determinants, and too
little is known at the empirical level about the true causes of
savings. As is often the case in economics, the theory seems to
have advanced well beyond empirical research ...ln sum, the
question of what determines saving is like a good jigsaw
puzzle. It has a number of pieces. Some of the pieces have
been found. Those that are available do not immediately fit
together, but not all the combinations have yet been tried.
The pieces that are missing are not necessarily in the bottom
of the box and indeed miry be mixed up with identical-looking
pieces in some other jigsaw puzzle. While it is easiest to keep
playing with the pieces at hand, the puzzle may never be
solved without the tedious task of looking in the other boxes.
While the outlines of the puzzle are getting clearer, the
precise picture it displays remains well worth the search.
Kotlikoff (1989) pp 34-35
1.1 PURPOSE OF STUDY
The purpose of this study is to investigate the extent to which psychological factors explain
individual differences in household saving behaviour. Establishing the causes of saving has
occupied scientists since Aristotle (384-322 BC), who considered whether accumulation of
wealth was laudable or objectionable.'. In the two past centuries especially, household saving
has been subject to extensive theoretical and empirical research. This is due, in part, to its
increasing importance for national economies. In spite of that, households' motivations for
saving are still only partially understood. We know some variables that might be used as
predictors for household saving, such as income and age, but the underlying psychological
process governing the choice between saving and spending is an under-researched topic. In
this study, we will explore some of the psychological variables that might be important for
household saving in order to contribute towards a broader understanding of its complexities.
The study is motivated by an increasing concern for the standard of living of future elderly
generations in many Western countries (e.g. Disney, 1996) and by the so-called "debt crisis"
that appeared in many countries at the beginning of the 1990s, which was characterised by a
large number of households with debt problems (Berthoud & Kempson, 1992). The
deregulation of the credit markets in many European countries, in combination with the
l As cited in Wårneryd, 1999
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dismantling of public pension arrangements, makes it more important than ever that
households distribute their income over time so that the frugalities future may be avoided.
Simultaneously, the options available for making the consumption stream independent from
the income stream are multiplying in number for most consumers. We therefore need a
broader understanding of how households view their future and make saving and borrowing
decisions. This knowledge is important for public policy, consumer policy, financial
institutions and for the public at large.
This thesis reports results from a theoretical and empirical investigation of the impact of
psychological factors on household saving. The variables in focus were chosen based on an
extensive literature review of savings studies within the fields of microeconomics and
economic psychology. More specifically, effects of income expectations, time horizon,
economic uncertainty, degree of economic deprivation, saving motives, time preference,
attitudes towards saving and borrowing and personality structure, were studied, along with the
socio-economic variables traditionally used by economists. Many of these variables are
frequently mentioned in the savings literature, but their impact on saving has seldom been
subject to empirical testing. Here, these variables' effect on saving was tested by using data
from a panel of 3000 Dutch households.
1.2 SIGNIFICANCE OF TOPIC
A study of possible determinants of household saving is both practically and theoretically
important. Economists have long since addressed the challenge of predicting household
saving, but lately they have reported problems in making good predictions based on the
traditional saving models. This has led to calls for research on saving from new perspectives.
A recent development is to enrich traditional theories with psychological constructs in order
to reconcile the theories with the data and analyse the heterogeneity of savers (e.g. Aaron,
1999; Dynan, Skinner & Zeldes, 2000; Lusardi, 2000, Venti & Wise, 2000). The economic
environments in which households are immersed have also changed dramatically during the
past decades. It is of interest to financial institutions and public policy makers to know more
about how people adapt to the changes.
Practical interest
Household saving became increasingly important for western economies following the
Second World War. While saving had been a privilege of the small and rich upper-class, who
had a surplus after necessities were paid, the post-war economic improvement resulted in
economies where the majority of the population has a variety of postponable expenditures (or
discretionary income). Consumers in affluent post-industrial societies have substantial liquid
assets that they can spend or save (Arndt, 1976; Katona, 1975). Their decisions affect the
level of investments, intergenerational equity, productivity, inflation, cyclical movement, and
long term economic growth. To understand and predict business cycles and growth, we must
first understand household saving and consumption behaviour.
In past decades, researchers have reported a general decline in saving in the West (e.g. Maital
& Maital, 1994; Modigliani, 1986). There are fears that savings ratios will continue to
decrease and cause "burnout" problems in national economies, which will leave problems for
future generations. The dominating model of saving - the life-cycle/permanent income
hypothesis - does not offer many ideas about the encouragement of thrift and saving (Thaler,
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1994; Wiirneryd, 1989; 1999). The model is based on assumptions about utility maximisation,
so that ideas about how to change peoples' motivations to save are limited to economic
incentives. However, history shows that most policy measures taken in order to stimulate
saving are inadequate and fail to produce the desired results' (Tucker, 1991; Wiirneryd, 1989).
It is therefore important to identify the most important reasons for saving so that these can be
taken into account when designing saving programmes.
Moreover, understanding household financial decision-making is important for the design of
social welfare and consumer policy. In many countries, consumption growth has been
fmanced by borrowing. For some households, these mortgages and loans grew into
problematic debt (see Dessart & Kuy1en, 1986; Lea, 1998; Lea, Webley & Levine, 1993;
Lunde & Poppe, 1991; Parker, 1988; Webley & Nyhus, 2001). Future generations of the
elderly might also face a strained economic situation unless they save sufficiently for
retirement (e.g. Diamond & Hausman, 1984; Lusardi, 2000, Venti & Wise, 2000). In order to
prevent such situations, it is important to gain more knowledge about how people think about
their future, how saving can be encouraged and if easy access to savings and to credit affects a
person's saving behaviour.
Finally, household economic decisions about saving and spending are of interest to credit
institutions, which should provide households with adequate financial services. Knowledge of
the factors that can explain (i) debt problems and (ii) processes underlying decisions to
borrow money is important for making decisions about granting loans and in the renegotiation
of lending terms with consumers affiicted with problem debt (Canner & Luckett, 1991).
Knowledge of how individuals prefer to allocate their income between different stages in their
life cycle and how to assist them in fulfilling their economic goals is also important for the
segmentation and development offmancial products (see Gunnarsson, 1999).
Theoretical interest
Despite extensive research on saving behaviour, a large part of household saving is still
unexplained. The life-cycle model, which is the dominant framework for analysis of saving,
does not provide adequate predictions about saving and consumption. This is the conclusion
drawn from studies of household saving in the USA (Carroll & Summers, 1991; Courant,
Gramlich & Laitner, 1986; Kotlikoff, 1989; Kotlikoff & Auerbach (1991); Kotlikoff &
Summers, 1981; Shafer, Elmeskov & Tease, 1992), Italy (Ando, Guiso, Terlizzese &
Dorsainvil, 1992; Guiso, Jappelli & Terlizzese, 1992b), and Japan (Ando et al., 1992). To
some extent, empirical evidence is inconsistent with the life cycle model. The conventional
saving theory is unable to predict and explain the general decrease in saving in most OECD-
countries (Shafer et al., 1992). Consequently, some authors argue that, in reality, we do not
have a theory of saving (Maital & Maital, 1994). Interdisciplinary research is therefore
required. It must use the individual or household as the unit of analysis. Its focus should be on
heterogeneity among savers rather than on homogeneity (Burtless, 1999; Attanasio, 1998;
Maital & Maital, 1994).
Many studies of the psychological determinants of saving have been conducted within the
field of economic psychology (e.g. Daniel, 1994; Furnham, 1985; Groenland & Nyhus, 1994;
Gunnarsson, 1999; Julander, 1975; Katona, 1975; Lindqvist, 1981; Livingstone & Lunt, 1992;
Lunt & Livingstone, 1991; Wahlund, 1991; Wiirneryd, 1995; 1996a; 1996b). As will be
shown in Chapter 3, economic psychological studies are scarce, and the results from these
2 With the exception of the targeted retirement savings programmes in the US (Poterba, Venti & Wise, 1995).
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studies are neither easily comparable nor conclusive. A comprehensive psychological model
of saving has therefore not yet been developed. More research is necessary in order to
accomplish this.
In addition, within the field of marketing and consumer behaviour, there are repeated calls for
research on the longitudinal aspects of money allocation. Gredal (1966) and Arndt (1976)
classified consumer behaviour into four comprehensive categories, in which budget allocation
is the first category, laying the foundation for other consumer decisions such as choices
among product categories and brands. Arndt (1976) argued that marketing researchers have
focused too much on the consumer's choice of product categories and brands compared to
strategic allocation decisions, such as saving. A similar critique was put forward by Olander
and Seipel (1970), Olshavsky and Granbois (1979) and Ferber (1973). In spite of this,
consumer behaviour researchers have not responded, leaving consumer decisions on income
allocation over the life span as an underdeveloped research stream for the discipline of
consumer behaviour. Modem textbooks on marketing and consumer behaviour scarcely
contain information on the choice between saving and spending, despite wealth and credit
being acknowledged as important consumer resources (e.g. Arnould, Price & Zinkham, 2002;
Engel, Blackwell & Miniard, 1993).
Contributions of the present study
In this study, the effect of selected psychological variables on household saving is tested. A
study examining how psychological variables affect saving implies that assumptions
underlying many economic models of saving are challenged. For example, the rate of time
preference (degree of impatience) is frequently treated as a constant in economic models,
often assumed to equal the real interest rate in the market. Ifwe find that time preference for
consumption varies between individuals and is associated with differences in saving, this
means that time preference should be allowed to vary across households because it will
influence the propensity to save. Another important assumption in economic models of saving
is preference independence, which holds that an individual is unaffected by the consumption
of other individuals. If variables capturing mechanisms of social comparison are found to
affect saving, this indicates that the opposite is closer to reality: people are affected by other
peoples' consumption. Therefore, saving models should rely on assumptions about preference
interdependence.
Furthermore, this study represents an improved replication of some of the previous empirical
studies examining the effects of psychological variables on household saving. Many
psychological theories have been tested only once. Moreover, studies have suffered from
serious shortcomings. Firstly, measurements of saving and income variables have been rather
poor, consisting of simple self-report measures of previous saving and income. Secondly,
when data are collected by surveys, both the dependent variables (being either past saving or
intentions to save) and the explanatory variables are measured at the same point in time. This
raises methodological concerns because assessment of the direction of causality is impossible.
Thirdly, previous research has often failed to consider that psychological variables might
affect different saving types in different ways. If, for example, a psychological variable
influences two different types of saving in opposite directions, the effect of this variable might
be neutralised when examining total saving. Fourthly, many previous studies have not dealt
with the level of analyses in a proper way. That is, household saving should be studied at the
household level, but, often, psychological studies have focussed on individuals without
considering how the individual's interaction with other household members might influence
their economic behaviour. The use of subjective data in the study of saving requires finding
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an appropriate way of constructing a measure of subjective data at the household level. These
methodological problems are not solved in the present study, but they have been met by
improving the way saving and income are measured and by measuring the explanatory
variables in the middle of the period in which saving is studied. Household saving is defined
in various ways in order to explore whether the psychological variables influence different
forms of saving in the same way. In addition, a new method is used for approaching the
aggregation problem of subjective information to the household level.
1.3 RESEARCH QUESTIONS
The behaviour related to consumption, saving, and borrowing is complex and may be studied
from many perspectives that focus on different actions involved in so-called "saving
behaviour". In this study, the focus is on the level of saving and wealth within a household.
Related decisions like choice of supplier of financial services, portfolio choice, labour supply,
and housing decisions might interact with both the ability and the willingness to save, but for
the purpose of this study, these topics are disregarded.
Saving during a period of time is a product of several decisions of varying significance, such
as whether to buy a cheap or expensive product, whether to spend now or later, and whether
to borrow or save. Saving can be seen as a result of continuous intertemporal decisions, where
outcomes (payments and consumption of goods) appear at different points in time. Some
authors even posit that, in principle, the individual always finds himself in a saving decision
situation, since resources such as income and wealth must be managed and distributed at
every instant (Olander & Seipel, 1970). When studying saving we have to assume that
consumers have some awareness of their overall economic situation when they make buying
or saving decisions. We must also assume that they make a judgement of the consequences of
the decisions. Furthermore, we have to assume that certain personal characteristics, such as
attitudes or expectations of the household's future economic situation, will play apart in this
judgement. Studies of saving can therefore be described as searching for regularities. They
should identify the variables that have an effect across the majority of spending- and saving
decisions. Only these variables will serve as useful determinants and predictors of saving over
extended periods and have a potential for being useful for analyses at the aggregate level.
Saving has been studied by economists for centuries and by psychologists for a few decades.
The economic theories of saving have rested on strong assumptions about how people make
decisions and the factors that motivate them. These assumptions have been modified, but with
little explicit testing of their adequacy. The first research question therefore concerns the
more-or-less implicit psychological theories of saving and their empirical support. Though
previous reviews have identified several theories that rest on psychological ideas (e.g.
Wåmeryd, 1999), they have not systematically evaluated the theories in light of any empirical
results that may support or contradict them. This is important in order to establish which
theories should be subject to further investigation and which should be ignored.
Research Question 1:
Which of the psychological explanations for saving found in the existing economic and
economic psychological literature are supported by empirical findings?
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This research question is addressed in Part II, which consists of three chapters (Chapters 2 - 4)
presenting reviews of relevant parts of the saving literature and the hypotheses to be tested in
the empirical part of the thesis. In Chapter 2, the foundations of the most important micro
economic theories of household saving are reviewed and discussed in light of relevant
empirical research within the fields of microeconomics, psychology and sociology. Chapter 3
is a review of empirical studies on saving where psychological variables have been applied.
The reviews reveal which factors are considered the most important for saving behaviour.
Some of them will be addressed in the empirical part of the dissertation.
Some studies of the effect of psychological variables on household saving already exist and
the "Index of consumer sentiment" has been found to have predictive power at the macro
level (e.g. Katona, 1975). Despite this, we have limited knowledge about the role of
psychological variables. Many of the psychological theories have been tested only once, and
many studies suffer from serious weaknesses with respect to measurement of the variables of
interest. It is therefore appropriate to say that psychological research on household saving is in
its infancy and that the fundamental question - what role do psychological variables play in
household saving? - is left unanswered. Consequently, it is necessary to start the empirical
study of the psychological effects on saving with the following question:
Research Question 2:
Do psychological variables contribute towards explaining variation in household saving?
Studies of saving have been dominated by economists, who have made clear what should be
considered saving. Forma1ly, saving is defined as the difference between net worth at the end
of the period and the net worth at the beginning of the period, which should equal the excess
of income over consumption expenditure in the same period (Wårneryd, 1999). This may
sound straightforward to measure and analyse, but it is not. When people save, they do it in as
various ways as putting money in a bank account, paying down mortgages, or investing in
insurance, shares and mutual funds. When trying to investigate the effect of psychological
variables on saving we should consider whether different forms of saving are likely to be
affected by different underlying psychological mechanisms. For example, putting a sum of
money towards a mortgage is economically equivalent to putting the same amount into a bank
account. However, the two saving acts might reveal different preferences in delaying
gratification or the ability to do so. People who save before buying are more able to delay
gratification than those who prefer to buy first and pay afterwards. Katona (1975) also pointed
out that these two types of saving differ with respect to when the decision to save is made.
Putting money into a bank account involves a discrete decision to save made in the current
accounting period. Katona (1975) labelled this discretionary saving. Putting money towards a
mortgage is usually a result of previous decisions to save (or borrow), and is often determined
by contractual agreements. Katona termed this contractual saving. It is not certain that the
variables that influence discretionary saving also influence contractual saving or that
contractual saving, in terms of paying down mortgages, is influenced by psychological
variables at all.
In order to adequately explore the effects of psychological variables on saving, a distinction is
made between discretionary and contractual saving. Discretionary saving includes saving that
is likely to be a result of discrete saving decisions in the accounting period. Contractual
saving, as defmed here, includes repayment of debt and mortgages, and is a result of previous
--'9¥",#
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borrowing decisions. The reason for distinguishing between these two types of saving is
because it is likely that the direction of the effect of some of the psychological variables might
be opposite for the two types of saving, as the underlying psychological processes governing
them are so different. Contractual saving (as defmed here) implies a preference for buying
before paying, while discretionary saving implies preference for the opposite. Any effect of
psychological variables that influence the two types of saving differently might be neutralised
when studying total saving. The third research question that will be addressed is therefore:
Research Question 3:
Do psychological variables have different impacts on discretionary and
repayment saving respectively?
Numerous economic studies of saving show that household saving is largely determined by
household income. It is a logical relationship as the income determines a household's ability
to save. With the exception of dramatic increases in the value of real estate or financial assets,
it is impossible to save more than one's income, while some of the income must be used for
providing necessities like food and housing. However, income cannot explain all saving. As
suggested by Katona (1975), the substantial increase and spread of discretionary income
among families in Western economies increases the importance of variables other than
income when explaining saving and spending decisions. It is reasonable to suggest that the
increase in discretionary income tips the relative influence of economic, situational, and
psychological variables on saving in favour of psychological variables. In order to test this
assertion, estimates based on data from different income groups will be compared. The fourth
research question addressed in this study is:
Research Question 4:
Do psychological variables have more impact on saving
in high-income households than on saving in low-income households?
The variables selected for the empirical study are outlined in Chapter 4. The expected sign
and direction of the relationships are also indicated. The selection of independent variables is
based on the literature review presented in Chapters 2 and 3. Several different ways of
measuring saving are used as dependent variables. A distinction is made between
discretionary, contractual and total saving and between stock and flow measures of saving.
Part III of the dissertation contains two chapters (Chapters 5-6), which report the preparations
for the empirical part of the dissertation. Chapter 5 describes the procedures followed when
sampling panel members and collecting data, the questionnaires, selection of key informants
in the households, the design of the study and construction of the data file. Chapter 6
describes the instrumentation used.
Part IV of the dissertation contains two chapters (Chapters 7-8) in which the data analyses are
reported and discussed. InChapter 7, the data are described and the results of the estimation
of the models are presented. The theoretical and practical implications of these results are
discussed in Chapter 8.
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Chapter 2
The psychological foundations of
economic theories of saving
Consider the problem of predicting the shots made by an expert
billiard player. It seems not at all unreasonable that excellent
predictions would be yielded by the hypothesis that the billiard
player made his shots as if he knew the complicated mathematical
formulas that would give the optimum directions of travel, could
estimate accurately by rye the angles, etc., describing the location
of the balls, could make lightning calculations from the formulas,
and could then make the balls travel in the direction indicated by
the formulas. Our confidence in this hypothesis is not based on the
belief that billiard players, even expert ones, can or do go through
the process described; it derives rather from the belief that, unless
in some way or other they were capable of reaching essentially the
same result, they would not in fact be expert billiard players.
Friedman (1953): Essays in Positive Economics, p 21.
2.1 INTRODUCTION
In this chapter, economic models of saving and consumption will be reviewed. The focus is
on the psychological foundations of the theories, which will be discussed in the light of results
from relevant empirical studies within the fields of psychology, sociology, and anthropology.
The review will facilitate identification of the psychological factors that may be fruitful for
future research. As economists have conducted numerous and detailed studies of saving
throughout the last two centuries, a complete review of these studies is beyond the scope of
this thesis. Excellent reviews have also recently been written. King (1985) and Modigliani
(1986) have reviewed research on saving within the life cycle perspective. Deaton (1992)
gives an extensive review of microeconomic theories of saving. Browning and Lusardi (1996)
provide an updated review on the most modem microeconomic theories of saving behaviour
and results from empirical tests of these theories. Wåmeryd (1989, 1999) has reviewed the
psychological ideas underlying the different models of saving behaviour as well as
psychological research on saving behaviour. The following review will also focus on the
psychological theories found in the savings literature, but, in addition, we will investigate the
extent to which psychological ideas receive empirical support.
As the number of studies of saving behaviour is high, it is difficult to find a suitable way to
structure a review. Many possible schemes might have been used in order to facilitate the
evaluation of the literature. After assessing several methods, a structure where the dominating
economic theories of saving behaviour were used as a starting point for the discussion of
empirical fmdings was chosen. The theories are presented chronologically so that the review
also serves as a historical overview of the development of saving theories throughout the last
century. The psychological ideas underlying the original theory are presented first, while
empirical studies that relate to each theory are discussed successively. Differences between
the economic models are also highlighted. Table 2.3 summarises the most important saving
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models, the psychological hypotheses implicitly assumed, and the results from empirical
studies, if any, of these hypotheses.
2.2 THE ECONOMIC APPROACH IN STUDIES OF SAVING
In general, economics is concerned with how an economy or individual chooses to allocate
scarce resources among each other and over time. The purpose is often to make as good
predictions about behaviour as possible, rather than finding the real explanation for why
people act as they do. The development of theories is achieved by constructing a model of the
behaviour under investigation based on a number of simplifying assumptions. Generally, it is
assumed that agents - being firms, individuals or nations - will act rationally and maximise
their utility or profits. The models often also rely on assumptions concerning the markets.
Such assumptions may be perfect competition or perfect capital markets. Although the realism
of the assumptions is questionable, the assumptions have proved useful in economic analyses
(Wårneryd, 1999). Moreover, many economists are not greatly concerned with descriptively
"realistic" assumptions, but sufficiently good approximating assumptions for a particular
purpose (Friedman, 1953). For psychologists evaluating this work, it is important to note that
economic models do not claim to predict behaviour of individuals. Instead, they often depend
on the law of large numbers and predict average behaviour (at the macro level) or the
behaviour of the famous Economic Man (at the micro level).
Much research on saving behaviour has been conducted at the aggregate level (nations). This
stems from the need to explain aggregate fluctuations in savings and consumption in order to
assist public policy making. There are strong links between saving, growth, competitiveness,
welfare and business cycles. It is, therefore, important to understand how they influence each
other and how they can be influenced through policy measures. Macro economic models of
aggregate consumption and spending typically use variables like "money supply", "inflation",
"consumption level", and "labour supply". These are variables meant to describe the results of
human behaviour, yet they are abstract and imply the use of simplifying assumptions about
how humans think and act. As observed by Browning and Lusardi (1996), the results of these
studies do not provide us with a great deal of knowledge about the complex behaviour
underlying saving behaviour. For this reason, they are not included in the present review.
Studies of saving at the aggregate level require some microeconomic theory. The modem (or
neo-classical) microeconomic theories often rest on the assumption of rational behaviour.
They are theories about the choices and actions of "Economic Man". The Economic Man is
assumed to enjoy consumption and dislike work. Economic models are built on assumptions
about his preferences. For example, his consumptive pleasure is assumed to be dependent on
previous consumption, so that pleasure derived from a certain product declines the more of
that thing he has already consumed. Thus, the third grilled chicken in a given week gives less
pleasure than the second chicken, but more pleasure than the fourth one. Similarly, dislike of
work is assumed to increase with each additional hour worked so that the 40th hour of work in
a week is more displeasing than the 39th• Since Economic man is comparing pleasures and
pains associated with each and every decision he makes in order to do what is best for himself
(maximise total utility), he does not spend money on one more chicken if the same money
spent on fish gives him more pleasure. He will work as long as the utility from consuming the
goods and services he can purchase from the earnings from his last hour of work is higher
than the disutility associated with working. In the same vein, he will not spend money on one
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more chicken in this period if he expects the pleasure derived from consuming chicken in the
future to be higher (for the same money adjusted for interest and inflation).
In general, saving decisions (or, more correctly, consumption decisions) are assumed to be
made in the way described above. For each unit consumed, the decision maker will weigh the
marginal utility derived from spending now with that of the future, and under the assumptions
of a diminishing marginal utility from consumption, he will try to smooth consumption so that
the utility from consumption is constant from one period to another. If he thinks the utility
from one extra unit of consumption will give more utility if consumed in the future, the
consumption will be postponed. Economists agree that this is how saving decisions are made.
However, they disagree on the factors influencing this decision process and the factors that
are most important. They also disagree about what consumers derive utility from and under
which constraints the decisions are made. Some of these differences are illustrated in the
review below.
2.3 ECONOMIC THEORIES OF SAVING
The review presented below is divided into the three parts':
i) Saving as a result of willpower andforesight
The first part of the chapter deals with ideas about saving behaviour proposed by economists
from the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th century (e.g. Bohm-Bawerk 1889/1959;
Fisher, 1930). Despite the age of these theories, they are interesting since they are founded on
advanced psychological thinking, which still receives attention'. In fact, we will see that
Fisher (1930) discussed most of the ideas that underlie the more recent saving models.
Important psychological concepts in these theories are "time preference", "self control",
"short-sightedness", and "ability to delay gratification". Economic variables were assumed to
have an indirect effect on saving, as they would work through time preference. The central
idea is that individuals might be incapable of correctly evaluating their future needs and
wants, so that the present is given too much weight. Individuals are also expected to differ
with respect to how much they value the present compared to the future.
ii) Saving as a result of ability to save - the income approach
In the 1930s, a new era of saving theories began in which income was considered the
dominating (and sometimes the only) determinant of saving. Keynes (1936) started the stream
of income theories by proposing that saving was a linear function of present income, and he
was followed by researchers who proposed alternative income definitions. Duesenberry
(1949) proposed that past income and relative income would provide better predictors of
saving, focusing on habit formation and preference interdependence. Friedman (1957) and
Modigliani and Brumberg (1954) argued that future income or lifetime income would be the
most important determinant when proposing the Permanent income theory and the Life-cycle
hypothesis respectively. They argued that individuals are forward-looking and allocate their
income evenly over the expected remaining lifetime. Although these theories appear to rely
on ideas of economic stimuli being the only determinant of saving and consumption, this
3 The borderlines between these three types of models are not as clear-cut as this division might suggest.
However, from many other alternative ways of structuring this review, this was considered the best one.
4 See, for example Thaler, (1997): Irving Fisher: Modern Behavioral Economist. (AEA Papers and Proceedings)
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review shows that they also rely on psychological and sociological assumptions about the
reasons for consuming and saving.
iii) Saving as a result of self-controlling strategies and mental accounting
Finally, a more behavioural version of the LCR is presented. The Behavioural Life Cycle
Hypotheses (Shefrin & Thaler, 1988) is an attempt to integrate the LCH, multiple self models
(Thaler & Shefrin, 1981), as well as psychological ideas about how we mentally handle
money - "mental accounting" (Thaler, 1985). The model has been tested empirically to a
limited extent, but some supporting results are presented here. The model can, to a degree, be
viewed as an integration of ideas presented in i) and ii).
2.3.1 Saving as a result of will-power and foresight
2.3.1.1 The theory of interest formation
The first models of saving focused on the intertemporal choice between consuming now or
later and factors that influence this choice. Although several economists in the 19th century
had discussed similar ideas,s Båhm-Bawerk (1889/1959) and Fisher (1930) are considered the
creators of the concept and theory of time preference. Writing at the turn of the zo" century,
their initial research questions asked why interest rates exist and how they are formed. They
tried to answer the question of why people want rewards for saving money by lending it to
others and why they are willing to pay compensation in order to borrow money. When doing
this, they used advanced psychological thinking that still receives attention from both
economists and psychologists.
The core of their theories is the trade-off between spending and investing; it is of choosing
between immediate enjoyment and possible larger deferred enjoyments. By focusing on this
intertemporai dilemma, they point to a central problem of human life: giving up immediate
pleasures in order to obtain long-term goals. They recognised that saving and investing are
results of how people handle this intertemporai conflict.
Bohm-Bawerk (1889/1959) argued that the formation of interest rates was influenced by three
factors:
1) Tendencies to value future goods lower than goods of the same quantity and quality
available immediately. Bohm-Bawerk proposed that this tendency is caused by
incapability to imagine the pleasures and pains we will feel in the future. Present
wants and desires are given the highest weight.
2) Positive expectations towards the future. In general, people are optimistic and expect
to be better off in the future. This optimism has a depressing effect on saving, since
people might wish to spend some of the increased future income on unfulfilled present
needs.
3) Goods existing in the present are economically superior to goods that exist in the
future, because they can produce more goods or give income/utility in the interval
between the present and the relevant future period. This is particularly true for goods
that will outlast one's expected lifetime.
5 See Loewenstein (1992) and Wiirneryd (1999) about the writings ofear1y economists such as Rae, Senior,
Mills, and Jevons.
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The size of the interest was supposed determined by the importance of these three factors. The
more positive the expectations of the future economic situation, the more tempting it is to
fulfil present needs and desires. The lower the ability to imagine future pleasures and pains,
the more weight is given the present feelings.
Fisher (1930) developed and refined Bohm-Bawerk's theory of the interest rate formation and
further formalised the analyses. He introduced the concept of time preference, which he
explains as reflecting a person's impatience for consumption. In his model, time preference is
an important determinant of saving. He formally defmed the rate of time preference (also
called the subjective discount factor or the rate of impatience") as "the (percentage) excess of
the present marginal want for one more unit of present goods over the present marginal want
for one more unit of future goods" (page 62). The rate of time preference is a derivative of
marginal desirability, i.e. the preference for present over future goods. With this definition,
Fisher also stressed the importance of discounting, as it is the present want for future goods
that is assumed to form the premises for decisions. Future events must be discounted into
present values in order to be comparable to present events.
Fisher further argued that all preference resolves itself into a preference for early "enjoyment"
income" over deferred enjoyment income. He argued that it is the stream of all future
enjoyment income that plays the essential role. Enjoyment income was defined as a
psychological entity (similar to what is called "utility" in contemporary texts), which could
not be measured directly. Therefore, for practical purposes, Fisher proposed that "real
income" was better to use, which is defined as those final physical events in the outer world
(e.g. shelter, music, bread and butter) that give us our inner enjoyments. "Real income" could
be measured by the prices we paid in order to obtain them (and would be denoted
"expenditure" instead of "real income" by contemporary economists).
The underlying assumption for the theory of interest is that individuals, in general, have
higher preferences for consumption today than for consumption tomorrow, which means that
the rate of time discounting usually is positive. The strength of the time preference or the
degree of impatience is assumed to be influenced by many factors. Factors that explain
differences in individual time preference can be divided into income characteristics and
personality factors.
Fisher (1930) proposed that three characteristics of the income were important. The first
factor is the size of the expected income stream. The lower the income, the higher the time
preference due to many unfulfilled needs. People have a minimal need for food and shelter,
and those with low incomes have to spend it all on their basic needs, regardless of how much
compensation they receive for saving. Those with higher incomes will have most of their
basic needs covered, and might therefore be able and willing to save if they find the
compensation offered for it satisfactory. The second factor is the expected time shape of the
income. Expected decreases in income (for example, before the time of retirement) will
reduce impatience. Expected increases in income will increase impatience, and people with
low incomes will be more sensitive to changes in the time shape of income than those with
high incomes. The third factor is the uncertainty related to the income stream. If future
6 Fisher (1930) has been criticised for using time preference and impatience as synonyms. He defended this
practice by arguing that the meaning of impatience is more self-evident than time preference, it is shorter, and it
carries a presumption as to the usual direction of the time preference. Fisher did realise that time preference is
sometimes negative (Fisher, 1930; page 67), for which Loewenstein (1987) and Loewenstein and Sicherman
(1991) found empirical support.
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income is uncertain, this will usually decrease the time preference and people will "lay up for
a rainy day". Fisher pointed out, however, that the effect of risk might be numerous,
depending on the degree and range of application of risk for various periods of times and on
expected lifetime.
Fisher (1930) suggested that the preference for immediate (as opposed to deferred)
gratification was established early in life through the teaching of parents and through social
pressure from the environment. Furthermore, Fisher related the rate of time preference to the
following personal characteristics:
1) Foresight. The greater the foresight, the lower the impatience.
2) Self-control. Self-control reflects the willingness to resist temptations. The greater the
self-control, the lower the impatience.
3) Habits. The influence of habits may be in either direction. Someone who is used to
spending will continue to spend although the income declines. Likewise, someone
who is used to providing for the future will do so also when the income increases.
Hence, two persons with the same income might differ in their impatience due to a
difference in habits.
4) Expectations of life. Fisher regarded the chance of death as the most important rational
factor tending to increase impatience. Anything that tends to prolong human life will
tend to reduce impatience.
5) Thoughts for relatives. The stronger the bequest motive, the lower the impatience. In
addition, Fisher argued that the increase of offspring (number of children) lowers
impatience.
6) Need to follow the whims of fashion. The more independent of "Mrs Grundy and the
high-powered salesman of devices that are useless or harmful, or which commit the
purchaser beyond his income prospects", the lower the impatience.
These income and personality factors would interact, so that time preference could vary
among people with the same income and income characteristics. The same individual may,
over her life cycle, move from one extreme of impatience to the other. Such an alteration may
be caused by a change in the personality factors or by variation in the income factors.
Therefore, Fisher also attempted to explain within-subject variation in time preference at
different times. He described the following typical life cycle profile for a man's rate of time
preference: As a child, he will be impatient because children in general lack foresight and
self-control. As a young man, he will also have a high degree of impatience, because he
expects large increases in income. When he has settled down and has a family, the impatience
will decrease, because he will be forced to think more about meeting future needs. In the
"empty-nest" -stage, the impatience will increase due to a shorter expected remaining lifetime.
With this Fisher indirectly suggested that stage in the life cycle is an important determinant
for time preferences and economic behaviour. He also suggested that the most common
behaviour will be to try to transform a given income into a uniform one; i.e. most people will
try to smooth their real income stream. As will be shown in the next section, these ideas are
similar to those that underlie the Life-cycle model.
Fisher's theory of time preference included factors that will explain differences between and
within individuals, but these individual differences are seldom included in economic models
of intertemporal choice. This is because Fisher (1930) suggested that individual differences in
time preference would be harmonised in the capital market. In fact, at the macro level, Fisher
(1930) argued that the real interest rate reflects the aggregate time preference of all
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individuals in the society. People that are impatient to spend (have a high rate of time
preference) will borrow money from those less impatient (have a lower rate of time
preference). He also assumed decreasing marginal utility from consumption. For each extra
unit the impatient people could consume, the lower the marginal utility for extra consumption
and the less compensation they would be willing to pay in order to consume even more. He
illustrated that by using the following demand schedule (page 97):
For each successive one hundred dollars added to his present income, assuming that income
was stable and certain, a certain prospective borrower is willing to payout of next year's
income, as follows:
For the first $100, $120, with an impatience rate of20%.
For the second $100, $115, with an impatience rate of 15%.
For the third $100, $110, with an impatience rate oflO%.
For the fourth $100, $106, with an impatience rate of6%.
For the fifth $100, $105, with an impatience rate of5%.
For the sixth $100, $104, with an impatience rate of 4%.
Likewise, the less patient people consume, the higher the marginal utility for extra foregone
consumption and the more compensation they will demand in order to give up further
consumption. Consequently, in a perfect capital market with no liquidity constraints, the
process of lending and borrowing will continue until the compensation offered and the
compensation demanded for extra units of consumption are equal. That is, it will continue
until every person in the society has the same rate of impatience. This process of harmonising
rates of time preference describes the formation of the interest rate in a society. On the macro
level, the aggregate degree of impatience of all individuals determines the rate of interest. On
the individual level, the relationship is opposite. For individuals (each having a negligible
influence on the market interest rate) the interest rate will be fixed, and it is their individual
rate of impatience that varies and determines their tendency to lend or borrow. A person is
assumed to harmonise one's rate of time preference with the market interest rate. Therefore,
the real interest rate in the market is used as a proxy for time preference.
Fisher (1930) also formulated his theory in mathematical terms. In this part of his book, little
of the psychological insight displayed in the first part of the book is incorporated. The
assumptions about the formation of the market interest rate as described above are taken for
granted, so that the economic models of intertemporai choice rely on the assumption of the
individual rate of time preference being equal to the market real interest rate. Thus,
intertemporal choices can be described by using the apparatus of indifference curves (or
"Fisher-curves"). Numerous economic models have adopted this assumption, without
reflecting on its inappropriateness when describing behaviour in imperfect capital markets or
questioning the assumption about individuals harmonising their rate of time preference with
the market interest rate.
Fisher's theory of interest (as formulated in the stylised version in mathematics) formed the
basis for the Discounted Utility Model (the DU model), which was formally developed by
Samuelson (1937), Koopmans (1960), Lancaster (1963) and Fishbum and Rubinstein (1982).
This model, built on strict axioms concerning preferences and utility functions, describes how
rational individuals with rational preferences will distribute consumption between the present
and the future. Although even the inventors of the DU model realised it lacked mundane
realism (see Loewenstein, 1992), the model has been the most powerful tool for analysing
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intertemporal decisions (including saving decisions). In the past decades, empirical research
has found that this is a poor descriptive model of intertemporal choice, and focus has
especially been on determinants of time preference and individual differences. This research
will be reviewed below.
2.3.1.2 Some empiricaljindings
In the following paragraphs, some empirical tests of parts of Fisher's theory are presented. In
particular, the focus is on empirical studies of time preference and some implications of the
findings. The section starts with a review of studies that imply tests of the propositions of
Fisher (1930) and proceeds with a review of other results from empirical studies of time
preference and intertemporal choice. Here, we are concerned with the impact of the length of
the delay periods on time preference. The results suggest that we might observe time-
inconsistent behaviour, which means that people will have difficulties in following their own
plans. These findings further suggest that self-control and willpower are important variables
to include in models of intertemporal choice. Finally, the few studies that focus on the
relationship between time preference and behaviour are reviewed.
Tests of Fisher's theory
The most applied argument from Fisher's theory of interest is that individuals will harmonise
their rate of time preference by lending and borrowing in the capital market (assuming a
perfect capital market). This hypothesis is not supported by empirical investigations either in
studies using hypothetical choice situations or when observing real-world behaviour. In
general, the time preference rates found in empirical studies exceed market interest rates. For
example, Hausman (1979) found subjective discount rates ranging between 5.1% and 89.0%,
when deriving the rates used in actual purchases of air-conditioners (the mean discount rate
was 26.5%). Gately (1980) reported discount rates between 45% and 300% in a similar study
of refrigerator purchases. Houston (1983) found a mean discount rate of 22.5% in an
experimental study of choice of an "untried energy-saving durable good". Thaler (1981)
found median discount rates as high as 345%, while Benzion, Rapoport and Yagil (1989)
found mean discount rates as high as 59.8% among university students responding to
hypothetical choice situations". Samwick (1998) estimated time preference rates from wealth
data and found a median annual rate of time preference equal to 7.63. One quarter of the time
preference rates was below 2.93% and another quarter above 14.66%. 14.17% of the sample
had estimated rates of time preference above 20%s.
The discount rates found in these studies have not only been high, they have also varied
between individuals. These differences can be attributed to a non-perfect capital market,
which was an important underlying assumption in Fisher's argument. However, they may also
indicate that people do not seek to harmonise their subjective discount rates with the real
interest rate in the market and that, consequently, factors other than their time preference
might play an important role in intertemporal choices.
Fisher also proposed several factors that might influence time preference: the size of current
income and expected development and uncertainty related to future income, upbringing,
7 The mean discount rates in these studies varied with the characteristics of the questions used to measure them.
The mean rate given here is from the question with the lowest amount and the shortest time period.
8 Samwick (1998) also found the rate of time preference of 5.32% of the sample to be lower than -15%. He
attributes all findings of negative rates to a strong bequest motive or inheritance. Inclusion of inheritance (or
initial wealth) gives higher estimates of the rate of time preference.
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personality factors and stage in life cycle. Empirical studies of these factors are addressed in
the following paragraphs.
A few studies indicate that the time preference is related to the size of the income. Lawrance
(1991) and Hausman (1979) reported evidence for a negative relationship between income
and the discount rates. Low-income families use on average higher discount rates than high-
income families. A weakness of their studies is that they did not measure the discount rates
directly, but estimated them from consumption equations (Lawrance, 1991) or investment
decisions (Hausman, 1979). Additionally, other factors than those controlled for might
therefore have played a role". Donkers and van Soest (1999) and Houston (1983) did not find
a relationship between income and the discount rate when using a more direct measure of the
rate of time preference, while Nyhus (1997) reported an unexpected significant positive
relationship between the discount rate and income. Antonides (1988) and Nyhus (1997), on
the other hand, found that a variable called "fmancial position" co-varied negatively with the
discount rate thus indicating that time preference might be influenced by the fulfilment of
needs.
Only one empirical study has so far addressed the effects of expectations and uncertainty on
time preference. Antonides (1988) found that non-savers with an optimistic view of the future
had higher discount factors than pessimistic ones, but these fmdings were not statistically
significant. Expectations and uncertainty have, instead, been found to effect saving directly.
Income uncertainty has a depressing effect on consumption in favour of saving (Browning &
Lusardi, 1996; Carroll, 1997) while optimism concerning future economic situations tends to
increase spending at the cost of saving (Katona, 1975). Webley and Nyhus (2001) found that
people with debt problems had more optimistic expectations about their income than others.
Expectations and uncertainty might work through time preference as Fisher proposed, but few
empirical investigations have been conducted to study this further.
Fisher's proposal that upbringing might have an important effect receives some support.
Mischel (1961) found in a study of Trinidadian children that father absence is closely
associated with children's preference for immediate rewards. He attributeed this fmding to the
children's trust that the promised delayed reward indeed will be forthcoming and argues that
the trust is absent or weak in households without fathers. Other evidence that suggests that
parental modelling is important is that children from the Trinidadian Negro subculture, in
which immediate self-reward was the prevailing gratification pattern, displayed a greater
preference for immediate rewards than children of Trinidadian Indians, who more often
exhibited self-denying delayed-gratification behaviour (Mischel, 1958). The same conclusions
were reached in a more controlled laboratory setting in which children were exposed to live
and symbolic models (through written behavioural descriptions). Children exposed to models
that showed preferences for delayed rewards, changed their delay-of-gratification behaviour
in favour of delay-reward, whilst the children who were exposed to a model showing
immediate-reward preferences altered their behaviour in favour of immediate-reward
(Bandura & Mischel, 1965). These results were later successfully replicated by Stumphauzer
(1972), using a sample of young prison inmates. Some evidence also suggests that delay of
gratification behaviour is stable over time. Mischel, Shoda & Rodriguez (1992) carried out
experiments on a group of four-year-olds' ability to delay gratification and compared the
results with the children's achievements more than ten years later. They found that children
9 For example, Carroll (1997) and Deaton (1992) criticise Lawrence (1991) for not taking into account that more
highly educated people have a faster labour income growth than the less educated.
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who could defer gratification longer than others when they were four years old, were later
described as being more successful in school and coping better with frustration and stress than
those who were not able to wait. Combining the findings from these studies, Mischel et al.
(1992) argue:
" ... an early family environment in which self-imposed delay is encouraged and
modeled also may nurture other types of behavior that facilitate the acquisition of
social and cognitive skills, study habits, or attitudes that may be associated with
obtaining higher scores on the sArlO and more positive ratings by parents." (page
158)
Similar conclusions were reached by Maital and Maital (1977). They studied children's ability
to delay gratification and concluded that socio-economic factors have an important influence
on delay-of-gratification behaviour. Their evidence suggests that time preference patterns are
firmly established for life by adolescence. They further argue that differences in time
preference among individuals play an important role in determining both the distribution of
income at a particular point in time and the transmission of economic inequality from one
generation to another I I • However, it is still not clear if, and to what extent, the ability to delay
gratification is relevant for saving behaviour. The studies mentioned above do not directly
imply that the time preference of the children varied, rather that it might be that they have
learned more techniques for self-control.
A more recent study by Bernheim, Garrett and Maki (2001) suggested that it is the teaching of
self-controlling techniques that is important (also for macro behaviour). They studied the
effect of consumer education policies. In particular, they studied household financial decision-
making courses in high school and their influence on subsequent asset accumulation in
adulthood. The courses covered topics such as budgeting, credit management, balancing
cheque books and compound interest. The study resembled a natural experiment. Some states
never adopted the educational programmes, while others adopted them at different times,
making it possible to compare subsequent saving across states and over time. Analysing those
young enough to have been exposed to the education, they found that asset accumulation was
higher in the states that had adopted the educational programme than in those that did not.
Moreover, Bernheim et al. (2001) found that people who, as children, had been encouraged to
save using a bank account, saved more than others in their adult life. Similarly, those who
characterised their parents as having saved more than average saved more than others. The
effect of the educational programme was largest for those who characterised their parents as
saving less than average, indicating a substitution effect between teaching by parents and
teaching in school. Finally, Bernheim et al. (2001) mentioned the positive effect of retirement
education on saving found in a different study, which indicates that economic education has
positive effects at all ages, not only in childhood.
10 The Scholastic Aptitude Test, which is a measure of cognitive academic competencies and school-related
achievements.
Il Similar arguments were put forward by Strotz (1956). He assumed that most of us are born with hyperbolic
discount functions, but that these are modified through parental and social teaching. He divided consumers into
three groups: a) "The thrifty": These people were trained so effectively that the original discount function has
been substituted with a log-linear one. Self-control is not necessary for them, as inconsistency problems do not
occur. b) "The Precommitters": These are people who have been taught to plan and behave consistently, but
without having their tastes altered. They will need to use precommitment in order to stick to their original plans.
c) "The spendthrifts": These are people who, because of a lack of training or insight, have never learned to
behave consistently and for whom the intertemporal tussle remains unsolved. Strotz argues that we find these
among the lower-income classes.
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Only a few studies have addressed the notion that degree of foresight (or time horizon) is
relevant for time preference. Rather, this relationship has been regarded as indisputable. By
definition, conswnption beyond the time horizon is given the value of zero and is not
discounted. The time horizon can then be elicited by identifying the discount rate used. For
example, Landsberger (1971) round discount rates between 17% and 45% and concludes that
people's horizon is between 2-6 years. Alternatively, the discount rate can be inferred from
the time horizon people use. For example, Lusardi (1998) used a self-reported planning
horizon as an index for time preference. Samwick (1998) compared his estimates of time
preference rates with the respondents' self-reported most important planning horizon with
respect to saving and spending decisions, in order to validate his time preference estimates.
He found that average values of time preference rates decline steadily with the planning
horizons that ranged from "the next few months" (average rate = 10.43%) to "ten years or
more" (average rate = 5.91%).
Finally, no studies have addressed the relationships between time preference and personality
factors and stage in life cycle. Fisher's propositions regarding these variables still lack
empirical validation. Instead, other authors have proposed and tested alternative determinants
of time preference. The next paragraph will report findings from some of these studies.
Empirical studies of time preference
Empirical studies of time preference suggest that Fisher (1930) asswned too much
consistency. He did put forward the notion that individuals differ in their time preference as
well as argue that individuals' time preference might change when one of the factors
determining time preference changed. For example, he suggested that the rate of time
preference could change as an individual proceeds through their life. Nevertheless, it seems
that he expected a person at a certain point in time to use the time preference consistently
across all intertemporal choice situations. The results from the empirical studies reported
below show that this is not the case. In fact, decision-specific factors seem to be the most
important determinants of time preference.
Findings from several studies suggest that individuals react very differently to receipts than to
payments and to speed-ups as opposed to delays (Benzion et aI, 1989; Loewenstein, 1988;
Nyhus, 1997; Shelley, 1993). These results have been attributed to shifts in reference points.
Loewenstein (1988) and Shelley (1993) argued that the effects of outcome sign (receipt vs.
payment) and question framing (delays vs. expeditions) should be combined when the results
are interpreted. They defmed delay of rewards and speed-ups of payments as "immediate
losses" because these situations involve a worsening of the present well-being. Likewise,
speed-ups of rewards and delays of payments were defined as "immediate gains", because
these situations involve an improvement of the present well-being. They argued that the
present state is used as a reference point. The sign of the change for the present situation
determines whether a situation is considered a gain or a loss. This theory has much in
common with prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979), which proposes that the value
function for losses is steeper than that for gains. It also holds that outcomes are evaluated in
terms of deviations from reference points instead of absolute values. However, the
intertemporal reference point model also suffers from the same weakness as the Prospect
Theory: our knowledge about which reference point a conswner uses and how it is formed or
chosen by the conswner is very limited. In situations outside the laboratory where the
researcher cannot manipulate the reference point we know little about whether a particular
outcome is perceived as a gain or a loss.
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Furthermore, on average, people also use higher discount rates for low amounts than for high
amounts (Abdul-Muhmin, Nyhus & Ronqvist, 1993; Benzion et al., 1989; Thaler, 1981;
Shelley, 1993), and on average, they use higher discount rates for decisions involving short
delay periods in contrast to long ones (Benzion et al., 1989: Shelley 1993; Thaler, 1981). In
addition, these fmdings suggest that characteristics of the alternatives involved in the
intertemporai decision are important for the discount rate used.
Abdul-Muhmin et al. (1993) and Nyhus (1997) found that people do not only change their
discount rate from one situation to another, they also change their place in the frequency
distribution of responses. Abdul-Muhmin et al. (1993) presented a sample of employees at the
Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration with four different questions
that had been used in previous investigations'{ to measure time preference. They found that
the inter-item-correlations were surprisingly low (the highest was .32). Between two of the
items, the correlation was negative (r = -.13). Nyhus (1997) investigated the consistency in
answers to twelve time preference questions using responses from a Dutch sample of 4000
individuals. She found that, in general, correlations between answers to different time
preference questions were low, but they were high for questions involving the same framing
(i.e. high between items involving delaying receipts of money and between items that
involved delaying payments). This suggests that it is not only the size ofthe of discount rates
used for different situations that changes but people also change their relative position in the
distribution of responses when the situations are framed differently. A person that appears to
be the most impatient in one situation might be the most patient in another.
Furthermore, empirical studies of time preference also show that people seem to hold
different discount rates for different goods. These discount rates are affected by factors that
are decision-specific. For example, Landsberger (1971) found in his study that the average
discount rate for canned fruit was 27% while, for fresh fruit, it was 9.5%13. Houston (1983)
found that household square footage and number of household members were important
determinants of the level of discount rate used in investment decisions of energy-saving
devices (though he could not test whether these variables captured effects of income level).
Nyhus (1997) found that decision-specific factors (the size, sign and direction of money flow)
explained much more of the variation in subjective discount rates than socio-economic
variables did.
Finally, one of the most important findings, the implications of which will be discussed at
length in the rest of this and the next section, is that an individual's rate of time preference
tends to change as a function of time (being high for the present and immediate future and
lower for periods in the future). The fmdings suggest that instead of discounting future events
with a constant discount rate (which can be illustrated by exponential curves), individuals use
higher discount rates for the near future than for the remote future (which can be illustrated by
hyperbolic curves). This discount function has been called Herrnstein's matching law
(Ainslie, 1992). The curves found in experimental designs differ in their specific forms, but
they share this common hyperbolic characteristic. Thaler (1981) described the phenomena
with the following example: Most people prefer two apples in one year and one day to one
12 Being investigations by Lea et al. (1987), Thaler (1981) and Webley (1992). The fourth question was
constructed by Abdul-Muhrnin et al. (1993).
13 These results suggest that the measure is problematic. It is reasonable to question results that show higher
impatience for canned fruits (that are available the whole year) than for fresh fruits (which are available only in
specific seasons).
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apple in one year. But, when asked to choose between one apple today and two apples
tomorrow, most people will want an apple today. This means that their discount rate for the
future apples is much lower than for the apple available in the present or near future. This
implies a change in tastes over time and time-inconsistent behaviour.
Figure 2.1a (source: Ainslie, 1992) illustrates an individual's preferences and behaviour under
stable time preferences. At To the individual prefers alternative B, which is larger but is
available at a later point in time than alternative A. The graphs illustrate the present value
assigned to the two alternatives after discounting it to the present value. As Tn approaches,
alternative B is still considered superior because the decision maker uses the same discount
rate when evaluating the alternatives. The preference curves are exponential and proportional
to each other. They never cross. The decision-maker waits for alternative B, which is
available at Tn+l. Figure 2.1b shows the preferences and behaviour under hyperbolic
discounting. At To. the individual prefers alternative B to A. However, as the time of
availability for A approaches, the decision-maker starts using a higher discount rate, which
causes a shift of preferences. When the two alternatives are discounted with a much higher
rate, the alternative closest in time has the highest present value. The change in discount rates
produces more curved preference curves and the curves cross. Alternative A is chosen, in
spite of the preference for alternative Bwhen choosing from a more remote temporal distance.
Figure 2.la
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Effects of exponential and hyperbolic discounting
Ainslie (1975) reviewed numerous studies of this kind of inconsistent behaviour, which he
denotes "impulsivity". Impulsive behaviour has been found among birds, animals, children
and adults. Preferences for two goods available at two different points in time are better
described by hyperbolic curves than by exponential ones. The effects of overvaluation of the
present were theoretically outlined by Strotz as far back as 1956. He showed that if the time
preference changes as a function of time, the result is dynamically inconsistent behaviour. A
conflict will occur between today's preferences and tomorrow's preferences. People do things
they would not have done if they had made the decision to act from a remote perspective; they
will not follow their own plans.
..~
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Two other explanations for the seemingly dynamic inconsistent behaviour have been put
forward. Loewenstein (1996) argued that the economic theory of intertemporal choice is mis-
specified because it does not include 'visceral' factors (or "passions"). He points to the
weakness of the theory of changing discount rates, which fails to explain why inconsistent
behaviour is only induced in some situations and not in others. He attributed "inconsistent
behaviour" to the role of visceral factors, which he described as important dimensions of
human reality such as hunger, thirst, mood, emotion, drive, desire, physical pain etc. The
traditional Economic Man has no passions in the sense of yearning or craving, and for this
reason every deviation from deliberative and stable preferences are left unexplained by the
economic models. They are interpreted as a change in tastes and irrational time-inconsistency.
Loewenstein's (1996) point was that if the role of visceral factors" is included in models of
choice over time, impulsive behaviour will not be viewed as an irrational shift in preferences.
The preferences remain stable, but other factors that interact with them in determining
behaviour must be taken into account.
Hoch and Loewenstein (1991) and Loewenstein (1996) claimed that visceral factors can
explain why some types of behaviour are associated with impulsive behaviour and others are
not. Hoch and Loewenstein (1991) argued that shifts in reference points are important for
impulsive behaviour. Reference points might change because of physical and temporal
proximity that makes not consuming painful. Or it might change through unfavourable social
comparisons with peers or others. They defmed consumer self-control as a struggle between
the two psychological forces "desire" and "will-power". In their model, self-controlling
strategies were divided into two classes: attempts to directly reduce desire and willpower
tactics that seek to overcome desire. Loewenstein (1996), on the other hand, argued that
impulsive behaviour is not so much caused by the immediate availability of the events, goods,
or outcomes, as by the immediacy and level of intensity of visceral factors. At high levels of
intensity, passions gain complete control, and perceptions of self-interest become unable to
influence behaviour. As the level of intensity increases, an individual will focus his attention
and effort on the present and on himself as opposed to other points in time and other persons.
Loewenstein (1996) further argued that passions are more systematic in their effects than
previously supposed, so that it is possible to model the interaction between interests and
passions.
14 Loewenstein (1996) mentioned three important differences between preferences and visceral factors:
l) Visceral factors change more rapidly than preferences because they are correlated with external
circumstances such as stimulation and deprivation. Consequently, it is more difficult to defend oneself
against them.
2) Visceral factors draw on different neuropsychological mechanisms than preferences. Neurological research
has found that the core of the brain (the limbic system) uses chemical regulation to control body functions,
and different configurations of these chemicals are experienced as hunger, thirst, sleepiness, elation,
depression, etc. The role of this part of the brain is also critical in the regulation of behaviour. Preferences,
on the other hand, consist of information stored in memory concerning the relative desirability of different
goods and activities.
3) We have a limited ability to imagine hunger, pain, anger, or other passions when we are not experiencing
them. Human memory is not suited to storing information about visceral sensations. For example, we can
recognise pain when we re-experience it, but we cannot recall pain at will by re-experiencing it in our
imagination. Often, we might regret and feel ashamed about behaviour induced by visceral factors, since we
cannot remember the intensity of the pain, hunger, or arousal in later periods. Similarly, it will be difficult
to consider the visceral sensations when planning future behaviour.
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Empirical studies support some of the aspects of Loewenstein's (1996) theory. Studies on
compulsive buying or addictive consumption" show that some people have debt problems
due to compulsive buying (Faber & O'Guinn, 1988). Some buying might also be a result of
tempting situations (immediacy of goods). Research in pre-purchase processes suggests that
there are substantial differences among consumers in the amount of pre-purchase deliberation
(e.g. Rogers & Shoemaker, 1971). According to the review of household pre-purchase
decision making by Olshavsky and Granbois (1979), 20 - 25% of durable goods and clothing
purchases appear to be "impulsive". Up to 50% of supermarket purchases and 33% of
transactions in variety stores and drugstores are "impulsive purchases" in the sense that
shoppers do not state intentions to buy these items in store entrance interviews. Research by
Grønhaug, Kleppe and Haukedal (1987) suggested that even purchases of'houæs are achieved
without much pre-purchase planning. Indirect support for the role of visceral factors are also
provided by the fact that marketers for decades have investigated how to stimulate impulsive
buying by manipulating the atmosphere, smell, structure, and display of products in shopping
centres and supermarkets.
An alternative perspective on inconsistent behaviour is to model an Economic Man with two
selves similar to Freud's theory of the Ego and the Id (Schelling, 1978; Thaler & Shefrin,
1981). This framework does not attribute observed time inconsistent behaviour to changing
tastes, but to a short-sighted self gaining more control of behaviour than a more long-sighted
self. Thaler and Shefrin (1981) modelled the internal conflicts between short-term and long-
term preferences (e.g. eating vs. losing weight) as a principal-agent problem. They argued that
there is a constant conflict between "the planner" (the self that maximises long-term utility)
and "the doer" (the myopic self that maximises only present utility). Ainslie (1992) advocated
a similar perspective under the label picoeconomics. He modelled the intrapersonal struggle
as a repeated prisoner's dilemma and argued that the two (or more selves) are continuously
bargaining.
Time preferences and behaviour
Fisher (1930) argued that time preference was the most important determinant of saving as it
captured interaction effects of socio-economic and personality factors. Only a few empirical
studies have focused on the effect of time preference on (saving) behaviour, and the results, so
far, are ambiguous. Antonides (1988) found differences in the discount factors between
people that saved and people that did not save (Antonides, 1988: 96). The average monthly
discount factor of the savers was 1.4% while it was 2.6% for the non-savers. Ritzema (1992)
found that time preference was significantly related to the likelihood of financial problems
and total debt. Webley and Nyhus (2001) found that people with debt problems had higher
time preferences (measured by delayed payment scenarios) than those with mild or
nonexistent debt problems. Donkers and van Soest (1999) found a negative relationship
between time preference and the probability of owning a house, while they found a positive
relationship with the probability of holding risky assets. Daniel (1994), on the other hand,
using the same data, did not find a significant relationship between time preference and five
different measures of saving behaviour.
The lack of conclusive results concerning the relationship between time preference and
behaviour might be that time preference is not the only factor that influences intertemporal
15 Scherhorn (1990) defmed addictive behaviour as behaviour that runs out of control because of an
overpowering but initially welcome desire, while compulsive behaviour stems from an unwilling pressure that
the person experiences as alien to himself.
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choices. For example, Julander (1975), studying the effect of book-keeping on saving,
reported that both an index intended to measure lack of impulse control and an index intended
to measure ability to delay gratification correlated with some of his saving measurements. A
person, governed by the matching law or visceral sensations, will have problems with rational
planning due to the tendency to form temporary preferences. Nevertheless, most people
manage their fmancial affairs satisfactorily to the extent that they avoid debt problems, they
usually get up in the morning, they do their duties at school and work, and they resist most
consumption temptations exposed in shopping centres and supermarkets. Not all situations
involving intra-personal conflicts of interest produce time inconsistent behaviour.
Mechanisms other than impatience and temptation must be playing an important role. In some
way, people must be able to follow their long-term plans by committing themselves to them.
The applied techniques have been called self-controlling strategies or impulse control
(Ainslie, 1992), or as Schelling (1978) put it: " ... tricks we play on ourselves to make us do
the things we ought to do or to keep us from the things we ought to foreswear" (page 290).
Concepts such as self-control and thrift have been linked to saving at least since Adam Smith
included a chapter on self-command in the Theory of Moral Sentiments'", The theories that
incorporate the role of self-control implicitly recognise that refraining from pleasure can be
difficult. Within this perspective, behaviour is not only a result of the experienced intensity of
the temptations, but also of the ability to execute self-control in situations where there is a
conflict between short-term and long-term goals. Self-control may be defmed as those efforts
on the part of the individual made to avoid or resist behaving inconsistently, or may be
defined as a deliberate choice to accept pain in order to gain something (Schelling, 1984).
When Strotz (1956), Elster (1979), and Ainslie (1992; 1993) discussed the problem of non-
exponential discounting and intertemporal inconsistency, they used the story from Homer's
Odysseus about Ulysses and the Sirens as an example of how inconsistent behaviour can be
avoided'", The story neatly demonstrates two main techniques for controlling impulses and
resisting temptations: 1) prior commitment and 2) avoiding exposure. Ulysses precommitted
himself by allowing himself to be tied to the mast so that any desired change in the ship's
direction could not be executed by him. He controlled his crew by preventing their exposure
to the harmful Siren song. In Loewenstein's (1996) terms, Ulysses used techniques to
overcome impulses to act upon visceral sensations. By controlling himself, he acted in
accordance with his more stable preferences.
Strotz (1956) suggested that future actions might be controlled by precommitment and the
strategies of consistent planning. Using strategies of consistent planning means that an
individual should choose the best of the plans that the individual believes it is possible to
follow. Similar techniques have been proposed by Ainslie (1992; 1993) who argues that the
process underlying impulse control can be modelled as a repetitive, intertemporal prisoner's
dilemma. He argues that one choice will set precedents for later ones. Since a person wants to
act rationally in her future choices, she might act rationally in the present choice too, since she
believes that it will serve as an example of future behaviour. "If she makes an impulsive
16 See Loewenstein, 1992; Wårneryd, 1989; 1999.
17 Ulysses, preparing for a sea voyage, was warned that he would be tempted by the beautiful and irresistible
song of the Sirens, which would lure him to steer his ship onto rocks near where the sirens sang. In other words,
he was warned about the possibility that he would act dynamically inconsistent. Still, wishing to sail his ship past
the Sirens and fmishing his voyage, Ulysses prepared himself: he had his men tie him to the ship's mast before
he came within earshot of the Sirens so that he could not yield to the temptation. He plugged the ears of his crew
so that they would not hear the song and be tempted to steer the ship towards the Sirens and the rocks. This way,
Ulysses managed to both enjoy the Sirens' song and to finish his journey.
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choice, she will have little reason to believe she will not go on doing so, and if she controls
her impulse, she has evidence that she may go on doing that" (Ainslie, 1992; page 336).
According to Ainslie's framework, self-control is most likely to be observed for choices that
will be repeated (that are one in a series of similar choices). Elster (1979) proposed many
ways of precommitting oneself by invoking social mechanisms. By making (side-) bets with
others, people make the exaggerate the negative aspects of failing to achieve their long-term
goals. Another self-controlling strategy is to punish oneself when one behaves myopically.
Thaler and Shefrin (1981) compared intra-personal conflicts with the conflicts described in
principal-agent theories. Following the suggestions about how principals might control
agents, they suggest that one's future actions can be controlled by altering incentives
(monitoring available resources) or altering rules (by establishing self-imposed rules of
thumb, habits, and routine). In this way, it will be in the short-sighted self's interest to behave
in accordance with the long-sighted self's preferences.
Both Katona (1975) and Bernheim (1995) reported that people say they save less than planned
or that they would like to save more, which give some indication of self-control problems
with respect to saving and spending. Some empirical evidence suggests that self-controlling
strategies can be found in economic management. Examples of such strategies are fixed
saving arrangements, deliberate overpayment of income tax, participation in Christmas
Clubs", and even instalment buying, since this produces a stream of obligations to pay
(Caplovitz, 1963). Other research suggests that people use mental budgets, so that a moment
of weakness that leads to an impulsive purchase is compensated by decreased expenditure on
other things (Heath & SolI, 1996). Self-controlling techniques and methods used to
accommodate deviations in original plans might be more important for saving than time
preference. The extent and role of self-controlling strategies in economic affairs have yet not
been subject to much empirical testing. For example, methods for monitoring one's own time
preferences by avoiding exposure have received very little attention from researchers. Such
techniques could be not going to shopping malls or avoiding mail and telephone marketing.
Webley and Nyhus (2001) found that people experiencing debt problems used the technique
of not going shopping more often than others. Other techniques could involve choice of
friends and neighbourhood, as exposure to other peoples' possessions can give rise to desires
for the same lifestyle and products (Duesenberry, 1949; Schor, 1998). The delay of
gratification experiments carried out on children support the idea that avoiding exposure
enhances ability to delay gratification. The children participating in the experiments tried to
wait for the delayed, preferred rewards by avoiding thinking about the immediate available
awards. They distracted themselves by singing, playing games, and even by sleeping.
Distraction from the available rewards was found to be an important factor in waiting
behaviour (Mischel & Ebbesen, 1970).
2.2.1.3 Summary
The framework reviewed above clearly shows that saving has been long associated with
conflicts of interest. It does not matter whether the conflict is caused by a higher rate of time
preference for immediate events or caused by a dominance of temporary visceral sensations.
Saving is about deferring pleasure from present to the future. Due to budget constraints, most
18 Christmas clubs are organisations that help saving for the extra expenditures many have before Christmas (e.g.
presents). Money is paid (sometimes regularly) by members into an account, no interest is earned on the
accumulated assets and the account cannot be drawn on until a specified date (e.g. December I"), Since saving in
a regular interest-bearing savings account is a better alternative, it must be the labelling of the account according
to what the money is meant to be used for as well as the inability to withdraw the money before the set date that
are the attractive characteristics.
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of us are forced to set priorities about consumption over time, thereby deciding the timing of
pleasure. The empirical findings suggest that the intensity and frequency of such conflicts
might vary. Individuals differ in their valuation of present pleasure and the decision situation
itself might influence this. Moreover, there are individual differences in how people handle
the intertemporal conflicts, as some individuals are better in exercising self-control than
others.
Empirical findings suggest that time preference varies systematically across different decision
situations. Time preference is not a personality trait but varies over time and situations; it can
be manipulated. The framing of the decision situation has a significant effect on the rate of
time preference applied. Time preference might be a more complex concept than has been
previously assumed because it has multiple underlying dimensions. The results are unclear
with respect to individual differences. Firstly, people change their rank in the frequency
distribution of time preference rates from one situation to another (Nyhus, 1997). Secondly,
apart from the decision characteristics, we know little about the factors that influence time
preference. The socio-economic factors used hitherto have explained only a few percent of the
variance in rates of time preference (e.g. Daniel, 1994; Donkers & van Soest, 1999; Nyhus,
1997). It is still a challenge to find a good way of measuring time preference due to its
dependence on the characteristics of the questions used. The limited understanding of the
formation of time preference and its effect on behaviour makes it an important area for future
empirical investigations.
Furthermore, we know little about how self-control and time preferences interact. It is also
unclear how their effect on behaviour can be modelled. Self-controlling techniques that
involve precommitment might moderate the relationship between time preference and
behaviour. The stronger the self-control, the weaker the relationship between time preference
and behaviour. Another possible model could be to regard self-control as a determinant of
time preference, as proposed by Fisher (1930). Since time preference can be manipulated, it
might be that people control themselves by avoiding situations that produce high time
preference. Avoiding exposure to tempting situations might prevent high time preference.
The degree to which people tend to behave in the same manner across the majority of their
saving and consumption decisions is still an unexplored field of research. Although it is likely
that saving decisions involve some conflict of interest, we do not know how this affects
overall saving. More effort should be directed towards investigating if and how the outcome
of one consumption- or saving-decision influences the next. Rather than the notion that some
individuals are continuously self-controlled or continuously impulsive, it might be true that
giving in to a temptation in one situation makes the individual adjust other expenditures so
that the total consumption budget is kept constant (as the findings by Heath & SolI, 1996,
indicate). Although the ideas from Fisher's or Loewenstein's theory represent plausible
explanations for the psychological processes underlying saving and consumption decisions, it
is not clear what the effect on the amount of saving will be over a period of, for example, a
year.
Several authors have pointed to the role of upbringing and economic well-being when
discussing the formation of time preference. Both Fisher (1930) and Strotz (1956) expected
the time preference and behaviour of the poor to differ from that of the rich. On average, they
expected the poor to give into temptations and fail to delay gratification. Maital and Maital
(1977) suggested that the children of the poor will copy this behaviour. Poor people are likely
to be tempted more often than the rich due to more unfulfilled needs and more frequent
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exposure to people that are richer. At the same time, they have not learned how to deal with
temptations. These issues should be studied further as they have important policy
implications. So far, only a few studies have addressed the formation and persistence of
delayed gratification behaviour, which is surprising since many authors cite "childhood" as
important for saving behaviour.
This section has shown that economic theory is rich with psychological thinking and ideas. It
uses psychological mechanisms as underlying arguments. However, the empirical validity of
the assumptions is still weak. As the "old" psychological assumptions have been proven
unrealistic, new psychological assumptions are used as the basis for new and more
psychologically-enriched economic theories. These new psychological assumptions also lack
empirical validation and much research effort is needed in order to establish whether the new
theories are any better than the old ones.
2.3.2 The income approach
The dominant independent variable in most economic analysis of saving behaviour is income.
Income determines a household's ability to save. The positive relationship found between the
two entities in most studies is not surprising. Several theories in which income is the most
important determinant of saving and consumption have therefore been proposed. There have
been many debates about whether it is past, present, future, or relative income that has an
effect; or, more correctly, which psychological mechanism best describes the typical saving-
or consumption decisio.~senberry (1949) proposed that social comparison and 'keeping
up appearances' were important considerations, which implies a focus on past income and
income level relative to the income of the groups used for comparison. Keynes (1936) argued
that psychological traits and saving motives would change very slowly in a population and
argued that current income is the important income measure. Modigliani and Brumberg
(1954) argued that people are forward looking and try to distribute current assets and
remaining lifetime income evenly over the remaining lifetime. In the following section, these
most significant income theories and their psychological foundations are discussed.
2.3.2.i.The absolute income hypothesis
Just as Fisher (1930) did in the "Theory of interest", Keynes (1936) extensively discussed his
ideas about psychological factors' impact on saving in his "General theory". He referred to
both reasons for saving and to personality traits he considered important for economic
behaviour. Keynes defined propensity to consume as the functional relationship between a
given level of income in terms of wage-units and the expenditure on consumption out of that
level of income. Two chapters in the "General theory" concerned the objective and subjective
factors Keynes thought would influence the propensity to consume on the individual or
household level. He listed six objective factors (but without specifying the direction of the
relationship between the factors and the propensity to consume):
l) income. Changes in the wage units could change propensity to consume.
2) A change in the difference between income and net income. This simply concerns the
tax rate, as it is net income that determines how much someone can spend. Keynes
noted that he did not regard this factor to be practically important as he expected it to
be relatively stable over time.
3) Windfall changes in capital values.
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4) The rate of time discounting", Keynes criticised his predecessors for believing that an
increase in the rate of interest would lower consumption. Keynes argued that the effect
of such changes would be ambiguous since a rise in the interest rate could both
strengthen and weaken the motives for saving. He also argued that saving and
spending would be insensitive to changes in the interest rate. Increases or decreases in
the interest rate were more likely to have long-term effect on the subjective factors.
5) Changes in fiscal policy.
6) Changes in expectations of the relationship between the present and future level of
income. Keynes regarded this factor to be important on the individual level, while he
expected it would cancel out on the aggregate level.
Of these six objective factors, Keynes argued that changes in income and windfall gain or
losses to be the most important determinant of the propensity to consume. He argued that the
function of the propensity to consume would be stable, particularly for short periods, so that
at the aggregate level, consumption could be predicted by aggregate income. He used a much-
cited argument to support it:
The fundamental psychological law, upon which we are entitled to depend with great
confidence both a priori from our knowledge of human nature and from the detailed
facts of experience, is that men are disposed, as a rule and on the average, to increase
their consumption as their income increases, but not as much as the increase in their
income. That is to say, if C; is the amount of consumption and Yw is income (both
measured in wage-units) .:lCw has the same sign as .:lYw but is smaller in amount, i.e.
dCw/dY w is positive and less than unity. (page 96)
The subjective factors that would influence a community's propensity to consume he
described as the "psychological propensities and habits of the individuals composing it and
the principles on which the income is divided between them (which may suffer modification
as output is increased)" (page 91). These factors primarily concern individual differences in
reasons for saving and consumption. Moreover, he indirectly proposed a hierarchy of motives,
arguing that primary needs of a man and his family must be satisfied before motives for
accumulation will be strong. A consequence is that the propensity to consume will decrease
with the level of income. He defmed eight different motives for refraining from consumption
(although he noted that he expected that there would be more) that would influence the
marginal propensity to save20:
l) Precaution, which implies building up a reserve against unforeseen contingencies;
2) Foresight, which includes providing for anticipated future divergence between the
income and the needs of the individual or family (e.g. retirement, education of
children or other expected decreases in income or increases in expenditures);
19 Keynes (1936) argued that this rate did not equal the rate of interest as it also includes subjective perceptions
of risk (for example, survival considerations and confiscatory taxation). However, he used the rate of interest as
an approximation.
20 Browning and Lusardi (1996) renamed some of these saving motives as 1) the precautionary motive, 2) the
life-cycle motive, 3) the intertemporai substitution motive and 7) the bequest motive. They also note that since
1936, only one motive has been added to the list of possible saving motives: the downpayment motive, which
concerns accumulation of deposits to buy houses, cars and other durables.
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3) Calculation, which refers to the wish to earn interest and appreciation, because he or
she prefers a larger real consumption at a later date than smaller immediate
consumption;
4) Improvement, which means to enjoy a gradually improving standard of living over
time;
5) Independence, which refers to the need to feel independent and to have the power to
do things;
6) Enterprise, which means to have freedom to invest money if and when it is
favourable;
7) Pride, which concerns leaving money to heirs; and
8) Avarice, which concerns satisfying pure miserliness because of dislike of acts of
expenditure as such. (p. 108).
Keynes also defmed motives for consumption that would have the opposite effect on the
propensity to consume. He labelled these motives enjoyment, short-sightedness, generosity,
miscalculation, ostentation, and extravagance. The strength of the motives was expected to
vary according to the type of organisation of the economic society, according to habits,
present hopes and past experiences, according to the scale and techniques of capital
equipment, and according to the prevailing distribution of wealth and the established
standards of life. In addition, using consumption habits as explanation, Keynes proposed that
people would react quicker to an increase in income than to a decrease. He proposed that race,
education, convention, religion and current morals determined the habits.
Keynes argued that the distribution and effect of subjective factors would change very slowly
over time in a population along with most of the objective factors. On the aggregate level,
they would have little impact on the propensity to consume. He concluded:
"Thus, after all, the actual rates of aggregate saving and spending do not depend on
Precaution, Foresight, Calculation, Improvement, Independence, Enterprise, Pride or
Avarice. Virtue and vice play no part. It all depends on how far the rate of interest is
favourable to investment, after taking account of the marginal efficiency of capital."
(pages 111-112)
For this reason, Keynes did not further elaborate on the psychological processes he thought
were underlying saving behaviour. Just as Fisher (1930) had argued that the inclusion of
psychological factors was unnecessary in aggregate models of saving, Keynes (1936) argued
that the subjective factors and most of the objective factors would change very slowly and that
the propensity to consume could be regarded as a constant. Relying on this argument, Keynes
proposed the simplest model of saving: "the absolute income hypotheses". He claimed that
the current absolute income was the only variable necessary to include in models of
household saving. Formally, the model is expressed as:
s= (I-b) * I
where S represents annual saving, b represents all the subjective factors and the propensity to
consume, and I represents the only objective factor assumed to be important: current annual
income. The predictions based on this theory for a person with a marginal propensity to save
ofO.l are: if the income goes up with $1000, saving will increase with $100 and consumption
with $900, while if income goes down by $1000, saving will decrease with $100 and
consumption with $900.
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2.3.2.2 Empirical findings
Keynes' absolute income hypotheses received much criticism from macro and micro
economists, psychologists, and sociologists. Although it would be desirable that peoples'
saving could be predicted from income changes solely, it does not require sophisticated
studies of saving behaviour to conclude that such a theory is far from realistic21• In most
countries, time series data show that the aggregate propensity to save increase over time with
income, not only at the individual level as Keynes (1936) had assumed. For example, Brown
(1952) using Canadian panel data found that the absolute income hypothesis is the model with
the worst performance when testing a set of alternative models. In addition, cross-sectional
studies show that the saving ratio is higher with higher incomes. Schumpeter (1954) described
the psychological law as follows: "Keynes's well-known psychological law about the
propensity to consume .. .is a statement of statistically observable fact which Keynes raised to
the rank of an assumption. Nothing is gained, except a spurious dignity, by calling it a
psychological law" (pages 1059-1060). In the same spirit, Modigliani and Brumberg (1954)
referring to the psychological law wrote that " ... the consumption function has undoubtedly
yielded some of the highest correlations as well as some of the most embarrassing forecasts in
the history of economics" (page 388).
As these citations show, the main criticism of Keynes' theory concerned the assumption that
the subjective and most of the objective factors are not important at the aggregate level.
Katona (1975) was the first to show that consumer expectation or sentiment does not 'average
out' in a population and he showed that consumer sentiment is not stable over time. As people
receive the same economic news and the same economic stimuli, people tend to share
expectations about the future. The majority might be either optimistic or pessimistic and these
sentiments are liable to rapid change.
Thus, Katona (1975), along with the other authors, criticised the absolute income hypotheses
of Keynes (1936) for being too simplistic with respect to predicting saving. The theory would
not apply in affluent societies in which households earned more than what was needed for
satisfying bare necessities. He argued that two aspects needed to be added to the theory; the
effect of willingness to save and separate analyses of different types of saving. Keynes' theory
states that saving would decrease in times of recession due to decrease in income and the
ability to save. In Katona's framework, people will feel an increased need for saving when
they are expecting a recession. The willingness to save may work in the opposite direction
from the ability to save. According to Katona (1975), the net effect of the ability and the
willingness to save will be different for different types of saving, as illustrated in Table 2.1.
Katona (1975) noted that the scheme displayed in Table 2.1 does not answer whether we save
more during a period of upswing or downswing. For example, the effect of income changes
might neutralise the effect of the other factors. He also notes that in addition to the factors
mentioned in the table, inflation and interest rates might affect saving. Nevertheless, when we
know the circumstances prevailing at a given time, it is possible to derive definite answers
from the scheme.
21 It should be noted that recent studies show that conswnption tracks current income rather closely (Deaton;
1992; Carroll & Summers, 1991). This fmding has not been attributed to subjective factors being stable or
'averaging out', but they have been explained by referring to subjective factors such as precautionary motives,
demographics, impatience and uncertainty.
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Table 2.1
Assumptions about changes in personal saving in good and bad times
Factor During a recession During an upswing
1. Instahnent buying Net saving grows because it is not Net saving declines because it is
reduced by extensive credit reduced by extensive credit
incurrence incurrence
2. Unusual cash expenditures Net saving grows because it is not Net saving declines because it is
reduced by extensive withdrawals reduced by extensive withdrawals
from bank accounts from bank accounts
3. Frequency and size of income Net saving declines because income Net saving grows because income
increases increases less frequently and less increases frequently and
substantially substantially
4. Strength of saving motives Net saving grows because people Net saving declines because people
are strongly motivated to save are less strongly motivated to save
(Source: G. Katona, 1975: page 240)
Keynes' psychological thinking has not been subject to the same criticism as his assumptions
of (i) stability and (ii) all effects averaging out on the aggregate level. His list of saving
motives has been much cited and subjected to empirical testing. For example, the surveys
conducted by the Survey Research Center at the University of Michigan (Katona, 1975) have
confrrmed the validity of some of the motives mentioned by Keynes, while other motives
were found to be less important. In particular, people stress the precautionary saving motive,
saving for retirement, and saving for providing for children's needs when they are asked about
their saving motives. The studies also reveal that few consumers mentioned saving for the
purpose of earning additional income or to bequeath money to their heirs.
In two different Swedish studies on saving behaviour (Lindqvist, 1980; Lindqvist, Julander &
Fjæstad, 1978), the buffer motive was mentioned most frequently (by 29% and 46%
respectively), 15% and 28% of the two samples respectively saved in order to buy goods. In
the first study, 19% of the sample said that both these motives were important (this option
was not possible in the second study, which explains much of the difference in percentages).
Only 3% in each sample said that bequest was the most important motive for saving.
Respondents were not asked whether earning interest or retirement saving were important
motives in these studies.
Lindqvist (1981) suggested a hierarchy of four saving motives, which he called: cash
management (meeting short-run financial needs), buffer saving (for unforeseen
contingencies), goal saving (for durables, house, holidays etc.), and wealth management
saving. The hierarchy is a mixture of saving motives and portfolio management motives.
Wahlund and Wårneryd (1987) used this hierarchy to investigate the effect of a Swedish tax-
reform and found some support for the idea that people with different saving motives reacted
differently to economic stimuli. Those with a cash-management motive reacted differently
than those with other motives. Knowing more about people's saving motives might be useful
in segmenting the population so that different models can be applied appropriately.
Inmodern models of saving, many of the motives on Keynes' list of reasons for saving have
been incorporated (Browning & Lusardi, 1996). The precautionary motive is regarded by
some researchers as one of the most important for saving (e.g. Carroll, 1997) and several
studies support this assertion. The role of the bequest motive is still much debated. The reason
for the assumption by economists that there is a bequest motive is that people tend to hold
wealth when they die (e.g. Bernheim, 1986). The bequest motive is either assumed to be
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altruistic or strategic (e.g. an elderly person might hold wealth so that their family will visit
and help them). Other explanations of wealth holding include uncertainty about the date of
death (so the bequest is accidental), the illiquidity of wealth (e.g. a house), decreased
consumption possibilities due to the deterioration of health, as well as to sticking to old saving
and consumption habits. It is difficult to differentiate between these alternative assumptions,
and so far, no one has presented conclusive evidence for any assumption. It might be the case
that they are all partly true, as different people are likely to think differently about these
matters.
Keynes' idea that people prefer improvement over time has received some empirical support.
Loewenstein and Sicherman (1991) presented different wage profiles to eighty museum
visitors in Chicago. The majority of respondents preferred the alternative that implied
increasing wages in spite of a lower net value than the other alternatives. The workers could
have chosen an alternative with a decreasing wage profile, which had a higher net value than
the one with increasing profile, and saved so that their consumption profile would still be
rising. Since they still preferred the wage profile also to be increasing, this indicates that
people find saving difficult. Loewenstein and Prelec (1991) presented respondents with
alternative sequences for restaurant visits. In this study, respondents showed a preference for
the sequence that involved an improvement in quality of the restaurant over time. The same
results were found in a similar study with sequences of visits to "an old irritating aunt" and "a
former, nice work associate". The results show that people have a clear preference for
improvement over time, and factors like savouring over future positive events and dread about
future negative events seem to play an important part in choices among sequences of events.
People seem to consider the utility derived from savouring and the disutility caused by dread
when evaluating alternatives. Moreover, these findings suggest that delay of gratification
behaviour depends on whether the decision-maker perceives her choice as a part of a
sequence or as a single event. The improvement motive should be studied further as it is
inconsistent with the notions of people consistently preferring immediate consumption.
The other psychological ideas of Keynes have not yet been tested. Like Fisher, Keynes
proposed that habits would be important for saving behaviour. Apart from some studies that
show that past consumption can be used as a predictor of present consumption, this
relationship has not been explored. The effect of generosity on saving is also still lacks
empirical exploration. Keynes' notions that the effects of hopes, extravagance, ostentation,
distribution of wealth and established standards of life will influence the propensity to
consume have not been tested explicitly, but they might be related to the theories about social
comparison processes, which is the subject of the next section.
2.3.2.3 Summary
Keynes' theory of saving and consumption was based on a comprehensive psychological
discussion about people's motives for saving and consumption, the role of expectations and
effects of habits. But, just as Fisher (1930) used the assumption of people harmonising their
rate of time preference with the market interest rate as a reason for discarding the
psychological ideas from further analyses, Keynes (1936) formulated a psychological law. He
assumed that all psychological factors would be relatively stable over time and that any
effects of them would be neutralised at the aggregate level. Consequently, psychological
thinking disappeared from discussions and economists relied even more on mathematical
theorising than before. The emphasis Fisher and Keynes put on the psychological foundations
of their theories was not reflected in the work of their successors. Nevertheless, recent
.~.
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empirical research shows that Keynes' ideas about individuals' motives for saving are
supported; they seem to have a role to play at the macro level. Interestingly, as pointed out by
Browning and Lusardi (1996), most of the motives from Keynes' list have been incorporated
in the life cycle-models of saving. We will turn to these models later. First, we will consider a
competing model that incorporates social comparison considerations.
2.3.2.4 The relative income hypothesis
The first attempt to define an alternative consumption function to that of Keynes came in the
formulation of a model that included notions of habit formation and social comparison (Brady
& Friedman, 1947; Duesenberry, 1949; Modigliani, 1949). It implied that past income and
relative income were better predictors of saving. In this section, Duesenberry's theory of how
and why social comparison and habits would influence economic behaviour is described. His
theory is the most elaborate with respect to the discussion of its psychological foundation.
Duesenberry (1949) challenged the Keynesian consumption function and criticised the
assumptions of independent preferences. He also criticised the notion that consumption
relations were reversible in time. For him, it would be more correct to focus on relative
income (interdependent preferences) and past income (habit formation). Duesenberry (1949)
thereby separated the propensity to save from the absolute level of income, relating it more
directly to social factors such as the relative position of the consumer in the income
distribution of the group he or she used for comparison. He argued that consumption
expenditures are strongly influenced by comparisons with other persons' consumption ("the
demonstration effect") and that the utility index is a function of relative, rather than absolute,
consumption expenditure.
Duesenberry built on theories similar to those put forward by Veblen (1899/1967), in which
the symbolic meaning of consumption are highlighted. Veblen argued that consumption
expenditure among the rich was important to communicate social status. Low-income
households would imitate the consumption of people in the high-income classes, so that
consumption patterns would spread through society from the rich to the poor. Duesenberry's
theory is similar with respect to stressing the role of social comparison. His theory, in
contrast, is built on the belief that people are comparing themselves to people they meet on a
regular basis - neighbours, rather than a rich upper class - when they determine their
consumption level. Consumption patterns would therefore spread through groups in society
that share commonalities (e.g. neighbours or work colleagues).
The framework rests on the belief that people do not want a certain good for the sake of it.
They want goods that serve different purposes. Within a society, there will often be a
collective perception of how needs can best be satisfied based both on objective differences
between products and on the prestige of the goods. This agreement about which product is the
best is most coherent within groups of people of the same age, social class, and from the same
geographical area. A person is more likely to compare himself with people he meets on a
regularly basis and whose products he is regularly exposed to. Exposure to these people's
consumption and possessions might influence his motivation and aspiration for similar
consumption and purchases. The more often a person is exposed to certain goods, the higher
the motivation for buying similar goods will be. The underlying mechanism that connects
consumption decisions is not rational planning but learning and habits.
Duesenberry's theory has some interesting implications, which highlight its differences from
the absolute income hypothesis of Keynes. First, a consumer who experiences changing
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incomes will, at first, consume the same as before because it takes time to establish new
consumption patterns22• When a high-income family suffers an income loss, they continue
living in the same neighbourhood and they retain the contact with others of the same
economic status. Moreover, people defend their status through consumption. Saving will be a
result of how high the person's income is relative to the people he wants to equal. Since status
is often a result of past consumption, consumption in the present period will be correlated
with past consumption. Duesenberry proposed that the past peak income of a consumer would
be a good predictor for present consumption. By substituting relative income with the highest
peak income, he elegantly avoided the problem of defining the group(s) used for the social
comparison.
The second implication of interdependent preferences is that the level of consumption might
change at times of stable income. For example, we might increase our consumption despite a
stable income if we are often exposed to better goods that the goods one possesses in the
present (or with ''the frequency with which he has to make an unfavourable comparison
between the quality of the goods he uses with those used by others" [Duesenberry, page 31]).
A habitual consumption pattern can therefore change without changes in prices or income.
Factors such as a switching to a different comparative reference, being exposed to marketing
campaigns or hearing news about high consumption among other groups might play a role in
this process.
The theory of Duesenberry has, to a certain extent, been downplayed in the economic
literature - if not, omitted altogether. However, some theoretical work on static models of the
effects of social status seeking has been conducted (e.g. Cole, Mailath & Postelwaite, 1992;
Gaertner, 1974; Pollak, 1976). The assumption of interdependent preferences has also been
studied theoretically in a dynamic framework (e.g. Futagami & Shibata, 1998). In this work,
the goal has been to mathematically derive the effects interdependent preferences have on
capital accumulation, wealth distribution and growth. These new models and their
implications have not yet been tested empirically. The next section reviews some empirical
studies from different fields that address the importance of social comparison on
consumption.
2.3.2.5 Empirical findings
Social scientists such as anthropologists (e.g. Douglas & Isherwood, 1996), marketers (e.g.
Coleman, 1983) and social psychologists (e.g. Baxter, 1988; Crosby, 1976) have long
recognised that consumer behaviour cannot be fully understood unless consideration is given
to the effects of interpersonal influence. Nevertheless, empirical research on how the
comparison process influences behaviour is scarce. This might be due to the methodological
challenges associated with this type of research. Studies have been carried out in order to
identify reference groups" and their functions (e.g. normative vs. comparative, positive vs.
negative) and the relationship between the individual and the reference group (whether the
individual is a member or aspires to become a member) (Baxter, 1988). Results from this
research clearly highlight the problem of identifying the relevant reference group for the
behaviour in question. First, different persons have different reference groups. It is not yet
22 As pointed out previously, Keynes did suggest that there would be a lag in the reaction to income changes
because of habits. However, he discarded this idea when formulating his model of saving and consumption.
23 The tenn "reference group" was coined by Hyman (1942). He noted that there is a disadvantage to this tenn:
the reference group does not need to be a group. It can also be a single person or even an abstract idea (like
oneself in the future l.
Chapter 2: Psychological foundations of economic saving theories 35
clear how the reference groups are selected, although some evidence suggests that the choice
depends on factors such as relevance, perceived importance, salience, and similarity (Baxter,
1988). Second, the same person might have different reference groups for different types of
consumption and behaviour. In addition, the degree of influence exercised by these groups
might vary (e.g. Bearden & Etzel, 1982). Third, if we use the household as the unit of
analyses, we might find that different household members have different reference groups.
Alternatively, they might share the reference group, but the influence of the group on the
different household members might vary. Hence, the problem of identifying the significant
reference group and its effect on the behaviour of the comparer is difficult to assess. Testing
the logic of the theory without running the risk of being tautological might therefore prove
difficult. As pointed out by Martin (1981), social comparison processes are often a post hoc
explanation for observed facts, and not something that has been tested explicitly. The
inferential statements about comparisons can easily become tautological. For example, "X is
satisfied because he's comparing himself to Y, who is worse off; this is the comparison being
made because if X were comparing himself to Z, he would be discontent, because Z is much
more prosperous than X" (Martin, 1981, page 75).
Below, the results from some studies on effects of reference groups are reported. They are
divided into three groups: 1) studies that focus on the relationship between social comparison
and satisfaction with income and standard of living, 2) studies in which social comparison is
used as an interpretation of observed behaviour (without explicitly considering the social
comparison process) and 3) studies that relate social comparison to behaviour.
The relationship between social comparison and satisfaction
In a large-scale social-psychological study of American soldiers during the Second World
War, several findings supported the notion of social comparison being important for
satisfaction. Stouffer, Suchman, Devinney, Star and Williams (1949) reported numerous
instances where those who had the same, or more, of a valued outcome were less satisfied
than those who were objectively in a worse or the same position. They attributed this to a
feeling they denoted "relative deprivation". Relative deprivation is defined as a feeling of
discontent based on the belief that one is getting less than one deserves. It is labelled
"relative" because a person feels deprived relative to some comparative referent (Martin,
1981). Runciman (1966) defined it as follows: A is relatively deprived of X when (i) he does
not have X, (ii) he sees some other person or persons, which may include himself at some
previous or expected time, as having X (whether or not this is or will be in fact the case), (iii)
he wants X, and (iv) he sees it as feasible that he should have X. He also notes that relative
deprivation might vary in magnitude, frequency and degree. Crosby (1976) adds to
Runciman's list of conditions that relative deprivation will only occur if A does not blame
himself for his failure to possess X.
Stouffer et al. (1949) studied the resentment about compulsory induction into the armed
forces and found that it was higher among those who were married compared to those who
were not. They explain this using the married men's standard of comparison. If the married
men compared themselves to their unmarried colleagues, they would feel they had sacrificed
more than them, since they had to leave their family behind in addition to making the
sacrifices equal for both married and unmarried drafted for induction. If they compared
themselves to other civilian married men, they would feel that they had been called on for
sacrifices which the civilians escaped altogether. Moreover, Stouffer et al. found that
preference for being stationed either in the North or the South could be related to relative
status considerations:
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"Relative to most Negro civilians whom he saw in Southern towns, the Negro soldier
had a position of comparative wealth and dignity. His income is high, at least by
general Southern standards ... Consider, on the other hand, the Northern Negro
stationed in the North. The differential in income and status between soldier and
civilian was not the same as that in the South. The industrial earning power of one's
Northern Negro civilian acquaintances was at an all-time high very often far
exceeding that of the Negro soldier" (Stouffer et al, 1949, page 563).
Runciman (1966) conducted a well-known survey of economic inequalities in twentieth-
century England to investigate the possible effects of the inequalities in 1962. His conception
was that people's attitudes, aspirations and grievances largely depend on the frame of
reference within which they are conceived. He found that reference group was an important
variable in explaining feelings of relative deprivation with respect to income. He also found
that non-manual workers with a high or mid-range level of income reported higher levels of
relative deprivation than did manual workers at the same income levels. Runciman maintains
that these differences in the level of relative deprivation are due to the use of different
reference groups. Manual workers tended to choose other manual workers (who, on average,
had a low income) as reference group, while the non-manual workers would more often
choose other non-manual workers (who, on average, had a higher income) as their reference
group.
Kapteyn (1977) developed an economic theory of preference formation which incorporates
interdependence and habit formation. The essence of his theory is that individuals evaluate
their own income level by comparing it to income levels in their social reference group,
taking factors such as family composition into account. Past income is also assumed to
influence this evaluation. Social reference groups are assumed to be individuals with identical
social characteristics (age, education and job type24), and it is assumed that the more alike a
social group is to the individual, the more weight is given to that group. Using this
framework, Kapteyn argues that individual utility functions are identical to the perceived
consumption distribution.
Parts of this theory formed the basis for a study by Kapteyn and van Herwaarden (1980) in
which they analysed individual welfare functions of income (allowing for interdependence).
The income functions were measured by asking the respondents to state which income they
would consider to be very good, good, sufficient, insufficient, bad, and very bad. The six
responses were translated into a scale called the Individual Welfare Function of income. They
found that models including interdependence gave different results and different
consequences for policy conclusions regarding the desirability of income redistribution. In the
presence of interdependence, equal income distribution is not optimal, while it would be
optimal in the absence of interdependence.
In a study designed to investigate the relationship between reference groups and subjective
definitions of poverty, Alessie, Kapteyn and Melenberg (1997) attempted to overcome the
problems associated with identifying the relevant social reference group by asking the
24 Kapteyn relied on Festinger's (1954) theory of social comparison, which states that, in the absence of
objective criteria, people will compare themselves to others who are similar. This contention was supported by
evidence from Martin (1981) who reported that occupation, income, age, education, and - for blue-collar and
clerical workers only - seniority and productivity are the most relevant dimensions when people choose
comparative referents.
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respondents directly. They used two measures of subjective evaluations of minimum income
levels. The first measure was a direct question about what the respondent considered to be the
"absolute minimal income with less they could not make ends meet" (also called the
subjective poverty line). The other measure was based on questions about what the
respondents would consider a very bad, bad, insufficient, sufficient, good and very good
income respectively. The income of the reference group was elicited by asking the
respondents about the average age, family composition, income, education, and job type of
the people they meet frequently, like friends, neighbours, acquaintances or colleagues. Three
indicators for the income of the reference group were used: 1) average income in reference
group as perceived by the respondent 2) average income among people in the same age- and
education-group as the respondent and 3) average income among people in the age- and
education-group reported as being average in the respondent's reference group. Indicators for
the average family composition of the reference group were measured using similar
indicators. They found that, controlling for family composition, both habit formation
(measured by previous perceptions of what it takes to make ends meet and what constitutes a
good or bad income) as well as the income level of the reference group did affect the
individual's perception of what constitutes a good or bad income and his notion about what it
takes to manage. The respondent's perception of what it takes to make ends meet shifted
proportionally with one's own income and the mean income in one's reference group.
A recent study indicateed that people prefer being 'better off than others' to being 'better off
in absolute values but worse off than others'. Solnick and Hemenway (1998) asked
respondents to choose between a world where they have more of a good than others and one
where everyone's endowment of the good is higher, but where the respondent has less then
others. Approximately 50 percent of their respondents preferred the scenarios in which they
had half the real purchasing power, as long as their relative income position was high. The
majority also preferred themselves and their children to be relatively more attractive and
intelligent, instead of absolutely better, but relatively worse in these respects than others.
Unfortunately, the study did not allow respondents to choose a world in which people were
equal in order to test whether people would prefer conformity to superiority.
Studies attributing observed behaviour to social comparison processes
In many studies, the social comparison process itself has not been studied. Instead, it has been
used as a way of explaining observed facts. For example, Brady and Friedman (1947) used
family budget data and showed that the proportion of income a household would save was
more related to the income of the family relative to mean income than to the absolute income
of the family. These findings inspired Modigliani (1949) and Duesenberry (1949) to modify
the consumption function. Duesenberry analysed cross-section data from the US and found
that blacks and whites in America at the same income level showed different saving patterns.
At each income level, a black would save more than a white. Duesenberry argued that the
reason for this was that, on the average, whites earned more than blacks. A white would
therefore be placed lower in the income distribution among whites than a black with the same
income would be in the income distribution among blacks. In other words, a white had a
lower relative income than a black with the same absolute income. The white would feel
worse off than the black, and the result would be that the white would use a larger portion of
his income for consumption in an effort to keep up with other whites. The black would not
need to spend the same amount of money in order to keep up with his reference group. The
less discrepancy between actual and desired consumption, the less pressure to consume the
individual will feel.
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Tobin (1951) explained the fmding that blacks save more than whites differently. He argued
"that Negroes had, on the whole, smaller financial resources other than income.
Consequently, Negroes were unable to dissave as frequently or as much as whites" (page
144). In his view, the paradox could be explained by adding assets to the consumption
function of Keynes (1936). Studies by Tobin (1951) and Galenson (1972) supported this
view: blacks do not save more; whites merely deplete their assets more. Galenson reported
that this finding was robust across several definitions of savings and income. Similarly,
Tucker (1991) reported that in the 1980s, almost one third of all black families had no net
worth, and in every income group, black families saved far less than other Americans. He
argued that in a nation of consumers, blacks were the best spenders. Attanasio (1998), on the
other hand, reported that the saving rates of households headed by a black are systematically
higher, for any interval of income, than those of households headed by a non-black. Hence,
the empirical basis of Dues enberry's theory is highly controversial.
Brown (1952) used Canadian panel data to study the effects of habit persistence and found
that consumption expenditure lags behind income changes. Comparing the performance of
different consumption models, he concluded that the full reaction of consumers to changes in
income emerges gradually, thus supporting Duesenberry's theory of defending status through
consumption. He did, however, find better fit for a model using past consumption as an
independent variable, rather than past income as Duesenberry (1949) suggested. He also
found that the effect of past income declined continuously over time, rather than
discontinuously as in Duesenberry's model.
Social comparison and behaviour
So far, the reviewed studies have shown that social comparisons have an effect on how people
evaluate their own situation and how they feel about it. There are also some empirical
observations that are difficult to explain without relying on an underlying process of social
comparison. Below, some studies that have focussed more specifically on behavioural effects
of social comparisons are reported.
Chao and Schor (1998) found strong evidence for conspicuous consumption in a study of
women's purchases of make-up. Women spent more money on make-up that would be
displayed in public (for example lipstick) than on make-up which is more common to use at
home in the bathroom (for example facial cleansers). Similarly, Bearden and Etzel (1982)
found that reference groups were particularly important for luxury goods and goods that
would be consumed in public. Reference groups were less likely to influence purchases on
necessities or goods that would be consumed in private. Both studies show that social
comparison mechanisms might influence both the type and brand of goods we buy.
Alessie and Kapteyn (1991) used a two-wave panel of consumer expenditures in the
Netherlands to study the effects of habit formation and interdependence on expenditures for
different product categories. They used social group as a proxy for the reference group and
defmed social group as people who share the following three characteristics: education of
head of household (5 levels), age (5 categories), type of job (5 categories). Using the 66
groups that were represented in their sample of 1579 households, they tested the performance
of a micro-model of consumption including habit formation and interdependent preference
with one that did not include these factors. They studied the effect on six expenditure
categories: 1) food, 2) housing, 3) clothes and footwear, 4) medical care, 5) education and
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entertainment and 6) transportation and "other". Expenditures on durable goods were
excluded from their analyses in order to avoid problems with disentangling investment
motives from other motives. Habit formation appeared to be most important for education and
entertainment, clothes and footwear and medical care, while it is unimportant for expenditures
on food. They also ranked the expenditure groups according to their conspicuousness: medical
care25, education and entertainment, clothes and footwear, transportation (and 'other'),
housing and food. They concluded from this that food, housing, and medical care can be
regarded as necessities. Further, they found that the model including habit formation and
interdependent preference was superior to models not including these factors. They therefore
concluded that collecting information on reference groups should have a high priority in the
future.
Kapteyn, van de Geer, van de Stadt and Wansbeek (1997) carried out a similar study and used
a linear expenditure system to explain interdependent preferences based on a consumer
expenditure survey. They assumed that the correlation between mean consumption level of a
social group and the total reference weight assigned to it is positive if the individual belongs
to a group with a consumption level above the population average. If the group's average
consumption is below the population average, the correlation between the two will be
negative. This means that if someone has a high consumption level he assigns, on average,
more weight to others who also have a high consumption level, while someone with a low
level of consumption assigns more weight to others with a low consumption. Hence, it was
assumed that there is strong interdependence between relatively similar groups. The sample of
2813 households was divided into 75 different social groups defined by education of head of
the household (3 categories), age of head of household (5 categories), and type of job (5
types). 56 of these groups were represented in the sample. Alessie et al (1997) defmed seven
expenditure categories: 1) food, 2) housing, 3) clothing, 4) medical care, 5) education and
entertainment, 6) transportation and 7) other expenditures. In addition, this study included a
ranking of conspicuousness of the expenditure categories, the order being: housing, medical
care, education and entertainment, clothing, transportation and food. They compared one
model (including their defmition of interdependence) with one that assumed independence.
They concluded that housing, education and entertainment, and clothing are the categories
most affected by interdependent preferences. The extent to which the aggregate consumption
of a good responds to changes in total expenditures depends not only on the good's marginal
budget share but also on its conspicuousness. Use of models not taking this into account, will
produce predictions of effects of increase in total expenditures on expenditures on
conspicuous products that are too low, while the predictions will be too high for products that
are not conspicuous.
In a recent study, using data from the CentER savings survey, Kapteyn (2000) found that the
incomes in one's reference group have an unambiguously negative effect on savings. In this
study, he exploited the subjective information in the data set: Respondents were asked about
the average total net income per year of the "households of their acquaintances", which
Kapteyn (2000) assumed represent the reference group of the respondents. He found that
reported reference group incomes tend to be lower than the respondents' own household
incomes. Not surprisingly, he also found a strong positive relationship between own
household income and reference group income as well as between own family size and
25 They attributed this fmding (that medical care is highly conspicuous) to an artefact caused by the fact that
wage-earners below a certain income level is compulsory insured in a health-fund with premium payments
proportional to income.
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reported family size of the respondents' reference group. A correlation between own age and
age in the reference group was also strong. Although the measures of saving used in this study
were rather rough, the result was convincing. Across several modelling strategies and model
specifications, own household income and reference group income were always significant
predictors of household saving.
Schor (1998) estimated a savings function including variables intended to capture the impact
of interpersonal comparisons on savings behaviour and compared it to a model that did not
contain such variables. One model contained socio-economic variables such as income, age,
sex, occupation and education level, while the other model also included a comparative
variable capturing the respondents' perception of how well they are off compared to their
reference group. Using a sample of middle- and upper-middle class people from the US, she
found the comparison variable to improve the performance of the model and that it had great
impact on the expected saving. Those who thought they had a worse financial situation
compared to their reference group, reported lower expected savings". Interestingly, she also
found a negative relationship between expected saving and daily hours spent on television
viewing.
Studies of relative deprivation show that the reactions to relative deprivation differ (see
Crosby, 1976, for a review). Some people are left frustrated depending on how much control
they perceive they have over their situation. Some people turn their anger outward, which
might result in unconstructive reactions such as violence or crime. Others might turn their
anger inward, resulting in depression. Yet others might try to resolve the situation with efforts
at self-improvement. Research in a related area called "equity theory27" shows that people
might change both their input and outcome from that input if they feel that the relationship
between the two is unfair compared to how they perceive the relationship between input and
output to be for others. People who are relatively deprived with respect to their fmancial
affairs do not necessarily do anything about it. They might try to increase their incomes in
various ways or dissave or borrow, but research shows that other variables might interfere
with this relationship. For example, the relationship between relative deprivation and self-
improving actions might be stronger during booms when the job market is good than it is
during recessions when there is high unemployment. The relationship might be stronger
among people working in the private sector, where possibilities for working overtime is
higher, than for people working in the public service where such possibilities are limited.
Two recent studies support the notion of increasing income to resolve feelings of relative
deprivation. Assuming that siblings constitute an important reference group, Neumark and
Postlewaite (1998) tested to what extent a woman might choose to work because her sisters-
in-law has raised their families' standard of living by entering the labour market, or because
her husband's earnings were lower than that of her brothers. They found that, in addition to
individual women's market opportunities, home productivity, other sources of income, and
demographics, woman's employment decisions were influenced by the employment decisions
of their sisters-in-law together with an unfavourable ratio between the earnings of own
26 Saving was defmed as the sum of expected additions to non-retirement savings plus expected additions to
retirement savings minus expected reductions in existing savings accounts plus expected reductions in existing
debt minus additions to debt.
27 Equity theory states that people decide if they are being rewarded equitably by comparing their inputs
(investments such as education and costs such as stress) and outcomes (such as pay) to the inputs and outcomes
of another person. If the ratios are equal, the reward should be considered equitable, whereas if they are unequal
a feeling of inequity will occur.
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husband and that of her brothers. Woittiez and Kapteyn (1998) found that a woman's previous
labour participation and the reference group means of females' working hours have strong
impact on female labour participation decisions. In particular, the effect of presence of
children was dramatically decreased when the preference formation variables were included.
Although Woittiez and Kapteyn do not indicate this themselves, their results might be
interpreted as a consequence of the desire to increase consumption. The results of these two
studies imply that income should be treated as endogenous when social comparison
mechanisms are included in consumption models. Increases in consumption caused by social
comparison might be financed both by dissaving and increasing income.
2.3.2.6 Summary
The theory of preference interdependence and social comparison is compelling. People
compare their own situation with that of others, feel more or less deprived depending on how
they perceive their relative position, and take actions (like not saving) to reduce any feelings
of relative deprivation. Yet, this theory shares the same problem as the prospect theory and
the reference point model discussed in section 2.3.1. The problem is that we do not know who
the "others" are to assess the reference level of consumption. Veblen proposed the rich, while
Duesenberry proposed the people one regularly meets, for example friends and neighbours,
would set the norm for consumption. Schor proposed the "upper middle class" or people ones
see on television. Kapteyn and his colleagues proposed those who have the same age and
education level or "households of acquaintances". The problem is that all might be partly
right. People might compare themselves to different groups for different types of
consumption. It might be the case that an individual compares his clothes consumption with
his colleagues at work, while his neighbours set the preferred standard for housing
consumption. If this is the case, it will be a difficult task to identify the relevant reference
group and the theory is difficult to test.
Some of the studies reviewed so far support the idea that satisfaction with one's own income
and standard of living depends on that of "others". People might feel more or less satisfied or
deprived depending on the circumstances of the people they compare themselves to. Some
studies indicate that 'keeping up appearances' is important for product and brand choices.
However, just as with the theory of impulsiveness and self-control, we do not know whether
such considerations have an effect on the overall level of saving and spending. Spending
considerable amounts on conspicuous consumption might be compensated by lowering
standards for inconspicuous products, so that "keeping-up"-considerations do not necessarily
mean that social comparisons affect saving. There are also behavioural alternatives to satisfy
needs. Instead of borrowing, people might work more in order to increase their income.
Similarly, none of the studies reviewed above addressed the question of what is compared.
These studies relied on the assumption that people compare their income or consumption to
that of others. It might be possible that people also compare their saving or investments.
Certain types of saving are conspicuous, such as investments in real-estate, consumer
durables, artwork and jewellery. Saving is not necessarily a residual of the consumption
decisions resulting from social comparison, but saving can be the first priority, which is both
culturally standardised and imposed (e.g. Tucker, 1991). The extent to which people talk
about their savings, insurance arrangements, and private pension arrangements might differ
between groups in a population and between countries. People do talk about, for example,
how much they have earned on the stock market and about their insurance arrangements. Such
information is also provided by the mass media. Marketing campaigns of fmancial institutions
seek to create the perception that saving is the right thing to do if you want to live up to a
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certain image (like "the responsible parent"). So far, the effects of social comparison with
respect to investment saving have not been addressed, with the exception of the studies by
Alessie and his colleagues, who found expenditures on real-estate to be highly conspicuous.
The economic studies on the effects of reference groups could benefit from incorporating
some of the research done in other fields. Typically, it is assumed that the groups identified as
social reference groups are positive reference groups which will defme a person's aspiration
level. The notion that people also compare themselves to groups they want to be different
from has not yet been incorporated in economic studies. For example, a person having
invested in high education might compare his salary to that of a person without education and
feel deprived unless his pay is considerably higher than that of the lower educated. A person
who is working might feel deprived if someone who is living on social welfare receives nearly
the same income as himself. Distinguishing oneself from such a negative reference group
might have just as strong impact on consumer behaviour as a positive reference group.
Similarly, it is assumed that the reference group has a normative function, which means that
the reference group will serve as a basis for defining aspiration levels. However, a reference
group might also have a comparative function (Kelley, 1952) which means that the reference
group primarily serves as a source of information. An unfavourable comparison of one's own
standard of living does not necessarily affect aspiration levels or cause relative deprivation.
The relationship between economic behaviour and satisfaction with one's standard of living
has been a focus of many studies. Results support the idea that social comparison is taking
place, and that it affects the satisfaction level of the comparer and certain types of economic
behaviour. The research also shows that these processes of comparison are complex and their
effect on behaviour is not straightforward. It might be mediated by situational and personal
circumstances. Much more research is needed in order to be able to understand the
comparison process and the way it affects economic behaviour beyond brand choices. Now
we will turn to the saving model that outperformed the model of Duesenberry and which is
the framework used in most modem economic studies of saving and consumption: the life
cycle model.
2.3.2.7 The life cycle hypothesis
Modigliani and Brumberg (1954) proposed the most path-breaking income theory of saving,
C the Life Cycle Hypothesis (LCH), which is the basis of most modem research on saving. It is
a theory written in the spirit of Irving Fisher and in which it is assumed that consumers
allocate their resources optimally to consumption over their life. Modigliani and Brumberg
criticised Keynes for his static framework and for disregarding the work by Fisher who
promoted a more dynamic model of resource allocation over time. They also criticised the
implication of Keynes' consumption function which held that income receivers below some
critical level would have negative saving. They criticised Duesenberry's theory for failing to
explain cyclical fluctuations in the saving ratio as well as how "relatively" poor people could
go on dissaving indefinitely. Modigliani (1975) pointed out that the average dissaving must
reflect the inclusion of the currently poor or the transiently poor who had managed to save in
the past and could save in the future. Modigliani and Brumberg's fundamental idea is that the
marginal propensity to consume with respect to life income will equal one for all households
independently of lifetime income (assuming no bequest motive). Saving in one period of life
will be matched with dissaving in another. Using their experiences about the typical life cycle
of income (raising until retirement) and tastes (smooth consumption), they developed their
much-applied framework.
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The psychological foundations of the model hold that people, in general, are forward-lOOking]
and prefer smooth consumption over time. They will make their consumption stream
independent of their income stream using the financial markets. The model is based on
considerations relating to the usual life cycle of income and consumption needs of
households. Moreover, it is based on the assumption that people rationally determined hOW]
much they can consume over the remainder of their lifetime so as to maximise utility.
Therefore, in any given year, the difference between the optimal level of consumption andJ '!Jr.); (
income will be the amount saved. The simplest version of the model (illustrated in Figure 2.2)
holds that agents will try to keep the marginal utility of expenditure constant over time, and,
consequently, the lifetime path of income and consumption are independent. Furthermore, in
the stripped-down version of the model" (denoted the certainty equivalent model, or CEQ, by
Browning & Lusardi, 1996), it is assumed that agents have constant income until retirement
and that they know the time of their death (the mortality rate is assumed to be zero up to the
assumed age, and then the rate equals one). The consequence is the hump-shaped profile of
wealth, rising until retirement and decreasing thereafter. Since everything is assumed known
with certainty, the lifetime consumption plan is made in the beginning of life, with theJ
consumer doing no more thereafter than following the predestined plan (Deaton, 1992).
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Figure 2.2
The stripped-down life-cycle model:
Income, consumption, saving and wealth as a function of age
Modigliani and Brumberg (1954) argued that the preferred path of consumption is likely to be]
relatively stable over the lifetime, when effects of family size are taken into account. They
also expected current income to exhibit short-run variation of an accidental type as well as
systematic variation over the life cycle, which will tend to be well below average in later
years (due to retirement). This means that the relationship between a family's saving and
income over short time periods would be determined by the extent to which current income
was above or below average lifetime earnings (as illustrated in figure 2.1). Households with a
current income above life average income are expected to save, while those with income
below average are expected to dissave.
28 See Chapter I in Deaton (1992) for the mathematical formulation of the stripped-down version of the LCH. '2
o
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The life cycle model could explain the same findings as the relative income hypotheses (for
example, fmdings from the budget study of Brady & Friedman, 1947) and the finding that
blacks saved more than whites in the same income group (Duesenberry, 1949), as well as
other puzzling findings as-yet unexplained. It also explained the high marginal propensity to
save in occupations with unstable income (e.g. farmers), without implying a high average
propensity to save. Although there were no data that could be used for explicit tests of the
model at the time it was proposed, it was more promising than previous models and was
quickly adapted as an appropriate framework for studies of household saving.
The simple LCH framework outlined above formed the basis for a long line of testable
implications of the savings ratio on the aggregate level. In particular, these implications relied
on the demographics of the population. For example, in a stationary economy, with zero
population growth and productivity growth, the saving ratio was bound to be zero. An
economy with income growth will have a positive savings ratio. Population growth leads to
positive saving if the ratio of younger to older and retired households increases.
As this model is based on some simplifying (and rather unrealistic) assumptions, introduction
of complicating factors has been necessary in order to reconcile the model with the observed
data. Firstly, a positive interest rate has been incorporated, which has the effect that capital
income is taken into account in addition to labour income (Deaton, 1992). Changes in the
interest rate will change lifetime income; agents will change their consumption level
accordingly. In addition, positive interest rates will tip consumption paths downward in the
early years and upwards in old age due to intertemporal adjustments over the life cycle.
Secondly, the LCH has been expanded so that rising income over the career path can be
accommodated. One consequence of this is that young people might want to borrow during
their early years instead of engaging in saving. With these adjustments in the model, the
average agent should borrow when young, save for retirement when middle-aged, and dissave
when retired. On the aggregate level, with rapid growth rates, additional growth will decrease
saving, as higher growth rates magnify early borrowing relative to later repayment (Deaton,
1992).
Thirdly, the LCH has been expanded to include uncertainty. This has been done by
substituting utility with expected utility. In such models, the agent is assumed to choose
current consumption and the allocation of net worth between alternative assets so that the
expected utility of consumption over life is maximised. The effect of uncertainty is that
people with an uncertain income stream will save more than those whose income is more
predictable. This can to, a degree, explain why farmers and self-employed people save more
than others. Combined with other factors (such as high time preference or asset-based welfare
programs) this can also explain the large differences in wealth holdings.
Since not all observed saving behaviour complies with the predictions of the moderated LCH
and the model cannot explain large individual differences or the behaviour of certain
segments of the population, the model has been enriched with possible psychological causes
for the observed behaviour. For example, many of the young do not borrow or spend as much
as the theory predicts. Ando et al. (1992) proposed that this fmding can be explained by
consumption smoothing. Young people might expect a rising expenditure profile due to
increases in the size of the household, and therefore save for the increased level of
expenditure. Ando et al. also suggested that young people do not have a clear idea about their
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preferences, but that these will evolve with age along with social identity. Consequently,
young people postpone their expenditures until they have settled down in their "social niche".
Inclusion of a precautionary motive is the principal innovation of the theory in the past decade
(Browning & Lusardi, 1996). One implication of this motive is that the path of consumption
is not necessarily independent of the path of income. If the future variability of income
increases, saving for the future will increase too. Likewise, an agent facing higher income
uncertainty will also-save more (Carroll & Samwick, 1997; Hubbard, Skinner & Zeldes,
1995). The-rnagnitude of the effect depends on the level of current assets and income relative
to expected future income. A problem with including the precautionary savings motive in the
LCH is that it fails to explain the low levels of wealth of many households.
Deaton (1992) and Carroll (1997) attributed the behaviour of the young to so-called "buffer-
stock"-behaviour, which implies that there is an upper-limit for precautionary saving. The
precautionary motive alone cannot explain that so many households have very little wealth,
and the inclusion of a competing factor gives better predictions. The assumptions underlying
buffer-stock models are that, in general, people are impatient (have a high rate of time
preference). At the same time, they fear the possibility of having no consumption
opportunities in the future. Carroll (1997) argued that people therefore have a (typically
small) wealth/income ratio target for their saving. If wealth is below the target, prudence."
dominates, as people are afraid of destitution in later periods. If wealth is above this level,
impatience dominates and the available resources will be consumed. Carroll (1997) suggests
that it is the possibility of poverty later in life that stops agents from borrowing when young.
The more uncertainty that is associated with the future income, the higher the buffer-stock
saving. The interaction between precautionary saving motives and impatience is that
consumption will track income in the early part of life, while (significant) saving will only be
observed in later years. Gourinchas and Parker (1999) suggested that the motives follow the
life cycle, so that people are typically buffer-stock savers until they reach a certain age
(around 40). After this age, they start saving for retirement, because most income-uncertainty
is resolved, and their behaviour is as expected by a certainty equivalent consumer.
The saving of the young could also partly be explained by the fact that many young engage in
goal saving in order to invest in their own accommodation. Investments in an apartment or
house require further investments in furniture, decorations and appliances. These investments
or purchases are often complementary so that a large sum of money is needed in order to be
able to acquire the "full package". If the young have a high time preference and expect a
rising income profile, it would be reasonable to borrow in order to fmance the investments.
The fact is, however, that the young are often liquidity-constrained. Credit institutions usually
give more weight to a loan-applicant's present income than his or her expected future income.
Many young might therefore have their loan applications rejected due to low income at the
beginning of their careers. Often mortgages have terms that are more favourable if they are
well below 100% of the value of the purchased object (e.g. house). Itmight also be difficult to
borrow money in order to invest in furniture and appliances. This might cause the young to
save until they qualify for better mortgage terms.
Moreover, the observed behaviour in the elderly does not comply with the LCH. The elderly
do not dis save as much as predicted by the model. Understanding the saving of the elderly
29 Kimball (1990) defined prudence as the propensity to prepare and forearm oneself in the face of uncertainty.
.~.
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becomes increasingly important because they constitute a growing part of the population
[
(Hurd, 1990). Many explanations have been proposed for slow dissaving by the retired. The
most frequently discussed explanation is the bequest motive. The bequest motive implies that
the utility of children (or others that receive the bequest) is taken into account in saving
decisions when maximising utility (Barro, 1974). The model implies altruism, since the
person who leaves the bequest seems to reduce their own utility without getting something
back. Bernheim, Shleifer and Summers (1985) criticised this view and suggest that a bequest
results from strategic considerations. Their model implies that the person approaching the end
of his or her life will hold wealth in bequeathable forms and use it strategically. to obtain
services and attention from beneficiaries.
Borsch-Supan and Stahl (1991) have observed that the old have a reduced ability to consume
due to deteriorations in health. They analysed the behaviour of people aged 75 and above and
concluded that they were consumption constrained. Technically, this implies a model with a
[
declining marginal utility of consumption as households age. Davis (1981) proposed that most
bequests are the result of uncertainty about the time of death, which means that most bequest
is accidental. He tested whether or not the slow dissaving of the elderly could be explained
without a bequest motive, and found that uncertainty about death could provide "the major
element in a complete explanation of the slow decumulation of wealth" (Davis, 1981, page
576). Annuity market imperfections also contributed to the explanation.
Finally, several analyses have revealed that there is an excess sensitivity of consumption to
income (consumption tracks income too closely) (e.g. Carroll & Summers, 1991). This has
been interpreted by many as evidence against the life cycle model, although Attanasio and
Browning (1993) and Attanasio, Banks, Meghir and Weber (1996) showed that the
consumption path is smoother when household characteristics are taken into account. They
explained the "bump" in the consumption life cycle profiles with "bumps" in family needs
due to child bearing. The consumption profile per household member is thus quite smooth.
Carroll (1997) provided the buffer-stock saving as an explanation for the excess sensitivity.
Since people hold a small buffer-stock and use the rest of their resources due to impatience,
consumption will track income. Uncertainty about future earnings makes people avoid
borrowing. Hence, self-imposed liquidity constraints may play apart, in addition to external
liquidity constraints.
The permanent income hypothesis
Friedman (1957) proposed a similar model to that of Modigliani and Brumberg (1954). The
model is called the Permanent Income Hypothesis (PIH) as the model relies on the
assumption that the rate of consumption is proportional to the return on total capital (termed
'permanent income'). Total capital is the sum of human wealth (present value of expected
labour income) and non-human wealth (market value of net assets) and permanent income is
the annuity of total capital. Friedman claimed that people have a notion of what their mean
permanent income will be over a given time period and that they aim to consume a fixed
proportion of the permanent income during that time. Their actual income and consumption
may well vary from the permanent income and saving will 'take up the slack'. The marginal
propensity to consume from increases in permanent income is assumed to be close to one,
while the marginal propensity to consume from an increase in transitory income is equal to
the interest earned by the increment plus a little more in the absence of a bequest motive.
Friedman also applied an infmite time horizon, in contrast to the life cycle model that assumes
that the length of life is known. This is one of the most important distinctions between the two
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life cycle models, and it implies that we cannot draw systematic conclusions about the role of
age when using the permanent income model as we can when using the life cycle model.
Another important difference between the permanent income and the life-cycle hypothesis is
that permanent income is not the same as expected lifetime earnings. Friedman recognised
that individuals make calculations based on a time-horizon that does not necessarily extend to
their death30.
2.3.2.8 Empirical studies
In the following paragraph, we refer to the LCH although much of the criticism also applies to
the PIH. Some results from empirical studies have already been discussed", as they explain
why the life-cycle models have been changed to include other considerations than
consumption smoothing over time. Some results cast doubt on the empirical validity of the
model (e.g. Alessie & Lusardi, 1997; Deaton, 1992; Bernheim, 1991; Kotlikoff & Summers,
1981), while other studies support it (e.g. Attanasio & Browning, 1993; Attanasio, et at,
1996; Hurd, 1987). Results from such studies will not be further reviewed; recent and
comprehensive reviews can be found in Attanasio (1998); Browning and Lusardi (1996),
Deaton (1992), Modigliani (1986) and King (1985). A problem with the LCH is that it is not
easily testable, and that many "anomalies" can be attributed to bad measurement or
operationalization of the economic variables.". King (1985) concluded that the LCH could
explain the savings of the majority of savers, while the behaviour of the remainder (20-25%
of the population) would be better explained by alternative models. The following review will
focus on studies that have addressed the psychological foundations of the theory. These
foundations include assumptions about saving motives, homogeneity among savers, rational
expectations and fungibility of money.
Saving motives
The LCH has been enriched by the inclusion of different saving motives. Psychologists have
not addressed the issue of saving motives but the identification of their existence, with the
study of Wårneryd (1995) and Wahlund and Wåmeryd (1987) as notable exceptions.
Economists, on the other hand, have tried to estimate the effect of the motives by
incorporating them in their models. In particular, two motives have received much attention:
the precautionary motive and the bequest motive. While there seems to be little disagreement
about the existence and importance of the precautionary motive, the importance of the bequest
motive is more controversial.
As mentioned in section 2.3.2.2, Swedish studies of saving show that the precautionary saving
motive is the most important (Lindqvist et al, 1978). In all, 46% of the respondents reported
that the precautionary saving motive was their most important saving motive. Similar results
were reported by Katona (1975) and Wårneryd (1995; 1999). Barlow, Brazer and Morgan
(1966) studied motives across different income categories and found the precautionary motive
to be stable across income groups, saving for retirement and children's education to be
decreasing with income, while the bequest motive increased with income.
30 For more elaborate discussions of the permanent income hypothesis, see Deaton (1992) and Wåmeryd (1999).
31 As empirical testing and theory development go hand in hand with respect to expanding the LCH, it is difficult
to separate theory and empirical results, as indicated by the structure of this review.
32 For example, failure to include annuities such as government and private pensions in the measure of wealth or
a failure to take demographics into account.
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The subjective data suggest that saving models not allowing for the precautionary saving
motive are misspecified and several different ways of incorporating this motive in the LCH
framework have been proposed. Due to the lack of subjective data on saving motives, it is
often assumed that the strength of the precautionary saving motive is higher the higher the
income variability (e.g. Carroll, 1997; Lusardi, 1993) or expenditure variability (Dynan,
1993) of the household, with the former being the most common assumption'", The estimates
of the importance of the precautionary motive show large variations, which most likely stem
from different ways of measuring uncertainty or the parameters chosen for the estimation.
Carroll and Samwick (1995) reported that between 39 and 46 percent of wealth in their
sample (The Panel Study of Income Dynamics) is attributable to income uncertainty. They
also find that the fraction of wealth attributable to income uncertainty is higher among low-
income households. Dardanoni (1991) used consumption and income data from Britain and
estimated that more than 60% of savings is a precaution against future income risk. Guiso,
Jappelli and Terlizzese (1992a), on the other hand, stated that precautionary saving in Italy
accounts for only two percent of the household's net worth. Lusardi (1993) re-analysed the
Italian data and estimated the precautionary accumulation in Italy to be about 13%. She used
occupation as a proxy for income risk. In general, she found that subjective earnings variance
was small because of measurement error and employer insurance. Dynan (1993) found very
little support for the precautionary motive using expenditure variability as a measure of
uncertainty .
The buffer-stock model of saving is one example of how a precautionary saving motive can
be incorporated in the LCH framework. Carroll (1997) and Carroll and Samwick (1997)
found empirical support for the buffer-stock model. Research by Gourinchas and Parker
(1999) supported the fmding that it is young people who engage in buffer-stock saving, while
older people (older than 42 years) accumulate liquid assets for retirement in line with the
standard LCH. They interpreted the findings as being a result of the life-cycle profile of
expected income, which causes saving motives to change over the life cycle. Samwick (1998)
reported findings suggesting that households save only to maintain a buffer stock until
retirement is only a few years away.
Hubbard et al. (1995) tested a buffer stock model (assuming a rate of time preference of 10%
and a consumption floor of $1000) against a model with lower time preference rates (3%) and
incorporation of the asset-based means testing of welfare programmes. The latter model fitted
the data better than the buffer stock model. In particular, it could better explain why many
households showed a strong persistence in low levels of wealth: saving while receiving
transfers is discouraged as higher wealth is likely to disqualify for further transfers. The
buffer-stock model predicts that households will have a strong motive to rebuild their buffer
stock on all levels of income and wealth. The buffer-stock model therefore failed to explain
why 56% of the households that had assets worth less than $1000 in 1984, still had less than
$1000 total wealth in 1989. Carroll and Samwick (1997) argued that they found evidence of
the buffer-stock model performing better than the model of Hubbard et al. (1995). Consumers
facing greater income uncertainty held more wealth. In particular, they found that buffer-stock
saving is important for consumers younger than 50 years of age. After this age, people engage
in retirement saving. Furthermore, they reported that the sensitivity to uncertainty decreased
with rising time preferences.
33 Browning and Lusardi (1996) also cite sources that include uncertainty about household demographics, health,
and future interest rates.
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Ballinger, Palumbo and Wilcox (1998) performed a laboratory experiment in order to
investigate certain aspects of life cycle saving decision making. They asked their respondents
(36 students) to solve a sixty- "year" consumption and saving problem. Respondents were
assigned randomly to three "generations", and those belonging to the second generation could
observe and interact with the first generation players in their zo" - 40th years, and the third
generation players could observe and interact with the second generation players in their zo"
-40th years before starting their own game. A special technique, called "the binary lottery
ticket mechanism" was used in order to induce the utility function of the decision-makers.
Subjects received an endowment of initial assets at the beginning of the first period and a
randomly drawn income level in each period. The income variance was varied so that there
was one low-variance and one high-variance treatment. The income realisation was added to
assets previously accumulated so that the respondents would know the level of cash on hand
for spending. The respondents where then asked how much they would spend each year. It
was expected that respondents subject to the high-variability income treatment would save
more than others do, in line with the theory of the precautionary savings motive. They found
that subjects typically under-smooth their expenditure patterns relative to what would have
been predicted by an intertemporal optimisation model. In both high-variance and low-
variance income treatments, subjects failed to build and hold a large enough buffer-stock of
assets to facilitate consumption smoothing. They did fmd, however, that the decision making
improved by learning. The third generation players did better than the second and first
generation players.
Another much-debated motive is the bequest motive. One testable implication of the simple
version of the LCH is that even patient consumers would like to spend all their wealth before
they die. In general, findings suggest that the wealth holdings of the elderly are very unevenly
distributed. When collecting subjective data on the matter, the bequest motive is primarily
found among the upper parts of the income and wealth-distribution. Subjective data also
support that a very small part of the population regards bequest to be a reason to save.
Lindqvist (1981) reported that only 3% of his sample said that leaving bequest was the most
important saving motive. The same frequency was found in the Survey of Consumer Finances
in 1992: 3% said that leaving inheritance was the most important motive, while 5% of the
sample indicated that inheritance was among their top five reasons for saving (Carroll, 1998).
Modigliani (1988) cited several surveys about saving motives, which all give little support to
the bequest motive, and he also found the bequest motive to be increasing with income and
wealth. Lack of dissaving ameng the elderly seemed more to be caused by precautionary
motives, so that decumulation takes place at a very old age. Hurd and Smith (1999) found
some support for this view. They used data from the Health and Retirement study and the
Asset and Health Dynamics of the Oldest Old (AHEAD) and found that respondents
anticipated substantial dissaving at advanced old age. Much bequest might therefore be
accidental.
Bernheim et al. (1985) found some support for their notion of a strategic bequest motive.
They found that contact between parents and children is much higher in families where the
elderly parent has a substantial amount of bequethable wealth to offer, controlling for
potentially spurious factors such as ability to pay for frequent contact and the characteristics
of the parents' house. The authors referred to an interview study by Sussman, Cates and Smith
(1970), who reported that many of the interviewees in their study directly or indirectly said
that bequest was used as a means of payment for services rendered to parents.
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Responses to the questions about bequest in the CentERdata-panel show that all the proposed
explanations for the saving of the elderly might be right, as people obviously differ in their
bequest motives. Table 2.2 shows the responses from respondents with children. The
exchange motive (or strategic bequest motive) does not get much support in this study, but
this might be due to responses being affected by social desirability considerations. Probably,
it will be difficult to make people admit to strategic use of their wealth. A considerable
portion of the sample says that they want to leave some bequest for their children. This means
that this motive should not be excluded from the aggregate saving models. More effort should
be spent on finding a way to identify the households that want to leave a bequest so that the
effect of this motive can be estimated. For example, Modigliani (1986) suggested that bequest
should be treated as a luxury good, which only will be important in the upper reach of the
lifetime income distribution. This has been supported in a study by Dynan, Skinner and
Zeldes (2000) who found that households with higher lifetime income leave a larger bequest.
Using Canadian data, Burbridge and Robb (1985) found that blue-collar households
decumulated wealth after retirement whilst white-collar households did not. Alessie, Lusardi,
and Kapteyn (1995, 1999) analysed Dutch data and found income, wealth and home
ownership to be strongly associated with bequest. They reported that the frequencies of the
respondents who have a bequest motive increased almost monotonically with wealth. Finally,
Table 2.2 shows that the large majority does not want to leave bequest to their children, which
supports the notion that bequest is accidental.
Table 2.2
Motives for leaving bequests
Statement Frequency Percent
If our children would take good care of us when we are old, we would like to 93 4.3
leave them a considerable bequest (exchange motive)
We would like to leave our children a considerable bequest, irrespective of the 478 22.2
way they will take care of us when we are old (altruism motive)
We have no preconceived plans about leaving a bequest to our children 1524 70.8
because we want to enjoy our own lives (self-interest)
We don't intend to leave a bequest to our children, because we don't think it is 58 2.7
desirable (rejection)
Total 2153 100
..Data from the first wave of data collection of the CentER Savmgs Survey. Source: Warneryd, 1999 (page 276)
The fact that the number of respondents who say that they would like to leave their children
some money is higher than the number who say that they do not explicitly save for bequest,
indicates that people have a hierarchy of saving motives or that the same money serve several
purposes. Itmight be that the primary motive for saving is precaution, but when this motive is
satisfied, other motives, for example bequest, becomes operational. Precautionary saving will
be bequeathed in the cases it is not needed. Alessie et al. (1995) found that the bequest motive
is more important among the older household than among the younger. This means that
motives might change over the life cycle.
One possible determinant of a bequest motive is the ratio of parents' wealth against that of
their children. If there are great differences in wealth or expected life income between
generations, with the younger generation being better off, this might have an impact on the
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older generation's motive for leaving a bequest (Hurd, 1990). Leaving a bequest to children
who enjoy a higher standard of living than their parents ever had, might seem pointless as the
utility the parents have to give up while saving does not match the marginal utility their
children will derive from the transfers. This might explain why bequest is mostly found
among the richer part of the population, as the likelihood of parents being richer than their
children is higher for this group. Unfortunately, data sets seldom contain information about
income of both parents and their offspring, so this interpretation is difficult to test directly.
Kotlikoff (1988) and Bernheim and Severinov (in press) reported results from several studies
that show that wealth bequeathed to children is shared equally, which indicates that parents do
not take differences in their children's earnings capacities into account when they divide their
bequest. However, Hochguertel and Ohlsson (2000) found indications of such considerations
with respect to inter vivos transfers between parents and children. Using the HRS data set
from the U.S., they found that only 5% of parents who give gifts divide them equally among
their children. Children less well-off than siblings received relatively more gifts. Bernheim
and Severinov (in press) suggested that parents divide bequest, which is observable to all
children equally between children in order to make them feel equally loved. Inter vivos gifts
do not need to be observed by other siblings, so that parents can give gifts to a favoured child
without revealing this to his siblings who then might suffer from feeling less loved.
Alessie et al. (1997) found, as Borsch-Supan (1992) and Borsch-Supan and Stahl (1991),
some support for the notion that old people save due to less ability to consume.". Using Dutch
data, they found the decumulation of retired household to be modest (some evidence was also
found for accumulation), and they found that one cause could be a substantial reduction in
consumption, in particular in leisure and transportation expenditures. Still, it is puzzling that
the reduction in one type of expenditure is not matched by increases in other expenditures so
that substantial decumulation still could be observed. Although the elderly are taken care of
by mandatory health insurance systems in many countries, they could, and should according
to the LCH, still increase their utility by buying additional services. Consumption habits
might therefore also play an important role. When the possibilities for engaging in the
household's established consumption patterns decline, habits prevent them from engaging in
new activities or markets.
Given that many people do not want to leave a bequest, there is one observation that seems to
be a mystery: the infrequent use of reverse mortgages'" and annuity insurance. Elderly
owning their own accommodation have, for example, the option of taking out reverse
mortgages, which enables them to spend housing wealth without having to go through the
painstaking process of selling and moving. The reason why this type of mortgages is not
popular is likely to be the uncertainty of the time of death. Such an arrangement could cause
serious problems if one were to live ten years longer than expected or if one would experience
a serious medical problem that would necessitate large expenses in terms of buying services.
The mortgage would grow with compound interest. Although parents would not wish to leave
any bequest to their children, they are not likely to want to leave them debts (although these
preferences have not been subject to testing) or live their last years in poverty. The risk
associated with reverse mortgages is, however, resolved in the annuity insurance contracts,
34 They did note, however, that the precautionary motive is the best explanation for a lack of decumulation. They
also find some indication that some expenditure is not measured appropriately so that the expenditures of the
elderly might be under-estimated.
35 With a reverse mortgage, the retired homeowner uses collateral in the house to borrow money from a bank.
The proceeds of the loan are typically paid to the borrower in monthly payments. When the borrower dies or
decides to sell the house, the loan is repaid.
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which permits people to share the risks associated with an uncertain time of death. The fact is
that also this type of annuity is less popular than expected and predicted by the LCH. The
proposed explanations for this are the unfavourable rates of return on such annuities (4-6
percent below market rates of return) and uncertainty about future inflation (Kotlikoff, 1988).
According to estimates provided by Kotlikoff, Spivak and Shoven (1989) the absence of well-
functioning private annuity markets might cause a doubling of savings in life cycle economies
and bequests might occur involuntary.
Hurd (1990) analysed panel data and found that there is a tendency for the elderly with
children to decumulate their wealth at a faster rate than the childless households. This fmding
can be explained in many ways. Firstly, it does not necessarily mean that people with children
do not think of their offspring. It can also be that they give money (or presents) to their
children and any grandchildren while they live. Most people have their most difficult
economic situation when they are young and are starting a family. Parents can therefore feel
more motivated to help their children in this stage of their live cycle instead of saving for a
bequest their children most likely will receive in a more affluent period of their lives. For
example, Katona (1975) found that saving for children's education and other needs was the
second most important saving motive. This supports the notion of parents engaging in inter
vivos intergenerational transfers before their death (which in many data sources will appear as
consumption). Alternatively, the results from Hurd's study can be interpreted as support for a
precautionary saving motive as the elderly with children might feel a smaller need for a buffer
against unforeseen contingencies. They might rely on support from their children if they
would require assistance in their final years, in line with the notion of within-family annuity
markets proposed by Kotlikoff and Spivak (1981). The flow of intergenerational transfers
does not necessarily go in one direction only, although the net effect is a transfer from the old
to the young. Although little evidence of transfers from children to parents is found (Hurd,
1990), children might still serve the same function as a buffer. Transfers will only take place
in cases of unexpected bad events.
Homogeneity among savers
One of the assumptions underlying the LCH is that people make their saving and borrowing
decisions in a homogeneous way. We just need to know what they expect their age and life
income to be, as well as their present income and age, in order to predict whether they will
borrow or save. As shown above, the framework has been expanded by including different
saving motives. The inclusions of the motives are done in such a way that it is of concern to
all subjects. Either everyone has a precautionary saving motive or no one has. Either everyone
has a high rate of time preference or everyone has a low rate. Segmenting of the population
into different groups, as promoted by, for example, Weil (1991) and Wårneryd (1999) has so
far not been common practice. Wåmeryd suggested a segmentation of the population based on
saving motives and showed that people with different motives might react differently to
policy measures (Wahlund & Wårneryd, 1987). The research by Carroll (1997), Gourinchas
and Parker (1999), and Samwick (1998) suggested that motives change with age, so that age
can be used for segmenting. Weil (1991) suggested that wealth classes could be used as a
basis for segmentation and that different models should be used for "non-savers", "forward-
looking savers", and "non-forward-looking savers". Carroll, Rhee and Rhee (1998) found that
saving patterns of immigrants are significantly different across country of origin. Other useful
dimensions that can be used for segmentation are indicated by the research reviewed below.
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Recent studies have revealed that people are remarkably heterogeneous with respect to their
savings. One observation from the US is that many households accumulate very little. In
particular, it seems that the accumulations are grossly inadequate to ensure a comfortable
standard of living at retirement (e.g. Bernheim, 1995; Lusardi, 2000). Hubbard et al. (1995)
explained this finding by pointing to the incentive structure built into the welfare program.
Since eligibility to transfers is conditional on having assets less than some specified amount,
such programs place an implicit tax rate of 100% on assets above the limit. Thus, for people
with little wealth the incentives to increase their wealth are small. Carroll (1997) attributed the
difference in accumulation to differences in income uncertainty and impatience. The target
saving-to-income ratio assumed in the buffer-stock model is typically very low. Lusardi
(2000) studied differences in saving across households 10-15 years before their retirement,
using data from the Health and Retirement Study (HRS). She found that a variable called
"thinking about retirement" was important for accumulation of wealth, indicating that the
extent people plan ahead vary from "hardly at all" to "a lot", and that this planning affects
their saving behaviour (in line with Weil's suggestion). One third of her sample had "hardly at
all" thought about retirement, and she found this to have a dramatic negative effect on their
saving. Thinking about retirement was also closely associated with level of education and
marital status. Similar results were found by Alessie et al (1995), who found that saving
increased with reported time horizon.
Lately, the rich have also received some empirical attention. In the US, the rich constituted
the top 1% of the income distribution and were responsible for 29%36or 36%37of total private
wealth in 1989 (Gentry & Hubbard, 1998). The rich have been found to have higher lifetime
saving rates than others. Their behaviour is inconsistent with the LCH, which underestimates
the wealth of the richest households. Alternative models have been proposed that could better
explain the behaviour of this particular segment of the population. Carroll (1998) tested
several alternative models and found that the behaviour of the rich can best be explained by a
model in which consumers regard the accumulation of wealth as an end in itself (a capitalist
spirit modelr'", This model implies that wealthy people derive utility either directly from the
ownership of wealth, indirectly from the activities that lead to wealth accumulation or from
utility derived from the power or social status tied to the ownership of high wealth. An
alternative model, which did not receive much support in Carroll's study, is the "Dynastic"
model of Barro (1974), which implies that wealthy save mainly for the benefit of their heirs.
Carroll (1998) also pointed to the fact that it is difficult for the super-rich not to accumulate
assets. For example, Bill Gates would have to spend more than $10 million every day on non-
durable assets in order to avoid further accumulation, which is in itself a difficult task.
Extremely rich people might also be subject to consumption satiation. Gentry and Hubbard
(1998) focussed on the saving of entrepreneurs, as this group overlap with the rich to a certain
extent. They found that costly external fmancing for entrepreneurial investments and
potentially high returns of those investments can explain higher saving rates of this particular
part of the population.
These studies suggest that it would be better to divide the population into segments and
develop different models or use different parameters for the different segments. It is not yet
36 Based on data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics.
37 Based on data from the Federal Reserve Board Survey of Consumer Finances.
38 Carroll noted that the Capitalist Spirit model will be behaviourally indistinguishable from a psychological
model stating that the wealthy enjoy doing their jobs well and that accumulated wealth is their measure of own
job performance.
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clear which criteria will be the most useful for segmentation. For example, the behaviour and
motives of the rich versus the poor seem to be rather different. The rich have more often a
bequest motive than the poor, while the poor might have small incentives to save because this
might cause a loss in social benefits. Differences in time preference and in saving motives can
also produce different saving behaviour. Therefore, segmenting based on these variables
might prove worthwhile.
Rational expectations and decision making
[
Surprisingly, only a few empirical studies address the actual decision process the consumers
go through when they make saving decisions (e.g. Ballinger et al., 1998). An important reason
for this is the limitations in the available data sets. They usually contain little information
about decision processes, which leaves researchers to make more or less qualified guesses
about how decisions are made and which factors influence them. Thaler described the
decision process underlying the LCR framework in the following way:
The essence of the life-cycle theory is this: in any year compute the present value of1
your wealth, including current income, net assets, and future income; figure out the
level of annuity you could purchase with that money; then consume the amount you, '
would receive if you in fact owned such an annuity (Thaler, 1990; 193-194). (
_)
Thaler pointed out that it is unrealistic to assume that people can actually solve such a
multiperiod dynamic maximisation problem. Firstly, this task is difficult even for trained
I economists, and, secondly, there is little chance of learning since people save for retirement
f just once. In addition, no rule of thumb that would approximate an optimal saving plan has
been found to be known and in use. Thaler pointed to research within decision theory and
claimed that the intertemporal allocation calculations that are assumed underlying saving
decisions are too difficult for most people to perform. Thaler's criticism is supported by
experiments data. Ballinger et al. (1998) found that people did not allocate money as
predicted by the LCR. Rather, people undersaved compared to the models prediction. Ng
(1992) reported that people failed to calculate compound interest, with the result that they
underestimate the long-term effects of saving. When they where shown the right figures, they
indicated a willingness to save much more. Kohler (1996) conducted an experiment in which
people were asked to make saving and consumption decisions, and found that the respondents
were simplifying the saving decision by restricting the amount of information considered.
Respondents typically considered only a few years ahead instead of the whole reminding
lifetime. Finally, Johnson, Kotlikoff and Samuelson (1987) conducted an experiment in which
respondents were paid to answer a computerised consumption questionnaire. The subjects
were asked to place themselves in a simple life cycle setting and were given all information
necessary in order to perform the calculations assumed by the LCR. Johnson et al. found a
widespread inability to make coherent and consistent consumption decisions. Errors in
consumption decision-making were substantial and systematic.
In both the LCR and the PIR, consumers are presumed to have a set of expectations about
lifetime wages, lifetime family structure and the rate of return to assets over the lifetime.
From these expectations, consumers visualise potential lifetime resources. The variable
"expectation" is central to the LCR framework. Current saving or dissaving is considered a
reflection of the expectations. Research on the formation of expectations and the effects of
expectations on economic behaviour was left to psychological economists for decades (see
Dominitz & Manski, 1997). Economists rejected the notion that consumer expectations data
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could contain any information of predictive value, embracing the theory of rational
expectations. Alternatively, they assumed that people used extrapolated or adaptive
expectations (Wårneryd, 1997). These could be estimated based on realised changes or past
changes adjusted for new information, and subjective data were unnecessary. In recent years,
however, economists have explored the usefulness of the Index of Consumer sentiment as
well as other types of subjective expectation data (e.g. Vanden Abeele, 1983; Souleles, 2001).
Two issues have been in focus in studies using subjective information about expectations. The
first is the accuracy of the measures. Their accuracy has been assessed by comparing
subjective expectations with realised changes. Dominitz and Manski (1997) found that
subjective data on income expectations corresponded well with data on realised income
changes. They derived the subjective expectations using the following question formulation:
"What do you think is the percent chance (or what are the chances out of 100) that your total
household income, before taxes, will be less than Y over the next 12 months?" A sequence of
such questions was posed for different income thresholds (Y). The responses allowed them to
<estimate each respondent's subjective probability distribution for next year's household
income. Alessie, Lusardi and Aldershof (1997) and Das (1998) found that reported expected
changes in income correlated significantly with actual income changes. Das and van Soest
(1997), Das, Dominitz and van Soest (1999), and Das (1998) using data from the Dutch
Socio-Economic Panel, found some evidence in favour of extrapolation and consequently
against the rational expectation assumption. They found that people who had experienced an
income decrease in the previous year were more pessimistic about their income in the
following year than others, while those who had experienced an increase in income were more
optimistic about their future income than others. Das and van Soest (1997) also found that the
forecast errors are correlated with household demographics. On average, future income
growth was underestimated. Souleles (2001) used the household data set from the Michigan
Survey of Consumer Attitudes and Behavior, which contains the Index of Consumer
Sentiment, and analysed the rationality of consumer expectations. He found that the
expectations appeared to be biased and that people tended to underestimate the amplitude of
the business cycle. The forecast errors did not average out even over the sample period of
almost 20 years. The forecasts were also inefficient, since he found that people's forecast
errors are correlated with demographic characteristics (income and education level). He also
found that the most useful information was derived when asking about the respondent's
economic situation rather than the aggregate economy.
The second issue of interest is the effect of uncertainty with respect to income changes. The
reason for increased effort in understanding the combined effects of expectations and
uncertainty is that empirical studies indicate that precautionary saving is an important saving
motive and that income uncertainty has an effect on this type of saving. Carroll (1994) found
that income uncertainty had a depressing effect on consumption. Similar results have been
found in studies by Banks, Blundell and Brugiavini (1995), Guiso, Jappelli and Terlizzese
(1992a), and Lusardi (1993). This means that uncertainty will mediate the effects of
expectation on saving. Optimistic expectations concerning future income might not lead to
more spending if the uncertainty of its realisation is high. Both expectations and uncertainty
must therefore be taken into account.
So far, little research has addressed the more interesting research concerning the effect of the
subjective expectations on behaviour. It is useful to know whether people's expectation
concerning their future earnings is a good predictor of their actual earnings. Dominitz (2001)
concluded that the high consistency between subjective expectations data and expectations
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derived from realised income changes provide a validation for the subjective measurement. It
is more important to assess, however, the extent to which people act upon their expectations,
regardless of how they were formed. Souleles (200 1) found that consumption was excessively
sensitive to consumer sentiment. Higher confidence is correlated with less saving, consistent
with precautionary saving motives and ideas put forward by Katona (1975). Guiso et al.
(1992b) and Alessie et al. (1995) used subjective income expectations as explanatory
variables and found that they predicted saving. Similar results were found by Carroll, Fuhrer
and Wilcox (1994) who also found the index of consumer sentiment to predict consumer
spending. Souleles concluded that the subjective measures contained important additional
information to that captured by other variables. All these results support the notion of
precautionary saving as saving decreases in times of optimism.
Another important assumption underlying the LCR is the fungibility of money ("a dollar is a
dollar"). The LCR predicts that an extra dollar of housing wealth, pension wealth or liquid
assets generates the same increase in consumption. Empirical research suggests that this is not
the case. Most studies report that a large portion of households have loans despite holding
money in a saving account. For example, some cash is held for precautionary reasons.
Poterba, Venti and Wise (1994; 1995) did not find much substitution between targeted
retirement saving accounts and other wealth components and this pattern is consistent with
studies of substitution between personal financial assets and the value of employer-provided
pensions and between housing equity and personal financial assets. Engagement in some
types of saving seems to increase the total saving of the household. The nonfungibility of
money will be discussed more extensively in the next section.
2.3.2.9 Summary
The life cycle model, as it was originally proposed by Modigliani and Brumberg, is now
regarded as obsolete. The assumptions of perfectly far-sighted families operating in complete
insurance and financial markets are not regarded as satisfactory with respect to predicting
household saving. The LCR is now more a framework for studies of saving. The idea that
people are forward-looking is still the basic underlying idea of the model and empirical
studies support that expectations play an important role. In order to investigate the role of
expectations further, future research should also include expectations towards lifetime
earnings and not only the next one to five years. Although lifetime earnings might be difficult
to quantify in exact amounts for most respondents, they could give meaningful answers by
reporting, for example, the expected income profile. Only by measuring life expectations is it
possible to test whether the assumed decision-process, which is critical for the LCR
framework, makes sense. Some findings suggest that people vary in their planning horizons
(Alessie et al, 1995; Lusardi, 2000); some people report it to be only a few months ahead.
Still, it is possible that people have a more-or-less detailed idea of both their income and
expenditure levels and profiles in the future that in turn might lead to goal-directed behaviour.
Many studies apply the assumption that people are maximising lifetime utility. Some studies
suggest that people are unable to make the necessary calculations in order to maximise utility.
We should also know more about what is giving consumers utility (what is maximised) as
well as the constraints experienced by households. Several attempts have been (and continue
to be) made to enrich the model to make it more behaviourally realistic. In particular,
uncertainty and precautionary saving seem to be important factors. The role of other saving
motives has also been investigated, and it seems like saving motives might change over the
life cycle.
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The above review shows that economists allow for consumer heterogeneity, use experimental
techniques, use subjective data as well as use psychology to enrich their models. Progress in
the field is not hindered by a lack of openness or willingness to explore new and uncharted
waters. Rather, the limitation exists within the data sets. Existing data sets seldom provide the
data necessary to separate one interpretation of the fmdings from another. In the lack of direct
measurement of the variables of interest, researchers are bound to assume parameters for
many important variables or estimate them based on other available data. The empirical
results presented above do not represent the fmal say in the discussions about the LCH.
Reaching consensus concerning which motives are important, how to measure bequest and
inter vivos transfers, whether the most appropriate time horizon is one month, three years, the
life time, or longer, whether the rate of time preference is high or low, etc., is still far into the
future.
Future research should make more use of subjective data because this might provide more
accurate tests of the theory at the individual level. This is not easy, as huge measurement
problems must be solved. The scepticism towards subjective data by many economists is
sound. Subjective measures assume that individuals are aware of their preferences, are able to
express them, and express them in a way similar enough to others for their answers to
constitute an ordinal scale. Recent attempts to measure people's rate of time preference show
that there are many problems that have to be solved (e.g. Knetsch, 1997; Nyhus, 1997). More
work is also necessary in order to develop measures of expectation, uncertainty and the
strength or importance of different saving motives.
Some of the recent developments in the field deal with complex human behaviour. Attempts
are made to find out more about the reasons for saving, in order to explain observed behaviour
and modify the models accordingly. It seems evident that it is time for more qualitative'"
research in order to improve the interpretations of the fmdings in the data. In-depth
interviews, either by psychologists or by economists, could reveal the relative importance of
different motives. Such an investigation could shed some light on whether people actually
think as prescribed by the buffer-stock model or whether a completely different explanation
can account for the low saving among large parts of the population. In depth-interviews could
also give some insights about the extent to which increased labour supply is considered a
substitute for precautionary saving. Further, we could learn more about the critical incidents
that could trigger use of savings that were accumulated for precautionary reasons and which
type of uncertainty would trigger the precautionary motive - income uncertainty or
expenditure uncertainty (for example, that associated with children, owning house and cars,
and health) or both. There are many more questions than answers with respect to household
saving behaviour, and the studies reviewed in this section can only answer a few of them.
Estimates that either confirm or reject the existence and importance of a particular motive
often rely on certain parameters chosen by the researchers. The conclusion we can draw is, for
example, that when given a high rate of time preference and a certain level of uncertainty or
absence of a perfect fmancial market, people act as if they have a buffer stock motive. It
would be nice to know what people actually are doing.
The next section presents a model that is an extension of the LCH. It is designed to be more
realistic with respect to consumer decision making. In particular, the possible self-control
problems people might face when trying to allocate income rationally over time as well as
methods to deal with the self-control problems are incorporated.
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2.3.3 Behavioural saving models
2.3.3.1 The behavioural life cycle hypotheses
[
In recent years, a new stream of research on saving behaviour has received attention. This
research represents a rather extensive modification of the LCH, drawing on behavioural
theories of consumer choice. The enriched model was called the Behavioural Life Cycle
Hypothesis (BLCH) and it was proposed by Shefrin and Thaler (1988). The BLCH includes
~e notion of self control (Thaler & Shefrin, 1981; Schelling, 1984), mental accounting
L ~Thaler, 1985) and the effects of framing. The most important assumption of the theory is that
household wealth is nonfungible, which means that households divide their wealth into
different mental accounts. Shefrin and Thaler (1988) propose that three mental accounts are
useful in studies of saving": current income, current assets and future income. They argue
that the temptation to spend from these accounts varies so that the propensity to consume
from the different accounts also vari~
The incorporation of self-control reflects recognition that refraining from consumption is
difficult. In the LCH framework, it is not considered a problem for the consumer to distribute
her income over the life span. Giving up consumption today in order to increase consumption
possibilities in, for example, thirty or forty years, is considered unproblematic. However, as
discussed previously in this chapter, research on intertemporal decision making (e.g. Ainslie,
1975) has revealed that such a model is too simplistic. Although people have preferences for
saving in order to have a smooth consumption stream, they also have preferences for
immediate gratification. Shefrin and Thaler (1988) modelled this as an internal conflict
between two coexisting and mutually inconsistent personalities; one concerned with the long
run ("the planner") and one with the short run ("the doer"). They argued that modelling these
two competing forces is consistent with findings from brain research and that it corresponds
to the interaction between the prefrontal cortex and the limbic system.
Apart from the use of sheer will power (which is effortful), the planner controls expenditures
by introducing rules of thumb and mental accounts (for example, pension plans). The purpose
of mental accounts is that each is associated with different levels of spending temptation. The
temptation to spend is assumed greatest for current income and least for future income and the
self-control needed to refrain from spending is higher for current income than for wealth (past
income) and future income. Consequently, the marginal propensity to consume wealth is
assumed to be account-specific. For example, the marginal propensity to spend from the
account "wealth" will be different from the account "income". This contrasts with the LCH
framework in which such labelling of money is absent.
An implication of this theory is that the propensity to consume from income is dependent on
into which mental account it is entered or how the income is viewed. If, for example, a
windfall income is entered into the "wealth account" the propensity to consume the windfall
would be lower than if it is entered into the "present" income account. For this reason, Shefrin
and Thaler (1988) argued that lump sum bonuses are treated differently than increases in
regular income. The saving rate can be affected by the way increments to wealth are
described.
39 Shefrin and Thaler (1988) admitted that the rules applied by households will differ from one household to
another and might be context specific. However, in spite of representing a great simplification of actual mental
accounting rules, they argued that there are some common elements that can be used for aggregate predictions,
which are the three accounts mentioned here.
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An important implication of the BLeH framework is that saving would be inadequate without
Social Security and pensions. This opinion is reiterated by Maital and Maital (1994), when
they criticised the deregulation of the credit markets. Adopting the doer-planner framework of
the BLeH, they pointed to the fact that externally imposed restrictions as well as self-imposed
constraints on spending and debt have been weakened the past decades. They attribute the
general decline of saving in the West to this weakened precommitment and argue that saving
will not increase again before the precommitment mechanisms are re-installed. It is
increasingly easy to borrow money and automatic teller machines provide easy access to
savings. Some banks even offer automatic loans if a consumer overspends his bank balance.
Hence, both Shefrin and Thaler (1988) and Maital and Maital (1994) raised concerns about
not taking the role of self-control into account when making policy decisions that deal with
household spending and saving.
2.3.3.2 Empirical findings
The BLeH has only been partially tested, but it is supported by some scattered empirical
findings. Shefrin and Thaler (1988) presented some results from a small survey designed to
study the differences in propensity to consume from an increase in regular payments ($200 in
12 months), a lump-sum payment ($2400), and a future payment (2400 plus interest in 5
years) respectively. They found that the students in their sample would use more of the
regular payments than of the lump-sum payment (the total amount of the payments was
identical). Most of the respondents also answered that they would not increase their present
consumption because of a promise to get money five years on. This was interpreted as support
for the assumption of the existence of mental accounts and that people have different
propensity to consume for different mental accounts.
In addition, Shefrin and Thaler (1988) derived ten predictions, which will support their theory
if confirmed:
1) Changes in discretionary saving from a change in pension saving is less (absolutely)
than 1.0 and declines sharply as age falls.
2) The change in discretionary saving from a change in pension saving increases with
income or wealth.
3) Without sufficiently large compulsory schemes, postretirement consumption is less
than pre-retirement consumption.
4) The saving rate increases with permanent income.
5) Holding wealth constant, consumption tracks income.
6) The marginal propensity to consume bonus income is lower than that for regular
income.
7) For (non-negligible) windfalls, the marginal propensity to consume is less than the
marginal propensity to consume regular income but greater than the annuity value of
the windfall. The marginal propensity to consume out of windfall income declines as
the size of the windfall increases.
8) Holding lifetime income constant, home ownership increases wealth at retirement.
9) The marginal propensity to consume inheritance income will depend on the form in
which the inheritance is received.
10) The marginal propensity to consume dividend income is greater than the marginal
propensity to consume increases in the value of stock holdings.
To find support for these predictions, Shefrin and Thaler (1988) reviewed studies in which
investigators have distinguished between different types of wealth and incomes. The results
from these studies supported the ten predictions derived from the BLeH, although the studies
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were not designed for testing the BLCH so that the applied definitions of different types of
wealth deviated from those of the BLCH. In addition, they reviewed some studies of the effect
of pension saving and social security wealth on saving. The results from these studies also
supported the BLCH. Finally, Shefrin and Thaler reported findings that support the
assumption that the propensity to save increases with income.
Levin (1998) carried out the first study designed to test the BLCH using a large panel data set
(The Retirement History Survey). He conducted a comparative study to investigate which of
the two models (the LCH or the BLCH) could best explain variation in consumption. He
tested the effects of level of wealth as well as the form of the wealth on the expenditures on
ten different goods. The results are strongly in favour of the BLCH as they reject the
fungibility assumption, they support a different propensity to consume of different wealth
components, and they show that the labelling of income (into which account it is entered)
affects spending. These results were valid both for liquidity constrained and unconstrained
subjects. However, Levin did not fmd support for the assumption that the marginal propensity
to consume past (non-liquid) wealth was higher than that for future wealth. Levin explained
this finding by the increase in the value of social security in the period of the data collection.
The increase in one period might have influenced the confidence that it would continue to rise
in the future.
Other studies have been conducted in order to test some of the underlying assumptions of the
BLCH. For example, Heath, Chatterjee and France (1995) found support for the existence of
mental accounting principles'". Heath and Soll (1996) found that people do apply mental
budgeting and that these mental budgets affect our consumption. People use resources
differently depending on how they are labelled. They found evidence that consumers earmark
money for certain product categories and that labels affect expenditures within the categories
in predictable ways. Inparticular, they found that the mental budgets were quite inflexible.
Prelec and Loewenstein (1998) elaborated the idea of mental accounting and suggested a
"double-entry" mental accounting theory in which they took the pain of paying as well as the
thought of paying into account. They introduced a mental accounting theory in which one set
of entries records the net utility of consumption (which means that the disutility of associated
payments are subtracted) and the other set of entries records the net disutility of payments
(after subtracting the utility of associated consumption). An underlying assumption of their
theory was that pre-paid consumption can be enjoyed as if it was free and that the pain
associated with payments made prior to consumption (but not after) is buffered by thoughts of
the benefits fmanced by the payment. They conducted several experiments to investigate this
assumption, and they found that people preferred to pay before consuming and to be paid after
finishing work. An implication of their theory is that people are debt-aversive and prefer to
prepay for consumption or to be paid for work after it is performed. Moreover, the degree to
which consumption calls to mind thoughts of payments is important.
2.3.3.3 Summary
The BLCH represented a refreshing and challenging framework to research on saving
behaviour. In particular, substitution of the rational maximisation framework with
assumptions relying on more behaviourally realistic assumptions is a promising start. It is
40 A review of evidence of physical labelling of money can be found in Zelizer (1993, as cited in Heath & al,
1995). People have been found to use sets of envelopes, china pitchers, tin cans etc. for dedicating different parts
of their wages to particular expenses.
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disappointing, though, that the ideas put forward in this theory have not been subject to
empirical studies but for a few cases.
Some weaknesses concerning this theory should also be addressed. The theory about the
effect of framing suffers from the same weaknesses as the Prospect theory (Kahneman &
Tversky, 1979) and the Reference Point model (Loewenstein, 1988): since we know little
about how reference points are formed, we know little about how different people will frame
a certain payment and therefore it will be difficult to predict behaviour. Shefrin and Thaler
(1988) noted that people might differ in their mental accounting practices, but did not
elaborate on how these differences can be identified so that they can be taken into account
when testing the model. The framing of a lump-sum payment might, for example, depend on
the ratio between the present income and the size of the lump-sum, so that high-income
people will have a higher tendency to put lump-sum payments into the "current-income"
account than people with low income. Alternatively, the effect of the size of the lump-sum
might interact with saving motives. Many possible factors that might influence the framing of
an income component need yet to be explored.
Moreover, the theory should be elaborated in order to incorporate factors that influence the
marginal propensity to spend from the different accounts. The theory does not say anything
about whether the differences in the propensities will be stable across time. Is it possible that
the propensity to spend current income decreases while the propensity to spend future income
increases? What happens to current income which is not spent? Does it automatically enter
the "savings-account" or does it stay in the current-income account? How do expectations
about future income affect the propensities to spend from the different accounts? Although
this model is based on ideas about human decision making, which are more behaviourally
realistic, we do not know more about whether these assumptions correspond more to actual
behaviour than what is the case with respect to the LCH.
2.4 CONCLUSIONS
Table 2.3 provides a summary of the proposed relationships and the empirical results
concerning these relationships. It is clear that many of the relationships have not been tested
empirically by economists or psychologists, although they have been flagged as important by
several authors. The economists who proposed the most important saving theories displayed
substantial psychological insight. However, when they formalised their models the effect of
the psychological variables was reduced to mathematical constants. In Fisher's theory the rate
of time preference equals the market interest rate; likewise, the marginal propensity to
consume is a constant in the theory of Keynes. For this reason, the underlying assumptions of
their theories received little attention. Nevertheless, more recent contributions show that the
trend is to abolish the simplifications and to allow for individual differences. It is clear that, in
addition to the differences in economic variables, people differ in their motives, ability, and
willingness to save and, further, that these differences can be quantified and used in empirical
analysis.
Income is the most important variable in all the reviewed models. This is obvious because it
defines the limit for spending and saving. The psychological variable that has been given the
most weight is time preference, which describes the degree of concern for the present as
opposed to the future. A variable that relates to time preference is self-control. The combined
effects of time preference and self-controlling strategies have been tested empirically but only
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to a limited extent, although the concepts themselves are often mentioned. Several authors
mention upbringing and education as important in the shaping of time preference and self-
control, which indicates that they think of these variables as reflecting enduring personal
characteristics.
The various motives for saving are also frequently mentioned, with a special emphasis on the
precautionary motive. It is still debatable how much of total saving can be attributed to a
precautionary saving motive, and from this derive its importance. More research is necessary
in order to establish the importance of, for example, the bequest motive in the elderly, the
downpayment motive of the young, and the investment motives of the rich. The importance of
the different saving motives might vary across household groups.
The effects of social comparison mechanisms have not been regarded important for saving
behaviour within economics, although in other social sciences they are regarded as important
for many types of behaviour; including spending behaviour. Duesenberry's theory has not
inspired many of his successors, and the effects of interdependent preferences have not been
addressed in all but a few studies. The research reported in this review shows, however, that
social comparison variables are likely to have an effect on saving. Consequently, these effects
and their implications should be studied further. In particular, ways of defining the reference
group that people use should be given attention.
"Upbringing" is a variable that is mentioned by many authors. This indicates that they believe
financial behaviour to be influenced by our earliest learning experiences. It can imply both a
general training in the delay of gratification behaviour or specific training in economic
behaviour by having to budget pocket money or discussing and participating in economic
decisions with parents. For obvious reasons, the impact of differences in upbringing has
barely been tested. The data necessary for a careful study would take years to collect.
Nevertheless, the studies conducted this far support the notion that elements of an individual's
upbringing, such as observing role models delay gratification, are important for economic
behaviour in adult life. This area should receive more attention in the future.
Economic theories are often based on a narrow set of explanatory variables. A phenomenon is
observed (often on the macro level) and a story is produced to explain the behaviour that must
have caused the phenomenon This may lead us to overlook the most important variables.
Perhaps it would prove useful to take a step backwards and attempt to get an overview of
variation in saving behaviour over a longer period. The historian David A Tucker (1991), for
example, examined the past hundred to two hundred years in such a manner. In a book on
saving behaviour in the US, he shows how the American culture shifted from a one valuing
frugality and the virtue of thrift to a culture valuing immediate gratification and spending. Inthe
eighteen and nineteenth century, religion played a crucial role with respect to controlling luxury
spending and extravagance. The attitude could be described as 'vice is wrong, saving is right'.
The virtue of saving was taught in schools and in churches, it was promoted by politicians, and
it was advocated in contemporary modern literature (for example, in the writings by Benjamin
Franklin41 and in books and magazines edited by Sarah Hale42). Even the saving banks
produced propaganda-like literature that argued that the only effectual way of assisting the poor
was to encourage the moral habits of industry, economy and sobriety. Some schools had
"school banks", which were founded in order to teach children to save. From all institutions in
41 "The Way to Wealth"
42 "Boston's Ladies' Magazine", "Godey's Lady's Book", "Keeping House or House Keeping", "Boarding Out"
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society, the take-home message was that one should delay gratification and save for better
experiences in the future.
Tucker showed that the long-running affair with the virtue of thrift started to fade in the 1920s.
The concept of thrift was gradually removed from language, textbooks and reference books. For
example, female teachers preferred the concept "scientific management of households" to
''thrift and frugality". In women's magazines, saving was more often described as the most
serious fmancial mistake that was dangerous for the community and the nation". Thrift was
even described as a curse and a vice. It represented the least praiseworthy qualities a man or
woman could have. Self-restraint was rejected, while living for the moment was in fashion.
Advertising and the possibilities of credit and instalment buying played a role in this shift.
Moreover, the stock market crash in 1929, followed by the Great Depression convinced people
that saving would not do any good. Over 5000 banks shut down without repaying their
depositors. Finally, Keynes won recognition when he preached that people should spend in
order to reach full employment. The government practised deficit spending and the idea that
thrift was not a virtue trickled down.
Tucker did not try to model saving or identify the variables that should be included in theories
of saving. He left that to the reader. From his writing, it is clear that decisions about whether to
save or to spend are not decisions made in a vacuum. Individuals are certainly affected by the
norms in the society they live in. When thrift was considered as a preferred trait, spending
would be subject to disapproval by others. Post World War II, the norm was that saving was bad
and spending was good. These shifts in education are reflected in the savings rates. The saving
rates in America are now less that half of what it was in the nineteenth century.
Tucker's descriptions also showed that people's beliefs and attitudes differ across individuals
and groups in the society. There were people speaking in favour of spending in the nineteenth
century, and people speaking in favour of thrift in the l 950ies. Saving habits could also differ
between ethnic and religious groups. The economic theories reviewed in this chapter have not
looked at variables like attitudes, norms, and beliefs. These are variables that not only might
explain individual differences at one point in time, but might be important variables at the
macro level as well, although they might change very slowly in a population. The next chapter
will review some psychological research on saving behaviour in which the role of the
variables identified by this economic historian, such as attitudes and norms have been focused
upon.
43 Examples (cited in Tucker, 1991) include: Martha B. Bruere: "Good Housekeeping" and "Increasing Home
Efficiency". C.W. Taber: "The Business of the Household". Christine Frederick: "Efficient Housekeeping or
Household Engineering".
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Table 2.3
Overview of proposed relationships and their empirical support
Important variables at the household level Proposed by Results from empirical studies
The rate of time preference ~ Saving (neg.) Fisher (1930) Rates of time preference vary across
People will harmonise their time preference rates in decision scenarios, are often much higher
the fmancial market so that it will equal the market than the real interest rate in the market, and
real interest rate. Time preference higher than the vary across individuals. Time preference
interest rate leads to dissaving and/or borrowing has been found to predict financial
problems
Determinants of time preference:
Size of income Ambiguous results
Expected future income Weak support
Income uncertainty Not tested
Degree of foresight (length of time horizon) Supported in one study
Consumption habits Not tested
Self-control Not tested, but some observations indicate
that self-control might mediate the effect of
time preference.
Expected remaining lifetime Not tested
Strength of bequest motive Not tested
Dependence of fashion Not tested
Stage in life cycle Not tested
Upbringing/ teaching of parents /social pressure Indirectly supported by studies on ability to
delay gratification. Supported by the
fmding that those encouraged to save as
children save more than others.
Absolute income ~ Propensity to save (pos) Keynes Supported by most studies.
(1936)
Saving motives ~ Propensity to save (pos) The precautionary motive influences
Precaution, foresight, calculation, improvement, saving behaviour, although researchers
independence, enterprise, pride, avarice are motives disagree about how much. Some support
thought to increase propensity to save. also exists for the improvement motive.
The effects of other motives are not well
documented, apart from the fact that people
state that some of them are important.
Habits ~ Propensity to save Not tested directly (but past consumption
can predict present consumption)
Determinants of habits:
Race Not tested
Education Not tested
Convention Not tested
Religion Not tested
Current morals Not tested
Generosity ~ Propensity to save (neg) Not tested
Hopes-s Propensity to save Not tested
Extravagance ~ Propensity to save (neg) Not tested
Ostentation-s Propensity to save (neg) Not tested
Distribution of wealth-s Propensity to save Not tested
Established standard of living-s Propensity to save Not tested
Relative income of people one meets frequently ~ Duesenberry Support for the existence of social
Saving (neg) (1949) comparison is found, and that this
Modigliani influences purchase behaviour. Weak
(1949) support for the notion that social
comparison influences saving
Habits ~ Saving Past income level and past consumption
level have been found to predict saving
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Table 2 3 continued
Important variables on the household level Proposed by Results from empirical studies
Expectations towards life time income and remaining Modigliani& Studies support that subjective
life time ~ saving (neg). Brumberg expectations towards future income
(1954) influence expenditures in the predicted
manner.
Households maximise their utility by distributing their Not supported by any experimental studies.
life-time income evenly over their remaining expected
life-time
Uncertainty ~ saving (pos) Higher saving has been found among
people who are subject to income or
expenditure uncertainty.
Precautionary motive ~ saving (pos) Found to have effect, but researchers
disagree about the magnitude.
Bequest motive ~ saving Barro (1974) Ambiguous results concerning importance
and impact
Strategic bequest motive ~ saving Bernheim et al Supported in one study, but the
(1985) explanations concerning the saving of the
old are difficult to distinguish in the
available data sets.
Consumption constraints ~ saving (pos) Bersch-Supan Supported indirectly by observed decrease
& Stahl, 1991 of certain types of consumption
Framing of income ~ propensity to save Shefrin & Support is found for the existence of
Thaler, 1988 "mental accounting" and that the marginal
propensity to conswne from these accounts
differs.
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Chapter3
The psychological
approach to saving
The primary lesson here is admittedly a depressing one for economic
theorists. The lesson is that theirjob is much harder than we may have
previously thought. Writing down a model of rational behavior and
turning the crank may not be enough, and writing down a good model
of less thanfully rational behavior is difficult for two reasons. First, it
is not generally possible to build good descriptive models without
collecting data, and many theorists claim to have a strong allergic
reaction to data. Second, rational models tend to be simple and elegant
with precise predictions, while behavioral models tend to be
complicated, and messy, with much vaguer predictions. But, look at it
this way. Would you rather be elegant and precisely wrong, or messy
and vaguely right?
R. Thaler 1992: The Winner's Curse, p. 198
3.1 INTRODUCTION
In this chapter is presented a review of empirical tests of the impact of psychological variables
on saving and debt. The chapter closes with a discussion of the results of research using a
psychological approach.
Psychological research on saving differs from economic research in several ways. A striking
difference is that the psychological research on saving is fragmented, while the economic
research is more thorough and consistent. Psychologists also tend to use different definitions of
saving than those used by economists. Psychologists often focus on active decisions to save,
while many economic models treat saving as a residual of consumption decisions. Moreover,
psychologists have a fundamentally different perspective of human beings. Psychologists focus
on the heterogeneity of savers - they assume that human beings do not react to stimuli
mechanically - while economists often focus on homogeneity. Consequently, psychologists and
economists often differ in their choice of explanatory variables. Finally, psychologists use a
different methodology when studying saving. For example, economists test the relative
importance of the precautionary saving motive and the bequest motive by testing the assumed
implications of the two motives using structural models. Psychologists approach the same
research question by asking people about why they save and which motive they consider the
most important.
Research results from the two fields do not necessarily conflict. Instead, we often find that they
are complementary and serve different purposes. As pointed out by Wåmeryd (1999: p 297):
The primary purpose of economic-psychological research on saving is to provide
descriptions and explanations of saving that are detailed and close to reality (cf. Katona,
1975; Simon, 1986; Lea et al., 1992). This enterprise is in no way in conflict with the
economic approach nor is it a competitor. It will be a source of ideas which can in the
long run become something more: a good descriptive and explanatory theory of savings
and saving behavior. We are not quite there yet.
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Many books and articles have been published in which both economic and psychological
approaches to economic behaviour are reviewed and discussed (e.g. Furnham & Lewis, 1986;
Lewis, Webley & Furnham, 1997; Maital, 1982; Maital & Maital, 1993; Lunt & Livingstone,
1992; Thaler, 1992; Wårneryd, 1999). Although they differ in scope and magnitude, the authors
seem to agree on one thing: we need more descriptive and psychological research on the
economic behaviour of individuals in order to restore economics' relevance to the human
condition. The authors mention numerous examples of economic behaviour that do not lend
themselves to being described by models of rational behaviour. One example is the division of
labour between spouses (Lewis et al., 1995). For an economist, it would be natural to predict that
the person who can earn the most "in the market" will be the breadwinner of a family.
Household members would try to maximise their outcome and divide labour between them in the
(economically) most efficient way. A psychologist, having a wider base of alternative
explanations to choose from, might instead argue that the division of labour also depends upon
factors such as social identity, preferences, values and cultural considerations. The same is true
for saving behaviour. Psychologists see the act of saving as embedded in a larger behavioural
layer of financial management, and do not limit explanations to economic stimuli alone 44.
In 1970, Olander and Seipel introduced their review of psychological approaches to the study of
saving with the following statement: "The phenomenon of saving has been dealt with in many
different economic theories, but several circumstances contribute to the fact that the factors
influencing the saving behavior of private individuals have not been investigated to any large
extent" (page l). Today, 30 years later, this statement stands as an introduction to this study.
Despite repeated calls for research both by economists and psychologists (e.g. Arndt, 1976;
Ferber, 1973; Katona, 1975; Maital & Maital, 1994; Van Veldhoven & Groenland, 1993;
Wåmeryd, 1989, 1999) that stress the importance of increased psychological research on saving,
empirical tests of the impact of psychological factors on saving are surprisingly scarce. The
review in this chapter contains results from studies that have had saving as the dependent
variable.
This chapter proceeds with a closer look at the ways psychologists defme saving and the
different approaches used, after which a review of the individual studies of saving is presented.
To facilitate the review, it is organised according to the variable in focus. The variables are
presented in the following order: expectations with regard to future economic conditions,
attitudes towards saving and borrowing, saving motives, impulsiveness, personality structure,
mental accounting, time perspective, risk taking and control of use of income and fmancial
coping.
3.2 PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDIES OF SAVING
The study of saving is located within a branch of psychology called economic psychology.
George Katona, being trained in both economics and psychology, is considered the founding
father of modem economic psychology, although the term was coined by Gabriel Tarde as long
ago as 1881 (see Wiimeryd, 1999). Katona's observation of the economic development towards
affiuent economies, in which the consumers have a great variety of postponable expenditures,
44 It is important to note that this difference is not necessarily due to economists being unaware of other variables
that might play a role. The difference is more a consequence of how models are built within the two fields.
Economists prefer to start with a simple model, and do not include new variables before empirical evidence suggests
that the first model is too simplistic.
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gave rise to increased focus on psychological variables in studies of consumption and saving.
Consumers' saving and spending decisions became increasingly more important for fluctuations
in the business circles and Katona (1975) argued that these fluctuations are influenced by
people's motivations, attitudes and expectations.
One of Katona's most important contributions to the savings literature was to develop an index
called the "Index of Consumer Sentiment" or the "Index of Consumer Expectations", which is
described below. Through repeated surveys throughout several decades, Katona and his
colleagues at the Survey Research Center at the University of Michigan demonstrated that
models including psychological variables could, in some cases, provide better predictions of
household saving and consumption thari pure economic models. Katona's research has served as
an important source of reference and inspiration for psychologists in exploring effects of
psychological variables on economic behaviour.
3.2.1 Definitions of saving
Economists and psychologists often measure saving in different ways. Economists being
concerned with predicting saving at the macro level, have often stressed that savings should be
measured accurately and should include a broad range of ways of saving. Many psychologists,
on the other hand, have been concerned with measuring what people mean about the word
"saving" (see for example Bloem & Groenland 1995; Lyck 1992) and argue that we should study
saving according to people's perception of the word saving. Some psychologists have therefore
studied perceived saving rather than actual saving.
The definition of saving used by Katona and his colleagues was similar to that used by
economists (see Lansing, 1954). However, Katona (1975) proposed a division of saving into
three different types that he labelled "discretionary saving", "contractual saving", and "residual
saving". They differ with respect to the decision processes underlying them. Discretionary
saving is saving deposits of income made in the present period. Contractual saving is saving
resulting from decisions in the past, such as down-payments on mortgages and saving contracts.
This saving is fixed and regular and requires no new decisions in the present period. Finally,
residual saving is saving in which is money "left over" by the end of the accounting period
without being a result of an explicit decision to save. Katona (1975) argued that it is important to
give special attention to discretionary saving, since it is this form of saving that will vary
between periods and therefore influence the business cycle.
Scherhorn and Fricke (1961) divided saving into "Ansparen", which means to increase the value
of assets, and "Absparen", which means reduction of debt. They studied the corresponding
saving ratios and found that they relate to income in different ways. The "Ansparen -ratio"
increases with income while the "Absparen-ratio" decreases.
Lindqvist (1983), inspired by Ferber (1973), distinguished between four different saving motives
and argued that they are hierarchically ordered. The motives were labelled: l) cash management,
2) buffer for unforeseen emergencies, 3) financial means for attaining a desired goal, and 4)
wealth management. The underlying idea is that people respond differently to economic stimuli
depending on which level in this hierarchy is most relevant to them. According to Lindqvist's
theory the motives are not considered direct causes of saving; rather, they are mediating factors
that might explain variation in reactions to economic stimuli, both in terms of saving and
portfolio choice. Wahlund (1991) has found some evidence that people on different levels in the
hierarchy responded differently to a tax reform.
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Lunt and Livingstone (1991) distinguished between recurrent saving and total savings. They
defined recurrent saving as saving done on a regular basis ("recurrent commitments to
discretionary savings") and total saving as liquid assets in banks and building societies. They
found that variation in regular saving was predicted by disposable income, savings, amount spent
on clothing and food, importance attached to the value of enjoyment and other psychological
variables. Total saving, on the other hand, was predicted by disposable income, demographic
variables, amount of money invested and purchases of insurance. Little of the variation in total
saving was predicted by the psychological variables. Similar results were reported by Daniel
(1997). She found that total saving was best predicted by age, while regular saving was
associated with a healthy current financial situation, tendency of the decision-maker to save
rather than spend a windfall income, high self-control and low time preference.
Results from these studies show that it might be important to distinguish between saving types.
Different factors playa role in different types of saving. These factors might be neutralised when
total saving is the dependent variable and the effects of psychological variables is difficult to
identify. This speaks in favour of having a more advanced perspective on saving when the
underlying processes behind saving are studied. Studying different types of saving in isolation
might be deemed necessary in order to understand the psychological mechanisms underlying
saving.
3.2.2 Approaches used in psychological studies of saving
Psychologists differ with respect to the approaches they use when they study saving. From the
psychological literature, three approaches can be identified:
1) Saving is a result of a goal-oriented decision process in which evaluation of all possible
outcomes concerning dispositions of income is assumed to be the underlying mechanism
behind decisions about saving and consumption (e.g. Julander, 1975; Olander & Seipel,
1970). So far, this hypothesis has not been tested empirically.
2) S-O-R models, in which psychological variables ("Organism variables") are assumed to
moderate effects of economic variables ("Stimuli variables") like income on saving
("Response variables") (e.g. Brandståtter, 1996, Julander, 1975; Katona, 1975; Lindqvist,
1981; Wahlund &Wårneryd, 1987).
3) Psychological variables (e.g. personality and attitudes) have an independent effect on
saving (e.g. Lunt & Livingstone, 1991).
With a few notable exceptions (e.g. Wårneryd, 1996a, 1996b) it is the third perspective that has
been subject to empirical testing. In the empirical work, researchers have made use of statistical
tools such as multivariate regression, which do not easily lend themselves to testing models that
include moderating or intervening variables. Instead, the stimulus and organism variables are
combined and the statistical tools used actually assume that little interaction between the
variables exists. For this reason, the S-O-R models of saving have hardly been tested empirically.
3.2.3 Concepts used in studies of saving
In the following section, some of the most important concepts applied in empirical studies on
saving are reviewed as well as the results from the studies. Some of the work of Katona (1975)
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on expectations and attitudes is a natural starting point. The review will then proceed with other
psychological variables that have been proposed more recently.
3.2.2.1 Expectations - optimism vs. pessimism
Katona and his colleagues at the Survey Research Center at the University at Michigan
conducted extensive surveys on the determinants of consumption and saving. In Katona's
opinion, the most important variables for predicting changes in consumption and saving were
income and expectations of future economic conditions (optimism or pessimism). Katona argued
that saving is a result of both ability to save (measured directly by disposable income) and
willingness to save (measured by how optimistic or pessimistic a person feels about the
development of the economy both at a personal and national level). Willingness to enter into new
credit agreements or to keep a low buffer for unforeseen events is a result of a high level of
consumer confidence with respect to future economic situation.
Katona suggested that psychological factors lead people to react to macro economic changes in
predictable ways. In particular, Katona (1975) disagreed with economists' faith in the laws of
large numbers and the assumption that individual differences cancel out on the aggregate level.
He argued that a variable like consumer expectation towards economic development is likely to
be uniform and distributed in a population rather than cancel out. The reason for this is that
economic news about business developments and economic policymaking are passed on to most
households via the mass media. Based on this framework and on empirical results from multiple
surveys using numerous questions about attitudes and expectations, the researchers at the Survey
Research Center at the University in Michigan developed an index called "The index of
consumer sentiment" (or "the index of consumer expectations"). The predictions based on the
ICS are not quantitative, but they are used to indicate the changes or turning points of business
circles.
The index consists of five questions, which cover three dimensions of consumer confidence and
attitudes towards the future:
-Two questions concern expectations about the personal fmancial situation: whether the family
expects to be financially better off, worse off or in the same situation compared to one year
earlier and whether they expect to be better off, worse off or the same one year hence.
-Two questions relate to expectations about the national economy as a whole: whether the next
year and the next five years will bring good or bad times.
-One question concerns expectations about the market situation (the prices and assortment of
goods offered): whether it is a good or a bad time to buy durable goods.
The results from repeated surveys on these dimensions using representative samples of the target
population provide economic forecasters with two useful measures. The first is a measure of
uncertainty with respect to the future. The ratio of uncertain respondents to the total number of
respondents gives an indication about the degree of uncertainty in the population. This measure
is used for adjusting predictions, since uncertainty tends to discourage consumption. The second
measure is obtained by calculating the ratio between optimistic and pessimistic respondents
while disregarding the uncertain respondents. Changes in the ratio over time provide an indicator
of aggregate economic behaviour. For example, when the ratio of optimistic people increases, it
is expected that consumption will increase, resulting in an upswing in the economy. The use of
this method in predicting business circles has spread to Australia and almost all European
countries but its usefulness has been subject to disagreement. Katona (1975) found support for
the index being an efficient indicator for development six months ahead and for changes in the
business circle (Katona, 1975). Mueller (1963) concluded that the Index of Consumer Sentiment
in combination with income data provides valuable information that cannot be obtained from
financial and business cycle indicators. Juster (1981) reported that changes in the index predicted
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personal saving and automobile sales at the aggregate level. Hymans (1970) and Sharpio (1972)
on the other hand, argued that variation in the ICS could be explained through objectively
measured economic antecedents and found that the contribution of the ICS to the prediction of
discretionary consumer spending was modest when economic indicators of a more objective
nature were included in the models. Vandel Abeele (1983) replicated these findings when
predicting new automobile registrations in four European countries. Williams and Defris (1981)
found that the index of consumer sentiment served as a useful predictor for short-term saving,
while the index had little effect on the consumption of durables and motor vehicles. They also
noted that real income and relative price effects were more important predictors. Finally, Carroll
et al (1994), analysing data from the US for the years 1955 - 1992, found that the ICS explained
14 % of the variation in the growth of total real consumption expenditures. However, they did
not find that the ICS contributed much beyond that of other available indicators.
According to Katona (1975), the Index of Consumer Sentiment failed to predict expenditure at
the micro level in both cross-sectional and panel studies. For this reason, the Survey Research
Center constructed a similar index for individuals. Using this moderated index, they found that
the median expenditures on durables of optimists was higher than those with middle attitudes,
who in turn spent more than the pessimists. Van Raaij and Gianotten (1990) tested the index of
consumer sentiment's ability to predict expenditures on durables, non-durables, "other things",
credit and saving. They found that that the expectation-oriented questions about the household
financial situation was a better predictor of saving than the questions concerning the
development of the general economic situation. They reported that the evaluation of the
development of the household financial situation is positively correlated with the consumption of
durables, credit and savings, while it is negatively correlated with the consumption of other
products and services. Disposable income was another important determinant of expenditure on
durable goods, credit and saving.
Gianotten and van Raaij (1982) examined consumer credit and saving as a function of income
and confidence. They found that the expectation of being able to save remained relatively stable
over time, while the expectation of utility of saving showed a cyclical pattern. Generally, the
more optimistic one is about the general economic situation, the more one expects to save, but
the utility of saving is unrelated to general economic expectations. Also Souleles (2001) found
that consumption was excessively sensitive to consumer sentiment Higher confidence is
correlated with less saving.
Lunt and Livingstone (1991) found that two items reflecting optimism ("expect to better off in
one year hence" and "feel better off compared to one year ago") discriminated between savers
and non-savers. Those who felt better off than before and were optimistic about their fmancial
future, were "savers". This is the opposite of what would be predicted by Katona's theory. These
items were not significant predictors of differences in saving. Moreover, they did not
discriminate between debtors and non-debtors or predict debt repayment (Livingstone & Lunt,
1992).
Webley and Nyhus (2001) used the data from the CentER Savings Survey and found that debtors
and non-debtors differed with respect to their five-year-income-expectation. Debtors were more
optimistic than the mild- and non-debtors, which might explain why they borrowed money in the
first place. This is in line with the life cycle hypothesis and Katona's theory.
The conclusions we may draw from this research is that the index of consumer sentiment is a
useful predictor for aggregate saving and expenditures, but it is not yet clear whether it
contributes much beyond other economic variables. With respect to predicting individual
behaviour, expectation data (measured by the les or by other methods) seem to be useful, but
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more research on the effect of expectations is necessary. The results concerning the relationship
between optimism and saving are contradictory.
3.2.2.2 Attitudes
Attitudes towards saving are assumed to be deeply rooted and connected with upbringing and
life style (Julander, 1975; Olander & Seipel, 1970). For example, both Keynes (1936) and
Katona (1975) argued that most people have positive attitudes towards saving. This may mean
that attitudes towards saving would not be expected to predict actual saving well, as indicated by
a failure to find any relationship between attitudes and saving in surveys. On the other hand, the
non-findings may be the result of the measurement of attitudes towards saving. Numerous
investigations have shown that when the relationship between attitudes and behaviour is studied
it is important that the items used to measure attitudes match the specificity of the behaviour in
focus. While most people are positive towards saving in general, they might differ in their
attitudes towards specific acts of saving and towards their own saving (as opposed to that of
others'). As there are so many different "saving acts", it might be necessary to use a substantial
number of items in order to cover all the relevant acts. The fact that people's reasons for (and
ways of) saving also vary merely adds to the challenge.
The general goal of studying the relationship between attitudes towards saving and saving is to
establish whether differences in attitudes or changes in them predict saving or a change in saving
behaviour. A stream of research projects on the effect of attitudes and other psychological
variables on household saving were carried out at the Stockholm School of Economics from the
end of the 1960s until the beginning of the 1980s. Julander (1975) carried out an experiment on
215 young single women in Stockholm in order to establish the effect of feedback on saving
behaviour. He found that attitudes towards saving correlated positively with each measure of
saving. He measured "saving in the past month", "saving last year", "regular saving
arrangements", "saving in the 32 days before the time of the interview", "how much of the
respondents' last month's salary was left the day before payday", and "balance on bank
accounts".
A second project commenced in the second half of the 1970s. One its purpose was to fmd cheap
and reliable proxies for household saving and wealth. Another was to investigate the impact of
some psychological variables on saving. The project was composed of three rounds of data
collection: I) personal interviews with 50 households in Stockholm, 2) telephone interviews with
200 randomly chosen Swedish households, and 3) telephone interviews with 400 randomly
chosen Swedish households. In these projects, great emphasis was put on the role of attitudes
towards saving. In the first study, 17 attitude questions were included, which were then used to
build an index. The researchers identified four factors with a Cronbach's alpha" higher than 0.6,
and these were used in the second and third round of data collection. The factors did not
correlate with the saving measures'? used in the first study, but some significant relationships
were found in the second and third study. Lindqvist et al (1978) reported the fmdings from the
second study. Attitudes towards saving were, in general, quite positive among all respondents,
but they were more favourable among elderly people. The researchers could not, however,
deduce whether this is an age effect or a cohort effect, as they had cross-sectional data. Using the
same three measures of saving as reported above, they did not fmd any strong relationships
between saving and attitudes. Two of the factors (these were modified versions of the ones found
45 Chronbach's alpha is a summary measure of the intercorrelations that exist among a set of items. It is commonly
used to assess reliability.
46 These are "changes in assets and asset components the past month", "changes in assets and asset components the
past three months", "expectations and plans to save the next six months", "number of assets components", and "use
of savings".
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in the first study) correlated positively with the total bank saving and some other assets
components. They also found that people with a positive attitude towards saving tended to have
more diversified economic portfolios.
In the third study, Lindqvist (1981) tested the effects of attitudes towards saving and four
different estimates of saving. These were stated bank saving (banking accounts, stocks and
bonds), repayments of debts, total savings and a liquidity estimate (the amount the household
could withdraw from the bank at the time of the interview). He controlled for household income,
family size and composition, educational level of husband and wife, employment, and type of
residence. Using a fourteen-item scale for attitudes, he reported that they had little predictive
power. However, his study suffered from two serious weaknesses. The scale used for measuring
attitudes consisted of three points that were labelled: "strongly agree", "partly agree" and "don't
agree" (Lindqvist, 1981). The high reported Cronbach's alpha of .96, could be due to the few
points on the scale and that the scale is asymmetric. Moreover, the measures of saving were not
adequate. Respondents were asked about changes during the past three months. One indication
that the measures were inadequate was that none of the economic variables (for example,
income) were related to bank saving.
Furnham (1985) investigated attitudes towards saving in Britain. More specifically, he
investigated the relationship between attitudes and variables such as age, sex, education,
likelihood of voting, and income. Attitudes toward saving and habits of saving were measured
using a l5-item 7-point agree: (7) disagree (1) scale. A Factor Analysis revealed five clearly-
interpretable factors, which accounted for over 55% of the variance. These were labelled
"pointlessness of saving", "benefits of saving","wealth", "denial", and "investments". He found
that education could discriminate between the various saving attitudes: the higher- and lower-
educated held negative attitudes towards saving, while the middle-educated were more positive.
Age was linearly related to saving attitudes (older people were more positive with respect to
saving). In addition, conservatism and alienation were found to have a relationship with certain
attitude dimensions. Furnham found that although older, left-wing, lower-income, more-
alienated people believed saving to be pointless, they did recognise its benefits, He concluded
that people can hold different attitudes towards their own saving as opposed to attitudes towards
saving in general. The relationship between attitudes and saving could not be analysed due to a
lack of variation in both how regularly the respondents saved and in their saving-to-income
ratios. In addition, this study suffered from weaknesses that might have affected the results. First,
the applied sampling technique was rather unorthodox, as the respondents were sampled in three
different ways. The sample came from two university subject panels, colleges of further
education and departments of external studies, and one third were recruited by post and by
undergraduate students in their hometowns. This might have influenced the results regarding
education. Secondly, the data collection procedure differed between the subjects. Thirdly,
Furnham (1985) did not specify the level of analysis. He collected data at the individual level,
but he did not report whether he asked people about their personal saving or their household
saving.
In their study of determinants of saving, Lunt and Livingstone (1991) found that one attitude
item was significantly related to recurrent saving. The more people save, the more inclined they
are to disagree with the notion that being in debt means people do not manage their money
properly. The attitude items used in their study did not contribute towards an explanation of total
saving.
Wåmeryd (1996b) tested a model similar to Ajzen's Theory of Planned Behaviour (Ajzen,
1991), using structural equation modelling and data from the CentER Savings Survey. Because
this data set was not tailored for his study, Wiirneryd's model deviated from that of Ajzen (1991)
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by not including attitude measures reflecting specific actions to save. Proxies had to be used for
the variables "subjective norms" and "perceived control". Wiimeryd analysed 21 attitude-to-
saving items and identified five orthogonal factors, which he labelled "thrift", "no need to save",
"saving involvement", "shame of debt", and "saving habits". These factors accounted for 47% of
the variance. Webley and Nyhus (2001) found some confirmation of this factor structure using
data from other waves of the data collection for the CSS. Contrary to expectations, Wiimeryd
found a negative relationship between attitude towards saving and intention to save. This could
be explained by three other fmdings: 1) attitudes were positively correlated with age and age was
negatively correlated with saving, 2) women were more positive towards saving than men
(independently of whether they had saved or not, but women still reported less intention to save
than men) and 3) certain savers were less positive towards saving than non-savers. Interestingly,
Wiimeryd found that the highest values for thrift were found among women whose households
did not save and did not plan to save. This might indicate that behaviour influences attitudes:
those who save, do not see much use of further saving and their attitudes are less positive than
for those who do not save, but would have liked to save. Wåmeryd also mentioned that
contractual saving and being forced to payoff debt can explain why we find a negative
relationship between saving and attitudes towards saving.
Some studies have focussed on attitudes towards debt. Attitudes towards debt and credit were
found to be relevant by Livingstone and Lunt (1992) and Lea, Webley and Levin (1993), but not
by Lea, Webley and Walker (1995). Livingstone and Lunt (1992) reported that four attitude
items concerning attitudes towards debt significantly discriminated between debtors and non-
debtors. Those who had no debt held negative attitudes towards debt, while those in debt tended
to think that credit makes life easier. However, among those with debt, these attitude statements
could predict neither the amount of debt nor debt repayment. Other attitude statements were
significant when predicting amount of debt. The more positive attitudes towards debt a person
had, the more debt he/she repaid
Lea et al (1993) studied people with no debt, mild debt, or serious debt to the Welsh Water
Company. Non-debtors were those with no outstanding debt to the company, mild debtors were
those who had received a second request for payment and who had yet not paid the bill at the
time of the study, and serious debtors were defmed as those against whom court proceedings for
recovery of debt had been initiated. Using a twelve-item attitude scale, they found that serious
debtors held slightly more permissive attitudes towards debt than the non-debtors, although no
group can be described as being positive towards debt.
Lea et al (1995) performed a new study of the customers of the Welsh Water Company in which
they put more effort in developing an attitude scale than had been in Lea et al (1993). Lea et al
(1995) carried out a preliminary analysis in order to develop a satisfactory attitude scale
following psychometrical methods. A set of 17 items was selected for use and the Cronbach's
alpha for this scale was 0.77. This scale did not differ significantly between the non-debtors,
mild-debtors and serious debtors. A Factor Analysis resulted in five factors with Eigenvalues
greater than 1.047• Scales corresponding to these five factors were constructed and tested for
differences between the groups. Only one of these factors showed significant differences
between the three debt-groups. This factor contained items that most closely related to money
management.
Davies and Lea (1995) and Webley and Nyhus (2001) found some support for the assertion that
attitudes towards debt are a consequence of debt rather than a cause. Davies and Lea collected
47 The Eigenvalue expresses the amount of variance explained by a factor. An Eigenvalue greater than 1.0 means
that the factor accounts for the variation in at least one item.
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data from 140 undergraduate students at the University of Exeter and found a higher tolerance of
debt in students who had been at university longer. The attitude score was slightly anti-debt in
the first year, when the average of debt was £53 and 25% of the students were in debt, while the
attitude score was strongly pro-debt in the third year when the average of debt was £527 and
65% of the students were in debt. Further analyses showed that the increase in debt occurred
earlier in students' careers than the increase in tolerance towards debt. Davis and Lea ascribed
this to attitude adjustments designed to ensure consistency between behaviour and attitudes.
Webley and Nyhus, using data from three waves of the CSS, found that debtors were less
unfavourable towards debts than mild debtors and non-debtors. Further analyses, using a cross-
lagged panel design, provided some evidence that being in debt modifies one's attitudes towards
debt. Both studies indicated that attitudes towards debt might be adaptive. Attitudes change after
debt has been incurred. This causal direction would be in line with Festinger's (1954) cognitive
dissonance theory. Nevertheless, the relationship needs to be studied further, as the study by
Davies and Lea was a pseudo-longitudinal study rather than a true longitudinal one. Moreover,
panel attrition might have affected the results of Webley and Nyhus.
3. 2. 2. 3 Purposes and motives of saving
Both psychologists and economists have studied the reasons for saving behaviour. Keynes
(1936) proposed eight saving motives (see Chapter 2), while Lindqvist (1981) proposed four.
Lindqvist (1981) proposed a hierarchy of saving motives inspired by Ferber's (1973) suggestion
that households' financial decisions consist of four types: cash management, consumption
decisions, saving decisions and assets management. Cash management involves decisions
concerning the households' handling of money: how regular expenses are paid, the number of or
types of bank accounts the household owns, etc. Consumption decisions concem both routine
purchases and strategic purchases of consumer durables. These decisions might result in saving
or borrowing decisions. Saving decisions are decisions in which the allocation of income
between now and later periods are made. According to Ferber, available resources and household
members' goals and attitudes will influence these decisions. Other influential factors might be
the household composition, life style and news from mass media and reference groups. Asset
management deals with how the saved money is invested; i.e. portfolio choice. The household
has to decide the time horizon and the risk to which they are willing to expose their savings.
According to Lindqvist, this division corresponds to the function of bankbooks in households
found in a German study by Schmolders (1969). He found that bankbooks serve four functions:
daily expenses, saving for consumption, precautionary reasons and increasing assets. Building on
these findings, Lindqvist proposed that it is possible to define a hierarchy of saving motives: 1)
The cash management motive, which means that a household has to keep a liquid reserve so that
expenses and bills can be paid. This motive is caused by the fact that salary often is paid once a
month, while bills and expenses have to be paid on a more continual base. 2) The buffer and
safety motive, which means that people need to have a (liquid) reserve to cover unexpected
expenses. 3) The goal saving motive, which stems from the fact that some products (holidays,
durables, or accommodation) are so expensive that the consumer needs to save to be able to buy
them. 4) The asset management motive requires that the other three motives are satisfied. This
motive arises when a household has a satisfactory reserve of liquid means for unexpected
expenses and their planned purchases. It concerns the needs to choose the suitable portfolio for
savings exceeding the necessary liquid reserve.
Wahlund and Wåmeryd (1987), and Wahlund (1991), found support for this saving hierarchy.
Wahlund and Wåmeryd performed a Cluster Analyses on a sample of Swedish males and found
four clusters that could be called, respectively, cash managers, buffer savers, goal savers and
wealth managers according to their most important saving motive. Wahlund (1991) studied the
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effect of a Swedish tax reform and found that the four types of households responded differently
to the reform depending on their place in Lindqvist's saving motive hierarchy. The reform was
constructed to reduce debts and increase saving, but Wahlund found that cash managers dissaved
after the reform was introduced, while the wealth managers acted according to their intentions.
Psychologists have studied the purposes or motives of saving by asking people why they save.
Table 3.1 reports the results from two surveys conducted in 1960 and 1966, in which people
were asked about their reasons for saving (Katona, 1975).
Table 3.1
Purposes of saving
Pu_rpose of saving_ 1960 1966
Rainy day 46% 45%
Retirement/old age 27% 31%
Children's needs 25% 22%
Buying a house 8% 8%
Buying a durable good 6% 7%
Total * *
Source: Katona (1975, Table 15-1 page 235)
Note: Totals add up to more than 100"10because some
respondents mentioned more than one purpose.
The table reports frequencies in percent.
Only purposes mentioned by more that 3% of the respondents are listed.
Katona grouped the reported reasons for saving into the following categories:
1. For emergencies. This corresponds to the economic "precautionary saving motive",
which implies reserving funds for "rainy days".
2. For retirement. Includes retirement and money needed for old age.
3. For children and family needs. This includes expenditures associated with raising
children and their education.
4. Other purposes. This includes buying a house or saving for a vacation.
Furthermore, Katona (1975) reported that few respondents mentioned saving for the purpose of
improving one's future standard of living, earning interest or bequeathing money to their heirs.
In spite of this, these motives are frequently mentioned by economists in studies of saving.
Both economists and psychologists agree that people have reasons for saving and that saving
might differ with respect to which motive is the most important. Some research has supported
the hypotheses that people with different saving motives respond differently to economic stimuli
(Wahlund & Wårneryd, 1987). Still, little has been done in order to develop this research further.
For example, the saving motives vary with respect to the time perspectives they imply. Saving
for old age implies more long-term planning than saving for a specific vacation that is likely to
imply a much shorter period. Saving for a "rainy day", on the other hand, is less associated with
a specific time period. It might be beneficial to investigate how the length of the time periods
involved with the savings motives will interact with the ability to control expenditures, the
impatience to spend, and the attitudes towards saving and borrowing. Furthermore, saving
motives might be related to the planning horizon people use and their expectations about future
economic expectations.
3.2.2.4 Impulsiveness
Impulse control has been associated with self-control and the ability to delay gratification (see
Daniel, 1997). Impulse control relates to the extent a decision-maker thinks about advantages
and disadvantages before making decisions. Individual differences in delay of gratification
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behaviour are considered behavioural manifestations of a general disposition to contain impulses
and desires. It is expected that impulsiveness will be negatively correlated with saving.
Julander (1975) found that impulsiveness correlated negatively with several of the different
measures he used for saving (see 3.2.2.2). A low degree of impulsiveness was related with high
saving. In his study, impulsiveness was measured using Barrette's index of "lack of impulse
control", which consists of items meant to measure the degree to which a person likes to do
things that require patience.
Daniel (1997) studied the relationship between saving behaviour and impulsiveness together
with related concepts such as impatience, time preference, the ability to delay gratification, self-
control and consideration of future consequences. Data were collected from 110households in
South-West England and analyses were conducted both at individual and at spouse level. Saving
was measured as total saving and recurrent saving (amounts saved regularly). Impulsiveness was
significant in some parts of the analyses of recurrent saving, but the fmding was not robust.
Depending on the methods of analyses, different psychological variables were significant.
3.2.2.5 Personality structure
Although the links between saving behaviour and personality were identified over thirty years
ago (Schmolders, 1966), few studies have addressed the relationship between personality
structure and saving behaviour. Traditionally, economists have not considered the concept to be
of much importance, since they are interested in changes over time, whereas personality traits
are, necessarily, stable over time (Wiimeryd, 1999). Psychologists' interest in household
economic behaviour has been limited and psychologists have failed to establish the relationship
between personality and saving. However, the concept might be important in explaining
individual differences in saving, and the few psychological studies that have been conducted in
order to study the effect of personality structure are reviewed below.
Within the field of psychology, controversy exists about which personality factors are the most
important. Consensus concerning the matter is increasing in favour of a model of personality
structure comprising five dimensions: Extraversion (vs. Introversion), Agreeableness (vs.
Dominance), Conscientiousness (vs. Inconscientiousness), Emotional stability (vs. Neuroticism),
and Intellect (vs. Openness) (Digman, 1990). Some of these dimensions might be associated with
the willingness and ability to delay gratification and, therefore, with saving behaviour. For
example, Wårneryd (1996a; 1999; 2000) linked the concept of thrift, which has been considered
being a stable personal characteristic important for saving, to the dimension "conscientiousness",
while Brandståtter (1996) proposed that stable introverts might score low on impulsiveness while
unstable (or neurotic) extroverts might score high on impulsiveness".
Routh and Burgoyne (1991) tested the relationship between the "Big Five" personality factors
and "absent-mindedness with money". Absentmindedness refers to a range of human mistakes,
slips and lapses, and the authors designed an instrument to measure absentmindedness in the
domain of money (AWMQ). The instrument contained thirty questions for assessing a person's
proneness to commit everyday errors involving money. The scale used for measuring the five
personality factors contained 181 items (the NEO-PI). They found a high negative correlation
between the AWMQ and the measure of conscientiousness. The correlation coefficients between
the AWMQ and the other four personality factors were low. Hence, more consciousness people
48 He relied on a study by Schmolders (1966) (as cited in Brandståtter, 1996), who found that both attitudes towards
saving as well as actual saving behaviour were deeply rooted in personality. Conscientious, self-disciplined people,
compared to the easy going, carefree people, were three times as often saving regularly and saved on the average 10-
12% of their income compared to 5 -7 % of the opposite type of persons.
Chapter 3:The psychological approach to saving 79
are less absentminded with respect to money. Relying on their own work as well as previous
studies that showed similar results, Routh and Burgoyne (1991) concluded that their study
established the importance of considering conscientiousness when seeking to understand
behaviour involving money. Similar conclusions were reached by Wårneryd (1996), who found
that conscientiousness was the most important personality dimension associated with fmancial
self-control.
The CSS contains the 16PA personality adjective list developed by Brandståtter (1988). The
index contains 32 bipolar scales of adiectives'", two for each of the original 16 dimensions of
Cattell's second order personality dimensions (the so-called Cattell's 16PF test) (Schneewind,
Schroder & Cattell, 1983). It is an index that takes five to seven minutes for the respondents to
answer and, according to Brandståtter (1988), it represents a sufficiently reliable substitute for
the full personality scales, which often comprise hundreds of questions. Hence, the scale should
be well suited for surveys. The idea is that these personality dimensions might moderate some of
the most theoretically important causal effects between economic factors and saving behaviour.
Brandståtter (1996) argued that the personality traits are broad and abstract variables and one
should not expect strong relationships with behaviour. Instead, the personality traits might affect
attitudes and intentions, which in turn will influence behaviour.
Brandståtter (1996), analysing the CSS data", found that the three dimensions "emotional
stability", "introversion", and "conscientiousness" are related to saving (saving was measured as
self-reported saving the previous year). He did not propose direct relationships between the five
factors and saving, but he suggested that the personality factors predominantly would influence
saving attitudes, which in the next round would influence saving behaviour. He also proposed
specific interaction effects between the factors. For example, he proposed that extroversion
causes a larger difference in saving with emotionally unstable subjects than with emotionally
stable subjects. Conscientiousness was also assumed to dampen the influence of extroversion on
saving. Brandståtter found that couples scoring high on conscientiousness found saving
attractive, and more so if they also were introvert. However, when saving attitudes were included
in the model, conscientiousness lost its impact. Brandståtter also found that the relationship
between saving attitudes and actual saving was stronger among introverts than among extroverts.
He also reported that there was a relationship between the personality factors and household
income, which makes it unclear how large the pure effect of these factors is on saving. The
personality factors were only found significant predictors if they were entered before the socio-
economic factors.
Wårneryd (1996a) found similar results as Brandståtter when using the same data set and the
16PA when measuring the personality dimensions. He used reported saving motives, saving
attitudes, and saving behaviour as dependent variables and found that conscientiousness and
inflexibility were significantly related to intention to save and saving behaviour. The strength of
the relationship was mediated by saving attitudes. Saving attitudes were also found to be
influenced by saving motives, which had no direct influence on saving. Overall, different
personality traits correlated significantly with different attitude factors, saving motives and
saving behaviour. But the results were not always robust, as they were not significant in both
panels (the representative panel and the high income panel - see Chapter 5 for a description of
the panels) and some results were also difficult to interpret, as the direction of influence was
opposite from what was expected. It is also difficult to compare the results of Brandståtter's and
Wårneryd's studies since there is considerable disagreement between the factor structures they
49 Sixteen questions were included in the first wave of data collection, while the other sixteen were included in the
second wave.
50 Brandstiitter used the sixteen items collected in the first wave of data collection.
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found when analysing the personality data. Only the conscientiousness factor was formed by the
same items across the two studies. As few as eight of the items used in Brandståtter's analysis
loaded on the same factors as in Wårneryd's study. This might explain why different personality
factors came out significant in the two studies. Webley and Nyhus (2001), analysing personality
data from more waves, found the factor structure reported by Wårneryd (1996a) to be robust.
They also reported that it had some relationship with being in debt.
In a second study of the CSSdata, Wårneryd (2000) analysed the Five-Factor Personality
Inventory (FFPI) (Hendriks, Hofstee, De Raad & Angleitner, 1999), which consists of 100 items
(these were collected in the fourth wave of the CSS taking place in 1996). He used only the sub-
scale for "conscientiousness" and found that it was a significant predictor for "financial
situation", "saving habits", and "saved sum". The increase in pseudo-Ri was rather low when
conscientiousness was added to the equation (containing socio-economic variables), so inclusion
of the variable did not contribute greatly towards explaining variance in financial behaviour.
In a recent study, Nyhus and Webley (2001), used the CSS data to explore the effect of
personality on six different measures of saving (liquid saving, investment saving, insurance
saving, debt, total saving and plans to save). They used both the l6PA and the FFPI to see
whether the personality variables contributed towards explaining variations in saving. As the
factors derived from the two indexes only partly overlapped, they used nine personality factors in
the analyses. They found that three personality factors - emotional stability, autonomy and
extraversion - were robust predictors of saving and borrowing behaviour. Agreeableness,
inflexibility and tough-mindedness could explain certain types of saving. The inclusion of the
personality factors significantly increased the explained variance in saving. Evaluating all the
studies reviewed above together, we may conclude that the personality factors seem to be
important for explaining individual differences in saving but more research is necessary to
explore the nature of the impact of these traits further.
3.2.2.6 Mental accounting
In some of the most recent contributions within the saving literature, the concept of mental
accounting receives some attention. The idea is that people allocate previous (current assets),
present, and future income to different mental accounts, and that their willingness to use money
from these accounts differs. Mental accounting describes the process of coding, categorising and
evaluating final financial outcomes. For example, Shefrin and Thaler (1988) proposed that the
marginal propensity to spend will be highest for present income and lowest for future income
(see Chapter 2), and they reported results from an experiment where students had expressed that
they expected to consume more during a year if money was coded as current income. The
students were less willing to use savings and least willing to spend future income.
Karlsson, Garling and Selart (1997) performed two experiments on Swedish undergraduate
students in order to test whether the propensity to consume varied for current income and assets.
They found that the propensity to consume was greater when subjects were asked to imagine that
they received an income increase than when they were asked to imagine that they experienced an
income decrease with saved money available. The total amount of available money was equal
between the two situations. The results of Shefrin and Thaler were replicated in this study. In a
different study, Selart, Karlsson and Garling (1997) collected data from a nationwide Swedish
sample (996 individuals) and a student sample (277 randomly-selected undergraduate students)
in a second attempt to replicate the results of Shefrin and Thaler. In this study, they found that
subjects expected to consume more when they were asked to imagine that an income increase
would be received as an immediate lump sum than when the income increase would be received
as future monthly increments. Selart et al. interpreted this as being contrary to the predictions of
the Behavioural Life Cycle Hypothesis. There is, however, a possibility that the respondents
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have perceived the (future) monthly increments as future income, and the findings are then in
accordance with the BLCH. The results are still puzzling, since the alternative with the monthly
increments was described as a permanent income change. The net value of this alternative was
therefore much higher than for the two lump-sum alternatives. For this reason, it would be
natural to expect that the willingness to consume would be highest for the monthly-increment
alternative.
The results from the research on mental accounting suggest that the assumption about fungibility
of money does not hold. It might, therefore, be sensible to take people's labels of their money
into account when predicting saving and consumption. We still know little about the process of
labelling money. For example, we do not know the threshold value of an income increase that
determines whether an increase will be labelled asset instead of income. We also need to know
whether the threshold value varies between individuals or households and which factors that
might influence the threshold value. Only with this knowledge will we be able to improve
predictions of the effect of an income increase on saving based on the concept of mental
accounting.
3.2.2.7 Time perspective and time horizon
Time horizon, in this context, expresses how far into the future a person plan their consumption.
In Modigliani and Brumberg's life cycle hypothesis described in Chapter 2, the time horizon is
set equal to the expected remaining lifetime. Friedman, the creator of the Permanent Income
Hypothesis, used consumption data to estimate people's time horizon and concluded that it is
three to four years. Other economists have argued that the time horizon lasts longer than a
person's remaining lifetime, as people take the needs of their heirs into account (e.g. Barro,
1974).
Psychologists have studied time horizons by asking people about whether they make plans or not
with respect to economic decisions and about the length of their planning horizon. Responses to
these questions suggest that time horizons vary between individuals and between purchasing
situations. The overall conclusion from the studies is that people with a longer planning horizon
save more. Juiander (1975) found that future time perspective is positively related to saving. He
defmed time perspective as "the degree to which the future is seen as predictable structured and
controllable" and he used an index consisting of twelve statements about the future to measure it.
Lea et al (1995) found that the debtors' time horizon was shorter than that of non-debtors and
mild debtors. Wåmeryd (2000) used a "Future-orientation" -scale, which was included in the
fourth wave of the CSS, and found that foresight was positively related to financial situation,
saving habits, and savings. Webley and Nyhus (2001) found that people with debt problems had
a shorter time horizon than others. However, a dynamic analysis indicated that the shorter
horizon was more likely to be a result of the debt problems rather than a cause. The causal
direction is uncertain and further work is required to clarify the relation between saving and time
horizon.
3.2.2.8 Risk taking
Dahlbåck (1991) studied the effect of risk taking on saving among single-person households in
Sweden. Treating propensity to take risk as an enduring trait variable, he argued that people's
propensity to take risk would influence saving and portfolio choice. He constructed an index of
propensity to take risk by asking subjects about their risk-taking across various situations. He
found that cautious persons tended to have a lower burden of debt and were more likely to have a
larger portion of their total savings in bank accounts. He did not fmd, however, a relationship
between caution and total net capital. The index used for measuring propensity to take risk was
only weakly related to a variable called "the security motive" of saving.
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3.2.2.9 Control with use of income andfinancial coping
Julander (1975) studied the influence of keeping track of expenses using a diary, knowledge
about how income was spent and to what degree goals were accomplished on saving. He also
studied the relationships between these explanatory variables. His sample consisted of women
between 24 and 28 years of age living in one-person-households in Stockholm. They also had
full-time jobs, were without any university degree and had a taxable income between SEK 16000
and 20000. He did not find the results he expected. First, satisfaction with saving and use of
income declined among the respondents who had kept track of their expenses for a month.
Second, the effect of bookkeeping on saving was not straightforward. Julander (1975) found that
those reporting the highest variable expenditures reduced .their saving after practising
bookkeeping for a month, while he found the opposite effect among those who had reported low
variable expenditure.
Lunt and Livingstone (1992) reported that those who did not save regularly felt less in control of
their finances and did not monitor their finances as well as the people who saved regularly. Non-
savers were also more fatalistic than savers. Non-savers preferred flexible strategies in their
financial management while savers used a more fixed financial management. However, the
question remains about what is cause and effect here. We do not know whether it is lack of
saving that makes people feel they have little control or whether lack of saving is caused by little
control.
3.3 WEAKNESSES OF PSYCHOLOGICAL RESEARCH
One problem with the studies reviewed above is that they are difficult to compare. Thus, it is not
always possible to link results to any general theory of saving. One reason is the differences in
the defmitions of saving, as discussed in the introduction of this chapter. A second problem is the
large number of independent variables used in the studies. Some studies can be characterised as
fishing expeditions in which questions are added to questionnaires without being associated to
any theoretical construct. It seems that the researchers have not given much thought to which
theoretical concepts they want to measure and which impact they are expected to have on the
behaviour in focus. Results are sometimes reported at the item level instead of at construct level.
This makes theory development in this area of research difficult. For example, Julander (1975)
used variables like "perception of how easy/difficult it is to make ends meet", "attitudes towards
book keeping", "attitudes towards planning", "attitudes towards more leisure time", "satisfaction
with standard of living", "how often one feels tired and depressed" in his study of saving
(Julander, 1975). Questions meant to measure these variables are asked and a significant
correlation between them and saving is found, but it is difficult to relate these findings to any
general saving theory. Likewise, Lunt and Livingstone (1991) reported that the following
variables predict recurring saving: "The use of for-sale columns in newspapers", "frequency of
shopping around for the best buy", "discuss money with friends", "attitude to debt as bad
management", and ''value of enjoyment". Livingstone and Lunt (1992) found that "think about
money", "enjoyment of shopping for clothes", "shop in favourite shops" may be used as
predictors for personal debt. It is not self-evident which theoretical construct these psychological
items are meant to tap. The measurement scales or indexes are not reported and the relationships
between the variables are not further explained.
A third problem is that it is difficult to conclude anything about the relationships between the
different psychological variables. Empirical tests suggest that attitudes towards saving and debt,
saving motives, and personality factors are related, but we do not know much about how they are
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related. We also need to know more about causes and effects with respect to these variables. A
fourth problem is that the studies vary with respect to level of analysis. Ideally, the household or
the decision unit within a household should be the unit of analyses. Instead, many psychological
studies are done at the individual level, without giving any account for how the problem of
common assets and joint decision-making is avoided (e.g. Furnham, 1985; Webley & Nyhus,
2001). Research by Gunnarsson (1999) and Daniel (1997) showed that results were affected by
the level of analyses and also by how the data are aggregated.
3.4 CONCLUSION
The reviews presented in this chapter and the previous one show that psychology has a lot to
offer with respect to increasing our understanding of individual saving behaviour. The economic
literature on saving is rich on plausible theories about which psychological mechanisms
influence the choice between saving and consumption. Unfortunately, many of these theories
have not been subject to empirical analysis, which make them little more than deductive theories
of saving. Psychologists can contribute towards testing the psychology-based assumptions
underlying the economic models.
Many studies have shown that the inclusion of psychological variables in saving models
increases the explained variance in saving. Beyond that, we know little about the size of the
impact of the psychological variables on saving and the relationships between the psychological
variables. We also need to establish whether the psychological variables are causes or effects.
Empirical psychological research on saving behaviour is in its infancy, and we need extensive
and systematic research before we can develop a psychological model of saving.
The most significant contribution of psychological research to the saving literature is the
inclusion of subjective expectation in saving models. As shown in the previous chapter, this way
of measuring expectations has been adopted by some economists. This variable can be used
successfully in studies at both the micro- and macro-economic levels. Saving motives, attitudes,
and individual time horizon have been found to have an effect on saving. In addition, these
variables might be useful in investigations of aggregate behaviour, as they might be used as a
criterion for segmenting the population. Psychologists are also focussing more on individual
traits that might be important for saving behaviour, such as personality, impulsiveness, and self-
control. Although these variables will be difficult to use in macro analyses of saving, they might
contribute with respect to explaining the large individual variance in saving left unexplained by
economic models. Some of the fmdings presented in this chapter can also be used as support for
some of the economic models presented in Chapter 2. For example, Wårneryd (1996b) found
some indication that those who save do not see much use of further saving and their attitudes are
less positive than for those who do not save, but would have liked to save. This finding supports
the ideas behind the buffer stock model: People prefer to have a buffer against unforeseen
emergencies and people who have a satisfactory buffer are not interested in further saving.
3.5IMPORTANT PSYCHOLOGICAL CONCEPTS IN THE SAVING LITERATURE
The first research question to be addressed in this study was: Which of the psychological
explanations for saving found in the existing economic and economic psychological literature are
supported by empirical findings? The reviews presented in Chapters 2 and 3 show that many
plausible relationships between economic and psychological variables and saving have been
proposed. The review also shows that the empirical foundations for most of these theories are
quite uncertain. Although it is tempting to propose and test a general economic-psychological
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theory of saving, it is not advisable because the primary need must be to identify the most
important factors. This identification must be empirical. We have to establish which of the
proposed factors are the most important for saving behaviour before putting them together in a
model.
It is sensible to follow Katona's (1975) suggestion when summansmg the most important
psychological saving theories. He proposed to study both ability and willingness to save when
studying household saving behaviour. Katona spoke predominantly about income as the ability
factor and expectations about the future as determining the willingness to save. The reviews
presented suggest that this framework can be used and further developed.
The psychological factor mentioned most frequently in the savings literature is time preference.
Time preference is almost equivalent to an individual's willingness to save because it captures
the preference for immediate consumption as opposed to future consumption. The results from
empirical investigations of the relationship between time preference and saving are not
conclusive, though some confirming evidence exists. Experimental studies also make it clear that
one of the problems that must be solved before we can learn more about this relationship the
measurement of time preference.
Several factors proposed as important psychological determinants of saving might influence the
willingness to save. In particular, the possibility that we do not adequately imagine the intensity
of our future feelings has been the topic of many discussions about saving behaviour. If we fail
to consider the utility we derive from consumption in the future, we might fail to save enough,
because we will put too much weight on the utility derived from present consumption. Several
authors advocate that time preference or willingness to save is related to, and might be
determined by, the time horizon people use when planning their economic behaviour. If people
use a short time horizon, time beyond the horizon is given no weight, which might result in focus
on consumption of the present and inadequate saving for the future. Some empirical support for
such a relationship between time horizon and saving and borrowing exists. Time preference and
willingness to save is also thought to be influenced by people's expectations about their future
income and expenditures. If a person is optimistic, he or she is less willing to save and more
willing to borrow, while pessimism makes a person more concerned about the future and more
willing to save. This relationship receives some empirical support.
Results from surveys show that people differ in the reasons or motives they have for saving.
Some people want to earn interest while others want to have security by having an economic
buffer against unforeseen emergencies. Empirical findings support that the saving motives might
have some effect on the levels of saving. However, research so far has only established the
existence of the motives and some estimates of how much saving that might be attributed to the
motives (in particular, the precautionary saving motive). No study has investigated whether
individual differences in the perception of how important the motives are have any influence on
saving. Few studies have also investigated why people vary in their saving motives. For
example, the precautionary saving motive might be related to both risk attitude and the
uncertainty with respect to future income and expenditures. Uncertainty has been found to
encourage saving, while positive attitudes towards risk might have the opposite effect. Other
frequently mentioned saving motives are retirement and children's needs. Their importance is
most likely to vary over the life cycle.
Although not proposed in the reviewed literature, it is possible that the influence of reference
groups might affect the willingness to save. If people feel deprived with respect to their
consumption, their willingness to save might be weak. Some empirical studies support the idea
that saving (or consumption level) is influenced by the consumption of others. It is also likely
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that trait variables such as attitudes towards saving and debt and personality factors are important
for explaining individual differences in the willingness to save. Empirical research suggests that
these factors have an independent effect on saving. These factors might also be related to the
importance people assign the different saving motives.
Katona (1975) mentioned economic resources as a primary determinant in the ability to save.
The findings reported above suggest that we should add some psychological variables to this
'ability' factor. Both psychological and economic research has demonstrated that the concept of
time preference is not straightforward in its prediction of saving, as many consumption situations
involve a conflict between short-term and long-term desires. Ability to delay gratification or the
ability to use self-controlling techniques is therefore an important factor in explaining how much
planned or wanted saving actually takes place. Self-control is regarded an enduring trait variable
that is formed through upbringing and training. Some weak empirical evidence supports the
effect of such variables on saving. The empirical evidence presented gives some weak support
for expanding the list of willingness-to-save factors to time horizon, expectations about future
economic situation, uncertainty with respect to income and consumption, saving motives,
attitudes towards saving and debt, personality factors and the influence of reference groups. The
ability to save factors should include ability to exercise self-control in addition to the economic
resources available to the household.
In the following chapters, the last three research questions from Chapter 1 are addressed. More
specific hypotheses to be tested in the empirical part of this thesis are put forward. They concern
the psychological variables identified as being the most important for saving behaviour.
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Chapter4
Hypotheses
Is the consumer rational or is he irrational? This is not the right
question to ask. The consumer is a human being, influenced by his
past experience. His sociocultural norms, attitudes, and habits, as
well as his belonging to groups, all influence his decisions. He is
apt to prefer shortcuts, follow rules of thumb, and behave in a
routine manner. But he is also capable of acting intelligently. When
hefeels that it really matters, he will deliberate and choose to the
best of his ability
George Katona (1975),p. 218
4.1 INTRODUCTION
The reviews in the two previous chapters show that our knowledge of which psychological
factors influence saving behaviour is limited, and the results from the studies that include
psychological variables are not very robust. We still know little about the mechanisms that
can explain individual differences in saving behaviour. The variables that have been regarded
as important for saving and that get some empirical support are: income, family composition
variables, expectations, uncertainty, attitudes towards saving, debt and risk, time preference,
social comparison mechanisms, saving motives and personality factors. Some of these
variables will be used to answer the second, third and fourth research questions presented in
the introduction. These are: (2) Do psychological variables contribute towards explaining
differences in household saving? (3) Do psychological variables have different impacts on
discretionary and contractual saving respectively? and (4) Do psychological variables have
more impact on the saving of high-income households than of low-income households?
When investigating the effects of psychological variables on saving, we should distinguish
between saving types that differ with respect to the psychological processes underlying them.
In this study, we will distinguish between saving types that are likely to differ with respect to
ability to delay gratification. As discussed in Chapter 3, the effect of a certain psychological
variable might influence different types of saving in different ways. The variables' effect on
total saving might therefore be modest, and even counteract one another. This might be the
explanation for the general failure to find any effect of psychological variables on saving and,
when found, why the results are not always robust. Here we will analyse the impact of the
selected variables on discretionary, contractual and total saving. Total saving includes saving
in real estate. Total saving is the sum of bank saving, financial investments, the sum of real
estate minus the sum of debt and mortgages.
Another important issue to consider when studying the effect of psychological variables on
saving is discretion to make saving decisions. Both discretionary income and discretionary
saving are frequently used concepts in the economic psychological literature on saving.
Discretionary income is income beyond that required for necessities, so that there is a surplus
that can provide means for a choice between spending and saving. In practical work, there is a
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problem with the measurement of discretionary income, as people will disagree on the
definition of a necessity. This will be further discussed in Chapter 6. Discretionary saving
relates to saving decisions made in the period under study. A household may save during a
year without making decisions about doing so. For example, if a household has borrowed
money and has to repay the loan during the following three years according to a fixed
schedule, they will save during these three years without making discrete saving decisions.
Saving that results from such previous commitments is called contractual saving (Katona,
1975). Researchers interested in the effect of psychological variables on saving are interested
primarily in discretionary saving. Psychological variables are not likely to have much effect
on households which do not have postponable expenditures or which save primarily because
they are forced by contractual obligations.
In this study, both discretionary and contractual saving will be analysed. It is, however,
necessary to clarify the difference in the definition of contractual saving used here from that
used as by Katona (1975). Contractual saving can consist of both repayments ofloans and of
saving arrangements such as pension schemes and insurance. Katona (1975) included both
types in his definition of contractual saving. But, as borrowing and committing oneself to a
long-term saving contract are acts that differ with respect to willingness to delay gratification,
the psychological mechanisms determining these two types of saving might differ.
Contractual saving is therefore limited to include repayment of different types of loans. A
distinction is also made between measures of debt and debt repayment, which includes
mortgages and mortgage payments and debt measures excluding mortgages and mortgage
payments respectively. Mortgages are connected to investments in real estate, and there might
be different psychological mechanisms governing these kinds of investments other than
borrowing for consumption. Contractual saving in terms of participating in pension schemes
or other fixed savings arrangements is not studied due to measurement problems (see Chapter
6).
In addition to making a distinction between discretionary (voluntary acts of saving in the
present) and contractual saving (saving due to contractual obligations made in a previous
period), we will in the following also differentiate between flow and stock measures of
saving. Generally, in studies of the relationship between saving and psychological variables,
more attention should be paid to the definition of saving used and the possible consequences
the various definitions can have for the results. Much of the ambiguity in empirical findings
concerning saving and psychological variables might be due to the use of different saving
definitions. Some studies focus on stock measures such as wealth (savings), which is the total
value of savings on a specific point in time and the result of saving behaviour during an
extended period. It can be regarded as a measure of a household's long-term tendency to save,
although it will be influenced by events such as illness, accidents, inheritances and lottery
prizes. We might expect long-term saving to have a stronger relationship with enduring
personal traits such as personality structure and attitudes than with psychological variables
that might change over time such as some of the saving motives and time preference. Other
studies focus on saving during a shorter period in the past, like for example the previous year.
When studying such flow variables, we need to pay attention to the time period involved. A
household saving 5% of its incomes each month for a year and then spends it all on a holiday
has saved nothing over the year. The household will be classified as a "non-saver household"
and the researcher might expect that this should be predicted by various psychological
variables. In contrast, if the period used in the study was shorter than a year, the same
household might be classified as a "saver-household" (depending on whether saving was
measured before or after the holiday), and the opposite relationships with the psychological
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variables would have been expected. The amount saved during a specific time period is found
to be highly influenced by the incomes in the same period. In order to control for the effect of
income level, some studies focus on the percent of income that is saved during a period or
"the savings ratio". This measure might tap a household's willingness to save more than the
ability to save. We should therefore expect that psychological variables have a stronger effect
on saving ratios than on saved amounts. In the following, we will distinguish between three
types of saving measures: wealth at a specific point in time, saving during a specific period,
and the saving ratio in the same period. An overview of the expected relationships is found in
Table 4.1.
When studying the contribution of psychological variables towards explaining borrowing
behaviour, we should consider all three types of decisions involved in a borrowing decision.
First, there is the decision to borrow money in the first place. There might be significant
differences in for example attitudes and personality between those deciding to borrow and
those deciding not to borrow. Second, given that a household has decided to borrow money,
there is the decision about how much to borrow. The size of the amount borrowed might also
be associated with psychological character traits. Third, there is the decision about how fast to
repay the loan. The creditor might suggest or insist on a plan for repayment of the loans, but,
in some cases, the borrower might decide to repay the loan at a faster or slower rate than that
proposed by the creditor. This preference for rate of repayment might be influenced by
psychological variables.
The variables included in this study are presented in the following section. As this is a cross-
sectional study, it is important at the outset to note that some presumably important
determinants of saving are omitted. Longitudinal studies have shown that variables used in
macro economic studies, such as inflation, tax rules and interest rates are likely to have an
impact on aggregate household saving, and may also influence individual saving decisions.
The effect of changes in such macro variables cannot be studied here since a cross-sectional
study does not lend itself to exploring adjustments to changes in the (real) interest rate.
Moreover, the sample is drawn within one country, which might cause little variation in the
macro variables. To some extent, the interest rates offered on loans and mortgages might vary
depending on the credit worthiness of the loan applicants and tax policies may affect people in
different ways, but we do not have enough information about such differences to analyse their
effect. Another variable that might have a substantial effect on saving is the change (actual or
perceived) in the value of assets. Households owning real estate and financial wealth such as
shares and mutual funds might experience quite substantial changes in the value of their
assets, which in turn might influence consumption and further spending. In this study, these
effects are omitted because of limited information about changes in value of assets. For
example, it is difficult to disentangle changes caused by changes in the price of a specific
asset component from changes due to purchase or sale of (parts) of the asset.
4.2 HYPOTHESES
Hypotheses about the relationships between the selected independent variables and the
different saving measures will be put forward below. In addition to the psychological
variables, hypotheses concerning some of the socio-economic variables found to be related to
saving are proposed. Table 4.1 provides an overview of the proposed relationships.
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4.2.1 Income
Income has always been considered the most important determinant of saving, as it defines
the intertemporal budget constraint subject to all saving and expenditure decisions. Income
defmes the upper limit for saving. A positive relationship is usually expected between income
and wealth and between income and saving, which most empirical investigations confirm (e.g.
Deaton; 1992; Carroll & Summers, 1991). Households require a certain minimum expenditure
in order to survive, which means that we often find low saving with low income. When
income rises and the most important needs of the household are fulfilled there is room for
discretionary saving. This means that both financial wealth, discretionary saving and the
tendency to save (measured by the saving ratio) are expected to increase with income.
The relationship between income and repayment saving is not necessarily as straightforward
Repayment saving is a result of borrowing. The tendency to engage in repayment saving is
therefore associated with the tendency to borrow. Previous research on debt (e.g. Lea, 1998)
has shown that borrowing is more likely to occur in low-income households. For this reason,
the tendency to be in debt and thereby save by repaying loans might be higher among the low-
income households than among high-income households. On the other hand, households with
larger incomes tend to be granted larger loans and mortgages than those with lower income
and they may also have a higher tendency to buy their own house. We therefore expect
households with low income to have more debt and higher repayment saving when mortgages
are excluded from the definition of debt, while we expect a positive relationship between
income and debt and income and repayment saving when mortgages are included in the debt
defmition.
As high-income households are expected to borrow in order to invest in real estate, we expect
a positive relationship between income and total wealth. Any borrowing by high-income
households are more likely to be outweighed by a positive value of real-estate or other
valuable assets than debt among low-income families. The relationship between income and
total saving is also expected to be positive.
4.2.2 Education
Education has been found to have a positive effect on financial wealth (Hochguertel, Alessie,
& van Soest, 1997). One explanation for this might be that those with higher education have
higher income and therefore higher ability to save. A psychological explanation might be that
both the tendency to save and the tendency to get through higher education are associated
with high ability to delay gratification. We therefore expect to find the same relationship here:
the higher the education level the higher the financial wealth. Assuming that education is
associated with an individual's ability to delay gratification, a positive relationship with
discretionary saving is expected. To what extent higher education also will influence the
saving ratio has not been investigated so far, but given the assumption of higher education
means a higher ability to delay gratification, a positive relationship is more likely than a
negative.
High education is often linked to student debt. As educated people are likely to expect a steep
increasing income profile, they might also decide to borrow in their early stages of their
career in spite of having a high ability to delay gratification. In particular, the tendency to
borrow in order to buy real estate is expected to be higher among the higher educated. A
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positive relationship between education and the size of debt and repayment saving is therefore
expected. Since discretionary and contractual saving are expected to be positively associated
with education, a positive relationship between total saving and education is expected. The
relationship between education and total wealth is more uncertain since education is expected
to be positively associated with both financial wealth and debt.
4.2.3 Household composition
The composition of the household is likely to influence saving as it defmes the number of
income earners present as well as among how many persons the income should be distributed.
Family size is an important variable to consider in investigations of saving behaviour. The
larger the family, the larger the expenses for necessities such as food, clothes, transport and so
on. A negative relationship between family size and discretionary saving is therefore
predicted, and between family size and financial wealth. It is also reasonable to expect that the
smaller the family, the higher proportion of income can be saved, so that there also will be a
negative relationship between discretionary saving and the savings ratio. Family size may
increase the probability that the household will borrow money as a larger family increases the
likelihood of buying real estate. Larger families are more likely to have a more strained
economic situation than smaller families (all things being equal) that in turn may increase the
likelihood of incurring consumer debt. Family size is therefore expected to increase the
tendency to borrow, the amounts borrowed and the subsequent contractual saving. The
relationship between family size and total wealth is expected to be negative. The effect of
family size on total saving is more uncertain since a positive relationship between family size
and contractual saving is expected while the opposite relationship is expected for family size
and discretionary saving.
Children's presence in the household means that the demands placed on income are higher
than in similar childless households. The presence of children is therefore expected to have a
depressing effect on financial wealth and discretionary saving. Households with children are
more likely to invest in real estate (McLeod & Ellis, 1983) and to borrow for other purposes.
The presence of children is therefore likely to increase the tendency to borrow, the amounts
borrowed and the subsequent contractual saving. The effect of presence of children on total
wealth is therefore likely to be negative, while it is uncertain what the effect will be on total
saving.
Presence of a partner is likely to affect saving as a partner might imply that the household has
multiple sources of income. Presence of a partner might also mean that the household benefits
from economies of scales with respect to heating, cooking, rent/interest on mortgage etc. We
therefore expect households made up of couples to have higher fmancial wealth and engage in
higher discretionary saving than households made up of singles. The presence of a partner
might increase the tendency to invest in real estate, as there are two adults to share the risks
associated with it. Presence of a partner might therefore be associated with a higher
probability of having debt, higher amounts of debt and higher contractual saving when
mortgages are included in the debt definition. Couples are less likely to incur consumer debt
than singles as they have a higher possibility of increasing their income. Presence of a partner
is therefore more likely to be associated with lower debt and lower contractual saving when
mortgages are excluded from the debt defmition. The effect of the presence of a partner in the
household on total wealth is expected to be positive, and although the partner's effect on
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discretionary and contractual saving respectively is opposite when mortgages are excluded, a
positive relationship between presence of a partner and total saving is expected.
4.2.4 Time preference
As shown in Chapter 2, time preference is regarded as one of the most important variables in
many saving theories. Time preference is defined as the value we assign one marginal unit of
consumption now (in the present period) as opposed to the value we assign the same unit later
(in a future period). It describes how intensely we wish to increase our consumption or the
resistance to decrease our consumption in the present, and it can be regarded as synonymous
with Katona's (1975) "willingness to save". The empirical evidence presented in Chapter 2
suggests that time preference should be treated as a variable as opposed to a constant discount
rate equal for all individuals (e.g. Hausman, 1979; Benzion et al., 1989). The empirical
findings concerning the relationship between time preference and saving are inconclusive, but
the usual hypothesis is that high time preference has a depressing effect on saving. People
impatient to consume will be less willing to put money aside than the more patient people
will. We therefore expect that high time preference will be associated with low financial
wealth as well as low discretionary saving. The research by Antonides (1988), who found that
savers have lower discount rates than no-saver, supports these propositions.
The empirical findings concerning the relationship between time preference and borrowing
behaviour is consistent. Two studies have found high time preference to be related to debt
problems (Ritzema, 1992; Webley & Nyhus, 2001). Households who borrow money are more
willing than others to pay extra for present consumption, and this might be due to high time
preference. Households with a high time preference are therefore more likely to borrow than
those with low time preference are and, among households having debt, to have higher debt.
Donkers and van Soest (1999) found a negative relationship between time preference and the
probability of owning a house. This means that high time preference is more likely to be
associated with high debt when mortgages are excluded from the debt definition, while we
might expect the opposite relationship when mortgages are included in the debt definition.
The consequences for contractual saving might be, because of the size of the debt, that higher
time preference leads to higher contractual saving when mortgages are excluded from the debt
definition, while low time preference is associated with high contractual saving when
mortgages are included in the definition of debt.
Time preference is expected to have a negative effect on total wealth as high time preference
means a preference to spend any available resources and to borrow for consumption. For the
same reason, high time preference is expected to have a negative effect on total saving.
4.2.5 Expectations
Expectation towards future economic situation is a central variable in the dorninant saving
models. Human beings are assumed to be forward looking and to take their expectations about
the future into account when making decisions in the present. Both Brumberg and Modigliani
(1954) and Katona (1975) proposed that expectations of an improved economic situation
would have a depressing effect on saving because people would feel less need to save or
because they want to have a smooth consumption stream. This has been supported in
empirical investigations by Alessie et al. (1995), Carroll, et al. (1994), Guiso et al. (1992b)
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and Souleles (2001). We therefore expect to find a negative relationship between expectations
about future economic decisions and financial wealth and discretionary saving.
The assumption that people want to smooth their consumption stream means that people may
prefer to borrow in times of optimism. For example, Webley and Nyhus (2001) found that
people with debt problems were more optimistic about their future income the next 5 years
than others. Optimism with respect to the future economic situation might therefore increase
the willingness to borrow, the amounts borrowed and the subsequent repayment saving. We
therefore expect that optimism will be associated with a higher probability of having debts,
higher amounts borrowed and higher repayment saving.
As optimism is expected to decrease fmancial saving and increase the amount of debt, we
expect a negative relationship between expectations and total wealth. The relationship
between expectations and total saving is more uncertain since positive expectations might
reduce discretionary but increase contractual saving.
4.2.6 Time horizon
Empirical studies indicate that people differ with respect to how far into the future they think
and plan. While some people plan years ahead, others limit their planning to weeks. Most
empirical studies have found a positive relationship between time horizon and saving (e.g.
Alessie et al, 1995, Julander, 1975; Wåmeryd, 2000), and a negative relationship between
time horizon and debt. Moreover, those with debt problems have been found to have a shorter
time horizon than mild debtors and non-debtors (Lea et al, 1995; Webley & Nyhus, 2001).
In line with findings in previous investigations, we expect a positive relationship between
time horizon and financial wealth as well as between time horizon and discretionary saving.
When mortgages are excluded from the debt defmition, we also expect that people with a
short time horizon are more likely to borrow than those with a longer time horizon. We also
expect a short time horizon to be associated with higher amounts of debt and higher
contractual saving.
Investments in real estate and taking up a mortgage require long-term planning. The
relationship between time horizon and the sum of debt when mortgages are included in the
debt defmition might therefore be opposite than when mortgages are excluded from the debt
measure. We therefore expect a positive relationship between time horizon and the tendency
to borrow, the amount borrowed and the repayment saving when mortgages are included in
the debt definition. The total effect of time horizon on total wealth and total saving is
expected to be positive.
4.2.7 Economic uncertainty
Previous empirical investigations have found some support for the notion that people who feel
uncertain about their future will have a tendency to save more and to borrow less (Browning
& Lusardi, 1996; Carroll, 1997). A high degree of uncertainty is likely to increase
discretionary saving because people will try to build a buffer against unforeseen events and
they are therefore expected to have a higher fmancial wealth than those feeling more certain
about their future. At the same time, uncertainty will discourage borrowing and investments,
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and uncertainty will therefore be associated with lower tendency to borrow, lower amounts
borrowed and less repayment saving. Uncertainty is expected to have a positive effect on
household total wealth while its effect on total saving is uncertain.
4.2.8 Attitudes towards saving
Many psychological studies of saving have included attitudes. As shown in Chapter 3, the
empirical results with respect to the impact of attitudes on saving are ambiguous and the
direction of causality is not yet established. One reason why attitudes towards saving have
had mixed success as a predictor of saving is that most people are positive towards saving.
Thus, the variation in this variable is not large enough to discriminate between different
saving practices. Another reason might be that attitudes work in opposite directions with
respect to influencing discretionary and contractual saving respectively. Positive attitudes
towards saving might have a positive effect on discretionary saving while the effect is likely
to be negative on the tendency to borrow and subsequent repayment saving.
Positive attitudes towards saving are likely to influence both discretionary saving and
fmancial wealth in a positive direction. As people who favour saving are less likely to be in
favour of borrowing and are less likely to need to borrow, we expect a negative relationship
between attitudes towards saving and the tendency to borrow. Among those having debt, a
positive attitude toward saving might imply a smaller amount of debt that that incurred by
households with a negative attitude towards saving. As positive attitudes towards saving are
expected to result in higher fmancial wealth and lower debt, we expect a positive relationship
between attitudes towards saving and total wealth. The relationship between attitudes towards
saving and total saving is more uncertain as a positive attitude towards saving is expected to
increase discretionary but decrease contractual saving.
4.2.9 Attitudes towards debt
Studies into the relationship between attitudes towards debt and actual debt have found that
debt attitudes can discriminate between debtors and non-debtors (Livingstone & Lunt, 1992).
Some attitude statements have also been found to predict the amount of debt and debt
repayment. In general, a negative attitude towards debt is assumed to cause people to avoid
debt, repay debt as quickly as possible and to save in order to avoid debt. These are also the
relationships expected here.
Negative attitudes towards debt may also influence discretionary saving, as saving in most
cases is necessary in order to avoid debt. Avoiding debt often means being able to pay for
unexpected expenses (for example, when the washing machine breaks down), which for most
households requires a fmancial buffer. A negative attitude towards debt is therefore expected
to be associated with both higher fmancial wealth and discretionary saving. A negative
attitude towards debt is expected to be associated with higher total wealth, while the effect of
debt attitude on total saving is less certain. A negative attitude towards debt might give higher
discretionary saving but lower contractual saving.
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4.2.10 Saving motives
Saving motives defme a person's reasons for saving. Individual differences in saving motives
have been found to influence how people respond to economic stimuli with respect to their
saving behaviour (Wahlund & Wårneryd, 1987). Despite Katona (1975) proposing that it is
the strength of the saving motives that would change over time (i.e. not the existence of the
motives), no studies so far have focussed on the effect of the perceived importance of the
different saving motives with regards to a person's tendency to save. Katona (1975) proposed
that the strength of the saving motives would weaken during upswings and strengthen during
recessions. In the same vein, we might find individual differences in the strength of saving
motives depending of stage in the life cycle, perceived risk of unemployment, expectations
concerning future income and so on. Surveys have shown that the precautionary saving
motive is the most important saving motive, while a smaller portion of the interviewed
household considers retirement, children's needs, investment opportunities and larger
purchases are important reasons to save. Here, we will study the relationships between the
perceived importance of six different saving motives and saving.
Precautionary saving deals with the need to have a buffer against unforeseen events. People
who regard precautionary saving as important are likely to have higher fmancial wealth than
people who do not think it is important. In addition, it is likely that a person who thinks that
precautionary saving is important will engage in further saving. The investment (calculation),
retirement, goal-saving, inter vivos transfer and bequest motives are expected to work in a
similar fashion: the stronger the motives, the higher financial wealth and the higher the
saving.
So far, few investigations have studied the relationships between saving motives and
borrowing behaviour. The most likely relationships are that strong saving motives will have a
negative effect on the tendency to borrow because higher discretionary saving and fmancial
wealth will reduce the need to borrow. We therefore propose that stronger saving motives will
be negatively associated with not only the tendency to borrow, but also the amount borrowed
and repayment saving. As strong saving motives are expected to be associated with high
saving and little borrowing, it follows that we also expect a positive relationship between
strength of saving motives and total wealth, while the effect on total saving is more uncertain.
4.2.11 Perceived position in reference groups
Duesenberry (1949) was one of the first to propose a saving model based on social
comparison, which acknowledges that saving decisions are not made in a vacuum but in a
social context. He argued that people would compare themselves to others (in particular, their
neighbours). Because we seldom can observe other households' saving, it is other households'
consumption that must be subject for the comparison. Duesenberry also argued that people
use their own past consumption (or income) as a basis for comparison. If they have less than
others or their previous selves, they will feel deprived with respect to their expected standard
of living and this, in turn, will dissuade them from saving. As shown in Chapter 2, these ideas
have not been adopted by economists with the exception of some recent work by Alessie and
Kapteyn (1991) Kapteyn et al (1997), Kapteyn, 2000, and Schor (1998). Their work gives
some empirical support to the idea that social comparison mechanisms are important for
saving behaviour.
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The usual hypothesis is that a feeling of deprivation with respect to one's standard of living
will lead to little saving, due to constant desires to consume more. A positive relationship is
therefore expected between a person's perceived position in his or her reference group and
discretioruuy saving. People feeling wealthier than others are also likely to have higher
financial wealth than people who say that they feel poorer than others. At the same time,
people who feel worse off than their reference group might be tempted to borrow money in
order to consume more or to buy their own accommodation. Hence, saying that the household
is worse off than others is likely to be associated with a higher tendency to borrow and,
therefore, higher debts and repayment saving. Feeling deprived compared to one's.reference
group is therefore likely to be associated with low total wealth. The impact on total saving is
not as straightforward, because a feeling of deprivation with respect to the reference group
may result in low discretioruuy saving, but high contractual saving.
4.2.12 Personality structure
Brandståtter (1996) argued that personality factors are broad abstractions that should not
necessarily correlate with specific behaviours. However, some studies have shown that
personality structure might be important for explaining individual differences in saving. The
findings from these empirical investigations are both ambiguous and weak, but they do
indicate that further studies of the relationship between saving and personality structure are
worthwhile. For example, Nyhus and Webley (2001) found that personality factors had robust
and independent effects on different types of saving. In addition, it is quite plausible that
personality factors might be important for saving behaviour.
Emotional stability has been found to increase discretionary saving (Brandståtter, 1996;
Nyhus & Webley, 2001). This is a probable relationship as emotional stability also
encompasses elements of self-control and planning. Emotionally stable people are therefore
more likely to follow their own plans and budgets than their emotionally unstable
counterparts. For example, some people have been found to engage in impulsive and
excessive buying (e.g. Hoch & Loewenstein, 1991). It is likely that people who have a
tendency to give in to short term desires also are on the more neurotic side of the emotional
stability dimension. We therefore expect a positive relationship between emotional stability
and financial wealth and discretionary saving. It is also more likely that emotionally unstable
people will incur consumer debt, and for this reason we might expect higher debts and higher
contractual saving among emotional unstable persons. Because emotional stability is expected
to be associated with higher wealth and lower debts, we expect a positive relationship
between emotional stability and total wealth, while the effect on total saving is uncertain.
The personality dimension mentioned most frequently in the savings literature is
conscientiousness (Wårneryd, 1999). Conscientiousness is related to traits such as planning,
self-discipline, and the ability to delay gratification. Conscientiousness might therefore affect
both the willingness and the cognitive ability to save. It is therefore natural to expect higher
discretionary saving and higher fmancial wealth among conscientious people. Some evidence
for the existence of such a relationship has been provided by Brandståtter (1996) and
Wårneryd (1996a), but it was not supported in the research by Nyhus and Webley (2001).
With respect to contractual saving, it is plausible to expect the opposite relationship. It is
likely that conscientious people have less debt and therefore lower contractual saving, as they
are likely to be able, and perhaps to prefer, to save before buying. Indication of such a
relationship has been reported by Webley and Nyhus (2001). They found that people who
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have had mild or serious debt at least once in their lifetime were less conscious than people
who never have been debtors. Because conscientiousness is expected to be associated with
higher wealth and lower debts, we expect a positive relationship between conscientiousness
and total wealth, while the effect on total saving is uncertain.
Autonomy was found to be a significant predictor of saving by Nyhus and Webley (2001).
They found that autonomy is associated with lower saving and increases the likelihood of a
household having debt. This means that we are likely to find a negative relationship between
autonomy and financial wealth and autonomy and discretionary saving, while we might
expect to find a positive relationship between autonomy and debt and autonomy and
repayment saving. Because autonomy is expected to be associated with smaller wealth and
higher debts, we expect a negative relationship between autonomy and total wealth, while the
effect on total saving is uncertain.
Agreeableness codifies the extent to which a person adjusts to other people's feelings or
opinions. It is likely that less agreeable people, being more selfish, will be less willing to
share their money with other people. Agreeable people might be more inclined to share their
resources with others which might be reflected in generosity in terms of gift-giving, inter
vivos transfers, charity and so on. Nyhus and Webley (2001) found a negative association
between agreeableness and fmancial wealth. Agreeableness was also associated with a higher
probability of having debts. We might therefore expect to find a negative relationship between
agreeableness and financial wealth and agreeableness and discretionary saving. Further, we
may expect a negative association between agreeableness and debts and agreeableness and
repayment saving. The expected effect on total saving is that agreeableness will reduce total
wealth while the effect on total saving is uncertain.
Brandståtter proposes that extroversion may be important for saving behaviour, which makes
sense in light of the social comparison theory of saving (e.g. Schor, 1998). Social comparison
theory states that people are influenced by the consumption behaviour of people they meet
regularly. One aspect of extraversion is a desire to spend time with other people. Extroverts
are therefore more likely to meet more people than introverts and might more often be
exposed to consumption patterns that make them less inclined to save. Frequent interaction
with other people often also causes extra expenditures. Going out, inviting people home, or
visiting other people's homes often incur some spending that in turn will reduce saving.
Brandståtter (1996) and Nyhus and Webley (2001) have found introverts to have more
savings than extroverts. We therefore expect a negative relationship between extraversion and
financial wealth and discretionary saving. Because introverts are expected to save more, it is
also plausible to expect that they borrow less, while extroverts might be expected to borrow
more. This means that extroverts might have higher contractual saving than introverts as they
might borrow in order to pay for conspicuous consumption. Since introversion is expected to
be associated with higher wealth and lower debts, we expect a positive relationship between
introversion and total wealth, while the effect on total saving is uncertain.
Table 4.1 includes an overview of the expected relationships.
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Table 4.1
Overview of expected relationships
Dependent variables
Wealth Saving/Saving ratio
Finan- Debt Debt Total Diser. Cont.sa Cont.sa Total
cial mortg. mortg. wealth Saving Mortg Mortg. saving
Independent variables wealth Incl. Excl. Incl. Exc!.
HH disposable income + + - + + + - +
Level of education + + + ? + + + +
Family size - + + - - + + ?
Presence of children in HH - + + - - + + ?
Presence of partner in HH + + - + + + - +
Time preference - - + - - - + -
Expectations toward econ. situat. - + + - - + + ?
Time horizon + + - + + + - +
Economic uncertainty + - - + + - - ?
Attitude towards saving + - - + + - - ?
Attitude towards debt - + + - - + + ?
Strength of prec saving motive + - - + + - - +
Strength of bequest motive + - - + + - - ?
Strength of retirement sav. motive + - - + + - - ?
Strength of goal saving motive + - - + + - - ?
Strength of investment motive + - - + + - - ?
Perceived position in ref. group + - - + + - - ?
Emotional stability + - - + + - - ?
Conscientiousness + - - + + - - ?
Autonomy - + + - - + + ?
Agreeableness - + + - - + + ?
Extraversion - + + - - + + ?
4.2.12 The importance of psychological variables for different income levels
Katona (1975) argued that the relative influence of psychological variables on saving
increases with discretionary income and level of postponable expenditures. As yet, this
conjecture has not been tested explicitly. If Katona's suggestion is true, the substantial
increase and spread of discretionary income among households in Western economies may
have increased the importance of other variables than income when explaining and predicting
households' saving- and spending decisions. It is reasonable to expect that an increase in
discretionary income alters the relative influence of economic, situational, and psychological
variables on saving in favour of psychological variables. This preposition will be tested by
comparing the results obtained from separate analyses for different levels of income.
So far, this study has shown which psychological variables that have been proposed as
important for saving behaviour and which variables that have been found associated to saving
in empirical studies. Hypotheses to be tested in the empirical part of this study have been
proposed. The next part of the thesis reports the procedures followed in order to test the
proposed relationships between psychological variables and saving.
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Chapter5
Data collection and questionnaires
5.1INTRODUCTION
This chapter describes the sampling procedures, the data collection method, the election of
key informants, the questionnaires, and the design used when testing the hypotheses. The
chapter closes with an account of how the data file used for the analyses was constructed.
Strengths and weaknesses related to the methods are identified and their implications are
discussed.
Testing the hypotheses involves the collection of data from individuals and households. In the
recent decades, it has been widely recognised that it is too simplistic to use the individual as
unit of analysis when studying various aspects of purchasing behaviour and financial
decision-making. This is because people are often communal, pool their resources and
incomes and often make combined decisions. The most meaningful unit of analysis when
studying saving is therefore the household. This is a challenge when studying the effect of
psychological variables on saving. Most theories that involve psychological explanations of
behaviour refer to individuals. Therefore, in order to test the effect of these variables we need
information from all household members who have an effect on saving decisions. The
required information is both economic and psychological. We also need some information
about decision influence in fmancial affairs in order to construct measures of psychological
variables at the household level.
As the independent variables specified in the proposed hypotheses are difficult to manipulate,
the ideal situation would be to observe a panel of households over several years to see if
changes in the independent variables are followed by the expected changes in saving. It is
useful to use the year as period of analysis to avoid variation in the saving estimates due to
seasonal fluctuations in expenditures, such as holidays. It is also beneficial for data quality to
collect data for one year at a time, since most people use the end-of-the-year reports about
their incomes and assets of the previous year as reference when answering the questions.
The required types of data are not easily found. Most panel studies of economic behaviour
focus exclusively on economic and demographic variables where the effects of psychological
variables cannot be tested. However, at CentER for Economic Research at Tilburg University,
the Netherlands, a panel was set up as a part of a large project called the VSB CentER savings
project that was succeeded by the TMR project on Savings and Pensions. The project is now
called the CentER Savings Survey (CSS) and data collected for this project will be used here.
The data collected for the CSS contain answers to questions that may be used as indicators for
all the variables included in the proposed hypotheses. As the method applied for this study is
closely connected to the two saving projects, they are presented below. The methods are
outlined in the subsequent sections.
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5.2 THE CENTER SAVINGS PROJECT
The (VSB-)CentER Savings Project was started in 1990 at the Center for Economic Research
(CentER) at Tilburg University, The Netherlands. The project is interdisciplinary and
involves many researchers with different backgrounds, but a common interest in household
saving and economic behaviour. The goals of the project were 1) to test the descriptive and
predictive power of economic and psychological factors on households' saving behaviour and
2) to study the stability of any possible influence of these variables on saving behaviour. The
project terminated in 1996 and was succeeded by the TMR-project "Savings and Pensions".
Data has been collected every year from a panel consisting of about 3000 households. The
first and second rounds of data collection took place in 1994, while the third was carried out
in 1995. Data concerning financial matters, work situation, demographics, psychological
traits, health and other living conditions are collected. The first rounds of data collection were
conducted by a fieldwork company called Stichting TelePanel (the TelePanel Foundation). A
telepanel is a panel of households that are connected to a central computer via modems.
Participants in the panel answer questions via computer sessions in their homes. The
questions and the answers are transmitted between the respondents and the central computer
by the use of the modems. The panel was taken over by CentERdata in 1996.
5.3 SAMPLE SELECTION
The sample used for the CSS consists of two sub-samples. One sub-sample is intended to be
representative of the Dutch population with respect to certain socio-economic variables (the
Representative Panel, or RP). This panel consists of individuals in about 2000 households.
The other sub-sample is a sample of Dutch high-income households, consisting of individuals
in about 1000 households (the High Income Panel, or HIP).
The initial sampling for the RP was carried out using telephone directories as the sampling
frame. Researchers used a procedure that gave new and unlisted numbers an equal chance of
being selected as listed numbers. In order to obtain a sample that was representative with
respect to region and urbanisation, a four-step stratified sampling procedure was used. This
involved (1) selecting primary sample areas (communities), (2) secondary sampling units
(banks of 100 telephone numbers within the selected communities), (3) telephone numbers
from those banks and finally (4) the households themselves. The specific sampling procedure
meant that all the largest communities in the Netherlands were represented and about half of
the smaller ones. Potential participants were telephoned, asked for background information
and whether they would be willing to take part in the panel. Those expressing willingness
were interviewed and introduced to the computer-aided interviewing technique. Individuals
ultimately agreeing to participate accepted to complete questionnaires administered by the
computer in return ror the use of a PC (and modem). This group constituted around 18.5% of
those households that were originally telephoned. Households with older members, one-
person households and families without children were less willing to participate than others,
and in order to correct for this, quotas were assigned for some demographic characteristics.
Note that this sample was not especially recruited for research into economic behaviour but
participants had to agree to answer questions on a variety of topics on a regular basis. A more
detailed description of the sampling procedures can be found in Appendix 1.
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The members of the Hll' were recruited specifically for the ess because of a wish to study
high-income households in more detail. Because income and wealth distributions in
populations often are skewed, a simple random sample would not provide enough wealthy
households to draw conclusions about their behaviour and distributions of many financial
variables (Kennickell & McManus, 1993). The high-income households are defmed as
households with the 10% highest incomes of the Netherlands. A problem related to this
recruitment was that the target population (high-income households) is much smaller than the
sample population (households with a telephone). Hence, the probability for drawing a
telephone number for a high-income household is much smaller than for hitting a household
that would fit for the RP. In order to reduce costs by reducing the number of households that
would have to be approached, two different sampling schemes were used for selecting
households to the Hll'. The first procedure was (1) to select area postcodes for wealth areas,
(2) select telephone numbers within the selected wealthy areas and (3) selection of
households. This procedure increased the probability of approaching a high-income household
from 10% to 20%. 20,000 households were approached based on this sampling scheme. In
addition, another 10,000 households were approached using the same 4-step sampling scheme
as described for the RP. Further information about the sampling procedures can be found in
Appendix 1.
5.4 DATA COLLECTION TECHNIQUE
Data were collected by using computers and modems which were installed in each selected
household. In return for this, household members agreed to answer questions for 30 minutes
every week. The data programmes used for administering the questionnaires and responses
were user-friendly, so that it should be possible for all kinds of respondents to complete the
questionnaires without assistance. Respondents having problems with any of the questions
could call a help desk that had weekend service. In addition, there were technical staff
available if problems arose related to the computers or the telephone lines.
The RP members received questions every Friday and they were supposed to complete them
during computer sessions the following weekend. The intention was that no session would last
more than 30 minutes. The responses were transmitted to the fieldwork company's central
computer. Panel members who did not answer within three days (the following Monday) were
called and asked to fill in the questionnaire before the following Wednesday. If the household
members still did not respond, they were counted as non-response.
The Hll' members received questionnaires once a month. They got longer questionnaires than
the RP members, but the total number of questions was lower. No session was supposed to last
more than an hour. The Hll' members also got more days to answer the questionnaires than the
RPmembers.
Further information about the advantages and disadvantages related to this data collection
technique can be found in Appendix 2.
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5.5 THE QUESTIONNAIRE AND KEY INFORMANTS
Below a short description of the different parts of the questionnaire is given along with a list
of the household members who are supposed to answer each part (key informants). The parts
of the questionnaire are called WRK (household. work and pension), INC (income and
health), HS (accommodation and mortgages), WTH (assets and loans), and PSY (economic
psychological variables) respectively. The routing system in the questionnaire is quite
complicated and can be found in the questionnaire or in the variable documentation
distributed from CentER. Any routing reported here serves mainly the purpose of identifying
key informants.
5.5.1 The questionnaire
The total questionnaire consists of five parts that were distributed to the respondents
according to the described agreements with the panel members. The description of the
questionnaire is based on the questionnaire for the first wave of data collection. The
questionnaires used for later waves contained additional questions.
Household. Work. and Pensions (WRK)
The first block of WRK, called "Block household", contains questions about primary occupa-
tion. All household members 16 years or older answer these questions. The responses to these
questions decide what questions the respondents receive. The heads of the households are
asked about marital status and children, and heads of the households born before 1953 are
asked about grandchildren. Heads of the households responding that they have children no
longer belonging to the household, are asked about the date of birth and sex of these children,
as well as their reasons for moving.
Health and Income (INC)
INC contains questions about health and about income in 1992. "Block Health" is asked of all
household members who are 16 years or older. It includes questions about height, weight,
subjective judgements about one's own health, smoking and drinking habits, absence from
work because of illness, and expected length of life.
"Block Income" was asked of all household members aged 16 or older. Respondents were
first asked about their personal income sources in 1992; that is, whether they were self-em-
ployed, received social benefits or pensions, had paid jobs on a contractual basis or any other
income sources. Responses to these questions were used for routing. They were then asked to
specify the yearly income they received from the relevant sources of income. They were also
asked to specify transfers to children or other family members, the price of medical insurance,
fringe benefits and inheritances and gifts.
The last questions in "Block Income" concerned household net income and were directed at
the households heads and their partners/spouses only. They were asked to estimate the
household net income for 1992. They were also asked to specify what incomes they
considered to be "very bad", "bad", "insufficient", "sufficient", "good", and "very good".
INC also entailed a part in which respondents were asked to evaluate the questionnaire and
their own responses as well as report how much time it took them to finish it.
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Accommodation and mortgages mS)
This part of the questionnaire contains questions about current and former accommodation
and about plans to move. It also contains questions about housing costs, such as rent and
mortgages and rent allowances. The questions are answered by one person from every
household; the "household financial manager" (HFO - defmed below).
"Block Accommodation" contains questions about the household's former and current accom-
modation (also any possible second residence); ownership, type of house, number and size of
the rooms; how long the household has lived there; the possession of a garage, garden and so
on. It also contains questions about how much the accommodation costs per month and
possible rent allowances. If any of the households have mortgages on their accommodation,
they are routed to "Block Mortgages". The HFOs are also asked whether their household is
looking for other accommodation. If they are, they are asked about the reasons for this and
what kind of accommodation they are searching for. They are also asked about economic
support from relatives with respect to former, current and future accommodation.
"Block Mortgages" starts with detailed defmitions of different kinds of mortgages. This might
increase the accuracy for the data collected about mortgages, as the probability of
misunderstandings is reduced. The questions are about the amounts that the households have
borrowed, how much of the loans are left as of December 31S\ 1992, interest rates, the
creditors, and payments on the mortgages.
Assets (WTH)
WTH is the longest and most complicated part of the questionnaire with respect to routing. A
large effort has been made in order to assess the value of assets as accurately as possible.
Questions often begin with definitions of the specific assets under consideration in order to
prevent misunderstandings of the questions. Responses to questions about balances can also
be given in two different ways: First, respondents are asked to give the exact amount in
guilders, the former monetary unit of The Netherlands (abbreviated Dfl). If they decline to
answer such an open-ended question, a second question is asked, for which amounts can be
given in brackets. This second option of giving answers results in less accurate data than the
first, but less missing data (see Appendix 3 for examples of the question formulation). All
household members who are 16 years or older are asked about the value of their private assets
as of December 31st, 1992. With respect to shared assets, the respondents are told to report
them only once per household. If, for example, the first member of the household reports
shared assets, the other household members should ignore them.
"Block Assets" contains initial questions about ownership of different kinds of checking
accounts, saving accounts, saving certificates and other ways of holding assets. They are also
asked about whether they plan to open new accounts in the next 12 months. They are then
asked about ownership of cars, motorbikes, boats, caravans, real estate that is not serving as
own accommodation, and debts to friends or family. The answers to these introductory ques-
tions are used for routing. There are separate blocks for each of the asset types. The respon-
dents get the blocks that are relevant for them in which they are asked to report the balances
of accounts and earned interest. They are also asked to estimate the values of durables as of
December 31st 1992. With respect to real estate, questions about any mortgages connected to
them are also included. Note that not all assets are included here. Information about
ownership of own accommodation is found in the HS described above.
Chapter 5: Data collection and questionnaires 104
"Block Debts/Liabilities" follows the same procedure as "Block Assets". The question block
starts with questions that are used for routing. All household members 16 years or older are
asked about the existence of private loans, extended lines of credit, outstanding debts with
mail-order firms, loans from family or friends, study loans, debts through credit cards and
other loans. Respondents are also asked about their opportunities to borrow money (liquidity
constraints) and whether they would like to borrow money. Questions about mortgages on
accommodation are not asked here. They are found in "Block Assets" (described above) for
real estate that does not serve as accommodation for the household and in the HS for real
estate that does serve as the household's accommodation.
Economic Psychology (PSY)
PSY starts with some questions that are to be answered by the head of the household and their
spouse/partner only. They are about income in the past 12 months, a subjective evaluation of
this income, income development and expectations about their income in the future (the next
year and the next five years.) They are also asked about plans for saving, motives for saving,
attitudes towards saving and debt, risk aversion, and changes in consumer expenditures. The
questions about risk attitudes were only asked if the households' net income was above Dfl
20,000 over the past 12 months.
The next part of PSY contains questions that constitute scales developed to measure certain
economic psychological variables like time preference, time horizon, self control, expected
life time, saving motives, self controlling strategies, expectations of inheritance or gifts, and
personality structure. These questions are answered by all household members 16 years or
older. Next, questions about family relations and perceived deprivation with respect to living
conditions were asked. These were to be answered by the heads of the households and
partners/spouses only.
Also the PSY entails questions where respondents are asked to evaluate the questionnaire and
their own responses. Responses to these questions are discussed in Chapter 6.
5.5.2 Selection of informants
Not all household members answered all the questions of the savings questionnaire. No
household member below 16 years was asked to answer any questions. For some parts of the
questionnaire, only one or two members of each household were asked to answer on behalf of
the entire household. An overview of which persons in the households answered the different
parts of the questionnaires is provided in Table 5.2.
Panel members were categorised according to their self-reported position in the household,
the categories being "head of the household", "spouse", "unmarried partner", "parent" (in
law), "child living at home", "house mate" and "other". The routing was based on these
categories in addition to a category called the "Household Financial Officer" (HFO). Some
blocks of the questionnaires were routed only to the HFOs, others to the heads of the
households, or to the heads of the households and their spouses/partners. Other sections were
answered by all members of the household 16 years or older. Questions were only asked those
respondents to whom they were relevant, so questions about last paid job were not asked to
respondents who were in their first paid job, and respondents who did not have a boat were
not asked about the value of a boat. It is therefore difficult to estimate how much time it
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would take each respondent to answer the questionnaire and, moreover, how many should
have answered each question.
Table 5.2
Overview of key informants of the households
Main Subject of Questionnaire Key informants
l) WRK - Household, Work, All household members> 15 years to whom the specific questions
and Pension are relevant (who have, had or are looking for a paid job).
Some questions concerning children are only asked the heads of
the households.
2) INC- Health and Income Personal income: All household members> 15 years to whom the
specific questions are relevant.
Household income: Heads of households and spouses/partners
3) HS - Accommodation and Household financial officer
Mortgages
4) WTH - Assets and loans Questions about personal properties to all panel members> 15
years.
Questions about shared property should be answered by one
household member only.
5) PSY - Economic psychological Questions about income, income expectations, saving plans,
variables saving motives, attitudes towards saving and debt, risk aversion,
and changes in consumer expenditure were asked to the head of
the households and spouses/partners only. (The questions about
risk aversion were only asked households with net income above
Dfl20,OOO a year.)
Questions about personality traits were asked all household
members> 15 years.
5.6 DESIGN OF THE STUDY
The original plan for the data collection was to collect data on a yearly basis from 1993,
concerning income and savings in the year before the data collection. However, due to
unforeseen problems, the first wave of data collection was delayed by 6-7 months. Because of
the delay, data for 1992 were collected in the period December 1993 to April 1994 instead of
in the period May -to October 1993. The second wave of data collection took place in May to
October 1994 and concerned incomes and assets in 1993.
Financial data from the first wave of data collection will not be used in this study for two
important reasons. Firstly, the delay of the fust wave of data collection reduces the reliability
of the financial data collected concerning incomes in 1992 and assets as of 31 st of December
1992. This is because of the long time between the data collection and the period for which
information is sought. Secondly, use of financial data from the first wave would also result in
a rather peculiar design. The fmancial behaviour in focus would take place in the year 1993,
while the variables expected to influence this behaviour are measured as of May - October
1994.
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For this study, data concerning the psychological variables collected in the first wave together
with some of the additional psychological data collected in the second wave will be used.
They were all collected in 1994 which is the year in which saving will be studied. The saving
and income data used were collected in the second and third wave respectively. Saving is
calculated by using assets data as of 31st of December in 1993 and 1994. Data concerning
income for 1994 was collected in the third wave. The independent variables were measured
during the time the studied behaviour took place. This resembles a cross-sectional design that
cannot be used for establishing causal relationships.
5.7 CONCLUSION
The data collected for the CSS are unique, as they contain information on both economic and
psychological variables. Although great efforts have been made in order to make the panel
representative of the Dutch population, a rather high degree of non-response (see Appendix 1)
gives reasons to doubt that this goal is obtained. The representative panel is representative to
the Dutch population with respect to some selected socio-economic variables, but this does
not secure representativeness with respect to the psychological variables.
The data have been collected using a rather new technique. The extent to which this method
increases or decreases data quality compared to other methods is left to speculation (see
Appendix 2). No study has so far compared the data collected by CAPAR with the more
traditional methods. Data on financial affairs are often plagued with missing or under- or
over-reporting. CAPAR might result in improved quality due to the possibilities for routing
and editing in the field and because any effects caused by the presence of an interviewer is
avoided. On the other hand, the complex routing might also lead to errors in the data that are
hard for the users of the data to detect.
5.8 PREPARING THE WORKING DATA FILE
The data used for this study are drawn from three waves of data collection:
First wave of data collection (beginning of 1994):
Psychological variables
Data about first and second residence and mortgages
Second wave of data collection (May - 1994):
Data about assets and loans as of31.12.93
Additional psychological variables
Psychological variables - new panel members
Household information
Third wave of data collection (May - 1995):
Data about assets and loans as of31.12.94
Data offrrst and second residence and mortgages - May 1995
Data about household income for 1994
These data are found in different data files. As data from three different waves of collection
will be used, only respondents having been members of the panel in all three waves and
having answered the relevant questionnaires will be used in the hypothesis testing.
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A household can be divided into several decision units with respect to spending and saving.
When it comes to the overall financial affairs, children and parents seem to act as separate
decision units. Children living at home, either studying or working, are likely to keep their
finances separate from their parents and they are unlikely to have any important decision
influence in major decisions concerning their parents' saving plans and strategic purchases
like the purchase of a house. Other adults living in the households like, for example, a mother
in law, or an unmarried son, are also likely to keep their finances separate from the HR and
spouse, although they might contribute with a sum to cover household expenses. In this study,
we therefore only study one of the decision units within a household, defmed as the head of
the household and his/her spouse or partner. Other respondents were deleted from the data
file. Respondents who had a partner who had not responded to all questionnaires were also
deleted from the files, Information about further cleaning necessary due to non-response with
respect to the assets questionnaire can be found in Appendix 4.
The sample resulting from following the procedures described above consisted of 2078
individuals, 1061 (51,1%) males and 1017 (48.9%) females, in 1212 households. 307 (25.3%)
of the households were one-person households while 346 (28.5%) households had no partner.
752 (62.0%) of the households had no children living at home. 62.2% of the households were
members of the representative panel while 37.8% were members of the high-income panel.
Members of these two panels differed in their household composition. In the high-income
panel, only 20 (4.4%) of the households were single-person households, while the
corresponding number for the representative panel was 287 (38.1%). 26 high-income
households (5.7%) had no partner, while 320 (42.4%) of the households in the representative
panel were without a partner. 48.5% of the high-income households had no children living at
home, while the corresponding number for the representative panel was 70.3%. This sample
of 2078 individuals will be used in the next chapter when reporting the measurement of
relevant variables.
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Chapter6
Measurement
"Yes, I save money when I go shopping at 'Rema '"
Answer to the question "Do you save money?"
Rema is a low-budget grocery store.
6.1 INTRODUCTION
The concepts taken to be important determinants of household saving behaviour were
described in Chapter 4. In this chapter, the operational definitions of these concepts are
outlined. The chapter will start with operational definitions of household saving and
household income. The measurement of the psychological concepts and household
characteristics are presented successively. Examples of the exact question wording are found
in Appendix 3.
6.2 HOUSEHOLD SAVINGS, SAVING AND THE SAVING RATIO
As explained in Chapter 4, when defining and measuring saving it is necessary to make a
distinction between savings (or wealth) and saving. Savings is a stock variable, and refers to
the stock of assets and debts at a particular moment in time, for example, as of 31st of
December in a particular year. Saving is a flow variable and refers to accumulation of assets
and debts over a specific period of time (for example, a year). Both savings and saving can be
positive and negative. Saving is negative if total expenditures exceed total incomes during the
given period. This is called dissaving. Savings are negative if the stock of debts exceeds the
stock of assets.
Saving can be estimated in at least three different ways. One way is simply to ask respondents
how much they have saved during the period in question. This gives us a direct estimate of
saving, but this way of measuring saving might result in saving estimates that cannot be
compared across respondents. For example, Lyck (1992) carried out an explorative study in
Denmark to establish what people mean by the word "saving". She found that only 12% of
the sample defined saving in accordance with the standard macro economic definition, while
62% defIne saving simply as money placed in a bank. 26% gave mixed answers, among them
that saving is "when you buy cheap". Only 6% included their house in the definition of
saving. Similar results can be found in the data set used for this study. The respondents are
asked if they consider certain types of assets as saving. The exact question formulation was
"If you had to calculate the sum that you have saved over the past 12 months, which of the
alternatives below would you include in your calculation?". The valid percents of the answers
to these questions from the second wave of data collection are displayed in Table 6.1. These
results highlight the importance of ensuring that the respondents have a common
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understanding of what information the researcher seeks when asking questions about saving.
The results support Katona's conception that most people's definition of saving includes
discretionary saving but not contractual saving, although in this sample, just as many regarded
payback of loans as saving as the number who did not.
Table 6.1
What respondents would include when calculating "own saving"
Include in definition ofsaving? Yes No Not
applic
able
Increase in the balance of total savings account 69.0 8.3 22.7
Increase in the balance of a checking account 26.7 39.8 33.5
Increase in the market value of shareslbonds 15.5 12.7 71.7
Increase in the market value of own house 11.3 40.1 48.6
Increase in the market value of cars, boats, motorbikes 5.6 38.6 55.7
Loan paid back in the past 12 months 18.4 19.9 61.7
Loan granted to someone else in the past 12 months 3.3 10.5 86.2
Increase in the market value of antiques/art) jewellery 1.8 22.4 75.8
Increase in the value of a life insurance 8.1 27.5 64.5
Other things? 5.5 94.5
N= 1984
The wording of the question was changed in the third wave of data collection. Rather than ask
respondents about their own saving, they were asked about which acts they would consider as
saving. The exact question formulation was "To what extent do you consider the following
actions a way of saving? If you really do not know, type O (zero). " The respondents could
indicate their view by choosing a number on a 7-point scale, where 1 means "has nothing to
do with saving" and 7 means "a proper way of saving." Table 6.2 displays the valid percents
of the respondents' answers.
Table 6.2
Whether alternative saving acts are perceived as saving
Alternative ways of saving Nothin A
to do proper
with way of Don't
saving saving know
l 2 3 4 5 6 7
To deposit money onto a savings ace. 1.8 1.3 1.9 5.4 9.2 24.1 53.3 3.0
To deposit money onto a checking ace. 31.7 22.7 12.2 13.5 9.3 5.0 2.6 3.1
To open a fixed-period deposit 6.9 4.4 5.2 12.6 13.6 18.8 18.5 19.9
To put money in a piggy bank 18.9 9.6 9.4 13.5 14.8 12.6 17.9 3.3
To buy stocks 9.4 5.5 8.8 20.0 21.0 15.7 7.2 12.4
To buy shares 9.5 7.2 10.2 19.4 22.5 14.4 5.8 11.0
To buy bonds 7.3 5.0 7.2 14.7 21.1 20.7 10.6 13.4
To participate in investment funds 6.6 5.0 7.0 15.5 21.1 21.6 7.7 15.5
To speculate in money 35.9 18.7 13.3 12.7 5.1 2.2 .7 11.3
To take out a mortgage 18.2 9.2 8.8 15.3 16.4 17.0 6.9 8.2
To consume less than your income 12.4 8.0 7.9 15.6 20.8 18.8 11.9 4.6
N=2033
The results shown in Table 6.2 also show that deposits in savings accounts as well as saving
in piggy banks are what most people consider as proper ways of saving. A deposit of money
into a checking account is not considered to be saving. People tend to be less certain if
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investment saving is a proper fonn of saving. Also these results highlight the fact that people's
understanding of the word "saving" differs from person to person, and measuring saving by
just asking people "how much did you save last year?" is inadequate.
The second way to measure saving is assess income and money spent on consumption during
a period of time - expenditure is then deducted from income. This method may give good
estimates of saving if the period in which saving is measured is sufficiently short. If we want
to study saving behaviour during longer periods, like, for example a year, it is unrealistic to
expect accurate data on expenditure. The result is most likely avery inaccurate estimate of
saving.
The third way to measure saving is to compute the differences between assets and debts, as
reported at the beginning and at the end of a period. This approach to measuring saving is the
most reliable one, as the respondents are asked about stock data from one point in time, which
is more likely to be accurate compared to flow-data (Ferber, 1977). Stock-data may be easier
for the respondent to remember than changes in stocks or expenditures. Besides, many
holdings are also often recorded, as most people regularly receive notifications from fmancial
institutions concerning balances on accounts. The accuracy of saving estimates can therefore
increase by asking about holdings at a particular moment in time and giving respondents time
to check their records before answering. The different saving measures used in this study will
therefore be based on stock data. Below, the exact way of calculating the saving measures is
described.
6.2.1 Questions about assets
The part of the questionnaire labelled "WTH" contains the questions concerning assets and
mortgages as of 31st of December. Data concerning assets and mortgages for 1994 were
collected in May 1994 (the second wave of data collection concerning value of assets as of
31.12.93) and in May 1995 (the third wave concerning value of assets as of 31.12.94). The
part of the questionnaire called "HS" contains questions concerning accommodation and
mortgages (see Questions 17-31 in Appendix 3). As questions concerning these assets are
about "present value", relevant information concerning value of accommodation and
mortgages in 1994 was collected in the beginning of 1994 (in the second wave of data
collection) and in May 1995 (the third wave of data collection).
Appendix 3 contains the first pages of the WTH questionnaire (Questions 1-16). It shows the
questions used for routing the respondents to the relevant assets questions, as well as all
questions concerning checking accounts. Some of the instructions given to the respondents
are also included. As the total questionnaire is too long to be included here, this sample from
the questionnaire will serve as example of how information about different assets was
collected. The full questionnaire is available from CentER upon request.
When answering questions about assets, the respondents are allowed to answer certain
questions by choosing one of several brackets (see Questions 5 and 15 in Appendix 3). This
option is given to those who refuse to report the exact amount of, for example, the balances on
their accounts (Questions 4 and 14, Appendix 3). The option to answer by indicating a bracket
was used in order to reduce non-response. The method leads to problems when the values of
different assets are to be added. In order to make additions and subtractions possible, the
middle of the bracket was used as the value for the asset. The last bracket was defined with
the lower edge, although this may cause underestimation of the real value.
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Appendix 4 contains an overview and definition of the asset components that were included in
the questionnaire. In addition, the appendix contains an overview of missing values for each
asset component. Because of a high proportion of missing values, some of the asset
components are not included in the operational definition of saving used in this study. The
exact definitions of discretionary and contractual saving are outlined below.
6.2.2 Saving definitions
The review of the saving literature in Chapters 2 - 3 shows that saving can be defined in
different ways. The operational defmitions can also vary in scope and complexity depending
on the purpose of the investigations and the resources available for the data collection. No
single definition is adequate for all purposes. Here, following Katona (1975), a distinction
will be made between discretionary and contractual (repayment) saving, in order to test the
extent to which the underlying psychological mechanisms are different for the two types of
saving. In addition, we will distinguish between saving during a year and the sum of savings
at a particular point in time (wealth).
Tables 6.1 and 6.2 show that discretionary saving is the saving most people would recognise
as saving. This is saving resulting from genuine decisions to save in the relevant period, not
performed because it was needed or governed by habit. A simple operational definition is to
equate discretionary saving with changes in liquid assets, such as currency, checking
accounts, and saving accounts. Liquid assets are either cash or assets that are immediately
convertible into cash. A more complete operational definition of discretionary saving is to
include changes in financial or intangible assets. Such assets can for example be government
bonds, stocks, annuities and mutual funds. These assets are described more as investments
than a form of saving, but they do imply decisions of putting money aside. The measure of
discretionary saving should be adjusted for so-called residual saving. Residual saving is a
result of a failure to spend the money, so that money is saved accidentally. As we do not have
the ability to distinguish between discretionary and residual saving in the data set, the measure
of discretionary saving includes any residual saving.
The operational definition of discretionary saving used in this study equals that used by
Katona (1975, pages 232-233), except for including contractual saving not being repayment
of loans in the definition of discretionary saving. The reason for this is the assumption about
the underlying mechanisms for repayment saving being different from other fixed savings
arrangement. Contractual saving done by repaying loans may be associated with a preference
for buying before paying. Contractual saving through participation in pension schemes may
be associated with a preference for the opposite. Moreover, the savings arrangements are not
so fixed than that they cannot be cancelled within a relatively short period. Automatic
transfers to a saving account can be stopped within a day. Insurance saving is often done by
paying a bill or accepting a transfer from one's checking account, and the household does, in
principle, make a decision on whether to continue this type of saving every time the amount is
to be paid. It is therefore reasonable to argue that these types of contractual saving are
discretionary saving.
A problem with the measures of fmancial assets such as shares, growth funds and mutual
funds is that it is difficult to identify the reason for changes in value of the funds from the
responses to the wealth questionnaire. For example, a rise in the value of funds is a result of
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two factors: more investments in the funds, or an increase in the value of the funds due to an
increase in their market value. Only the first factor can be characterised as discretionary
saving. Likewise, a reduction in the value of the funds might be caused by reducing the
investments in the funds or by a reduction of the value of the funds. Only the first factor
might be considered discretionary dissaving. It would have been better to ask respondents
directly about purchases and sales of such assets. Nevertheless, since this information is not
available, the change in the value of these assets will be treated as discretionary saving. The
exact definition of discretionary saving is the sum of the balance of checking accounts,
savings in Post bank accounts, saving in deposit books and deposit accounts, employer-
sponsored saving, money lent out to family or friends, the value of mutual funds, growth
funds, saving certificates, bonds, shares, annuity insurance and endowment insurance. The
sum of these assets is calculated for December 1993 and December 1994 respectively. The
sum of financial assets as of December 1994 is used as the "stock" measure of discretionary
saving and is denoted "financial wealth". The "flow"-measure "Discretionary saving during
1994" is calculated by subtracting the sum of fmancial wealth as of December 1993 from the
sum of financial wealth as of December 1994. The discretionary saving ratio is found by
dividing discretionary saving during 1994 by income in 1994.
Contractual saving is defined as repayment saving. Katona notes that this is regarded as
expenditure by many consumers, rather than a form of saving. Contractual saving is saving
that occurs when the household pays back their mortgages and other debt. The repayment
schemes can seldom be changed, and this saving is therefore more likely to be non-
discretionary than the fixed saving arrangements. As mortgages usually are used for
investments in real estate while the other loans usually are used for financing consumption,
we will analyse debt inclusive and exclusive mortgages and mortgage repayment respectively.
Debt is defined as the sum of loans to family, private debt, outstanding credit, instalment debt,
credit to shops, credit card debts, study loans and other loans. Mortgages are the sum of
mortgages on real estate (house used for accommodation, any second house used for
accommodation, real estate not used for accommodation). Total debt is the sum of debt and
mortgages. The sums of these different types of loans are calculated for December 1993 and
December 1994 respectively. The sum of debt and mortgages as of December 1994 is used as
the "stock" measure of negative saving. The "flow" -measure "Contractual saving during
1994" is defined as the reduction in the sum of debt and mortgages calculated by subtracting
the sum of debt as of December 1994 from the sum of debt as of December 1993. The
contractual savings ratio is found by dividing contractual saving during 1994 by income in
1994.
A complete operational definition of saving also includes changes in the value of assets like
houses, cars, and other durable goods. These are generally valued at market (resale) prices.
One reason for including these assets in the saving definition is that many people regard these
assets as investments instead of expenditures. Particularly in times with raising prices, the
purchase of a durable good may represent a substitute form of saving. This can be the case for
possessions as different as houses and quality clothes. For some households, the resale value
of their durable goods may represent the major part of the household's capital. Not including
it in the operational defmition of saving may result in considerable underestimation of saving.
This is particularly the case when the loans associated with the possession are counted as
negative assets. The "stock" measure of real savings is therefore defined as the value of real
estate and items such as cars, motorbikes, caravans, and boats as of 1994. Saving in real estate
during 1994 is defined as the change in the value of real savings between 1994 and 1993.
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Total household wealth as of December 1994 is defined as the sum of financial wealth and
value of real estate subtracted by the sum of debt and mortgages. Total saving during 1994 is
defined as the sum of discretionary saving during 1994, the sum repaid on debt and mortgages
and the change in the value of real estate and other valuable assets. The total saving ratio is
defmed as total saving during 1994 divided by income in 1994.
6.2.3 The saving measures vs. the subjective estimation of household saving
In each wave, the respondents were also asked about whether they put any money aside the
past 12 months. Those who answered "yes" to that question (1494 respondents) were asked
how much money their household had put aside in the past 12 months (Question 59,
Appendix 3). The answer was given by choosing one of seven brackets. Here we will compare
the responses to this question (the mid-value of the brackets) in the third wave of data
collection (1995) with the saving estimates calculated following the description above.
Although the question about past saving involves a different accounting period than 1994 and
involves all household members as opposed to only the head of household and spouse/partner,
the responses to this question should be correlated with the other saving estimates.
Since the question about "money put aside" concerned the household, the comparison was
carried out at the household level. If the partner and spouse had chosen different brackets
when answering how much money the household had put aside, the average of their answers
was used as measure. Of the 704 households with a partner present, the partners had chosen
the same bracket in 571 cases, while they deviated by one bracket in 107 cases and by two or
more brackets in 26 cases. These last 26 households were excluded from the analyses. Table
6.3 displays the results (Spearman's rho) of a comparison between responses to the question
"how much money did your household put aside last year" and saving estimates based on
differences in assets at the beginning and in the end of the year. Only the households in which
one of the spouses/partners had indicated that they had put money aside in the past 12 months
and where the household had a positive value for total saving were included in the analyses.
Separate analyses were carried out for the households who had not given any "don't know"
answers (see Appendix 3).
Table 6.3
Correlations between different saving measures
Amount put aside past Amount put aside past
12 months (reported in 12 months (reported in
1995) (households 1995) (households
with don't know- with don't know-
answers included) answers excluded)
Total saving (1994) r, .279** .377**
Discretionary saving (1994) r, .190** .257**
Bank saving (1994) r, .098* .171**
N 559 326
* Significant at the .05 level (2-taIied) ** Significant at the .01 level (2-taIled)
Given the results displayed in Tables 6.1 and 6.2, the results in Table 6.3 are surprising.
Taking into account what most people consider to be "saving", it is natural to expect that the
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question about "money put aside" would make most respondents report their bank saving. The
highest correlation coefficient was, however, found between the rather crude measure
"amount put aside" and the estimate of total saving during 1994, which also include
repayment saving, investment saving and changes in the value of real estate. The discretionary
saving measure includes both bank saving and investment saving and correlates more with the
"money put aside" measure that the estimate of bank saving (which includes saving in savings
accounts and employer-sponsored saving only).
The correlation between the two different saving measures is not very high. The reasons for
this might be many. First, as already mentioned, the accounting period and the definition of
household differ between the two measures. In addition, the "money put aside" question
might be unreliable as the respondents most likely define "money put aside" differently. The
fact that 17.8% of couples also disagreed on which bracket to choose further indicates that the
"money put aside" measure might be unreliable. Nevertheless, the positive and significant
correlations give some indication that the different saving measures have some reliability.
Table 6.4
Saving ratios (saving in percent of disposable income)
rrotal sample N= 1189 (758) Mean Median Minimum Maximum
[Iotal saving/ disposable income 19.2 (26.0 10.6 (11.4) 5185.5 (-1731.0 6273.9 (6273.9)
Repayment saving (mort.incl.j/disposable income -8.3 (-7.4 .0 (.0) -934.5 (-879.7 685.5 (685.5
Repayment saving (mort exc1.)/disposable income -.2 (-.7 .0 (.0) -341.0 (-341.0 685.5(685.5
Discretionary saving/disposable income 1.3 (5.4 .7 (1.3 -1127.8 (1127.8 5588.4 (5588.4
Low Income 2!"OUP N= 238 l_145J
rrotal saving/ disposable income 17.0 (3.6 -1266.7 (-928.1 2621.4 (342.6
lRepayment saving (mort.inc1.)/disposable income -3.7 (.5 -366.8 (-366.8 416.8 (416.8
Repayment saving (mort excl.j/disposable income .7 (-2.1 -231.0 (-231.0 269.2(169.6
Discretionary saving/disposable income -2.9 (-.6 -536.3 (-411.5 894.8 (894.8
Middle Income group N - 238 (151)
otal saving/ disposable income 2.9 (2.5 1242.32 (-440.0 999.4 (733.4
lRepayment saving (mort.inc1.)/disposable income -5.2 (-12.6 -716.2 (-716.2 444.0 (245.5
lRepayment saving (mort excl.j/disposable income -.3 (-4.4 -341.0 (-341.0 254.9 (254.9
Discretionary saving/disposable income -4.3 (-8.7 -555.0 (-555.0 864.1(727.5
High Income group N= 238 (157)
Total saving/ disposable income 19.2 (22.7 1000.9 (-1000.9 1666.8 (496.7
Repayment saving (mort.inc1.)/disposable income -14.9 (-10.0 -630.5 (-426.3 496.2 (316.12
Repayment saving (mort exc1.)/disposable income -3.6 (-2.7 -315.3_(-154.4 213.0(50.1
Discretionary saving/disposable income 1.0 (4.0 -856.5 (-611.2 965.6 (416.1
Note: Numbers m parentheses are results when respondents With "don't know" answers are excluded from the
sample.
Table 6.4 reports the maximum and minimum values of total, contractual (with and without
mortgage payments included) and discretionary savings ratios. Statistics are reported for both
the total sample, as well as for three income groups that will be defined in Section 6.4. The
statistics reported in Table 6.4 show that the range of the savings ratios is far too wide.
Although very high or low saving ratios might be expected with regards to contractual or
discretionary saving as a result of major reorganisation of a household's fmances, the range of
the total saving ratio, which should include all types of saving, is also too wide. There seems
to be a large portion of households with saving ratios much higher or lower than what we
normally would expect. One reason for the extreme values might be that respondents reported
the value of a major asset in one year but not in another. The measure is also very volatile for
typographical errors. Separate analyses were therefore conducted for the part of the sample
Chapter 6: Measurement 116
that had no "don't know" answers. As can be seen in Table 6.4, for some of the saving ratio
measures, this resulted in less extreme maximum and minimum values. The mean saving ratio
was also changed in some cases. However, the range of the saving ratios is still too large,
which means that many extreme values are also caused by typographical errors or otherwise
erroneous answers. Taking into account that the measure is constructed from up to 32 assets
components as well as many different income items from both heads of the households and
spouses, it is clear that the chance of typographical errors and respondent fatigue is quite high.
Since it is difficult to determine which saving ratio estimate might be correct and which might
be wrong, the analyses will be carried out for a trimmed sample. Table 6.5 shows the statistics
when the sample is trimmed by 10% of each tail of the distribution of the total savings ratio.
Table 6.5
Statistics of trimmed sample
Trimmed sample Mean Median Minimum Maximum
Total saving/ disposable income 16.9 10.6 -109.8 143.3
Repayment savin_g (mort.incl.)/disposable income -6.4 .0 -452.5 496.5
Repayment saving (mort excl.)/disposable income .7 .0 -255.9 213.0
Discretionary saving/disposable income .4 .7 -205.0 894.8
N=951
6.3 HOUSEHOLD INCOME
The questions about income from work are found in the part of the questionnaire called INC,
which included questions about health and income. Based on these data, a variable called
"household disposable income" is constructed. "Household disposable income" is defmed as
the income available to the household after payment of income taxes, National Insurance
contributions, and down payments on mortgages.
In the interview, the respondents were first asked about the sources of their personal income
in 1994: if they were self-employed, received any benefits or pensions, had a paid job on a
contractual basis or any other sources of income. Responses to these questions were used for
routing the respondents to the questions that were relevant for them. The respondents were
then asked to specify the yearly income received through the reported sources of income (see
for example Questions 32 to 38, Appendix 3). They were also asked about transfers to
children or other family members, the costs of medical insurance, fringe benefits,
inheritances, and gifts.
The income questionnaire does not contain questions about interest and dividend income.
Respondents report the amount of interest received for their savings account during the last
fiscal year as well as dividends for the same period. This information is not used when
constructing the variable Household Disposable Income because the income questionnaire
also contains a question about "other income not mentioned earlier". It is assumed that
answers to this question involve interest and dividend income, as most respondents indicated
either interest or dividend income as source. If we also add capital income to the income estimate,
we might doubly count this type of income.
The exact operational definition of household disposable income (HDISPINC) used for this
study is described in Appendix 5. Household income is found by adding the reported incomes
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of HR and spouse/partner. Appendix 5 also shows that the questionnaires contained many
different income questions. Answers to these questions were used for filling in missing
observations of household disposable income. The remaining missing observations of income
were estimated by using Maximwn Likelihood. The correlation between the calculated
disposable income and answers to the question "Do you know how much your taxable income
was for 1994?" was .93. The correlation (Spearman's rho) coefficient between income values
found by adding different income types and the mid-value of the eleven brackets used when
answering the question "Do you know, approximately, how much the net income of your
household would amount to over 1994?" was .872. This can be interpreted as a rather high
reliability with respect to the income data.
Table 6.6 shows some statistics for household disposable income (HDI) in the full sample and
in the two sub-panels respectively. 22 of the households in the high-income panel seem to
have a rather low disposable income, since these households had a gross income above Dfl.
110000 at the time they where recruited for the panel. These data were checked more
specifically. With the exception of three households, the income information seemed to be
consistent in the sense that gross income and net income derived from information about
different sources of income corresponded well to the chosen bracket for household net income
for the same period. The reason for why their disposable income is so much lower than the
gross income they had when they where recruited in 1993, could be that one partner stopped
working due to child bearing, payment of alimonies or support to children that are students
etc. For one household, a rather low estimate of the sum of income sources was substituted
with the much higher mid-value of the income bracket chosen by the same respondent, as this
estimate seemed more probable.
Table 6.6
Household disposable income
Total sample Representative High-income
I panel panel
N 1212 754 458
Mean 64876 45434 96884
Median 59228 42115 91040
HDI< 29999 180 179 l
30000<HDI< 59999 436 415 21
60000<HDI< 89999 344 144 200
90000<HDI<119999 178 10 168
120000<HDI 74 6 68
The discretionary income groups
When testing whether the importance of psychological variables increases with the level of
discretionary income), it would be helpful to be able to distinguish between those with and
without discretionary income. Katona (1975) distinguished between four groups:
1) The wealthy, which he defined as the top 5% of the income distribution. This
group would have discretionary income, but have a much greater degree to which
they may indulge in discretionary expenditures.
2) The discretionary income group, which is defined less accurately as "those
families who are not 'wealthy' and yet are in possession of income they may use
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for discretionary expenditures. Their income exceeds what is needed for minimum
necessities so that they can, to a smaller or larger extent, engage in spending not
only on what they need but also on what they want." (Katona, 1975: page 23).
Katona suggested a lower limit of income for this group, which placed close to one
half of all family units in the 1960s and early 1970s in the discretionary income
group.
3) The lower-middle income group, which is defined as having no discretionary
income but does not fall into the poverty group.
4) The poor, which Katona defmed as households with income less than the
minimum budgetary requirements for a family.
For the analyses of the effect of increase in discretionary income, we are interested in groups
l and 2. Per definition, groups 3 and 4 will have no saving, since the lack of saving is not
caused by unwillingness to save, but inability. The psychological variables should have little
impact on the saving behaviour of this group.
There are two possible ways of identifying those with discretionary income:
1)Exclude those who answer 1,2 or 3 to Questions 42 and 43 in Appendix 3.
or
2) Exclude those with an income below a certain level.
There are problems with both methods. The first method is problematic since an answer like
''we can just manage" does not necessarily mean that the household has no discretionary
income in the sense that they can buy things beyond necessities. As demonstrated by Alessie
et al. (1997), people's perception of what it takes to make ends meet increases with the
income of the reference group. They still might have income that exceeds necessities as
defined in a more objective way, but they might not perceive it as such. This is illustrated in
Table 6.7. Table 6.7 shows the frequencies (in percent) of responses to Questions 42 and 43
(Appendix 3) across each quartile of the distribution of disposable income. The average
response of spouses to the financial situation-questions (in 1994) is used for this purpose, and
scores with decimals (which occurred when spouses did not agree) have been rounded off to
the lower number. The table shows that the tendency to report that it is easy to manage on the
household income and that the household is able to save increases with income. Nevertheless,
there are still people in the high-income group that think that they can hardly manage and
there are people in the lowest income group who think it is easy to manage.
Table 6.7
Perception of economic situation across household income groups
How well can you manage? How is our financial situation?
Household Very Hard Neithe Easy Very Debt Use Just Save Save a
Disp. Income (I) hard easy saving manag some lot
1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5
1<38036 6.0 23.3 44.1 23.9 2.7 6.4 13.8 45.5 32.0 2.4
38036<1<59022 1.7 8.1 38.6 41.6 10.1 3.4 9.7 24.9 51.3 10.7
59022<1<85235 .3 4.7 27.6 53.5 13.8 1.6 6.4 17.2 53.5 21.2
1>85235 O 3.0 23.6 47.8 25.6 2.0 2.7 16.5 52.9 25.9
(N=1l89 households)
One possible reason for a lack of a more direct relationship between household income and
perception of the financial situation might be that the figures do not take the number of family
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members into account. Table 6.8 shows the distribution of answers about the economic
situation of the household when the disposable income is divided by the number of family
members. The transformation of household income to income per family member did not
change the pattern of response much.
Table 6.8
Perception of economic situation across levels of income pr. family member
How well can you manage? How is your financial situation?
Disp. Income (I) Very Hard Neithe Easy Very Debt Use Just Save Save a
pr. family hard easy saving manag some lot 5
member l 2 3 4 5 l 2 3 4
1<18083 5.7 20.6 49.8 22.9 1.0 404 12.5 46.1 33.7 304
18083<1<27638 1.6 lOA 39.9 39.9 8.1 4.1 8.7 28.2 48.0 11.1
27638<1<39755 .3 6.8 27.9 49.5 15.5 3.7 7.1 18.8 53.6 16.8
1>39755 .3 1.4 16.2 54.6 27.6 1.3 404 10.7 54.5 29.0
(N= 1189 households)
Tables 6.7 and 6.8 indicate that there is discretionary income also in the lower 25% of the
income distribution in the sample. It is difficult to identify the threshold that would separate
the poor and lower-middle income group from the discretionary income group. For the
purpose of this study, we use every lOthpercentile of the disposable income per household
member to divide the sample into three income groups (see Table 6.9). These groups will not
correspond to the groups of Katona, as households are likely to have discretionary income
even in the lowest income group. Yet, we can use them for testing whether the effect of
psychological variables increases with discretionary income. The responses displayed in
Tables 6.7 and 6.8 indicate that the discretionary income increases for each income group,
since the tendency to think it is hard to manage decreases with income. The effect of
psychological variables should therefore increase monotonically with the three income groups
as defined in Table 6.8.
Table 6.9
Defmition of income groups
Percent Disposable income/ Income groups
ile No. of fam. members
O
1 11901
2 16587 Low income group
3 19876
4 23843
5 27637 Middle income group
6 31800
7
8 37250
9 43159 High income group
10 53005
Table 6.10 shows some descriptive statistics of the full sample and the three income groups
defined by the income brackets shown in Table 6.9. The largest difference between the groups
is family size. There are more households with both spouse/partner in the low-income group
than in the other groups and the ratio of households belonging to the high-income panel is
higher the higher the income group, as expected.
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Table 6.10
Description of the three income groups
Full sample Low income Middle income High income
N 1189 238 238 238
Mean age (range) 47.3 (18-87) 47.0 (22-77) 50.1 (22-84) 48.1 (24-87)
Family size
1 306 (25.7%) 25 (10.5%) 71 (29.8%) 82 (34.5%)
2 458 (38.5%) 64 (26.9%) 92 (38.7%) 141 (59.2%)
3 138 (11.6%) 41 (17.2%) 40 (16.8%) 10 (4.2%)
4 196 (16.5%) 75 (31.5%) 31 (13.0%) 4 (1.7%)
5 75 (6.3%) 26 (10.9"10) 4 (1.7%) 1 (.4%)
6 13 (1.1%) 7 (2.9%) 2 (.4%)
7 2 (.2%)
9 1 (.1%)
Living with partner 844 (71.0%) 194 (81.5%) 165 (69.3%) 154 (64.7%)
Representative p. 745 (62.7%) 177 (74.4%) 155 (66.4%) 117 (49.2%)
6.4 EDUCATION LEVEL
All respondents are asked to indicate their highest level of education using thirteen categories,
from primary to University education. Two questions were asked: one concerned highest level
of education attended while the other concerned highest level completed. These were recoded
into high, medium and low education, according to the following rule:
Kindergarten/primary education, continued primary education or elementary secondary
education, continued special {low-level education and secondary education, junior vocational
training, special (low-level) education and vocational training through the apprentice system,
and "other sort of education/training" are coded as low education, pre-university education,
and senior vocational training are coded as middle education, while vocational colleges and
university education are coded as high education.
Before recoding the education level, several consistency checks of the reported education
levels were carried out. Answers given to the question about highest level of education
attended in the second and third wave of data collection were compared. 1852 of the 2033
respondents gave the same answer across the two waves. 113 of the 181 respondents who did
not give the same answer across the two years would be assigned to different education group
when following the rule outlined above. Moreover, answers given to the question about
highest level of education attended and the highest level of education completed in the second
wave of data collection were compared. In all, 1608 of the 2033 respondents gave the same
answer to these two questions. In268 of the cases, where the respondents had not reported the
same answer to the "education attained" question and "education completed" question, were
assigned to a different education group when following the rule specified above.
The procedure used when assigning respondents to the three education groups was therefore
as follows:
First, the variable "highest education completed" from the second wave of data collection was
recoded according to the described rule. In cases where the "highest education attended" was
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one group higher than "highest education completed" (108 cases), the new code was kept. In
the cases where the "highest education attended" was lower than "highest education
completed" (99 cases), and when the highest education attended was two groups higher than
highest education completed (14 cases), information from the third wave of data collection
was used to assess which education level was correct. When comparing the answers to
"highest education completed" collected for the second wave and "highest education
attended" collected in the third wave, the education group was the same for 89 of the 113
cases that were checked, and only for 18 respondents the reported completed education was
higher than reported attended education or the assigned education levels differed by two
groups. For the remaining 18 cases, the highest attended education group for 1994 matched
the highest education group reported in the first wave, so for these cases the education level
reported in 1993 was used. As there was a perfect match between the completed education
group in the fust wave of data collection and the reported highest attended education group in
the second wave of data collection, the 49 missing values for education level were replaced
with the values for highest attended education group from 1994. In the sample of 2033
respondents, 713 are assigned to the low education group, 516 to the middle education group,
and 804 to the high education group.
6.5 TIME PREFERENCE
Time preference is defmed as the subjective value of present goods relative to future goods of
equal quantity and quality. In empirical research, a frequently used operational defmition of
time preference is the discount rate people implicitly use when they make intertemporal
decisions, after controlling for the effect of risk (e.g. Loewenstein, 1987; Thaler, 1981). This
discount rate is called the "Subjective Discount Rate" (SDR) or the "rate of time preference".
The usual way of measuring the rate of time preference follows the instructions provided by
Fisher himself:
" ... we obtain the rate of time preference for a present dollar over a dollar one year hence by
the following process:
(a) take the present want for one more present dollar; and
(b) the present want for one more dollar due one year hence;
(c) and(c) subtract (b) from (a); and fmally
(d) measure the result (c) as a percentage of (b)." (Fisher, 1930; page 62).
Laboratory studies have shown that characteristics of the questions used to measure SDR
affect the responses. The SDRs observed in previous studies have been sensitive to the size of
the alternatives in the choice-sets, the time delay, framing in terms of losses and gains (e.g.
Benzion et aI, 1989; Nyhus, 1999; Shelley, 1993; Thaler, 1981) and framing in terms of
speeding up and delaying events (e.g. Loewenstein, 1988; Nyhus, 1999; Shelley, 1993).
Measurement of time preference is therefore not as straightforward as proposed by Fisher
(1930) and practised by many of his successors. Nyhus (1997) analysed responses to twelve
different questions used to elicit the rate of time preference (collected in the third wave of
data collection of the eSS) and found that the correlation between the responses to these
questions were high within scenarios, while it was low between responses when the scenarios
were different. She suggested to use scenarios in the questions used for measuring time
preference that correspond to the behaviour subject to observation. A delay-payment scenario
should be used when measuring time preference in studies of borrowing behaviour or
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contractual saving, while delay-receipt scenarios should be used in studies of discretionary
saving.
In the first wave of data collection for the CSS, time preference was measured using nine
questions with varying time horizon, size of amounts and different framing (delay receipt,
speed-up receipt and delay payment). An overview is given in Appendix 3 (Questions 95-
112). Because delayed consequences often are associated with risk, it is stressed in the
instructions to the respondents that delaying the reception of a gain or postponement of a
payment are without any risk. The organisation that pays the prizes is financially trustworthy,
while the organisations that claim the payments are state offices unlikely to change or forget
their claims. The questions involved periods no longer than one year. For this reason, the
following linear formula (as opposed to a compound formula) was used when eliciting the
discount rates from the responses to these questions:
r = «VF Np) - l) x 12ft
where Vp is present value of the cash flow, VF is the future value of the cash flow, t is the
time period to be waited (in months) and r denotes the discount rate used in the decision. All
discount rates were converted to annual discount rates. In the questions, respondents are given
t and either VF or Vp, and they are asked to fill in the missing value necessary to calculate r.
A Principal Component Analysis (PCA) was used in order to explore the data further. The
purpose of PCA is to transform the original set of items into a smaller set of linear
combinations that account for most of the variance in the original set. The principal
components are extracted so that the first principal component accounts for the largest amount
of the total variation in the data. The second principal component is the weighted linear
combination of the observed variables that are uncorrelated with the first component and that
account for the maximum amount of the remaining total variation. Table 6.11 shows the
results, when the correlation matrix was used as input, and with oblique rotation. The pattern
matrix shows the loadings that represent the unique contribution of each variable to the factor.
The three components which obtained an Eigenvalue greater than l are easily interpreted
according to the scenario of the questions: Component l: Delay Receipt score, Component 2:
Speed-up receipt score, and Component 3: Delay payment score. These components explained
57.0% of the total variation. The correlation between the first and second component was
.116, between the first and third component .09 and between the second and third component
.159.
Table 6.11
Pattern Matrix for 9 time preference questions
Components
Variables Delay Speed-up [Delay
eceipt eceipt payment
Delay payment of low amount l year .008 .026 .772
Delay payment of low amount 3 months .008 -.001 .813
Delay receipt of high amount l year. .840 .097 -.083
Delay receipt of high amount 3 months .889 -.009 -.Q7(]
Delay receipt of low amount 3 months .713 .069 .148
Speed-up receipt of high amount 3 months .041 .739 .Q7(]
Speed-up receipt oflow amount 12 months -.005 .749 -.203
Speed-up receipt of high amount 12 months -.084 .53 .170
Speed-up receipt of low amount 3 months .095 .53 .202
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Extraction Method: PrincipalComponent Ananlysis. Rotation Method: Oblimin with Kaiser Normalization.
N=2033. Pairwise deletion of missing.
Based on the results displayed in Table 6.11, three measures of time preference were used in
the subsequent study. A delay-receipt rate was derived by calculating the average of the
responses to the three delay-receipt questions. A delay payment rate was derived by
calculating the average response to the two delay payment questions, while a speed-up-receipt
rate was derived by computing the average score of the four speed-up receipt questions.
6.6 EXPECTATIONS AND UNCERTAINTY
The economic psychology part of the questionnaire contains data about people's expectations
concerning future income and how certain there were about the expected changes (see
Appendix 3, Questions 44-58). The measure of expectations will be limited to income
expectations because the data set does not include expectations towards expenditures. Income
expectations were measured by asking the respondents whether they expected their income to
increase, remain the same or decrease the next year and the next five years. If they expected a
change, they were asked to indicate the percentage change they expected. The answers to
these questions were used to construct two measures of income change (the next year and the
next 5 years). The correlation between the two measures is significant at the .01 level (r =
.35). The correlation coefficients between the income expectations of spouses are relatively
high and significant at the .01 level (expectations for 1 year ahead: r = 0.66 and expectations
for 5 years ahead: r = 0.55).
Income uncertainty was measured by asking respondents how likely (on a seven-point scale
where 1= highly unlikely and 7 = highly likely) seven possible changes in income in the next
12 months were (see Appendix 3, Questions 48 - 54). These changes were a rise/fall in
income of more than 15%, a rise/fall in income between 10 and 15%, a rise/fall in income
between 5 and 10%, and no significant change in income. Responses to these questions are
not straightforward to use, and at least two approaches of how to construct a scale from them
have been used in previous research (Das & Donkers, 1999; Webley & Nyhus, 2001). In this
study, the approach applied by Webley and Nyhus (2001) is used.
The seven questions Ij (Questions 48 - 54, Appendix 3) were assigned numbers 0= 1,...,7).
This assumes that the income changes are equivalent. The answering categories for each of
the questions (fj) were subtracted by one so that the answers to each of the questions range
from Oto 6 (f = 0, ...,6).
For each individual, each rating (fj) was divided with the total sum of the ratings (aj= fj ILfj)
in order to adjust for any individual differences when using the scales.
the variance is given by
7
I(a)= 1:Ij * aj.,
j=!
S2I(a)= 1:(Ij - I(a»)2* (X_j ,
Mean income change is given by the formula
and the standard deviation is Sl(a)= square root of S2I(a).
This standard deviation is a measure of the spread of people's ratings to the seven uncertainty
questions. It is used here as an index of uncertainty. For example, a person who has given the
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answers OOO6 OOO is quite certain that his/her income will not change more than 5% and
gets an uncertainty index of O. A person who answers OOO6 l OOis slightly more uncertain
about a positive change and gets an uncertainty index of 0.35. Persons answering 2 2 2 2 2 2
2 or OOOOOOOget a score of 2. The highest scores are obtained for persons answering 6 6
6 0666 (s = 2.16) and 5 5 3 23 5 5 (s = 2.20), as this indicates that the persons expect a
change in income, but that they do not know whether it will be positive or negative and regard
both direction of changes as equally probable. In the following, this index is labelled
"perceived income variability".
In addition to the described index, two simpler measures of income uncertainty were included
in the questionnaire (Questions 47 and 58, Appendix 3). One measure concerns how confident
the respondents feel about their own estimates of increases and decreases of income for the
next year the other measure regards confidence in estimates for the next five years. Scores of
the uncertainty index and the two simpler measures correlated significantly, and the
relationship was weaker between the l-year uncertainty index described above and the
responses about confidence in the S-year estimate (rs = .16) than the l-year estimate (rs= .23)
as could be expected. The correlation of the uncertainty index of spouses was significant at
the .01 level (r = .39).
6.7 TIME HORIZON
The respondents were asked about their most important as well as least important planning
horizon with regards to expenditures (Questions 115 and 116, Appendix 3). The reliability of
question 116 about the least important planning period does not seem to be high. Many
respondents specified the same time period as both the most and the least important time
horizon. No attempt was therefore made to produce an overall scale of time horizon, and
question 115 is used as the measure of time horizon. It is not desirable to rely on a single
item, but there is no other variable in the data set that will tap this construct.
Table 6.12
Most important planning horizon
Most important planning horizon with Frequency Valid
regard to planning expenditures and savings I percent
The next couple of months 939 46.2
Next year 475 23.4
The next couple of years 425 20.9
The next 5-10 years 120 5.9
More than 10 years from now 74 3.6
N= 2033
The answers given to the question about most important time horizon are displayed in Table
6.12. The answers to this question are not straightforward to interpret. Answering that the
"next couple of months" is the most important planning horizon, does not necessarily mean
that time beyond this period is considered unimportant. In lack of other measures that can tap
the concept of planning horizon, this measure will still be used in the subsequent analyses.
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6.8 ATTITUDES TOWARDS DEBT AND SAVING
The 21 items used to measure attitudes (Questions 74 - 94, Appendix 3) were analysed
previously by Wårneryd (1996b) and Webley and Nyhus (2001). Their results are presented in
Table 6.13. Wårneryd identified five orthogonal factors that he labelled "thrift", "no need to
save", "saving involvement", "shame of debt", and "saving habits". These factors accounted
for 47% of the variance. Webley and Nyhus tested the robustness of this solution using two
Table 6.13
Four factor structures for attitudes towards saving
Item Label This study Wirneryd Webley& Webley&
1993/1994 1993& Nyhus Nyhus
1994-data 1994-data 96- data
Factor 1: Thrift
STIGBOl I save to create a larger freedom of choice and .47 .37 F2 .49 Fl .40 Fl .52F2 .49 F3
to be more independent
STIGB04 Being careful with money is an important .57 .68 Fl .70FI .60F2
character trait
STIGB05 With financial affairs, I tend to listen carefully .51 .47 Fl .50 Fl .37 .44F2
to advice by family and friends F5
STlGB06 To me, the service of a bank is very important .67 .41 Fl .53 Fl .51 Fl
STIGB08 It is important always to save as much money .56 3.5 F5 .71 Fl .69FI .68F2
as possible
STIGB09 I try to have enough money in my bank .67 .61Ft .58 Fl .54 Fl
accounts to be sure that I will be able to meet
my financial liabilities
STlGBIO It is important to have some money left at the .64 .64FI .66FI .51 Fl .45F2
end of the month
STIGB16 Saving should be encouraged in today's society .39 .57FI .52 Fl .35F2 .52 Fl .40F2
Factor 2: SavinI! Involvement
STIGB02 I always try to pick saving schemes that yield .61 .59 F3 .64F2 .73 F3
high profits
STIGBI2 I am very interested in fmancial matters .68 .67 F3 .69 F2 .74F3
STlGB18 If I compare myself with my friends, I think in .64 .65 F3 .55 F2 .50 F3 .36FI
generallam(financially)betteroff
Factor 3: SavinI! habits
STIGB14 I reserve ~partof my wages to save .62 .50F5 .43 F2 .39F5 .60FI
STlGB19 For me there is no need to save because my -.58 .54F2 .54 F3 .42F2 .69F4
income will rise siznificantlv in the future
STIGB20 Most people in my environment are saving .59 .68 F5 .73 F5 .65FI
money
STIGB21 Because of the social security system in our -.59 .60F2 .64F3 .65 F4
country there is no need to save
Factor 4: Shame of debt
STlGB03 In general it is a good idea to be able to buy a -.72 -.65 F4 -.72 F4 -.70 F5
car on instalment
STIGBlI People who buy on instalment are wasters .64 .64F4 .56 F4 .62 F5.37 F2
STIGBt3 It is not a good idea to borrow money to go on .40 .50F5 .47 F4 .37F5 .47 F5.40 Fl
holiday
Factor 5: No need to save
STlGB07 Banks are only appropriate for people who have .69 .59 F2 .59 F3 .43 F2 .35F4
much money
STlGB17 People who are successful in saving are also .50 .52 Fl .47 Fl .37F2 .45 Fl
successful in life
STIGB15 I always keep some reserve money because my .45 .38 Fl -.40F5 .39F2 .50F4
income varies over the year
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization.
N=2025. Pairwise deletion of missing. 45.9 % of total variance explained. Variation explained after rotation: Fl: 13.7, F2:
9.0, F3: 8.3, F4: 7.8, F5: 7.0. Note: loadings smaller than.35 not reported
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different samples that differed from the sample used by Wårneryd. The solutions accounted
for 49.6% and 48.1% respectively of the variance and confirmed the factor structure found by
Wårneryd. In most cases, the same items were grouped in the same factor, although some
inconsistencies were found.
Table 6.13 shows the results from the four peAs carried out on the ess data. Wårneryd
(1996b) conducted a peA on the attitude data from the first and second wave of data
collection. The results from his analyses are shown in column four. Webley and Nyhus (2001)
analysed data collected in later waves and conducted a similar analysis to that of Wårneryd in
order to test the robustness of the factor structure. The results are shown in two columns:
column five shows the results using data from the 1993 and 1994 data, while column six
reports the results using the 1996 data. Wåmeryd and Webley and Nyhus instructed the
program to extract five factors. This was not done in this study, but the optimal solution was
still based on five factors (with Eigenvalues greater than l). The extracted components have
been labelled according to Wårneryd's (1996b) suggestions.
Table 6.14
Attitude factors
Item Label Loading
Factor I: Thrift
Variation explained after rotation: 15.9, Chronbach's alpha: .71
STIGSB04 Being careful with money is an important character trait .52
STIGSBOS With financial affairs, I tend to listen carefully to advice by family and friends .56
STIGSB06 To me, the service of a bank is very important .63
STIGSB08 It is important always to save as much money as possible .51
STIGSB09 I try to have enough money in my bank accounts to be sure that I will be able to .62
meet my fmancialliabilities
STIGSBIO It is important to have some money left at the end of the month .62
Factor 2: Shame of debt
Variation explained after rotation: 12.2, Chronbach's alpha: .53
STIGSB03 In general it is a good idea to be able to buy a car on instalment (reversed) .61
STIGSBll People who buy on instalment are wasters .69
STIGSBI6 Saving should be encouraged in today's society .43
STIGSBI7 Success in saving - success in life .57
Factor 3: Saving Involvement
Variation explained after rotation: ILS, Chronbach's alpha: .60
STIGSBOl Saving creates freedom/independence .45
STIGSB02 I always try to pick saving schemes that yield high profits .75
STIGSB12 I am very interested in fmancial matters .79
Factor 4: Saving habits
Variation explained after rotation: 9.4, Chronbach's alpha: .38
STIGSB14 I reserve part of my wages to save it .42
STIGSB19 For me there is no need to save because my income will rise significantly in the .71
future (reversed)
STIGSB21 Because of the social security system in our country there is no need to save .66
(rev.)
Extraction Method: Principal Component AnalYSIS. Rotation Method: Varimax With Kaiser Normalization.
N=2025. Pairwise deletion of missing. Total variance explained: 49.0 %
The results from the analyses reported in Table 6.13 show that in most cases the items group
into the same factor. As could be expected, the three analyses on the data from the first two
waves did not diverge much. The results from the analysis of data from 1996, however, show
that the factor structure used is not robust across different samples. Table 6.14 shows the
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factor structure that will be used in this study. Some of the 21 attitude items were excluded
from the analysis because they were unstable and loaded on different components across
different analyses. Other items were deleted because they reduced the reliability of the scales
in terms of the value of Cronbach's alpha. One of the questions (Question 88) was double-
barrelled. Question 91 is better used as a measure of perceived position in the reference group
(see Section 6.13). Question 93 had an exceptionally high number of missing values (597 of
2025). Excluding Question 93 reduced the number of missing of the derived composite
attitude measures from 694 to 271. After removing these items, a solution with four principal
components fitted the data most optimally. The factor structure is similar to those reported in
Table 6.13, although a higher consistency with the factor structure found when using the 1996
data is desirable. Component scores were computed to represent each of the four components.
These will be used in the subsequent regression analyses. A component score represents each
individual score on the group of items that load high on a component (Hair, Anderson,
Tatham & Black, 1995).
6.9 SAVING MOTIVES
The importance of saving motives was measured by Questions 61-73 (Appendix 3).
Respondents indicated how important they regarded the different saving motives by choosing
a number from 1 to 7 where 1 means "very unimportant" and 7 "very important".
Question 61 relates to the bequest motive. As this was the only question about bequests, the
replies to this question were used as a measure of the strength of the bequest motive.
Questions 61 and 67 relate to the inter vivos transfer motive. A measure of the importance of
inter vivos transfers was constructed by adding the responses to these questions and dividing
the score by two. Questions 63, 64, 72 and 73 relate to the precautionary saving motive. The
index of importance for this motive was constructed by adding the responses to the four
questions and dividing the total score by four. The same procedure was used when
constructing the index for importance of retirement saving (Questions 65 and 66), goal saving
(Questions 68 and 70) and the investment motive (Questions 69 and 71).
Table 6.15
Mean and median scores for importance of saving motives across gender and age groups
N Bequest Inter vivo Precautionary Saving for old Goal saving Calculation
Motive transf. mot. Motive age motive Motive
MeanlMedian MeanlMedian Mean/Median Mean/Median Mean/Median MeanlMedian
Men 1039 2.6 / 2.0 3.0/3.0 4.4 / 4.5 4.1 / 4.0 3.2 / 3.0 2.5 /2.5
Women 994 2.6 / 2.0 3.1 /3.0 4.7 / 4.8 4.3 / 4.5 3.3 / 3.0 2.3 / 2.0
Age: <30 143 2.1 / 2.0 2.9/3.0 4.7 / 5.0 3.8 / 4.0 4.4 / 4.5 2.6 / 2.5
Age: 30-44 796 2.9 / 2.0 3.3/3.5 4.6 / 4.8 4.2 / 4.5 3.5 / 3.5 2.5 / 2.5
Age: 45-59 670 2.6 / 2.0 3.1 /3.0 4.5 / 4.8 4.4 / 5.0 2.9 / 3.0 2.4 / 2.5
Age: 60-74 375 2.9 / 2.0 2.7/2.5 4.5 / 4.5 3.9 / 4.0 2.8 / 2.5 2.3 / 2.0
Age: >75 49 2.8 / 3.0 2.7/2.5 4.1 / 4.0 3.5 / 3.0 3.1 / 3.0 2.3 / 2.0
Table 6.15 shows that the precautionary saving motive is considered the most important
saving motive, while the calculation and bequest motives are considered the least important.
This is consistent with previous findings (e.g. Katona, 1975). We also see that, with the
exception of the calculation and bequest motives, women tend to consider the saving motives
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to be slightly more important than do men. In particular, the precautionary and retirement
saving motives are considered more important among women. The saving motives also seem
to vary with age. The bequest motive is considered more important among the older age
groups. The inter vivos transfer motive is considered more important among households who
are likely to have children living in their household. The importance of the precautionary,
calculation and goal saving motive declines with age, while the importance of saving for old
age is more important for those who have not yet reached retirement.
6.10 PERCEIVED POSITION IN REFERENCE GROUP
Questions 117 - 120 were used to measure perceived position in reference group. As
discussed in Section 2.3.2, effects of reference groups can be difficult to measure, because it
is problematic to identify the reference group a person uses. Here, we let the respondents
choose from a long list of possible reference groups (Questions 117 and 119, Appendix 3),
and the respondents were then asked to evaluate their own economic situation with that of
their chosen group (Questions 118 and 120). When constructing a composite measure for
perceived position in reference group, the answers to these two questions are weighted
equally. The composite measure was constructed by adding the responses to the two
questions, so that we get an index of relative deprivation ranging from 2 to 14.
Unfortunately, further inspection of the data revealed that many respondents had not
answered the questions about perceived position in reference group. Only 883 out of the 2033
respondents (43.4%) in the working data file answered. One reason is that many respondents
did not answer the question about who was their most important group for comparison and
they were not routed to the question about their financial situation compared to this group. In
addition, a routing error contributed to the high ratio of missing data for these variables. The
reference group questions were not repeated in the second wave of data collection, which
means that we cannot use data from later waves for imputation of missing values.
A different measure that may tap the construct "perceived position in reference group" is
Question 91 (Appendix 3). The correlation between the answers to this question and the
composite measure described above was significant at the one per cent level (rs = .488). Although
a higher correlation between the two measures is desirable, Question 91 will be used as a proxy
for perceived position of reference group because of the high number of missing observations for
the other reference group questions.
6.11 PERSONALITY DIMENSIONS
The CSS includes a personality inventory referred to as the 16PA (personality adjective)
scale. Brandståtter (1988) designed the l6PA scale as a short version of Cattell's personality
dimensions. Respondents locate themselves on 16 personality dimensions, each represented
by two bipolar scales to achieve a higher reliability of the measures and to allow for intemal
consistency checks (Questions 121 - 152, Appendix 3). Brandståtter (1988) used data from
228 respondents (a mixture of students and married members of the general public) to
demonstrate that four of the five secondary factors (emotional stability, extraversion,
conscientiousness or norm-orientation, independence, and tough-mindedness) of the 16PF
could be satisfactorily predicted from the secondary factors of the l6PA (the one that could
not was tough-mindedness). He further reported four studies using only the 16PA, which
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show that the secondary factors relate to other variables in line with theoretical predictions.
This provides some evidence that the 16PA is a valid instrument. The scale is constructed to
facilitate collection of personality data. Specifically, it is shorter than most other personality
indexes and takes only a few minutes for respondents to complete.
Table 6.16
Factor structure of the 16PA
Item Label Loading
Factor 1: Emotional stability
Explained variance after rotation:13.7 Cronbach's alpha: .82
TEG2 Slow thinker - quick thinker (reversed) .357
TEG3 Easily worried - not easily worried (reversed) .654
TEGIO Oriented toward reality - dreamer .469
TEG12 Happy with myself - doubtful .607
TEG14 Need to be supported - independent (reversed) .534
TEG16 Well balanced - Quick-tempered .658
TEGla Nervous - relaxed (reversed) .714
TEG13a Self-controlled - moody .580
TEG14a Self-confident - timid .593
TEG15a Can handle stress-cannot handle stress .642
Factor 2: Tough-mindedness
Explained variance after rotation: 8.7 Cronbach's alpha: .62
TEG5 Quiet, calm - vivid, vivacious .645
TEG7 Shv - dominant .676
TEGll Direct, straiidrtforward - diplomatic (reversed) .575
TEG4a Gentle - rough .445
TEG7a Aimed at proving mvself - indulgent (reversed) .497
Factor 3: Conscientiousness
Explained variance after rotation: 8.0 Cronbach's alpha: .61
TEG6 Carefree - meticulous .684
TEG8 Not easily hurt - easily hurt, sensitive .468
TEG15 Little self-control - discinlined .479
TEG5a Always worried - unconcerned (reversed) .579
TEG9a Principled - carefree (reversed) .662
Factor 4: Extraversion
Explained variance after rotation: 7.9 Cronbach's alpha: .58
TEGl Oriented towards things - towards people .604
TEG4 Flexible - stubborn (reversed) .367
TEG9 Trusting, credulous - suspicious (reversed) .477
TEG8a Friendlv - cold (reversed) .631
TEG10a Critical - accommodating .417
TEGlla Indeoendent - prefer company .495
TEG12a Artificial - natural .438
Factor 5: Inflexibility
Exnlalned variance after rotation: 7.9 Cronbach's alpha: .62
TEG13 Creature of habit - ODento changes (reversed) .584
TEG2a Like to try things - conservative .702
TEG3a Trained thinker-untrained thinker .455
TEG16a Want new experiences - want Quiet life .696
Alternating halves of the 16PA were included in the ess each year, which requires that two
waves must be merged in order to use the full scale (32 questions). Respondents answered the
questions using a 7-point scale. The instructions given to each respondent can be found in
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Appendix 3. Using data from multiple waves of the CSS, individual item stability was checked
and found to be satisfactory. With the exception of one item, the rank correlation between
answers given to the same question by the same person was between .5 and .7 with both one
and three years' interval. Due to the merging of the two waves, 285 individuals in 181
households were deleted from the working data file, as they were not members of the panel in
both waves.
Table 6.16 shows the factor structures resulting from a PCA of the 16PA followed by a
varimax rotation. This factor structure is similar to that reported by Wåmeryd (1996a), also
based on CSS data from 1993 and 1994. There were seven factors with Eigenvalues greater
than 1. The Eigenvalues for the first 12 factors were 5.20, 3.06, 2.42, 2.22, 1.46, 1.17, 1.10,
.97 .92, and .85. A scree test (Cattell, 1966) was performed to help identify the optimum
number of factors that should be extracted before the amount of unique variance begins to
dominate the common variance. The test suggests that five or six factors are appropriate (see
Figure 6.1). Given that previous analyses of 16PA have identified five factors, and these
factors are readily interpretable, a five-factor solution was selected for this study. These
factors have reliabilities ranging from .58 to .82, which is reasonable.
1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25 27 29 31
Component Number
Figure 6.1
Scree Plot - 16PA
6.12 CONSTRUCTION OF HOUSEHOLD MEASURES
Data concerning savings and incomes were collected at the individual level. A composite
household measure of these variables can be constructed by simply adding together the
responses from spouses. With respect to the psychological variables, an alternative strategy
will be followed. The procedure is explained below.
In recent years, there has been a stream of research into how couples choose their system of
financial management. It has been acknowledged that income is not distributed evenly
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between household members and that the strategies of financial management differ from one
household to the other. Using responses from one household member only when doing
analyses on the household level is therefore inadequate. Similarly, to give, for example, all the
males, heads of the households or "household financial managers" in the sampled households
the same weight would therefore be unwise. PaW (1989) studied the patterns of intra-
household allocation of money in Britain and identified very different allocation systems. She
devised the following nomenclature:
l) The independent management system, where both partners have a separate .source of
income and neither has access to all household funds (Burgoyne, 1998, found that this
system is often used among remarried couples - and she reported that less than two
percent of couples in Britain use it);
2) The pooling system, where nearly all household income is shared (PaW, 1995, reported
that equality between husbands and wives is greatest when money is pooled and
managed jointly);
3) The housekeeping system, where the husband gives the wife a fixed sum for
housekeeping expenses and retains the rest;
4) The wife whole wage system, where the husband gives all his wages (minus some
personal spending money) to the wife and the wife uses this and her own income (if
present) to cover the household expenses (this system is mostly used in low-income
households where financial management is more a chore than a source of power);
5) The male whole wage system, in which the husband manages all household finances
and typically leaves the wife with little independent access to money. This system is
associated with higher income levels and with male privilege in terms of decision-
making and personal spending money (PaW, 1995).
The described typology concerns management of money, but this does not mean that it also
captures the control of money. Although over 50% of the couples studied have a pooling
system, this does not mean that spouses have equal financial control. PaW (1989) found that
wives are more likely to have to justify their spending to their partners than were the
husbands. Vogler and PaW (1994) reported that in the pooling system, one partner tends to
have a greater role in financial management. Burgoyne (1990) found, through in-depth
interviews with husbands and wives that the presence of a joint bank account does not prove
that the money is shared in reality, or that it is jointly owned. Burgoyne also reported that
changes in financial control tended to track changes in the level and source of income, even if
a household applies the pooling system. PaW reported that husbands were more likely to
dominate decision-making when the wife did not have a job, while wives who were dominant
in decision-making were usually in paid employment.
The research results suggest that control of money is linked to occupational status and the size
of each spouse's financial contribution to the household. Even if all income is put in one
account, research shows that the feeling of who owns the money is linked to who earns it. A
decision weight has therefore been constructed based on two sources: 1) 'spouses' answers to
a question about who has the most influence in fmancial decisions and 2) 'spouses' relative
income. In the cases where income information from one of the spouses was missing, the
number of hours worked is used for constructing the weights.
The following question was asked in the third wave of data collection:
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"Which of the following four statements provides the best description of the way in which
financial decisions are made within your household?".
The answers to this question are displayed in Table 6.17, which shows that 399 of the 789
couples agreed on having equal influence in financial decisions. These were each given
decision weights of .5. A total of 152 of the couples agreed that the husband or male partner
had more influence than the wife or female partner, while 39 of the couples agreed that the
wife or female partner had more influence. When one of the partners had indicated that he or
she left all decisions about financial matters to the partner, the partner with the most influence
was given the weight of 1 and the partner O. In the cases where one of the partners had
indicated that the partner had more influence, the most influential spouse was given the
weight .75, while the partner with less influence was assigned .25. Overall, 199 of the couples
did not agree who has the most influence in financial decisions. For these couples, and for
couples where at least one of the partners had not answered the question about decision
influence, decision weights were constructed based on relative income, and number of hours
worked, when income information from at least one partner was missing. The decision
weights will be used when aggregating psychological variables to the household level.
Table 6.17
Answers about decision influence in financial decisions
Answers I always leave My partner has My partner and I I have more
byfemaJes decisions about more influence have equal influence on
fmancial matters on fmancial influence on fmanc. decisions
Answers by males to my partner decisions than I financ. decisions than my partner
I always leave decisions about 22 55
fmancial matters to my partner
My partner has more influence 1 7 62 97
on fmancial decisions than I
My partner and I have equal 9 35 399 46
influence on fmancial decisions
I have more influence on finan- S 31 16 1
cial decisions than my partner ..
N- 789 (households consisting of couples where both partners had answered the question about decision
influence)
6.13 RELIABILITY
An important issue to address in surveys like the ess is data reliability. Some tests of
reliability have been reported above. The answers to the various income measures correlated
highly, which is an indication of high reliability. In Table 6.18 we can see that the correlation
between the income estimates given with a one year interval is quite high. This is also a sign
of high reliability because income is relatively stable across years for most households. On the
other hand, the correlation between the two different saving measures provided in the same
year is not very high. This might be due to people having different opinions about what
'saving' is, so that the question about "money put aside" is influenced by such differences.
The fact that 17.8% of couples also disagreed on which bracket to choose indicates that the
"money put aside" measure might be unreliable.
Alessie, Hochguertel and van Soest (2002) compared the ownership rates and amounts found
in the data collected for the ess with statistics derived from National Accounts and
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administrative data in order to provide some external validation of the data. They found some
deviations with respect to home ownership, average balance on checking and saving accounts
and the ownership rate of stock, bonds and mutual funds. In particular, the CSS data
underestimate the wealth holdings of the very rich. They conclude that in comparison with
other surveys, the accuracy of the CSS estimates is not worse than other wealth surveys
(perhaps with the exception of the American Survey of Consumer Finances). Still, their
results indicate that people are not very accurate in their answers about their assets. This
might be a problem when calculating differences in wealth because the under- or
overestimation is not systematic. If, for example, a household underestimates their wealth one
year but not the subsequent year, this might lead to an erroneous conclusion about their
saving. We might conclude that the household saved a substantial amount during the year,
although the household actually dissaved. We might also find saving ratios that are outside
the range of normal possibility. This might explain the rather high number of outliers in the
savings ratio distribution. Therefore, the reliability of the income data seems to be high, while
it is low with respect to the value of assets and the measurers of saving derived from these
data.
Table 6.18
Consistency between answers given to selected questions in the first and third wave of data
collection
Questions Rs N
Expected change in income next year (increase, same, decrease) .234 1947
Percent expected increase in income next year .611 109
Percent expected decrease in income next year .510 44
Expected change in income next 5 years (increase, same decrease) .499 1947
Percent expected increase in income next 5 years .390 388
Percent expected decrease in income next 5 years .525 133
How certain about change next 5 years (very, rather, not very, not at all certain) .322 1947
Total net income of households past 12 months (6 brackets) .806 1746
How well can you manage on total household income (very hard, hard, neither .716 1947
hard nor easy, easy, very easy)
Personality questions
Oriented towards rings/people .598 1609
Slow/quick thinker .655 1637
Not/easily get worried .621 1640
Flexible - stubborn .467 1642
Quiet - lively. .645 1643
Carefree- meticulous .597 1638
Shy - dominant .654 1638
Not easily hurt/offended .576 1628
Trusting - suspicious .553 1638
Oriented towards reality - dreamer .535 1639
Straightforward - diplomatic .616 1634
Doubts - happy with myself .556 1643
Habits /open to changes .577 1642
Need support - independent .559 1644
Little self-control - disciplined .505 1634
Stable - quick tempered .544 1637
Note: All Correlation Coefficients were Significant at the .0.01 level (two-tailed)
Because the data comes from a panel and the same questionnaires are used every year, it is
possible to test reliability by comparing the answers given to the same questions. It resembles
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a test-retest procedure. Table 6.18 shows the results comparing answers to some of the
psychological questions with one-year interval. The number of respondents included in each
analysis (N) varies due to routing in the questionnaire. The correlation coefficients vary
substantially from one question to another. The first questions in the table concern
expectations and perceptions about the household's economic situation. The Spearman's rho
between the answers to these questions is high in some cases, while in others it is as low as
.234. It is difficult to assess the extent to which this indicates that reliability is low. There is
no reason to expect that all people will have stable expectations or have a stable perception of
how they manage there economic affairs. Various types of incidents during the period
between the measurements, such as unemployment, illness, or the birth of a child, might cause
a change in expectations and evaluations with regards to the household's economic situation.
It is therefore encouraging that the stability in the answers to the personality questions seems
to be quite high. Personality is, per definition, a stable trait, and we should therefore expect a
high correlation between answers measured with one-year interval. The correlation
coefficients between the answers to these answers are much higher than some of the questions
regarding economic situation. If we take into account that the answers to the personality
questions might be affected by differences in mood, and so on, at the times of the interviews,
we might conclude that the reliability for the psychological variables is reasonable. In the next
chapter, the results of the analyses are reported.
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Chapter 7
Results
7.1INTRODUCTION
This chapter contains the results of the analyses conducted to test the proposed hypotheses.
The chapter starts with a presentation of the sample population and the procedures followed
when doing the analyses. The results of the analyses are presented in accordance with the
order of the research questions presented in Chapter 1. First, the results concerning the
contribution of the psychological variables for an increase in the explained variance in saving
and borrowing behaviour are reported. Thereafter, the results of tests of the experimental
hypotheses are described in a variable-by-variable fashion. Finally, the differences in results
for different saving types and different income groups are presented.
7.2 DESCRIPTION OF SAMPLE
The working data file was created by aggregating the individual data at the household level.
When aggregating couples, the decision weights derived as explained in section 6.12 were
used in constructing household scores for the psychological variables age and education level.
Household measures of income and assets were constructed by adding the amounts reported
by husbands and wives (or partners) respectively. Only households with data from both
partners (in households with partners) and households participating in all the three pertinent
waves of data collection are present the data file. As a result, only households present in the
first wave of data collection are in the fmal sample because replies to the first part of the
personality index were missing for the households that joined the panel between the first and
second round of data collection (182 households). In addition, information from one of the
partners was missing in five households. These households were excluded from the file. The
final sample consisted of 1000 households.
The households in the sample had the following characteristics: 565 (56.5%) households were
in the so-called representative panel, while 434 (43.4%) households were in the high-income
panel. The ratio of members of the representative panel has decreased substantially compared
to the sample described in section 5.8. This means that the attrition has been higher in the RP
than in the HIP, so that the new panel members for the second wave of data collection were
primarily recruited for the representative panel. As only the "stayers" are in the present data
file, the ratio of HIP members has increased. 734 (73.4%) of the households consisted of a
couple, while 266 (26.6%) households consisted of singles or single parents. There were
children present in 379 (37.9%) households. The family size ranged from 1 - 9, and the
"weighted age" ranged from 22 - 87.
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7.3 PROCEDURES
Before testing the hypotheses, the data were further examined. As explained in Chapters 5 and
6, the data have already been subject to some 'cleaning'. Still, some issues need further
attention. The number and nature of missing observations must be analysed and a decision
about how to deal with the missing observations must be made. The data set is also plagued
with a high number of large outliers and influential observations, which must be handled in
order to conduct the proper analyses. These issues will be discussed below before the
procedures followed when performing the analyses are taken into account. Both ordinary least
squares (OLS) regression and logistic regression were used in order to test the hypotheses.
7.3.1 Missing observations
Table 7.1 displays the number of missing observations with respect to pertinent variables.
Variables not listed in the table do not have missing observations in the present data set.
Cases with missing values that are systematically different from cases without missing values
may obscure the results (Little & Rubin, 1987). It is therefore necessary to investigate
whether the missing values are 'missing completely at random' (MCAR). The values of a
variable are MCAR if other quantitative variables have roughly the same distribution for cases
separated into two groups based on whether the value of the variable is observed or missing.
This can be tested by two sample t tests.
Separate variance t tests showed that rmssmg values for psychological variables were
dependent on household characteristics as well as on some psychological variables. This can
be seen when comparing, for example, the mean income of those answering the attitude
questions with mean income of those who did not. A significantly different mean income in
one of the groups indicates that missing observations for attitudes depend on income. Such t
tests show that the probability of observing psychological variables increases with lower age,
presence of children, presence of a partner, larger household size, lower education, higher
income, more financial and durable assets, more debt, and higher savings ratios. Observation
of psychological variables is also more probable among those who (i) regard the goal saving
motive as more important, (ii) are more involved in saving than others and (iii) agree that they
are better off than others. This means that the psychological variables are not missing
completely at random, which is necessary in order to avoid biased estimates when using
listwise or pairwise deletion of data (Little & Rubin, 1987). This is also indicated by Little's
Chi-square test for MCAR, which is significant (Chi-square = 3040.46, df = 2457, p < .01)
and agrees with the indicated non-random pattern of missing values.
When a missing value is not MCAR, listwise or pairwise deletion of cases with missing
values for income can produce biased estimates. As such, they are not adequate methods for
handling missing values (Arbuckle, 1996). A weaker assumption about the missing
observations of income is that they are missing at random (MAR) which means that the
missing values depend on other variables than the values of the relevant variables. This
means, for example, that for each income level, observations of attitudes are missing at
random within that level of income. If this assumption holds, the most efficient way of
handling missing data is to replace missing observations by estimates provided by
expectation-maximasation (EM) or regression. Unfortunately, there is no test that can verify
the MAR assumption. However, Little and Rubin (1987) argued that the use of ML will
reduce bias even when the MAR condition is not strictly satisfied. This can also be seen from
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Table 7.1. Table 7.1 shows the number and percent of missing values for variables that have
missing values. The column "mean after listwise deletion" shows the means of the variables
with missing values if listwise deletion of cases is used. In most cases, these means deviate
more from the means we find when using all observed values for each variable ("mean all
values") than the means obtained when estimating means using the EM method". Inspection
of the means calculated using regression (not reported) shows that the estimated means are
closest to "mean of all values" when using the EM method (estimated means are shown in
Table 7.1). Missing values will therefore be replaced by estimates based on the EM method.
Table 7.1
Missing values, means and estimated means
N No. of Per- Mean Mean after Estimated
missing cent all values listwise mean
Variable deletion EM-method
Importance of precaut. motive 974 26 2.6 4.44 4.52 4.44
Imp. of bequest motive 960 40 4.0 2.50 2.56 2.50
Imp. of inter vivos transfers 964 36 3.6 2.93 3.01 2.91
Importance of calc. motive 977 23 2.3 2.39 2.54 2.39
Import. of goal saving motive 978 22 2.2 3.13 3.22 3.12
Imp. of saving for old age 979 21 2.3 4.13 4.26 4.13
Shame of debt 928 72 7.2 .00 .01 .02
Thrift 928 72 7.2 -.05 -.067 -.039
Saving habits 928 72 7.2 -.03 -.086 -.038
Saving involvement 928 72 7.2 .07 .19 .05
Delay payment 982 18 1.8 1.00 1.00 1.00
Delay reward 982 18 1.8 12.31 12.52 12.30
Speed-up reward 982 18 1.8 8.48 8.85 8.47
Expectations l year 999 l .1 -.51 -.38 -.51
Expectations 5 years 997 3 .3 1.94 1.45 1.91
Perceived income variability 951 49 4.9 .50 .52 .50
Ec. sit. compared to others 975 25 2.5 4.05 4.26 4.04
Emotional stability 934 66 6.6 -.13 -.16 -.13
Tough-mindedness 934 66 6.6 -.02 -.04 -.03
Inflexibility 934 66 6.6 -.07 -.10 -.06
Extraversion 934 66 6.6 -.08 -.16 -.08
Conscientiousness 934 66 6.6 -.01 -.01 .00
Note: This table reports the number and percent of rmssing values for vanables that have missmg values. The
table also shows the means of these variables using all available observations, means when using listwise
deletion of cases with missing values and the means following replacement of missing values with estimates
produced by the EM procedure.
7.3.2 Outliers
Three different ways of measuring saving behaviour were used in the study: wealth and debts
at one point in time and saving during a period of time measured both in absolute and relative
terms. One potential threat to the validity of the tests concerning saving over a period of time
51 For the EM procedure, a distribution is assumed for the partially-missing data and inferences are based on the
likelihood under that distribution. Each iteration consists of an E step and an M step. The Estep finds the
conditional expectation of the missing value, given the observed values and current estimates of the parameters,
These expectations are then substituted for the missing data. In the M step, maximum likelihood estimates of the
parameters are computed as though the missing data had been filled in (SPSS Missing Value Analysis 7.5,
MaryAnn HilllSPSS Inc).
Chapter 7: Results 138
is that saving measured by first difference of wealth can be very noisy, as suggested by the
high number of extremely high values displayed in Table 6.4. Measurement error may be
severe. One solution is to trim the distribution, which cleans the data of the large positive and
negative values that result from incorrect reports.
Obviously, total saving ratios higher than 100 or lower than -100 percent are most likely to be
incorrect. This need not be the case with respect to contractual or discretionary saving.
Changes in the portfolio of a household's saving might produce extreme savings ratios. The
trimming of the sample was therefore conducted on the basis of total saving ratios (further
explained in section 6.2.3). The distribution of the total saving ratio was trimmed by 10010.
The variation was still large, ranging from -106.5% to 144.9% (see Table 7.2). For each
analysis, observations found to have a large influence on the results were therefore excluded
from the analyses=. Exclusion of the outliers was also necessary in order to bring the
distribution of the error terms closer to a normal distribution.
Table 7.2 presents the univariate statistics of the different variables after deleting 10% of each
tale of the distribution of the total saving ratio. The table shows the minimum and maximum
values, means, standard deviations, skewness and kurtosis for all variables included in the
analyses. The table shows that the variables concerning assets and incomes have large ranges
and very big standard deviations. The large kurtosis with respect to debt and repayment
saving is partly due to many households not having debt, so there are many observations of
zero. This is dealt with when analysing these variables.
7.3.3 Procedures for the analyses
The results from the data analyses are displayed in Appendix 6 (Tables A6-1 to A6-9). Some
results are also presented below in Tables 7.3 to 7.6. Separate OLS regressions were estimated
for each dependent variable. A hierarchical form of regression was used that explored the
effects of a series of variables in turn. The variables were entered into the analysis in the
following order: l) income and demographic factors and 2) psychological variables. The
rationale behind this procedure is to show if psychological factors explain the variance in
saving behaviour over and above that explained by economic and demographic variables. The
variables were entered in this order to ensure that variance associated with demographic or
economic measures was accounted for first, so that any significant psychological variables
could not be attributed to such measures. Because age has often been used as a proxy for
capturing certain systematic changes over the life cycle, the variables age and the second
order term of age are also entered into the regressions. The contribution of the psychological
variables towards increasing explained variance in saving is found by comparing the adjusted
R2s before and after the psychological variables. In the Tables A6-1 to A6-9 and 7.3 to 7.6,
the lines "Adjusted R2 Modell" contain the results when including socio-economic variables
only, while the lines "Adjusted R2 Model 2" contain the results with the psychological
52 A more appropriate way to deal with the influential observations is to use robust estimators (e.g. Flavin, 1991).
Flavin showed how crucial robust estimation can be by comparing estimates generated by conventional, non-
robust instrumental variables and robust instrumental variables. She found that the use of a robust estimator
reversed the conclusions of the study in question. Use of robust estimators reduces the effect of outliers on the
results by placing a bound on the overall influence of any observation. By using this method, we avoid the
problem of excluding legitimate observations from our sample. However, as the statistical package used for this
study does not support such estimations, this study relies on the more subjective methods for rejection of
influential observations.
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variables included. The significance levels relate to the changes in the F-value when adding
the two blocks of variables. Hence, the first significance level reported relates to increase in
the F-value when including the socio-economic variables in the estimation, while the second
significance level relates to the change in the F-value when the psychological variables are
included.
Table 7.2
Univariate statistics
N Min. value Max. value Mean St. Skew- Kutto-
deviation ness sis
Value offmancial assets December 1994 800 -63194.00 1471434.00 55611.54 108877.45 5.88 53.44
Discretionary saving in 1994 800 -175714.00 182646.00 405.12 30277.12 .24 10.41
Discretionary saving ratio 800 -205.02 894.78 2.0056 50.10 6.86 127.52
Debt December 1994 - mortgages incl. 800 -10000.00 627500.00 104277.97 120282.79 1.19 1.07
Contractual saving in 1994 - inel. mortg. 800 -773100.00 391500.00 -2662.15 56311.97 -3.11 55.65
Contractual savings ratio - incl. mortg. 800 -452.53 496.51 -7.87 64.21 -1.32 17.30
Debt December 1994 - mortgages exc. 800 .00 401606.00 7699.45 25884.08 8.58 100.63
Repayment saving in 1994- excl, mortg. 800 -315000.00 170000.00 812.12 17251.11 -5.55 161.46
Repayment savings ratio - excl. mortg. 800 -255.92 212.98 .4673 21.64 -.34 57.14
Sum of durables, December 1994 800 .00 1913834.00 222201.41 211398.89 1.36 5.63
Saving in durables in 1994 800 -488000.00 814000.00 13021.72 74808.25 .96 29.41
Total savings December 1994 800 -56090.00 1649057.00 173534.98 210387.69 2.59 10.71
Total saving in 1994 800 -343787.00 327125.00 10764.68 50523.91 .19 11.81
Total savings ratio 800 -106.49 144.89 19.39 51.75 .18 -.09
HH Age (weighed mean age of spouses) 800 22.00 87.00 48.08 13.25 .39 -.62
HH Age squared 800 4.84 75.69 24.87 13.57 .87 .14
HH education level (weighted mean) 800 .50 3.00 1.32 .68 1.23 1.10
Dummy l=children present in HH 800 .00 1.00 .39 .49 .47 -1.78
Log of family size 800 .00 .95 .34 .23 -.07 -.92
Dummy =l if partner present in HH 800 .00 2.00 1.48 .88 -1.10 -.80
Household total income 11000 800 1.10 344.59 69.82 36.05 1.03 4.19
Dummy = l ifHH member of HIP 800 .00 1.00 .43 .50 .27 -1.93
Delay-reward rate 800 .00 300.00 12.56 15.27 9.13 158.47
Delay payment rate 800 .00 78.51 1.05 4.52 9.54 127.73
Speed-up reward rate 800 .00 141.51 8.42 12.74 4.09 27.18
Income expectation I year 800 -110.00 100.00 -.40 10.30 -.80 47.12
Income expectation 5 years 800 -505.00 400.00 2.25 30.35 -1.69 147.23
Most important time horizon 800 1.00 5.00 1.94 .98 .87 .08
Perceived income variability 800 .00 2.16 .49 .49 .90 .13
Thrift-attitude 800 -2.79 2.33 -.06 .83 -.09 -.02
Saving involvement-attitude 800 -3.11 2.78 .04 .88 -.27 .16
Saving habit attitude 800 -2.95 2.13 -.02 .80 -.44 .60
Debt-attitude 800 -2.57 2.66 -.02 .86 -.10 .14
Importance of bequest motive 800 .00 7.00 2.37 1.54 .94 .09
Importance of inter vivos transfers 800 .38 6.56 2.96 1.49 .21 -.94
Importance of precautionary saving 800 1.00 7.00 4.46 1.20 -.44 -.05
Importance of goal saving 800 .00 7.00 3.17 1.33 .30 -.36
Importance of saving for old-age 800 .50 7.00 4.09 1.77 -.12 -1.02
Importance of calculation motive 800 .00 6.75 2.36 1.14 .69 .17
Ec. situation compared to others 800 .41 7.00 3.99 1.50 -.18 -.46
Factor score, emotional stability 800 -2.95 2.76 -.12 .73 -.07 .96
Factor score, conscientiousness 800 -3.49 2.68 -.02 .80 -.29 1.10
Factor score, tough-mindedness 800 -3.26 3.00 -.04 .80 -.05 1.04
Factor score, inflexibility 800 -2.82 2.35 -.06 .80 -.05 .21
Factor score, extraversion 800 -2.34 2.82 -.07 .78 -.01 .63
In order to study the effects of the psychological variables in greater detail, we also tested the
extent to which psychological variables contributed towards distinguishing between savers
and dissavers and debtor and non-debtors respectively. The reason for this is that when
analysing borrowing behaviour only those having debt or mortgages could be included in the
analyses. The results of the OLS regressions could therefore only explain variation among
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those who had debt or mortgages in the first place, not between households with debt and
households not having debr". Table A6-9 contains the results from the logistic regression
analyses. For each analysis, one goodness of fit measure (the -2 log likelihood) and one
pseudo R2 (the Nagelkerke R2), which is similar to the R2 in regression analysis, are reported.
The power of the models is also evident in the percentage of cases that were correctly
classified as savers and non-savers, and debtors-and non-debtors",
Through Tables 7.3 to 7.6 we can see which psychological variables were important for
explaining individual differences in saving and borrowing behaviour, as well as the impact of
psychological variables on different saving measures. The analyses were repeated for the
three different income groups (low, middle and high) as defined in Chapter 6. The outcome of
these estimations can be found in Appendix 6 in Tables A6-5 to A6-8. Due to the rather
disappointing results with respect to the explanation of saving during 1994 (see Tables A6-1 -
A6-4), the analyses regarding the three income groups were conducted for stock measures
only. The results from these analyses give further insight into which psychological variables
are important. They also show if the impact of psychological variables increases with income.
Normal probability plots of residuals and plots of studentized residuals against the various
dependent variables were used in order to identify influential cases. For most analyses, the
number of influential outliers was less than five. These were excluded from the analyses to
make the distribution of the error term closer to the normal distribution and to avoid findings
that were caused by one or two single cases. Hence, before analysing variation in the sum of
financial wealth as of December 1994, observations higher than 400000 Dutch guilders were
excluded from the sample as they were found to have a large influence on the regression
results. For the analyses of the income groups, the analyses were limited to values below
100000, 200000 and 500000 Dutch guilders for the low, middle and high-income groups
respectively. In addition, one income observation above 250000 Dutch guilders was excluded
from the analyses due to its large influence on the results. Discretionary saving during 1994
had an unfeasibly high variance (range: -175,714 - 182,646 Dutch guilders). For this reason,
the distribution was trimmed by deleting 5% of each tail. This reduced the range of
discretionary saving in 1994 from -43,700 to 44,900 Dutch guilders. When analysing the sum
of debt and mortgages and repayment/contractual saving, the sample was reduced to those
having debt and mortgages. When analysing the contractual saving ratio, only households
with a saving ratio between O and 100 were included. When analysing debt as of December
1994, the analyses were limited to values below 30000, 40000 and 100000 Dutch guilders for
the low-, middle-, and high-income groups respectively. When analysing the full sample,
households with debt above 100000 Dutch guilders were excluded from the analyses.
53 Since the debt and mortgage data suffer from sample selection and are truncated at zero, the best way to
analyse the data would have been to estimate a 'tobit' model. The structure of the tobit model accommodates
sample selection by using two separate models for predicting the dependent variable: one predicts values of the
dependent variable that are zero and another predicts nonzero values of Y. Unfortunately, the statistical package
available (SPSS) does not support tobit models. For this reason, the less elegant and less precise method of using
logistic regression and OLS regression separately was chosen.
54 The results concerning the percentage correctly classified as savers and non-savers do not come from the full-
sample analyses. Before calculating the percentage correctly classified, a sample of savers of comparable size to
the non-savers was taken. As the probability of a respondent being a saver is quite high, the percentage of cases
correctly classified would otherwise not give an accurate impression of the power of the model.
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The data on repayment saving (inclusive mortgages) were not straightforward to analyse; the
data seem to have a lot of noise. Negative values for contractual saving were expected for
households who had borrowed money in 1994. However, over 50% of the sample had
negative values for contractual saving, and this is higher than what may be reasonably
expected. For example, Table A5-1 shows that the "total number of ownerships" of the
different types of debt and mortgages did not change dramatically between the two years, so
the ratio of negative observation of negative repayment saving is clearly too high. Exclusion
of the cases with negative contractual saving did not completely remove the problem of noisy
data. One indication that the data still are very noisy is that the amount of debt and mortgages
was not a significant predictor of yearly repayment. A strong relationship between the size of
the loans and mortgages and the loans was expected. The following report from Maarten
Ketelaars, who worked on constructing the assets variables from the first wave of data
collection, might explain why this noise in the data exists:
"385 respondents didn't know the current loan of their mortgage while 341 of these
respondents knew the initial loan of their mortgage. By using the initial loan to calculate an
approximation for the current loan of the mortgage, the number of don't knows can be
reduced. First, the percentiles of the relation current loan/initial loan are given for respondents
that answered both questions with a valid answer.
N 10% 25% 50% 75%
1071 .59 .78 .95 1.00
90%
1.00
Mean
.94
I used the median purchase price as an approximation of the current loan of a mortgage."
Hence, it is possible that this estimation method has produced inaccurate estimates of
mortgages. As noted before, good flow measures of saving are highly dependent on reliable
estimates of the stock measures used when calculating them.
Collinearity diagnostics revealed that the inclusion of the second order term of age produced
high tolerance measures for age and the second order term of age. This is expected because
age and age2 are highly correlated. However, since age2 is a non-linear function of age, the
multicollinerarity assumption is not violated. The three variables describing the size and
composition of the household also had high VIF-values. Separate analyses were conducted
without the size of family variable and this did not alter the finding, Since the two other
family composition variables are 'dummies', all three variables were included in the analyses
despite the high VIF-values. Only when analysing debt was the size of family variable
excluded due to collinearity problems. All other variables had acceptable tolerance measures
(VIF<5).
7.4 RESULTS
7.4.1 Contribution of psychological variables towards explaining variance in saving
The second research question asked if psychological variables had any effect on saving. In
general, the variables selected for analyses could explain saving at a specific point in time
better than saving during a year. Tables 7.3 through 7.6 below are the results of regression
analyses when including only the significant predictors from the analyses presented in Tables
A6-1 through A6-4 in the analyses. The tables show that the psychological variables
significantly increased the explained variance in financial wealth, discretionary saving, the
discretionary savings ratio, debt, debt and mortgages, the repayment saving ratio, total wealth
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and total saving. The psychological variables also contributed significantly towards
improving the prediction of which households have positive financial wealth and which
households have debt and mortgages.
Table 7.3
Overview of significant coefficients for financial wealth and discretionary saving
Dependent variables Fin. Wealth. Dec. 1994 Diser. Savin 1994 Diser. savin Vine.
Independent variables Beta Sig. Beta Sig. Beta Sig.
Constant .446 .010 .216
Socio-economie variables
Disp. Income/IOOO .325 .000 .185 .002 .Il8 .004
Panel .094 .040 -.155 .009
Age -.455 .046
Age squared/IOO .674 .003
Education level .098 .002
Discount rates
Delay reward rate -.063 .094
Speed-up reward rate .079 .039
Future-related variables
Time horizon .070 .027
Attitudes
Thrift -.084 .012
Saving involvement .122 .001
Saving habits -.060 .112
Shame of debt .141 .000 -.078 .041
Saving motives
Importance of goal saving .112 .003 .062 .096
hnportance of supporting children -.077 .035
hnportance of leaving bequest .100 .007 -.087 .019
Importance of saving for old age .086 .012
hnportance of earning interest .085 .022
Econ. situation compared to others -.077 .059
Personality factors
Inflexibility .088 .007
Extraversion .063 .049
N 786 711 711
Adjusted R2 Model I 19.6 .000 1.0 .012 1.1 .003
Adjusted R2 Model2 29.4 .000 2.5 .001 3.1 .002
Table 7.3 shows the independent variables that contributed significantly towards explaining
financial wealth and/or discretionary saving. The model explains wealth at a particular point
in time better than saving during a year. Many socio-economic variables can predict financial
wealth, but the psychological variables are important for improving the predictions. The
inclusion of time horizon, saving attitudes, strength of saving motives and personality factors
increased the explained variance in fmancial wealth from 19.6% to 29.4%. Table A6-5 shows
that the psychological variables contribute significantly towards explaining variation in
fmancial wealth in the three income groups as well.
The variables in the model do not succeed in explaining much of the variance in discretionary
saving during one year. The socio-economic variables can explain only 1% of the variation in
discretionary saving, while the inclusion of strength of the saving motives increase the
explained variance by 1.5 percentage points. Although the change in F-value is significant,
the total explained variance is disappointing. The model also fails to explain variation in the
discretionary saving ratio. Income and panel membership (which also might pick up income
effects) explain 1.1 % of the variance in the discretionary saving ratio, while the inclusion of
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discount rates, saving motives and perception of economic situation increases the explained
variance by 2.0 percentage points. Although this increase is significant, the total explained
variance is unsatisfactory.
Table 7.4
Overview of significant coefficients for debt and contractual saving
Dependent variables Debt Dec. 1994 Repayment of debt 1994 Log(Repayment linc.)
Independent variables Beta Sig. Beta Sig. Beta Sig.
Constant .000 .010 .218
Socia-economic variables
Size of debt .534 .000 .179 .007
Disp.income/lOOO .292 .000
Education level .120 .175
Children present= I .243 .109
Log of family size -.413 .067
Partner present= I .166 .250 .077 .398
Discount rates
Delay reward rate .094 .104
Future-related variables
Expectations 5 years .127 .027
Time horizon .120 .037
Perceived income variability -.153 .010
Attitudes
Thrift .098 .134
Saving involvement -.229 .000 -.188 .006
Saving habits -.160 .015
Saving motives
Imp. of precautionary saving -.160 .006 .174 .008
Imp. of goal saving -.112 .052
Importance of saving for old age
Personality factors
Tough-mindedness -.141 .027
N 297 190 218
Adjusted R2 Model I 31.1 .000 3.4 .020
Adjusted R2 Model 2 5.1 .001 39.1 .126 9.4 .096
Table 7.4 shows the variables that are significant in the analyses of debt and debt repayment
when mortgages are excluded from the debt definition (see Table A6-2). The model does not
predict debt very well. Only 5.1% of the variation in debt among households having debt is
explained by the variables used. None of the socio-economic variables is a significant
predictor of debt size. Debt is instead predicted by expectations, time horizon and saving
motives. In Table A6-7, we can see that the psychological variables are particularly important
for explaining variation in debt in the low- and high-income groups. In the middle-income
group, however, the socio-economic variables are important and explained 29.5% of the
variation in debt.
Table 7.4 further shows that the model performs better with respect to predicting repayment
of debt and the repayment saving ratio than the sum of debt. The socio-economic variables
(including the size of debt) can account for 31.1% of the variation in debt repayment, while
inclusion of discount rate, perceived income variability, saving attitudes, saving motives and
one personality factor increases the explained variance by 8 percentage points. This increase
is, however, not significant. The psychological variables are more successful with respect to
explaining how large part of income is used for repaying debt. Inclusion of attitudes in the
model increases the explained variance in the repayment ratio from 3.4 to 9.4%. This increase
is significant at the p < .01 level.
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Table 7.5
Overview of significant coefficients for debt and mortgages, and contractual saving
Dependent variables Debt and mortgages Log (Repayment of debt
Dec. 1994 and mortgages in 1994)
Independent variables Beta Sig. Beta Sig.
Constant .420 .000
Socio-economic variables
Disp. Income/IOOO .504 .000 .349 .000
Panel .182 .000
Discount rates
Delay reward rate -.058 .068
Speed-up reward rate .050 .120
Future-related variables
Expectations 5 years -.140 .023
Time horizon .073 .024
Attitudes
Saving involvement -.056 .372
Saving habits -.074 .021
Shame of debt -.114 .000
Saving motives
Importance of saving for old age -.075 .027
Importance of earning interest -.083 .014
Personality factors
Emotional stability -.076 .015
Conscientiousness -.103 .088
Inflexibility -.055 .080 -.113 .063
Extraversion -.058 .068
N 552 248
Adjusted R1Model I 43.9 .000 12.2 .000
Adjusted R1Model 2 48.5 .000 14.1 .055
Table 7.5 shows the results regarding debt and mortgages and the repayment of debt and
mortgages when limiting the analyses to the predictors that are found to have a significant
effect on these variables (see Table A6-3). The table does not include the results regarding the
contractual saving ratio, as none of the psychological variables is a significant predictor for
this measure of saving. The table shows that income and panel membership can explain
43.9% of the variance of the sum of debt and mortgages. Inclusion of psychological variables
such as discount rates, time horizon, attitudes, motives and personality factors significantly
increases the explained variance by 4.6 percentage points. Inclusion of expectations, attitudes
and personality factors increases the explained variance in the log of repayment saving from
12.2% to 14.1%.
Table A6-6 shows that the contribution of the psychological variables towards increasing
explained variance in debt and mortgages varies across income groups. While the contribution
is non-significant in the low- and high-income groups, it is significant at the p < .01 level in
the middle-income group. In the middle-income group, the inclusion of the psychological
variables increases the explained variance in debt and mortgages from 52.9% to 61.8%.
Table 7.6 shows the results of analyses of total wealth, total saving and the total savings ratio
when limiting the analyses to the significant predictors in the "full model" (see Table A6-4).
Inclusion of the psychological variables increases the explained variance in total wealth from
24.8 to 39.5%. Table A6-8 shows that the psychological variables also have a substantial and
significant contribution with respect to explaining variation in total wealth across the three
income groups.
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Table 7.6 Overview of significant coefficients for total wealth and total saving
Dependent variable Tot. Wealth. Dec. 1994 Total Saving 1994 Total saving inc. 1994
Beta Sig. Beta Sil(. Beta Sig.
Constant .044 .006 .102
Socio-economic variables
Disp. Income/1000 .409 .000 .137 .000 .136 .000
Panel .093 .036
Education level .062 .039
Children present= I .059 .100
Future-related variables
Time horizon .097 .001 .098 .006 .076 .043
Perceived income variability -.123 .000
Attitudes
Thrift .000 .999 -.015 .684
Saving involvement .089 .010
Shame of debt .191 .000
Saving motives
Importance of goal saving -.139 .000
Impoirtance of leaving bequest .092 .002
Importance of earning interest .155 .000
Personality factors
Inflexibility .097 .001
Extraversion .055 .066
N 770 792 717
Adjusted R2 Model I 24.8 .000 2.9 .000 2.2 .000
Adjusted R2 Model 2 39.5 .000 3.7 .006 2.5 .121
The contribution of psychological variables for explaining total saving is less, but total saving
during 1994 is not well explained by the socio-economic variables either. While the socio-
economic variables can account for 2.9% of the variance of total saving, the socio-economic
and psychological variables together can explain 3.7%. The psychological variables do not
contribute to a significant improvement in explained variance in the total saving ratio.
The overall conclusion concerning the second research question must be that the
psychological variables have the largest contribution with respect to explaining different
measures of wealth. For some income groups the psychological variables also increase the
explained variance in debt substantially. Inclusion of the psychological variables increases the
explained variance in saving and debt repayment significantly, but these saving measures are,
in general, poorly explained by the applied model.
In the following, each independent variable used in the analyses will be dealt with in turn.
7.4.2. J Income
A positive relationship between income and saving was expected for all kinds of saving
analysed, except with respect to debt and the repayment of debt. The results displayed in
Tables A6-1 to A6-9 show that income is a robust predictor of most of the saving measures
applied, and often the most influential predictor (having a higher beta-value than other
variables). These relationships are also found in bivariate analyses because the Pearson
correlation coefficients between income and many saving measures are significant. Income is
significantly correlated with financial wealth in 1994 (r = .309, p < .01), total wealth in 1994
(r = .500, p < .01), total saving in 1994 (r = .222, p < .01) and the total saving ratio (r = .175,
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p < .01). As could be expected, income is positively related to the size of debt (r = .691, p <
.Ol) when mortgages are included in the debt definition, but a somewhat unexpected a
positive association is found between income and debt (r = .234, p < .01) when mortgages are
excluded from the debt definition. Income is not correlated with the repayment of debt, but it
is negatively correlated with the contractual saving ratio (r = -.118, p < .Ol) when mortgages
are included in the debt definition. Income is not significantly correlated with discretionary
saving or the discretionary saving ratio.
Through multivariate analyses, it was found that income is positively associated with
financial wealth as of December 1994, discretionary saving during 1994 as well as the
discretionary savings ratio in 1994 (see Tables 7.3 and A6-l). This means that households
with higher income have saved more in the past by depositing money in a bank account or by
investing money in more risky financial products than others, and they also continue to save a
higher proportion of their income than others so that both their absolute and relative saving
during 1994 were higher. The probability that the household has positive saving also increases
with saving (Table A6-9). When splitting the sample into income groups, income is not a
significant predictor of the discretionary saving measures (Table A6-S). This is probably
because the variation in income within each group is small.
We do not find a significant relationship between income and amount of debt, but we find that
debt repayment is positively related to income (Table A6-2). The probability that a household
has debt increases with income (Table A6-9). When including mortgages in the definition of
debt (Table A6-3), income is a significant predictor of the total sum of debt. This is expected
because the size of the granted mortgages are based on the main breadwinner's income.
Probably for the same reason, the repayment of debt and mortgages in 1994 is also positively
associated with income.
Income is positively related with total wealth as of December 1994 as well as total saving
during 1994 (Table A6-4). This was expected because saving is positively related to both
discretionary saving and debt repayment. In the definition of total saving, the sum of debt and
mortgages is counterbalanced by the value of real estate, so that the positive effect between
income and total saving was expected in spite of the positive relationship between income and
the size of mortgages. The total saving ratio is also associated with income, which means that
the part of income a household saves increases with income.
When splitting the sample into income groups, income is not a significant predictor for
financial wealth (Table A6-S) or debt (Table A6-7), but it is for total saving in the middle-
income group. The variation in income within the groups is probably too small to affect the
results. The strong relationship between income level and mortgages is still present (Table
A6-6), which, as mentioned before, is likely to be an artefact of the practice of using the size
of income to determine the size of the mortgage.
7.4.2.2 Panel membership
In order to control for panel effects, a dummy variable was included that indicates which of
the panels the household belongs to. The panel dummy is significant in some of the analyses,
and the reasons for this may vary depending on the saving measure being analysed.
At least three possible reasons for the significant effect of this dummy exist. One reason can
be that the differences in the data collection as explained in Appendix 2 may produce some
differences. The HIP members have a lower total burden with respect to answering
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questionnaires throughout the year, which may cause them to be more willing to fill in the
questionnaire properly. This, combined with the HIP members being recruited specifically for
the savings survey, may also explain the difference in attrition between the two panels. It may
also be that household with high income in general is more interested in economic affaires
and might produce more accurate answers to the wealth questionnaires for that reason. A
second possible reason for the significance of the panel dummy is difference in income level
between the panels. Only a small fraction of the representative panel has the same income
level as the members of the HIP who were sampled from the upper 10% of the income
distribution of the Netherlands. The panel dummy variable may therefore pick up income
effects. This is likely in the cases where income is not significant, while the panel dummy
variable is. A third explanation for the significance of the panel dummy variable can be found
in Appendix 1. The sampling methods used for the HIP might have caused an over-sampling
of house-owners. This is because sampling was limited to "wealthy areas" where it is likely
that people own their own house. Households in the HIP are therefore more likely to own
their own house and to have a mortgage than the rest of the population this sample is drawn
from. They might also have more fmancial wealth than what we would expect from income
information alone.
Tables 7.3 and A6-l show that the panel dummy has a significant relationship with respect to
financial wealth when controlling for income level. This can be due to the selection of
informants for the HIP from wealthy areas. People who are attracted to such areas might have
more wealth than what is typical for their income group. They may also come from wealthy
families so that some of their higher wealth is due to inheritance. This is supported by the fact
that the panel dummy is only significant with respect to predicting financial wealth in the
low-income group, when analysing the income groups separately (see Table A6-S). Further,
Tables 7.3 and A6-1 show that the panel dummy is significant in the analysis of discretionary
saving. The direction of the relationship is, however, opposite of that of income. This means
that when income is controlled for, people in the representative panel save more than people
in the high-income panel do. This may be an indication that people in the HIP have more
wealth in the first place and therefore little need for further saving. Alternatively, living in
"wealthy" areas might involve a pressure to consume in order to "keep up with the Jones"'.
Table A6-3 shows that, among those having debt and mortgages, people in the HIP have more
debt and mortgages than people in the RP have when controlling for income level. This may
be a consequence of the sampling technique used when recruiting members for the HIP, as a
large part of the HIP members are likely to own a house and have mortgages. Table A6-6
shows that this effect of panel membership is largest in the high-income group. Table A6-9
shows that households in the HIP are less likely to have debt when mortgages are excluded
from the debt defmition. In the middle-income group, however, among those having debt,
HIP members have higher debt than RP members do.
Table A6-4 shows that the panel dummy variable predicts total wealth. This might be due to a
combined effect of members of the HIP having both more fmancial wealth and more real-
estate than what would be predicted by income alone. As for fmancial wealth, the panel
dummy has the largest effect in the low-income group (see Table A6-8). HIP members in the
low-income group are likely to be large families (as the income groups are defmed in terms of
income per family member). The size of the family may also have increased the likelihood of
the household owning their own accommodation.
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7.4.2.3 Age
Age was included as a control variable because the life cycle hypothesis suggests that there is
a strong association between saving and borrowing behaviour and age. In this way,
speculations about whether the inclusion of age in the analysis would have picked up some of
the variation explained by the psychological variables are avoided. Since the relationship is
expected to be "hump-shaped", the second-order term of age was also included in order to
account for this non-linearity in the expected relationship between wealth and saving and age.
Bivariate correlations show that there is a positive association between age and financial
wealth (r = .149, p< .01) and total wealth (r = .168, p < .01) and a negative relationship
between age and the amount of debt + mortgages (r = -.237, p < .01) and debt exclusive
mortgages (r = -.069, p<.lO). Age is not correlated with the other flow measures of saving
with the exception of the contractual savings ratio (r = .144,p < .01).
The results from the regression analyses also show that there is a significant association
between financial wealth and age (see Tables 7.3 and A6-l). The fmancial wealth decreases
with (weighted household) age for young households (younger than 38 in this sample) while it
increases with age for households older than 38. This association between age and financial
wealth is particularly strong in the high-income and middle-income groups (Table A6-5). In
the high-income group, fmancial wealth is negatively associated with age for households
younger than 44, while it is increasing with age for households older than 44.
In the further analyses, we did not find a significant relationship between age and the other
saving measures when using the full samples. We did find, however, significant relationships
when analysing the different income groups. In the low-income group, age is significantly
associated with the sum of debt and mortgages. The size of debt and mortgages is negatively
associated with age until the age of 54. For households above 54, the sum of debt and
mortgages is slowly increasing with age. In the high-income group, we found age to be
associated with the sum of debt. The amount of debt is positively associated with age for
households younger than 63, while the amount of debt decreases with age for households
older than 63. For the high-income group, age is associated with total wealth. Total wealth is
positively related to age until the age of 64, while total wealth decreases with age for
households older than 64. This is in line with predictions based on the life cycle model
discussed in Chapter 2.
7.4.2.4 Level of education
Education level was not significantly correlated with any of the savings measures. Education
was instead correlated with some of the family characteristics and psychological variables.
There is a negative correlation between education and age (r = -.121, p < .01), which is
probably due to cohort effects. Higher education is less common among the older part of the
population than it is among the younger part. There is also a negative correlation between
education and size of the family (r = -.444, p < .01) and the dummies indicating whether there
are children in the household (r = -.186, p < . 00) or a partner in the household (r = -.586, p <
.01). Education is positively correlated with income expectations, both one year hence (r =
.078, p < .05) and five years hence (r = .177, p < .01). Interestingly, there is a negative
correlation between education level and three of the attitude factors. Higher education is
associated with a less positive attitude towards saving (thrift: (r = -.114, p < .01), saving habit
(r=-.115, p<.Ol) and a more positive attitude towards debt (r = -.109, p < .01). Education level
is positively associated with thinking it is important to save for a goal (r = .102, p < .01).
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The multivariate analyses showed that education level has a positive relationship with
fmancial and total wealth as of December 1994 (Tables A6-l and A6-4). Higher education
level also increases the probability of the value of fmancial assets being positive (Table A6-
9). One interpretation of this fmding may be that higher education means greater ability to
delay gratification, which is positive for saving. Higher educated people may also have a
better ability to invest money in risky assets that, over time, may yield higher returns than
bank saving. Education level is not a significant predictor of financial or total wealth as of
December 1994 when analysing the three income groups separately (Tables A6-S - A6-8). It
may be that the variation in education level also was reduced when reducing the variation in
mcome.
Education level is not significantly associated with the levels of debt and debt +mortgages
(Tables 7.4, 7.5,A6-2 and A6.3), except for a negative relationship between education and the
level of debt and mortgages in the middle-income group (see Table A6-6). Higher education
increased the probability that a household has debt and mortgages (Table A6-9), but it does
not increase the probability of a household having debt. This can mean that education
increases the tendency to invest in a house (and thereby increasing total saving), and that
among those making such a decision, higher education means that the amount borrowed is
smaller and that the loans are attempted repaid faster. Table A6-2 shows that higher education
is positively associated with repayment of debt in 1994 when using all the variables in the
regression analyses. This relationship is not significant, however, when limiting the analyses
to the variables that are significant predictors of the log of the repayment saving ratio when
using the full model (see Table 7.4).
7.4.2.5 Family composition variables
A t test showed that the means of total saving and the total savings ratio are significantly
higher for households with children than for childless households. Among those having debt,
the mean of the sum of debt and mortgages is also significantly higher for households with
children than for households without children. The higher saving therefore seems to be related
to investments in real-estate.
The regression analyses showed that the presence of children in the household has a positive
relationship with total saving in 1994 (Table A6-4) and debt repayment when mortgages were
excluded from the debt defmition (Table A6-2) while there is a negative association between
the presence of children in the household and the level of debt in the low and middle-income
groups (Table A6-7). In particular, in the high-income group the presence of children had a
positive effect on total wealth (Table A6-8). This means that the effect of the presence of
children is opposite of that expected. It was expected that households with children would
have less saving and more debt than others due to the higher costs involved when running a
larger household. The results show that this is not the case. The analyses show that
households with children are more likely to have positive fmancial wealth than households
without children (Table A6-9) and that, among households having debt, the sum of debt is
lower for households with children in the low- and middle-income groups (Table A6-6).
The presence of children therefore seems to have a positive effect on saving behaviour in the
sense that their presence increases saving and reduces the amounts borrowed. Similar fmdings
were reported by Livingstone and Lunt (1992). They found that those in debt had fewer
children than others. They suggested as an explanation that those with more children may be
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forced to adopt more conservative and fixed budgeting strategies because the economic
demands on them are salient and constant, and therefore they deliberately avoid debt
(Livingstone & Lunt, 1992). Presence of children also causes higher uncertainty with respect
to future expenditures, which also may increase the need for precautionary saving. Hence,
although having children involves more costs, the need for more control over money may
have a positive effect on the overall economic situation of the household. An alternative
explanation can be that couples postpone childbearing until they have a solid economic
situation.
The size of the family is correlated with some of the "stock" measures of saving. There is a
positive correlation between family size and the size of debt and mortgages (r = .365, p <
.01), the sum of debt (r = .100, p < .01) and total wealth (r = .170, p < .01). A weak
correlation is found between family size and the total savings ratio (r = .063, p < .10). These
relationships are, however, not significant in the multivariate analyses. The size of the family
is related to some of the savings variables. Table A6-9 shows that the larger the family, the
smaller the probability that the household has positive financial wealth and the higher the
probability that the household has debt and mortgages. When analysing the full samples, no
significant relationship between family size and the saving measures are found except for a
negative relationship with the repayment of debt when mortgages were excluded from the
debt definition (Table A6-2 and 7.4). This means that among households having debt, larger
households pay back their loans at a slower rate than smaller households (when the size of the
debt is controlled for).
The presence of a partner in the household also has consequences for its economic situation.
A t test shows that the means of fmancial wealth and total wealth are higher in households
with a partner present than in other households. The means of discretionary saving and
contractual saving are also higher in households with a partner. On the other hand, the mean
size of debt is also significantly higher for partners than singles, for both defmitions of debt.
The effect of presence of a partner appears somewhat different when interpreting the results
from the multivariate analyses. The regression analyses show that the presence of a partner
has a negative effect on fmancial wealth in the middle- and high-income group (see Table A6-
5). These results were surprising, given the results from the bivariate analyses. Presence of a
partner does, however, increase the probability that a household has positive financial wealth
(Table A6-9). The presence of a partner is positively related to contractual saving and the
contractual savings ratio when mortgages are excluded from the debt definition. In the low-
income group, the presence of a partner is associated with a lower amount of debt (mortgages
excluded), among the households having debt. In the high-income group, presence of a
partner is associated with higher total wealth.
We do not find the expected effects of family composition on the saving measures. The
presence of children is positively associated with the economic situation of the household.
This is contrary to expectation, but similar results have been reported in other studies. The
presence of a partner has an ambiguous relationship with saving, but the results indicate that
the presence of a partner increases the tendency to buy a house. This may explain why
couples have higher contractual saving and the higher total wealth found in the high-income
group, and why we fmd the presence of a partner to be negatively associated with financial
wealth.
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We will now turn to the psychological variables included in the analyses. The correlation
coefficients between these variables are reported in Table 7.7. The table shows that the
different psychological variables are related, but not so strongly that it causes problems for the
regression analyses.
Table 7.7
Correlation coefficients between psychological variables
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7.4.2.6 Time preference
The subjective discount rates are correlated with different saving types in expected ways,
although the correlation coefficients are not as high as expected. The discount rates are
significantly correlated with each other, which is expected as the three rates are supposed to
measure the same concept. The delay reward rate is negatively correlated with financial
wealth as of December 1994 (r = -.103, p < .01) and total wealth (r = -.102, p < .01). The
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speed-up reward rate is positively correlated with the size of the debt when mortgages are
included in the debt definition (r = .072, p < .05) The speed-up reward rate is also negatively
associated with contractual saving which could be expected, but it is positively related to the
discretionary saving ratio, which is puzzling.
In the multivariate analyses, time preference is found to have an impact on some types of
saving, depending on how time preference was measured. The results are, however,
ambiguous and not readily interpretable. The delay reward and delay payment scores are
significant predictors of positive financial wealth. The lower the two discount rate factor
scores, the more likely the household is to have positive financial saving (Table A6-9). The
more people want to be compensated for postponing receiving money or the more they are
willing to pay for postponing paying money, the smaller the likelihood that the value of the
financial assets of the household is positive. This is in line with what was expected. The three
different time preference rates are not found to affect levels of financial wealth (Tables A6-1
and 7.3) or discretionary saving, except for in the middle-income group where a negative
relationship between financial wealth and the delay reward rate is found (Table A6-S). We
found, however, that the delay reward rate is negatively related to the discretionary savings
ratio (Tables A6-1 and 7.3). This is in line with our expectations. Patient people save a larger
portion of their income than more impatient people. A more unexpected finding is the
significant positive relationship between the discretionary saving ratio and the speed-up
reward rate (Tables A6-1 and 7.3). This is the opposite of our expectation that higher discount
rates will be associated with a lower saving tendency. Instead, we find that the more the
persons in a household who are willing to pay in order to speed-up receipt of money, the
higher proportion of their income they save. This indicates that the questions used to measure
time preference may capture something other than time preference. The questions used to
measure the speed-up reward rate may also measure a need to control the money or a general
pleasure of being in charge of money. The relationship between the speed-up reward factor
and the discretionary saving ratio is not significant when analysing the three income groups
separately (Table A6-S). A low delay reward discount rate is associated with higher total
saving in the high-income group (Table A6-8). This is also in line with our expectations.
Time preference is found to be associated with sum of debt as of December 1994. The speed-
up reward factor is positively associated with both debt measures (inclusive and exclusive
mortgages) as expected. The more people are prepared to pay for speeding up receipt of
money to the present, the more they have borrowed (Table A6-2). The analyses of the three
income groups reveal that the effect of the speed-up reward discount rates is largest in the
low-income group (Tables A6-6 and A6-7). The negative association between level of debt
and the delay payment rate (Table A6-7) is contrary to what was expected. The less people are
willing to pay in order to postpone a payment, the more debt they have. This may be caused
by a lack of willingness to pay for further debt.
A confusing result is that the delay reward factor is negatively associated with debt
(mortgages excluded) (Table A6-2) and with the sum of debt and mortgages as of December
1994 in the low-income group (Table A6-6). The less compensation people want in order to
delay receiving money, the more debt they have. One possible explanation for this finding can
be that people having borrowed the money they need are more patient regarding receiving
even more money. Such an explanation depends on a reversal of the causal relationship
suggested before and it requires a more dynamic analysis of the relationship between
borrowing and time preference than was conducted here.
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The relationship between discount rates and economic behaviour should be further
investigated. The results presented above suggest that discount rates are important predictors
for both saving and borrowing, but there are measurement problems that remain to be solved.
The correlation between the three discount rates should have been much higher than was
found in the present study, and the opposite signs found for the effect of two of the discount
rates respectively suggest that the measures might pick up other preferences than just time
preference for consumption. The correlation coefficients between the discount rates, saving
motives and saving attitudes (see Table 7.7) suggest that time preference may work through
these variables, and this should be a topic for further research.
7.4.2.7 Income expectations
The study included two measures of expectations regarding future income. One was about
changes in income the next year, while the other was about changes in income the next five
years. The two income expectations measures are significantly correlated with each other (r =
.303, p < .01). The two expectations measures are not significantly correlated with any of the
savings measures except for negative relationships between the one-year expectations and
total saving in 1994 (r = -.063, p < .10), one year expectations and total wealth (r = -.107, p <
.01), and five-year expectations and total wealth (r = -.080, p < .05). Younger people seem to
be more optimistic regarding their future income than older people, as the correlation between
age and one-year expectations is -.142 (p < .01) while it is -.245 (p < .01) between age and
five-year expectations. The correlation coefficients also show a positive relationship between
education and one-year (r = .078, p < .05) and five-years (r = .177, p < .01) expectations.
Further, we find that with more pessimistic expectations came positive attitudes towards
saving, and with more importance attributed to precautionary saving came less importance
attributed towards saving for old age.
Expectations were assumed to influence saving so that positive expectations would reduce
saving and increase borrowing while pessimism would increase saving and decrease
borrowing. The results from the regression analyses give some support for these hypotheses
with respect to borrowing behaviour. Positive expectations concerning income the next five
years are associated with higher debt (Tables A6-2 and 7.4). This is also found in the low-
income and the high-income groups (Table A6-7). Positive five-year expectations are
associated with less debt repayment (Table A6-3). We did not find any significant
relationships between the two expectations measures of wealth and saving, but we found that
positive expectations towards income next year decrease the probability that the household
has positive financial wealth. Positive expectations regarding the next five years, however,
increase the probability of the household having positive fmancial wealth.
The effect of expectations on saving was unexpected due to the large focus on this variable in
theories of saving. In this data set, we only fmd expectations to influence borrowing
behaviour and not wealth and saving. It may be that the lack of significant relationships is due
to measurement problems. In order to test effects of expectations as defined in the life-cycle
hypothesis, people should be asked questions with longer horizon than the next five years.
Although people are unlikely to be able to specify expected changes in terms of percentages,
they may be able to draw their expected income profile. Some people may expect a flat
profile, while others might expect a steeply rising one. Others still might indicate that they
expect high income variability.
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7.4.2.8 Time horizon
Time horizon correlates significantly with financial wealth (r = .190, P < .01), total wealth (r
= .256, p < .01, debt (r = .123, p <.01) and debt and mortgages (r = .077, p < .05). Time
horizon also correlates significantly with contractual saving in 1994 (r = .062, P < .10), total
saving (r = .091, P < .01) and the total saving ratio (r = .120, p < .01). Significant positive
correlations are also found between time horizon and size of the family, saving attitudes and
saving motives.
Time horizon was expected to have a positive association with saving and a negative
association with borrowing. The fmdings from the regression analyses support these
hypotheses to a certain extent, but not all fmdings are as expected. As predicted, we found
that the longer the time horizon. the higher fmancial wealth and total wealth as of December
1994 (Tables A6-l and A6-4). The length of the time horizon also has a positive effect on
total saving during 1994 and the total saving ratio in 1994 (Tables A6-4 and 7.6). Analyses of
the three income groups show that time horizon is most important for the middle-income
group (Tables A6-5 and A6-8).
Further, we found that the longer the time horizon, the lower the probability that a household
has debt (Table A6-9). This is in line with what we expected. Among those having debt, the
association with time horizon is opposite of what was proposed: the longer the time horizon
the higher the sum of debt (Table A6-2). In Table A6-7, we can see that this relationship is
strongest in the high-income group. The same relationship is found between time horizon and
debt when mortgages were included in the debt defmition. These findings suggest that longer
time horizons make people avoid debt, but when they borrow, they take out larger loans.
Just like Lusardi (2000), we have found time horizon to be important for saving behaviour
and wealth accumulation. If the individual differences in time horizon are large and the effects
of the time horizon as considerable as the results of this study show, the life cycle hypothesis
should be modified to incorporate this. People with a long time horizon may act more in
accordance with the life cycle hypothesis than people operating with short time horizons.
7.4.2.9 Perceived income variability
Perceived income variability with respect to future income was only found to be related to a
few of the saving measures. Perceived income variability is negatively correlated with total
wealth, which is opposite to what we expected (r = -.108, P < .01). One reason for this
unexpected finding, can be that younger people perceive their incomes to be more variable
than older people (r = -.279, P < .01), and that younger people usually have less wealth.
The results from the multivariate analyses are not different from what we found when looking
at the correlation coefficients. Perceived income variability is not found to have a significant
impact on any of the saving measures with the exception of total wealth (Table A6-4) and the
repayment saving ratio when mortgages were excluded from the debt defmition (Table A6-2).
In Table A6-9, we can see that higher perceived income variability decreases the probability
that the household has positive fmancial wealth while it increases the probability for the
household having debt (mortgages excluded from the debt definition). All these fmdings were
contrary to what was expected. Since the effect of age is controlled for in these analyses, the
fmdings are not easy to explain. It may be that people expecting high income variability have
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experienced variability in the past and have therefore been unable to save and forced to
borrow.
7.4.2.10 Attitudes towards saving
The correlation coefficients between the different saving measures and the attitude factor
'thrift' are not significant, with the exception of the correlation between thrift and the sum of
debt and mortgages (r= -.l48,p < .01). The thrift factor is, however, related to other variables
used in the analyses. There is a negative correlation between household income and fhrift (r =
-.137, p < .Ol), which means that households with higher incomes are less positive towards
saving. There is a positive relationship between age and thrift, which means that there may be
a cohort effect with respect to attitudes towards saving or that people become more positive
towards saving as they grow older. There is a rather strong association between thrift attitude
and how important the household regard the precautionary saving motive (r = .387, p < .01)
and thrift correlates significantly with the other saving motive variables (see Table 7.7). Thrift
also correlates significantly with emotional stability (r = .083, p < .05), conscientiousness (r =
.24l,p < .01), inflexibility (r = .096,p < .01), and extraversion (r = .105, p < .003).
The regression analyses show that thrift is significantly related to both financial and total
wealth, but the signs of the relationships are opposite to what was expected. The higher the
score on the thrift factor, the lower fmancial and total wealth (Tables A6-1 and A6-4). The
negative significant relationship is also found between fmancial wealth and thrift in the low-
income group (Table A6-5). Further, the thrift factor is negatively associated with the total
saving ratio (Table A6-4). These findings, which contradict expectations, give rise to
speculations about the direction of causality. It seems as though it is the households that have
been unable to save in the past that are the most positive towards future saving. Those who
already managed to save are less positive towards (further) saving. The thrift factor score is
constructed from answers to statements such as "it is important to have some money left at the
end of the month", and "it is important always to save as much money as possible" (see Table
6.14). It may be people with problems related to saving money who will agree with such
statements. Another possible explanation for the anomalous fmding, is that the result is a
product of an interaction effect between the thrift factor score and one of the other variables.
Table 7.6 shows that the thrift factor is not a significant predictor of total wealth when the
number of variables in the regression is limited to those with a significant coefficient in the
first analyses (Table A6-4). As shown above, thrift is not correlated with any of the savings
measures. The relationship between the thrift factor and the different saving measures is
ambiguous and should be studied in a dynamic model in order to establish the causal
relationships.
Thrift is found to be positively related to the repayment of debt when mortgages are excluded
from the debt defmition (Tables A6-2 and 7.4). This is the only significant finding with the
expected direction, and it means that households with debt holding a positive attitude toward
saving repay more of their debt than others (size of debt was controlled for). Apart from this
finding, thrift is not found to be important for borrowing or debt repayment (Tables A6-2 and
A6-3), which might be due to none of the items forming the thrift factor being about debt or
borrowing behaviour.
The attitude factor called saving involvement is positively correlated with financial wealth (r
= .266, p < .01) and total wealth (r = .315, p < .01). Saving involvement is also correlated
with debt when mortgages are included in the debt defmition (r = .243, p < .Ol). With respect
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to the saving variables, saving involvement correlates positively with total saving (r = .103, p
< .Ol) and the total savings ratio (r = .082, p < .05), while there is a negative correlation
between saving involvement and the contractual savings ratio when debt is included in the
debt definition (r = -.077, p<.05). There is a positive correlation between saving involvement
and income (r = .351, p < .Ol) which means that the attitude towards saving becomes more
positive as income increases. Saving involvement is positively correlated with all the saving
motive variables (see Table 7.7). The strongest correlation is between saving involvement and
importance of earning interest (r = .479, p < .01). Saving involvement is also highly
correlated with the measure of economic situation compared to "others". Households
believing that they are better off than others are more involved with saving (r = .396, p < .Ol).
The saving involvement factor is negatively associated with age (r = -.108, p <.Ol) while it is
positively associated with family size (r = .147, p < .01) and presence of a partner (r = .255,
p < .Ol). Saving involvement is positively associated with time horizon (r = .230, p < .01),
which means that the longer people think into the future, the more involved they are with
saving. There are also significant correlations between personality factors and saving
involvement. There is a negative correlation between saving involvement and emotional
stability, which is unexpected due to the positive relationship found between thrift and
emotional stability. Saving involvement and tough-mindedness correlates positively (r = .094,
p < .Ol), while there are negative relationships between saving involvement and inflexibility
(r= -.lOI,p < .Ol) and extraversion (r= -.l97,p < .01).
The regression analyses show that a high score on the saving involvement factor is associated
with higher financial wealth (A6-1) and higher total wealth (A6-4). The relationship with total
wealth seems to be particularly strong in the low-income group (Table A6-8). In Table A6-9,
we can see that the probability that the value of a household's financial wealth is above zero
increases with a high score on the saving involvement factor. Saving involvement does not
seem to be related to saving, but saving involvement is associated with debt repayment.
Saving involvement is negatively related to repayment of debt and mortgages (see Table A6-
3) and the contractual savings ratio (mortgages excluded) (Table A6-2). These relationships
are opposite to what we expected. People involved with saving were expected to repay their
debts as soon as possible.
The saving habit attitude factor does not correlate with any of the saving measures with the
exception of a negative correlation between saving habit and debt and mortgages. The saving
habit factor correlates negatively with the three discount rate factors, the two income
expectations factors and the income uncertainty factor (see Table 7.7). The saving habit factor
correlates positively with the importance attributed to precautionary saving (r = .225, p < .01)
and saving for old age (r = .131, p < .Ol). The saving habit attitude factor is also related to
personality factors. Saving habit is significantly correlated with conscientiousness (r = .151, p
< .01), tough-mindedness (r = -.068, p < .05) and inflexibility (r = .124, p < .004).
Results from the multivariate analyses indicate that the factor called saving habit is more
strongly related to saving than to wealth and debt, but the direction of the relationships are
opposite to what was expected. The saving habits factor is negatively related to the
discretionary savings ratio (Tables A6-1 and 7.3), the repayment of debt and the contractual
savings ratio when mortgages are excluded from the debt definition (Tables A6-2 and 7.4).
This means that people scoring high on the saving habits factor save a smaller portion of their
income than those with a low score. Although this is contrary to what was expected, it is not
as surprising when we look closer at the items defining the saving habits factor. Two of the
items are about needs to save. It is likely that those expressing that they need to save, are less
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able to save money than others. Among the households having debt and mortgages, saving
habits were negatively related to the sum of debt and mortgages (Table A6-3), and this
relationship is particularly strong in the high-income group (Table A6- 6). This result is in
line with our expectations.
The results suggest that people do vary in their attitudes towards saving and that these
attitudes are associated with saving and borrowing behaviour. It is necessary to continue
investigating whether attitudes influence saving or whether the attitudes are a result of
previous saving. Some of the results reported above are difficult to interpret without reversing
the direction of the proposed relationships. It is likely that attitudes towards further saving are
partly influenced by previous saving and partly by factors such as personality and education.
It is requires a dynamic model to test the predictive power of attitudes properly.
7.4.2.11 Attitudes towards debt
Shame of debt or debt aversion is correlated with the saving measures as predicted. The larger
the debt aversion, the more financial (r = .163, p < .01) and total (r = .186, P < .01) wealth
and the less debt (r = -.081, p < .05) and debt +mortgages (r = -.239, P < .01). Debt aversion
seems to be less associated with saving as it is weakly correlated with repayment of debt (r = -
.077, p < .05) the discretionary savings ratio (r = -.070, p < .05) and the contractual savings
ratio (r = -.139, p < .01). The stronger the debt aversion, the smaller part of the income is used
for saving and the larger part of income is used for paying back loans.
Results from the regression analyses show that the attitude towards debt factor has a robust
relationship with both saving and borrowing behaviour. A negative attitude towards debt
increases the likelihood that a household has positive financial savings while it decreases the
likelihood of a household having debt and mortgages (Table A6-9). Thinking that debt is
negative is associated with higher financial (Tables A6-1 and 7.3) and total (Tables A6-4 and
7.6) wealth. In particular, in the low-income group, differences in attitudes towards debt seem
to affect levels of wealth (Tables A6-5 and A6-8). Among households having debt, a negative
attitude towards debt is associated with lower levels of debt and mortgages (Tables A6-3 and
7.). This relationship seems to be particularly strong in the middle-income group (Table A6-
7).
A surprising result is that the attitude towards debt factor is negatively associated with the
discretionary savings ratio. This means that being negative towards debt is associated with
saving a smaller part of their income than people having a more positive attitude towards
debt. With the exception of this relationship, the results suggest that debt aversion is
important for both saving and borrowing behaviour in the predicted manner.
7.4.2.12 Saving motives
The degree of importance attributed to precautionary saving has less impact on saving
behaviour than expected. Precautionary saving is not correlated with any of the saving
measures except the sum of debt and mortgages (r = -.082, P < .05). Thinking that
precautionary saving is important is, however, related with some of the other psychological
variables (see Table .7.7). Importance of precautionary saving correlates significantly with
time horizon (r = .105), thrift (r = .387), saving involvement, (r = .187), saving habit (r =
.225), debt aversion (r = .l05), the importance attributed to the goal saving motive (r = .313),
importance of inter vivos transfers (r = .321), importance of bequest (r = 259), importance of
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saving for old age (r = .492) and the importance of the earning interest (r = .338). There is
also a positive correlation between thinking that precautionary saving is important and the
conscientiousness factor (r = .104, P < .0 l).
The results from the regression analyses show that the more important people think it is to
save for precautionary reasons, the more they repay of their debt (Tables A6-2 and 7.4). In the
low-income group, we also find that the more important saving for precautionary reasons is
considered, the higher the sum of debt (mortgages excluded) (Table A6-7). In spite of the
precautionary motive being the most frequently mentioned saving motive, the. expected
relationships between the importance of the precautionary saving motive and wealth and
saving were not found. This might be due to some of the effect of having this motive is
captured by some of the other variables. It could also be that people differ with respect to how
large a buffer they need for precautionary reasons. A third explanation could be that there is
an interaction effect between wealth and motives. Households that have not been able to save
in the past (having low wealth) may regard saving for precaution very important. Likewise,
households with low income and high debt probably do not have a buffer and regard this as an
important reason for trying to save.
The goal saving motive correlates with several of the dependent variables, but the
relationships are not as expected. There are negative correlations between the strength of the
goal saving motive and total wealth (r = -.122, p < .01). The goal saving motive correlates
negatively with the sum of debt (mortgages excluded) (r = -.102, p < .01) and both measures
of contractual saving. There is also a negative relationship between the goal saving motive
and the contractual savings ratio.
The results from the regression analyses show that the goal saving motive is positively
associated with discretionary saving and the discretionary savings ratio (Tables A6-1 and 7.3).
The more importance the household members think it is to save for a goal, the more they save
and the larger part of their income is saved. Among households with debt, those thinking it is
important to save for a particular goal also have lower debt (Tables A6-2 and 7.4). The goal
saving motive is, however, negatively associated with total wealth as of December 1994
(Tables A6-4). This suggests that households having saved already and therefore are able to
buy a desired product, do not regard goal saving as important.
Thinking it is important to support children is positively correlated with several of the
dependent variables, such as the sum of debt and mortgages (r = .140, p < .01) and total
wealth (r = .082, p < .05). Households attributing importance to helping their children also
have higher discretionary saving (r = .091, P < .05). Again, we find strong positive
relationships between saving motives and saving attitudes (thrift and saving involvement) (see
Table 7.7). The highest correlation is found between the motive for helping children and the
bequest motive (r = .519, p < .01).
The results from the regression analyses show that households who think it is important to
support their children have less fmancial wealth (Table A6-1), and this relationship is
particularly strong in the middle-income group (Table A6-5). In the middle-income group, we
also fmd that there is a significant negative relationship between how important the household
think it is to support their children and total wealth (Table A6-8). Thinking that it is important
to support children seems to have a negative effect on the household wealth as it also
decreases the likelihood of a household having positive fmancial wealth (Table A6-9). This
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might be due to these households already having given the money to their children or that
they are unable to support their children, but would like to do so.
The bequest motive also deals with support for children, but this concerns wealth that will be
transferred after the death of the parents. Thinking that bequest is important is positively
correlated with both financial (r = .245, p < .01) and total (r = .263, p < .Ol) wealth. There is
also a positive relationship between the bequest motive and the sum of debt and mortgages (r
= .092, p < .Ol). There are no significant correlations between the bequest motive and the
saving variables, but as can bee seen in Table 7.7, bequest correlates with some of the
psychological variables.
Results from the regression analyses, show that a strong bequest motive is associated with
higher financial wealth (Table A6-1) and higher total wealth (Table A6-4). This relationship
is particularly important in the low- and middle-income groups (Tables A6-5 and A6-8).
Thinking it is important to leave bequest also increases the likelihood of a household having
positive financial wealth (Table A6-9). Moreover, it increases the likelihood of a household
having debt, although it does not seem to affect the level of debt. Hence, in spite of being the
saving motive with the lowest score with respect to mean importance (see Table 6.15), the
bequest motive affects saving.
Thinking it is important to save for old-age is correlated positively with financial (r = .102, p
< .01) and total (r =122, p < .01) wealth as well as with total saving (r = .074. p < .05) and the
total savings ratio (r = .088, p < .05). As can be seen in Table 7.7, people thinking it is
important to save for old age, have a lower delay reward rate, a longer time horizon, feel they
are better off than others and have positive attitudes towards saving.
The results from the regression analyses show a somewhat different pattern concerning the
retirement saving motive and saving variables. A significant relationship was found between
the strength of the retirement saving motive and financial wealth when analysing the full
sample (Tables A6-1 and 7.3). This relationship seems to be particularly strong in the low-
income and high-income group (Table A6-5). However, no significant relationship was found
between the old-age saving motive and total wealth and total saving. Instead, we found that a
strong motive for saving for old age reduces the likelihood of a household having debt and
mortgages (A6-9) and, among households having debt and mortgages, it reduces the size of
debt (Tables A6-2 and 7.4) and debt and mortgages (Tables A6-3 and 7.5).
A strong "calculation motive", or thinking that earning interest is important, is positively
associated with financial (r = .226, p < .01) and total (r = .279, p < .01) wealth, and with total
saving (r = .072, p < .05). As shown in Table 7.7, the calculation motive is also associated
with having a longer time horizon, higher income variability, perceived economic situation
compared to others, saving attitudes, and the other saving motives.
The results from the regression analyses show a positive association between the calculation
motive and the level of fmancial wealth (Table A6-I) and the level of total wealth (Table A6-
4) and a negative association between the calculation motive and the level of debt and
mortgages among the households having borrowed (Tables A6-3 and A6-6). The relationship
between total wealth and the calculation motive is particularly strong in the high-income
group. This is in line with what was expected. It is not certain what the direction of causality
is here. Thinking it is important to earn interest may be an effect of having money to invest
instead of being the reason for further saving.
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The overall conclusion from the results concerning saving motives is that the importance
attributed to them affects saving behaviour. The link with attitudes should be further explored,
as the correlation coefficients suggest that attitudes and motives are related to each other, even
though they have independent effects on saving and borrowing behaviour.
7.4.2.13 Economic situation compared to "others"
Bivariate analyses indicate that perceived economic situation compared to "others" is related
to saving behaviour. Thinking one is better off is positively correlated with financial (r = .182,
p < .01) and total (r = .279, p < .01) wealth. It is also correlated with the amount of debt (r =
.295, p < .01) and the sum of debt and mortgages (r = .076, p < .05). Feeling better off is
positively related to total saving, but negatively related to the discretionary and contractual
saving ratio.
The same relationships were not found in the multivariate analyses. This might be due to the
fact that feeling better off is related to the level of income (r = .372, p < .0 l). When the effect
of income level is controlled for, the variable seems to lose some of its effect.
A significant relationship between perceived relative economic situation and fmancial wealth
is not found when analysing the full sample, but the relationship is significant in the low-
income and middle-income group (Table A6-S). A positive association between perceived
economic situation and total wealth is found in the high-income group (Table A6-8). A
problem with these results is that it is difficult to conclude whether people save more because
they feel better off than others and therefore do not feel a pressure to consume or whether they
feel better off because they do have higher wealth than others. In most of the analyses, there
are no significant links between perceived economic situation and saving and saving ratios
with the exception of two instances. Households that agree that they are better off than others
have a lower discretionary savings ratio than others (Tables A6-1 and 7.3). Agreeing that the
household is better off than others increases the probability that the household has debt and
mortgages (Table A6-9). These findings indicate that people compare their own consumption
with that of others when answering the question, and not the general economic situation. In
that case, people having borrowed money in order to buy their own house and spending most
of their income instead of saving it, may think they are better off than others. Alternatively,
people feeling that they are better-off than others think that they do not need to save.
The lack of results concerning the effects of economic situation compared to "others" is
somewhat disappointing, but it is important to remember that the measurement of this variable
is not optimal. One statement, originally meant to measure saving attitudes, had to be used as
a proxy for this concept due to a routing error which caused an unacceptably high number of
missing observations of the measurement instrument that was intended to be used. This
variable may also have larger effect in countries with larger income inequalities than what is
found in the Netherlands.
7.4.2.14 Personality structure
A simple bivariate analysis showed that personality factors might be related to saving
behaviour, although the direction of the relationships is not always as expected. Emotional
stability was expected to be positively related to wealth and saving. Instead, we found
emotional stability to be negatively correlated with both financial (r = -.074, p < .05) and total
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(r = -.127, p < .01) wealth. This is contrary to what was expected. In line with our
expectations, however, we found that emotional stability is negatively correlated with debt
and mortgages (r = -.178, p < .0 I).
The results from the regression analyses reverse some of the indicated relationships.
Emotional stability is still associated with lower levels of debt and mortgages (Tables A6-3
and 7.5). In the low-income and high-income groups, emotional stability is also associated
with lower levels of debt (Table A6-7). Emotional stability does not have any significant
relationship with the level of financial wealth when analysing the full sample (Table A6-1).
Emotional stability is, however, positively associated with the level of financial saving in the
high-income group (Table A6-5). A significant association between emotional stability and
total wealth and saving is not found (Tables A6-4 and A6-8).
Conscientiousness is positively correlated with financial (r = .084, p < .05) and total wealth (r
= .125, p < .01), as expected. There is also a significant negative relationship between
conscientiousness and contractual saving. Conscientiousness is positively associated with age
(r = .285, p < .01), and correlates significantly with the three time preference rates and the
income expectation variables (see Table 7.7). Conscientiousness is also associated with
having positive attitudes towards saving and thinking it is important to leave bequests.
We do not find the same relationships between conscientiousness and the saving variables in
the regression analyses. A high score on the conscientiousness factor decreases the probability
that a household has debt (Table A6-9). Unexpectedly, we also find that conscientiousness
decreases the probability of the household having positive financial wealth. Among those
having debt, conscientiousness is associated with having lower amounts of debt. In the
multivariate analyses, we do not find conscientiousness to be related to financial or total
wealth, saving measures or saving ratio.
Tough-mindedness is not significantly correlated with any of the saving measures. The
regression analyses do not reveal any results that indicate that tough-mindedness is important
for saving behaviour. Though-mindedness is associated with having a higher probability of
having debt (Table A6-9) and, among those having debt, tough-mindedness is associated with
repaying less debt (controlling for the size of debt) (Table A6-2).
Inflexibility is associated with some of the saving variables. Inflexibility is negatively
associated with the amount of debt and mortgages (r = .177, P < .0 I) and with total saving (r
= -.088, p < .05). In spite of the negative association between inflexibility and the level of
debt and mortgages, there is a positive correlation between inflexibility and the contractual
savings ratio (r = .077, p < .05). There is also a negative correlation between inflexibility and
total saving (r = -.88, p < .05).
The regression analyses revealed that inflexibility is associated with higher financial wealth
(Tables A6-1 and 7.3) and total wealth (Tables A6-4 and 7.6), and lower amounts of debt and
mortgages among the households having borrowed (Tables A6-3 and 7.5). This is in line with
our expectations. Analysing the income groups separately, we can see that the relationship
between inflexibility and fmancial wealth is particularly strong in the middle-income group
(Table A6-5), while the relationship between total saving and inflexibility is strongest in the
low-income group (Table A6-8). The relationship between inflexibility and the size of debt is
significant in the middle-income group (Table A6-6). Inflexibility is also found to be
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associated with lower repayment of debt and mortgages among the households having such
loans (Table A6-3).
The results concerning extraversion are, in most cases, opposite to what was expected.
Bivariate analyses suggest that extraversion is associated with less saving, as expected. The
correlation between extraversion and total saving is -.081 (p < .05). The regression analyses,
on the other hand, uncover a positive association between extraversion and levels of financial
wealth (Tables A6-l and 7.3) and total wealth (Tables A6-4 and 7.6). These relationships are
particularly strong in the high-income group (Tables A6-5 and A6-8). There is also a negative
correlation between extraversion and levels of debt + mortgages (r = -.136, r < .01). This
relationship is found in the multivariate analyses when analysing the full sample (Tables A6-3
and 7.5). However, when analysing the income groups separately, the relationships is not
found to be significant. Extraversion is not found to be related to any of the saving variables.
The results regarding extraversion contradict those reported by Nyhus and Webley (2001)
using later waves of the CSS data, and the effect of extraversion on economic behaviour
should therefore be subject to further investigation.
Brandstiitter (1996) proposed that personality would influence saving indirectly through a
person's attitudes. This research has shown that at least some of the personality factors have
an independent effect on saving in spite of also being significantly related to saving attitudes
and motives. These factors are extraversion and inflexibility. Conscientiousness, on the other
hand, was not significant in the regression analyses except in one case. The correlation
coefficients in Table 7.7 tells us that conscientiousness is associated with both positive
attitudes towards saving as well as strong saving motives, which means that Brandstiitter may
be right with respect to this personality trait. Further research should focus on the interaction
effect between personality factors and between personality factors and motives and attitudes.
Table 7.8 summarises the expected relationships and results from analyses on the full sample.
The predicted relationships are indicated in parentheses.
7.4.3 Discretionary vs. contractual saving
The third research question asked whether the psychological variables influence the various
types of saving differently. The psychological variables of interest and their expected
relationship with wealth and debt measures, and repayment and discretionary saving were
specified in Chapter 4. Tables A6-l through A6-9 report the results from multiple regressions
carried out in order to establish the impact of psychological factors on the two types of saving,
and a summary is provided in Table 7.8.
We do not find that the psychological variables have opposite effects on the various stock
measures of saving. Variables that have a positive relationship with wealth also have a
negative relationship with the sum of debt and mortgages, so that they influence total wealth
in a consistent manner.
The same conclusion must be drawn for the flow measures of saving. We do not, in this data
set, find that a psychological variable that has a positive relationship with discretionary saving
has the opposite relationship with repayment saving. We must keep in mind, though, that the
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study may be affected by measurement problem with respect to the flow measures, so that
further studies are required in order to obtain results that are more conclusive.
Table 7.8
Comparison of expected relationship and fmdings
Dependent variables
Wealth/Debt Savin2 Savin ratio
Fin. Debt Debt Total Discr. Cont. Cont. Total Discr. Contrs Contr Total
wealth mortg mortg. wealth Sav. Sav. Sav. sav. Sav. av. Sav. saving
Incl. Excl. mortg mortg ratio ratio ratio ratio
Inel Excl. mortg rnortg
Independent variables Incl Excl.
HH disposable income + (+) +(+) ns (-) +(+) +(+) +(+) +(-) +(+) +(+) -(+) ns(-) +(+)
Level of education +(+) ns(+) ns(+) + ns(+) ns(+) ns(+) ns ns(+) ns(+) +(+) ns
Presence of children ns(-) ns(+) ns(+) ns(-) ns(-) ns(+) +(+) + ns(-) ns(+) ns(+) ns
Family size ns(-) ns(+) ns(+) ns(-) nst-) ns(+) -(+) ns ns(-) ns(+) ns(+) ns
Presence of partner ns(+) ns(+) ns(-) ns(+) ns(+) ns(+) +(-) ns(+) ns(+) ns(+) +(-) ns(+)
Time preference ns(-) +/-(-) ns(+) ns(-) ns(-) nst-) +(+) nst-) +/-(-) ns(-) ns(+) ns(-)
Income expectations ns(-) ns(+) +(+) ns(-) ns(-) -(+) ns(+) ns ns(-) ns(+) ns(+) ns
Time horizon +(+) +(+) +(-) +(+) ns(+) ns(+) ns(-) +(+) ns(+) ns(+) ns(-) +(+)
Income variability ns(+) ns(-) ns(-) -(+) ns(+) ns(-) -(-) ns ns(+) ns(-) ns(-) ns
Attitude towards saving +/-(+) -(-) ns(-) +(+) ns(+) +/-(-) -(-l ns -(+) ns(-) -(-) -
Debt aversion +(+) -(-) ns(-) +(+) ns(+) ns(-) ns(-) ns -(+) nst-) ns(-) ns
Imp. ofprec. saving ns(+) ns(-) ns(-) ns(+) ns(+) ns(-) +(-) ns ns(+) ns(-) ns(-) ns
Imp. ofleaving bequest +(+) ns(-) ns(-) +(+) -(+) ns(-) ns(-) ns ns(+) ns(-) ns(-) ns
Imp. of helping childr -(+) ns(-) ns(-) ns(+) ns(+) ns(-) ns(-) ns ns(+) ns(-) ns(-) ns
Imp. of retirement sav. +(+) ns(-) -(-) ns(+) ns(+) ns(-) ns(-) ns ns(+) ns(-) ns (-) ns
Imp. of goal saving ns(+) ns(-) -(-) -(+) +(+) ns(-) ns(-) ns +(+) ns(-) ns(-) ns
Imp. of profit making +(+) ns(-) nst-) +(+) -(+) ns(-) ns(-) ns ns(+) ns(-) ns(-) ns
Relative economic sit. ns(+) ns(-) ns(-) ns(+) ns(+) ns(-) ns(-) ns -(+) ns(-) ns (-) ns
Emotional stability ns(+) ns(-) ns(-) ns(+) ns(+) ns(-) ns(-) ns ns(+) nst-) ns (-) ns
Conscientiousness ns(+) ns(-) ns(-) ns(+) ns(+) -(-l ns(-) ns ns(+) nst-) ns (-) ns
Tough-mindedness ns(-) ns(+) ns(+) ns(-) ns(-) ns(+) -(+) ns ns(-) ns(+) ns(+) ns
Inflexibility +(-) ns(+) ns(+) +(-) ns(-) -(+) ns(+) ns ns(-) ns(+) ns(+) ns
Extraversion +(-) ns(+) ns(+) +(-) ns(-) ns(+) ns(+) ns ns(-) ns(+) ns(+) ns
7.4.4 Effects of psychological variables at different income levels
The last research question addressed is whether the psychological variables have more effect
of saving in households with high discretionary incomes than in households with lower
discretionary income. The answer to this question can be found in Tables A6-5 through A6-8.
With respect to fmancial wealth (Table A6-5), the results are opposite of Katona's
proposition. The psychological variables increase the explained variance in financial wealth
by 10.8, 9.7 and 6.8 percentage points for the low, middle and high-income groups
respectively. Hence, the importance of the psychological variables is less in the high-income
group than in the middle- and low-income group. This means that the psychological variables
do not increase their importance as discretionary income increases. A similar conclusion must
be drawn with respect to the importance of psychological variables for total wealth (Table
A6-8). The increase in explained variance of total wealth when including the psychological
variables in the model is larger in the low-income group (17.4 percentage points) than in the
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middle-income group (11.0 percentage points) and than in the high-income group (4.1
percentage points).
When analysing the sum of debt and mortgages (Table A6-6), the introduction of the
psychological variables has a negative effect on adjusted R2 in the low- and high-income
group. The adjusted R2 increases significantly when including the psychological variables
when analysing the debt and mortgages of the middle-income group. Still, we cannot
conclude that the importance of psychological variables increases with higher discretionary
income. Table A6- 7 reports the changes in explained variance when analysing debt levels in
the three income groups respectively. In this table, we can see that the increases in adjusted R2
are largest in the low and high-income groups, while it is low in the middle-income group.
Hence, we do not find an indication of psychological variables being more important in the
high-income group than in the groups with lower discretionary income.
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Chapter8
Conclusions
8.1 INTRODUCTION
Kotlikoff (1989) described the question about what determines saving as a jigsaw puzzle with
missing pieces where even the known pieces are hard to put together. This study has
attempted to identity some of the pieces that might have been missing in previous attempts to
solve the saving puzzle and to explore how the pieces might relate to each other. The
underlying motivation has been the need for a deeper understanding of the psychological
mechanisms governing saving behaviour so that we may improve existing saving models. In
particular, we need to identity the psychological variables that are likely to affect the majority
of a household's spending decisions.
The first part of this study consists of a review of the saving literature. The purpose of the
review was to identity psychology-based theories in the saving literature and to evaluate their
empirical support. Contributions from economics, economic psychology and sociology were
examined. The second part of this study is empirical in nature. It is designed to test the
relationship between selected psychological variables and various measures of saving
behaviour. Data collected from a large Dutch household panel were analysed. Some of the
methodological problems found in other psychological studies of saving were sought solved.
In this chapter, the answers to the four research questions are presented. We proceed by
evaluating the empirical study, which is important when drawing conclusions from the results.
Finally, the theoretical and practical implications of the study are discussed.
8.2 ANSWERS TO THE RESEARCH QUESTIONS
8.2.1 Research Question 1
The first research question asked which of the psychological explanations for saving found in
the existing economic and economic psychological literature on household saving are
supported by empirical ftndings. This was achieved through an interdisciplinary literature
review. The review revealed three different - but not necessarily opposing - psychological
processes that have been proposed as important for saving. The first process considers saving
as a result of a choice between pleasure now as opposed to pleasure in the future. This choice
may be difficult to make if the short-term preferences conflict with the long-term preferences.
The potential conflict between short-term and long-term preferences has been described in the
saving literature throughout history. Long-term saving goals may be hard for people who are
frequently exposed to spending temptations. Central variables in these theories are time
preference and self-control. Time preference expresses the degree of impatience to experience
pleasure or the intensity of the wish to postpone unpleasant events. Self-control includes the
strategies people use in order to fight their impatience so that they stick to their long-term
plans and goals. Despite the acknowledged existence of such intertemporal conflicts, it has
seldom been incorporated in the more formal saving models. One reason for this is that the
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process of prioritising present and future pleasures is hard to codify in a model because many
situational factors may influence the outcome. The model is also hard to test empirically
because adequate measurement instruments have not yet been developed.
Many variables that may influence time preference have been proposed and, in many cases,
these variables are similar to variables included in the more recent saving theories where
income is the central variable. The variables that are expected to be associated with time
preference are income, expected income, income uncertainty, the length of the time horizon,
consumption habits and self-control, stage in the life cycle, expected remaining life-time,
upbringing and dependence on fashion. Few of these propositions have been tested
empirically.
The second process proposed as underlying saving behaviour involves the idea that people
rationally distribute their income over their expected lifetime in order to maximise the utility
derived from their available resources. People are described as forward-looking, sometimes
having a time horizon exceeding their own expected lifetime, and able to distribute income
throughout their remaining lifetime without being tempted to overspend in the present. This
framework includes the two well-known models called the Life-Cycle Hypothesis (LCH) and
the Permanent Income Hypothesis (PIH) respectively. Some controversies about the
definition of income are found. There is also a disagreement about the time horizon that
should be used when testing the LCH, and about the existence and impact of various saving
motives. For example, economists dispute whether people want to deplete all their assets
before they die or whether they want to bequeath. Several psychological concepts have been
added to the model to better account for observed behaviour. These include saving motives,
uncertainty and subjective expectations. There has also been an attempt to add the notion of
self-control to the life-cycle models. The LCH can explain some of the variation in individual
saving behaviour, but an unacceptably large part of the variation is still left unexplained.
A third proposed process involves social comparison. The idea is that people do not make
their saving decisions in a social vacuum. Instead, they compare their own consumption
(which is conspicuous) with that of their "reference group" and decide to spend or save based
on whether they feel better or worse off than others. This perspective implies a theory about
how people choose their reference group and the function this reference group may have for
the consumers. So far, this part of the theory is underdeveloped and under-researched.
Hence, the economic literature on saving is rich on assumptions and theories based on
psychological thinking. The psychological variables frequently regarded as important are time
preference, degree of self-control, expectations, uncertainty, time horizon, social comparison
mechanisms and various saving motives. Psychologists have added attitudes and personality
structure to the list of possible predictors of saving. So far, the empirical research on the effect
of these variables has been limited and the results are inconclusive.
The measures of time preference used hitherto have not been found to be associated with
saving behaviour in empirical saving studies, except for a few weak indications of the a link.
Several attempts to measure time preference have been carried out, but the results
demonstrate that time preference is a complex entity that may be heavily influenced by the
decision context. If this is the case, time preference can be important in unique spending
decisions but fail to have a consistent effect across the majority of spending decisions, which,
in turn, will influence saving over longer time spans. In addition, variables that might capture
self-monitoring behaviour have often been omitted despite the fact that the combined effect of
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time preference and self-control is assumed to explain saving. This implies that one important
predictor for intertemporal decisions may be missing from previous analyses.
The concept of self-control has been linked to saving since Adam Smith included the concept
in the Theory of Moral sentiments (as cited in Wåmeryd, 1999). The existence of saving clubs
has been interpreted as evidence for the necessity of self-controlling devices. The role of self-
control has also been studied empirically by asking people if they use certain strategies to help
refrain from spending. People admit to the use of such strategies and we may infer from this
that being able to develop and implement self-controlling strategies is important for the
overall level of saving. Still, further empirical research is needed in order to establish the
effect of self-control on saving and spending behaviour over an extended period. Measures of
will-power, which might make the use of self-controlling techniques superfluous, must be
incorporated in these studies.
Expectations about future income and economic situation have been subject to a great deal of
empirical research. The findings of these studies are encouraging. Most studies, conducted by
both economists and psychologists, have found that optimism is associated with lower saving,
while pessimism encourages saving. Uncertainty regarding future income (or expenditures) is
expected to have a depressing effect on saving and may mediate the effect of expectations.
Uncertainty has been found to increase saving in empirical studies. As saving has
consequences for future well being in most cases, the time horizon used by the decision maker
is likely to be important. The longer the time horizon, the more future there is to be concerned
about, which may in turn increase the tendency to save and reduce the tendency to borrow.
This has also been supported empirically.
Market research indicates that social comparison mechanisms are important for purchasing
behaviour. People who belong to the same social group, which may be determined by various
criteria, tend to favour the same products and brands. It is therefore a plausible idea that peer-
group influence will be important for the level of consumption and saving. Although social
comparison mechanisms, or "interdependent preferences" in economic parlance, have
received little attention from economists, some empirical studies support the role of social
comparison in saving behaviour.
Many saving studies have included various saving motives as determinants of saving.
Psychologists see motives as an intermediate variable, so that people who hold different
motives or vary in how important they regard the motives will respond differently to
economic stimuli. Only one study has tested such a S-O-R model explicitly (Wahlund &
Wårneryd, 1987), and support for such a model was found. Economists have studied the effect
of motives using structural analyses of saving by incorporating the precautionary saving
motive and the bequest motive into the life cycle model of saving. The results concerning the
effect of the motives on levels of saving vary from one study to another, but, in most cases,
researchers agree that an element of aggregate wealth can be attributed to these motives. In
other studies, people have been asked whether they think various saving motives are
important, in order to establish which motive is the most significant. The precautionary saving
motive is mentioned most frequently, but the effect of the variation in the strength of these
motives on saving and borrowing behaviour has not been further explored.
The results concerning the relationship between attitudes and saving are mixed. Some studies
conclude that there is a relationship, while other studies have not found any significant
associations. The question of causality has been addressed in a small number of studies, and
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there is reason to believe that the direction of causality is the opposite to that initially
proposed, or that there exists an interactive process where previous saving influences attitudes
influence future saving.
Finally, there is a line of research within the economic-psychological literature on saving that
focuses on the link between personality structure and saving behaviour. Conscientiousness is
the personality dimension that corresponds mostly with the notion of will-power and self-
control. Some studies have found indications of this personality trait being important for both
saving and borrowing behaviour, while other studies find no support for such a relationship.
Other personality traits are also likely to influence saving, and a couple of studies report that
introversion, inflexibility, emotional stability and autonomy may affect both levels of saving
and portfolio choice. Hence, the empirical studies have found support for the notion that
personality factors can explain individual differences in saving and spending behaviour.
We may conclude that psychology has a lot to offer with respect to increasing our
understanding of individual saving behaviour. Many empirical studies have shown that the
inclusion of psychological variables in saving models increases the explained variance in
saving. Psychological variables also contribute towards a deeper understanding of the
cognitive processes underlying saving behaviour. However, only a few of the psychological
theories about saving behaviour have been subject to direct empirical testing. As shown in
Table 2.2, a large amount of empirical work is required in order to test all the proposed ideas.
More problems remain than have been satisfactorily answered.
8.2.2 Research Question 2
The next research question concerned the contribution of psychological variables towards
explaining variation in household saving. Based on our empirical study, we can conclude that
psychological variables significantly increase explained variance in individual differences in
saving and wealth beyond that explained by socio-economic variables. In particular, with
respect to fmancial and total wealth and the sum of debt and mortgages, the psychological
variables account for a relatively large increase in the explained variance. The flow-measures
of saving were, in general, poorly explained by the variables in the model. This may be due to
problems in the measurement of these dependent variables. There is also a chance that the
accounting period used in the study of flow measures (saving during one year) is too short for
the effect of psychological variables coming to realization. Nevertheless, adding
psychological variables to the models of saving improved their ability to predict saving
behaviour.
One weakness associated with many previous tests of psychological theories of saving is that
"saving" is not consistently defmed, which make the results of the studies difficult to
compare. In order to investigate whether the saving defmition used matters for the
conclusions regarding effects of psychological variables, several different measures of saving
were used as dependent variables. Both flow and stock measures of saving were analysed. We
also carried out independent test of discretionary and contractual saving. Finally, we analysed
the probabilities of having wealth and debt. All psychological variables included in the
regressions are significant in one or more of the analyses. The most robust variables - in terms
of being significant across many analyses with different dependent variables or samples - are
time horizon and debt aversion. The other variables, being time preference, income
variability, attitudes towards saving, perceived relative economic situation, personality, and
saving motives, are significant in some analyses but not in others, and they do not always
relate to saving the way we expected. This indicates that it is necessary to study certain types
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of saving separately when assessing the effect of psychological variables on saving. For
example, there may be different psychological mechanisms underlying bank saving, insurance
saving, and investment saving respectively and the psychological variables may influence
these different types of saving in different ways.
8.2.3 Research Question 3
The third research question asked if psychological variables have a different impact on
discretionary and repayment saving respectively. Our study did not find any evidence for this.
In general, the model explained little of the variance in the flow measures of saving. The few
variables found to be significantly associated with the saving variables worked in the same
direction with respect to discretionary saving and contractual saving.
One issue that should be considered is the operationalization of discretionary saving (see
Chapter 6). First, we could not distinguish between discretionary saving and residual saving
in the data set. This might have produced some noise in the discretionary saving measure,
because some part of the saving defmed as discretionary may have been accidental, in the
sense that it was not a result of a decision to save. Secondly, it is questionable if saving
achieved as part of a contractual obligation (like, for example, an automatic transfer of money
to a savings account) should count as discretionary saving (as in this study) or contractual
saving. There is a possibility that alternative ways of measuring discretionary and contractual
saving respectively would alter the results.
8.2.4 Research Question 4
Finally, we set out to test a conjecture put forward by Katona (1975). He argued that the
explanatory power of psychological variables rises as discretionary income increases and
spreads among families in Western economies. Although we did not have an accurate
measure of discretionary saving and could not disentangle households with and without
discretionary income, the proposition could be tested by comparing the contribution of
psychological variables with respect to explaining variance in saving variables for three
different (discretionary) income groups. It is reasonable to expect that psychological variables
have little effect for households that do not have any discretionary income, but the results do
not indicate that an increase in discretionary income increases the importance of
psychological variables for saving behaviour. Rather, the results show that psychological
variables can explain differences in wealth just as well in the low- (discretionary) income
group as in the high- (discretionary) income group. This study therefore found no foundations
for the assertion that psychological variables will increase their predictive power as
discretionary income in a country increases. Rather, the psychological variables are also
important determinants of saving for households with little discretionary income.
Some reservations with respect to these results should be observed. As pointed out in Chapter
6, it is not a straightforward business to defme discretionary income. Discretionary income
means that a household has an option to choose whether to spend or save. That means that
discretionary income is disposable income with necessities subtracted. The question is how to
define a necessity. The definition of needs can both be based on pure physical consideration
of how much food, clothes and shelter people need in order to stay alive, as well as social
reference group considerations that will defme what people need in order to function within
social group. The definition used here is based on a definition of physical needs as the
division of the disposable income of the household by the number of household members. As
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shown in Tables 6.7 and 6.8, this is not consistent with a definition based on perceived needs.
If we had used perceived economic situation when defining the income groups, the results
may have been different.
8.3 EVALUATION OF THE STUDY
All empirical investigations have strengths and weaknesses that need to be considered when
evaluating their results and implications. In this section, some of these will be addressed.
Strengths
This research is interdisciplinary, drawing on research from three fields. This has provided a
rich pool of psychological theories from which to choose. As some of the theories on saving
and consumption used within one field of research have been tested within other fields,
interdisciplinary research gives a better foundation for evaluating the theories or assumptions
underlying them.
The data set used in this study is unique in that it contains information about both economic
and psychological variables. Usually, large surveys designed for economic research are
limited to socio-economic variables for economic and practical reasons. Psychologists having
studied saving have often used questionnaires and with limited potential to adequately
measure the economic variables. The special data collection technique used for the CentER
Saving Survey has overcome the problems caused by using long questionnaires by splitting
the questionnaires into smaller parts, using advanced routing techniques and spreading the
data collection over an extended period. Although we know little about how this special form
of data collection technique may influence responses through panel effects, respondent
fatigue, etc, the method of computer assisted interviewing has some features that clearly will
improve data quality. These are the possibilities for routing and consistency checks during the
interview as explained in Appendix 2.
In the empirical work, some of the problems associated with studying the effect of
psychological variables on economic behaviour have been improved. Psychological theories
usually concern individual behaviour. When studying "individual" economic behaviour, the
appropriate level of analysis is often the household, since household members tend to make
economic decisions and possess assets together. In this study, we developed weights
reflecting the household members' decision influence. These weights were used to calculate
household measures in households containing couples. This is assumed to better than a
reliance on the answers from one of the spouses or to use the average of responses from
spouses, because the distribution of decision influence between spouses is likely to vary from
one household to another.
This study has used several different saving measures. This has revealed the importance of
analysing asset components and different types of saving separately. The findings show that
different saving types (for example, stock measures versus flow measures, debt versus
financial wealth) may require different models to be explained and predicted adequately. For
example, repayment of loans is determined by factors other than discretionary saving. If the
study had focussed on total saving and total wealth in isolation, wrong conclusions about the
relationships between psychological variables and saving would have been drawn.
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The effect of the psychological variables was tested both on the full sample, as well as on sub-
groups of the sample that differed with respect to income level. The findings show that some
of the psychological variables may be more important for saving behaviour in one income
group than in another. Therefore, it is important to ensure (i) that all income levels are
represented in the sample when investigating the relationship between psychological variables
and saving behaviour and (ii) that different income groups are analysed separately.
Weaknesses
The empirical study has not covered all the theories found to be of potential importance for
saving behaviour in the literature review. For example, the theories concerning dynamic
inconsistent behaviour, in which conflicts between short-term and long-term preferences are
central, are found worthy of consideration. In this study, variables that may represent this
phenomenon have not been included. The time preference variables may have captured, to a
limited extent, the intensity of a household's wish to spend money, but strategies for
controlling urges to spend have not been incorporated in the model. The reason for this stems
from the problems with measuring self-control. The data set contains data about the extent to
which a household tries to limit spending through the use of certain strategies. The problem is
that we do not know whether a failure to use the strategies is due to a lack of self-control or is
due to an ability to control spending by internal will power that renders the self-controlling
strategies are superfluous. In addition, the questionnaire's list of possible self-controlling
techniques is not complete. The variable "self-control" was therefore not included in the
analyses. For this reason, there is a chance of an "omitted variable bias" in the results. This
may also explain why we did not find the expected relationships between time preference and
the dependent variables. This relationship may be moderated by the use of self-control or will-
power.
Despite the efforts made to get good estimates of all variables, problems with measurement
still seem to threaten the validity of the results. Little of the variation of the flow measures is
explained by the variables included in the regression analyses. This may be an indication of
considerable noise in the data. In particular, a stronger association between income and
discretionary saving was expected. The measurement of the independent variables should also
be improved. Tests show that the factor structures of saving attitudes and personality are not
robust across the different waves of data collection. More work should be put into improving
these indexes.
As concluded in Chapter 5 and Appendix 1, the sample used is not representative of the Dutch
population. Only a part of the full sample was eventually used in the analyses and this limits
the generalizability of the results. Attrition between the two waves of data collection was
responsible for a large drop in the sample size. Nonresponse with respect to parts of the
questionnaire also caused a reduction of the sample. Finally, because some influential
observations were excluded from the analyses, this means that the reported results only may
be used to say something about the larger bulk of cases, and not, for example, about ''the
rich", "the very poor" or the "lottery-millionaires". As it might be the saving of these
"influential observations", which in this case are households with much larger wealth and
saving than most people, that constitute a large part of aggregate saving, the results presented
here cannot be used for predicting aggregate wealth or saving. Rather, it is the sign of the
coefficients as well as their relative influence on the dependent variables that should be
interpreted and used in further research.
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More sophisticated statistical analyses could have improved the empirical part of the study.
Particularly in respect to the debt and mortgage data, data analyses that can account for the
censoring present in these data might have improved the validity of the study. Better methods
for dealing with influential observations also exist, and the validity of the results may improve
with the use of such methods.
With the exception of the personality variables, the reported fmdings do not increase our
knowledge about causes of saving; rather we know more about which variables are likely to
have a positive or negative association with the saving variables. Regression analyses are
merely correlational and firm statements cannot be made about the direction of causation. As
was suggested when reporting the results in Chapter 7, some of the fmdings are hard to
explain without reversing the direction of causality assumed when proposing the hypotheses.
It is necessary to test the psychological variables in dynamic models in order to assess
whether, for example, the time horizon changes when it becomes more pleasant to think about
the future, or whether attitudes towards saving change with wealth. We should also test
whether a hierarchical model of saving motives should be used, as the precautionary motive
seems to be more important among the relatively poor while the investment motive is more
important among the rich. Only when the question of causality is resolved, it is possible to
give good and credible advice about how to influence saving.
8.4 IMPLICATIONS
Practical implications
One important issue concerning saving is whether there are ways to stimulate saving at the
macro level. The results from this study show that debt attitude and time horizon are
particularly important variables with respect to explaining differences in saving and
borrowing behaviour. These may be influenced through educational training. For example,
Bernheim et al. (2001) found that participation in courses about personal economics and
budgeting has an effect on levels of wealth. They found that people having been subject to
such educational programs save more than people not having been exposed to them.
Education about the risk and costs of various types of debt, may influence the attitudes
towards debt which in turn may influence both saving and borrowing behaviour. Lusardi
(2000) reported that "thinking about retirement" was an important predictor for wealth levels
of people nearing their retirement. This means that measures that make people start thinking
about retirement and thereby stretching their time horizon, may have a positive effect on
saving. Finally, the findings concerning how delay of gratification behaviour can be changed
by exposure to models (Bandura & Mischel, 1965), also indicate that saving can be influenced
through education.
Distinguishing between people who are savers and people who are not and between different
types of savers, is important for policy makers who are interested in predicting saving in
general as well as predicting responses to policy measures within segments of the population.
The psychological variables increase our understanding of the decision processes underlying
saving decisions, and this knowledge may be used to improve our predictions about how
people will react to stimuli. For example, it seems like the strength of different saving motives
varies between income groups and wealth classes, and this may influence people's reaction to
changes in their economic environment. The effect of differences in time horizons on saving,
should be taken into account, when discussing whether retirement saving should be
Chapter 8: Conclusions 173
compulsory or not. The households with a long time horizon may succeed in saving
adequately for their retirement and may benefit from a higher return on their savings that what
is usually offered through compulsory arrangements. The households with a short time
horizon, on the other hand, may not achieve to save enough for maintaining their standard of
living after retirement, and may live their last years in poverty.
The results also confirm the usefulness of segmenting the population for financial institutions.
They are interested in tailoring their products and marketing campaigns so that they will reach
the most profitable costumers. Research has shown that households with different wealth
levels are likely to require different financial products. People with more wealth, tend to have
longer time horizons and think that earning interest is important. They may prefer products
with high interest and may accept some risk. People with short time horizons and problems
with sticking to their saving plans, may appreciate products that force them to save or that do
not allow them to withdraw money they have already saved. The psychological variables are
important criteria for the segmentation of financial markets. In addition, knowledge about a
particular segment's motives, attitudes and preferences may give insights about how to design
good marketing campaigns.
The results from this study may also be of importance for marketers who want to make people
spend more on their products. For example, the motive for precautionary saving may be
weakened by credit limits or different types of insurance. People with strong debt aversion,
may react positively towards products that are combined with a saving plan. For example,
travel agents can offer saving schemes that will help people to save up for a specific holiday.
People less debt averse, on the other hand, may be responding positively towards the
possibility of going on holiday before paying. Acknowledging that people do not only make a
purchase decision, but also take their saving plans into consideration, can generate ideas about
how to combine product offers with financial services in order to maximise sales.
Implications for research
The reported results have implications for future research on household saving behaviour.
These will be discussed below.
Our findings challenge some of the assumptions used in economic models of saving. For
example, the results cast doubt on the importance of time preference in saving behaviour.
Consistent with previous studies, we did not fmd strong support for the importance of this
variable for saving. Before a conclusion can be reached, we need to replicate the study with
better measures of time preference. The interaction between self-control and will power
should also be further explored. Moreover, the common practice of assuming a constant rate
of time preference is also questionable. The data show large individual variation in the
discount rates used by the respondents when answering the time preference questions. In
addition, the patterns in the data suggest that the frarning of the intertemporal decisions in
terms of present gains or losses influences the results. This means that it is inadequate to
assume that the rate of time preference is a constant, equal for all individuals and equal in all
situations. Situational factors seem to determine the size of the discount rate. More research is
necessary in order to establish whether also personality traits influence rates of time
preference, as proposed by Fisher (1930). The correlation coefficients presented in Table 7.7,
suggest that they do.
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One of the most robust predictors of wealth and saving in this study is the time horizon. Two
issues are important to consider here. Firstly, many people respond that their time horizon is
shorter than their expected remaining lifetime. Secondly, there are individual differences in
how far into the future people think and plan. This means that the LCH is based on
assumptions that do not hold. Because people do not plan until their expected time of death,
but has much shorter time horizons, they are likely to react more strongly to income changes
than what the LCH predicts. The reaction to income changes is likely to vary with the length
of the time horizon. The model should be changed in this respect.
Previous research on saving motives has identified the most frequently mentioned motives.
Based on these results, the precautionary motive has been regarded as the most important
saving motive, while bequest and the profit-making motive have been regarded as less
important. This study has shown that it is not the most frequently mentioned motives that are
the best predictors of wealth levels. Instead, it is the saving motives that are mentioned by a
smaller part of the samples, such as the bequest motive and the profit-seeking motive, that are
the best predictors of individual differences in wealth and saving.
The presented fmdings suggest that it is useful to take the heterogeneity of savers into account
in studies of saving and financial behaviour. Carroll et al (1998), Gunnarsson (1999) Weil
(1991) and Wåmeryd (1999) have advocated segmenting the population into groups based on
wealth classes, forward-looking behaviour, country of origin, fmancial strategies, saving
motives and age. They all point to the likely condition that different saving models might be
necessary for different segments of the population. This study divided the sample into groups
based on disposable income divided by the number of household members that are supposed
to live on that income. Analysing these groups separately, we found that different variables
were important for the saving behaviour of the three groups respectively. Further research is
needed in order to establish which criteria are the most useful ones. This study has shown that
discretionary income may be one important criterion, but there may be better or additional
criteria such as wealth-class, house-owner or renters, rural or urban and so on.
This study has used a new approach to overcome the problem of level of analysis in studies of
the impact of psychological variables on economic behaviour. The individual responses from
spouses have been aggregated to the household level by using decision influence weights.
PaW (1989) has demonstrated that it is highly unlikely that decision influence is distributed in
the same way across all households. The use of decision weights for each household seems
therefore to be sensible. Although Burgoyne (1990) reports that income may be a useful
indicator of influence in economic affairs, more research on how to develop good indicators
of decision influence within the household is required.
It may be necessary to use longer periods than one year to study effects of psychological
variables on saving. The disappointing results with regards to the flow variables may be
attributed to the period involved in the study being too short. In a study of repetitiousness of
consumer behaviour, Katona (1975) reported that the most frequent behavioural pattern was
to dissave every third or fourth year in sequences such as SSDSSD (where the S and Ddenote
yearly saving or dissaving respectively). Using a time span of one year might therefore
capture only a part of this cyclic behaviour where the full effect of differences in
psychological variables are not likely to be fully visible. One problem with using a longer
time span is that panel attrition will reduce the number of households available for analyses;
another is that the noise in the savings data may increase.
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Within economic psychology, an integrated model of saving that incorporates psychological
and economic variables and any possible interaction between them has not yet been proposed.
This study has shown that it is premature to propose such a model, because the empirical
foundation is still weak. We have also pointed towards methodological challenges that have to
be solved in order to produce the necessary reliable and valid results. These challenges
comprise better measurement of psychological and economic variables and realistic methods
for aggregating individual data to the household level. The results of the literature review and
the empirical study have identified some psychological variables that contribute towards
improving predictions of wealth and saving. We have also identified variables that are likely
to have an effect of saving, in spite of not being found important in this study. Better
measurement of these variables may alter these results.
Future economic psychological research on saving behaviour should study the links between
psychological variables and saving behaviour more systematically than has been commonly
the case so far. It is particularly important that we are clear about what kind of saving that is
subject to study, so that it is possible to compare the results with outcomes of other studies. It
is also important to be clear about which psychological concept is subject to investigation.
Only in this way we will acquire enough knowledge to build an economic-psychological
model of saving. It is also important to analyse different saving and asset components
separately, and to test if the results found when analysing representative samples can also be
found within segments of the population. Itmight be the case that no single model can explain
all types of saving behaviour, and that we, in reality, need to develop many models in order to
capture this complex behaviour appropriately.
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APPENDIX 1: SAMPLING TECHNIQUES FOR THE CSS
The methods used for recruiting members for the two sub-samples constituting the ess, and
the representative panel and the high-income panel respectively, are described below. Possible
sampling biases are also discussed.
A1.1 The Representative Panel (RP)
The RP is intended to be representative of the Dutch population with respect to socio-
economic variables like region, political preference, housing, income, degree of urbanisation,
and age of the head of household. This panel was a part of the ordinary panel originally used
by Stichting TelePanel (the TelePanel Foundation). The members of this panel are not recruit-
ed specifically for the savings project, but they are members of a permanent panel and serve
as informants for a variety of research projects. The RP was set up in 1991, which means that
the members of this panel had participated in the panel for 4 years or less when the data
collected for this study took place.
The sampling was carried out using telephone directories as the sampling frame. Drawn
telephone numbers were used as basis for creating so-called 100-banks of telephone numbers.
This was done by randomising the two last digits of every drawn number. Telephone numbers
were thereafter drawn from the 100-banks. Because of this, new lines and nonlisted numbers
also had a chance of being selected.
An Equal Probability Selection Method (EPSEM) sample design was used for the selection of
the telephone numbers. EPSEM is a widely-used sample design and refers any sample in
which the population elements have equal probability of selection (the sample fraction is held
constant). It is a probability sample that "often leads to self-weighting samples, where the
simple mean of the sample is a good estimate of the population mean" (Kish, 1965: page 21).
Inorder to obtain a sample representative with respect to region and urbanisation, a four-step
stratified sampling procedure was applied:
1) Selection of primary sampling areas (communities within The Netherlands)
2) Selection of secondary sampling units (lOO-banks of telephone numbers within the
communities)
3) Selection of telephone numbers within 100-banks
4) Selection of households
Selection of primary sampling areas
A sample of communities was selected before the telephone numbers were drawn. In total,
there are 703 communities in The Netherlands, all differing in size. When the clusters have
large size variation and the sample fraction should be held constant, it is not recommended to
select clusters by using uncontrolled random sampling (Kish, 1965). This might result in
difficulties with controlling the sample size. If only relatively large clusters are drawn, the
sample size will be large. If only relatively small clusters are drawn, the sample size will be
small. The communities were therefore selected proportional to size in order to control the
sample size.
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The sampling design used for the RP also involves some stratification in order to secure
representation of all regions and larger cities. Communities were sorted according to region,
and within regions according to degree of urbanisation. Stratification of communities instead
of telephone numbers is easier because the units are fewer and more information will be
available for a community than a telephone number.
In order to reduce costs when introducing the expected 3500 households to the computerised
interviewing technique, it was decided to visit at least five households within each corn-
munity. For this reason, there was a minimum number of telephone numbers drawn from each
community. The selection of clusters was a two-stage process. First, the largest communities
were selected and then a sample of the smaller ones. Large communities were defined as self-
representing because these communities had to be represented in order to make the sample
representative with respect to degree of urbanisation and region.
Selection of secondarv sampling units
Telephone numbers drawn within the selected clusters were used to create so-called "100-
banks" of telephone numbers. The PTT (Post Telefoon Telegraaf) -phone files were used as a
database for the sampling. Within the selected clusters, telephone numbers were drawn. The
sub-sampling rate within each cluster had to vary to keep the sampling fraction constant. For
the big communities, the numbers of telephone numbers drawn within each cluster was
proportional to the cluster's size. For the smaller communities, a fixed number of telephone
numbers was drawn. If, for example, the number 0245476267 was drawn, a 100-bank was
created by randomising the last two digits in this number. This procedure is called List As-
sisted Random Digit Dialling (LARDD) or Directory Assisted Selections. LARDD has the
advantage that both secret numbers and new lines can be drawn and included in the sample.
The disadvantage is that also non-residential numbers (nonexisting numbers or companies)
will also be included.
Selection of telephone numbers
One number was selected from each 100-bank. The fraction of non-residential numbers was
lower than expected. 80% of the drawn numbers turned out to be residential. The low fraction
of non-residential numbers was probably due to the fact that the LARDD was used, not the
traditional random digit dialling. In USA, residential telephone numbers are often clustered
within banks of telephone numbers. Use of listed residential numbers as a basis for
randomisation will therefore increase the probability of hitting residential numbers
(Lepkowski, 1988). Probably, this is also the case in The Netherlands.
Selection of households
The non-response for the next stages in the recruitment process was higher than expected. The
households were first contacted by phone. In the first interview, the respondents were asked
about background information and whether they were willing to participate in the research
project. The response rate for the first recruitment interviews was about 70%. Approximately
50% of the households who took part in the recruitment interviews were prepared to
participate in the RP. These households were visited by representatives from the Stichting
TelePanel and introduced to computer-aided interviewing. About 53% of the households who
were introduced to the computer aided interviewing technique participated in the panel
eventually. The overall response rate for the RP is thus 18,5% (see Nyhus, 1996 for further
details).
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Table AI-l
Responses for different stages in the recruitment process
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Total 100 100 100
Singles 27.0 24.0 20.0
Family with children 33.2 51.7 56.2
Fam., without children 39.8 23.7 23.7
< 29 years 18.9 15.2 16.8
30 - 39_years 21.5 24.8 30.3
40 - 49 years 18.5 21.4 24.8
50 - 64 years 21.4 21.3 18.5
> 65 years 19.2 17.2 9.5
100 100
32.7 27.3
26.0 27.6
41.3 45.1
31.1 34.6
16.8 18.6
15.2 17.6
20.7 19.7
16.2 9.7
Source: Stichting TelePanel. The figures are from additional sample done to compensate for panel attrition.
4596 households were interviewed by telephone, and 2813 households were willing to participate in the panel.
Random sampling means that the numbers that are to be included in the sample are selected at
random and that each unit has an equal chance of inclusion. This was the strategy used for
selecting telephone numbers. However, if there is non-response among the sample cases, the
unbiased property that random sampling is assumed to provide does not apply to the sample
used in the study. Non-response makes it impossible to obtain complete measurements on the
survey sample. As shown above, the level of non-response when recruiting members for the
RP panel was high (81.5%). Table Al-l also shows that people who were willing to
participate differed from those who refused. This means that if all households willing to
participate in the panel were included in the sample, the selective non-response would lead to
a sample that was not representative of the Dutch population. This is seen for the variables
"composition of household "and "age" in Table AI-I.
Table Al-l shows that households with older members, one-person households and families
without children were less willing to participate in the panel than other households. In order to
correct for this non-sampling error, the Stichting TelePanel assigned quotas in an unbiased
way for some background data. Quota sampling means that the mix of types of households
that can enter the sample, is controlled. For the RP, the selection was carried out so that the
sample would be representative with respect to region, political preference, housing, degree of
urbanisation, income, and age of head of household. As the sample is made up by selecting
households who will presumably give the sample the same characteristics as the population it
represents, this procedure has also been called ''purposive selection" (Neyman, 1934). The
rather low response rate in the last stage of the recruitment process is thus caused by two
factors: l) refusals to co-operate by contacted households, and 2) non-selection of households
that were willing to co-operate but did not have the required characteristics.
Because the sampling procedure described above did not result in as many panel members as
expected, additional sampling was required. This was done by drawing more numbers from
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the 100-banks that were created during the first sampling. In addition, new 100-banks were
created following the same procedure as described above. In the end, a panel consisting of
2188 households was established. When the first wave of data collection for the ess took
place, the RP consisted of 4462 persons in 1880 households.
As the RP suffers from a 30% annual attrition rate, the Stichting TelePanel performed con-
tinuous surveys to collect new panel members. This was done by drawing numbers from the
100-banks. The telephone interviews of selected households are carried out, which results in a
reservoir of households willing to co-operate in the panel. Households who drop out are
replaced every week with households with similar characteristics using purposive selection as
described above. If some of the households split, the Stichting TelePanel tried to follow both
partners in the following periods.
A1.2 The High Income Panel (HIP)
The members of the HIP were recruited specifically for the ess because of a wish to study
high-income households in more detail. As income and wealth distributions in populations
often are skewed, a simple random sample would not provide enough wealthy households to
draw conclusions about their behaviour and distributions of many financial variables (Kennic-
kell & McManus, 1993). The high-income households are defined as households with the
10% highest incomes of the Netherlands. These households have a gross income of at least
105,000 guilders a year. According to the Stichting TelePanel, the sample is representative of
this part of the Dutch population with respect to income, age, gender and degree of
urbanisation.
The goal for the sampling was to recruit 1,000 households. A problem related to this
recruitment process was that the target population was much smaller than the sample popula-
tion (households with a telephone). Hence, the probability for drawing a number for a high-
income household was much smaller than for hitting a household that would fit for the RP. If
the sampling for the HIP was to be done in the same way as for the RP, 100,000 numbers
would have to be drawn and dialled based on the same expected response rates. This would be
an expensive and exhausting task. In order to reduce costs by reducing the number of
households that would have to be approached, two different sampling schemes were used for
selecting households to the HIP. They differed in method and in hitting chance for the target
population.
The first procedure was as follows:
l) Selection of area postcodes for wealthy areas
2) Selection of telephone numbers within the selected wealthy areas.
3) Selection of households
Selection of area postcodes
A database belonging to a Dutch company called "Geo-Marktprofiel" was used in order to
increase the probability of approaching households belonging to the target population. Their
database consists of 400,000 postal code areas. Geo-Marktprofiel constructed a variable called
"wealth class" based on variables like prices of houses (and rent), presence of gardens and
level of prosperity. In this way, it was possible to get an overview of the geographical
distribution of Dutch households over wealth categories.
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The Stichting TelePanel has information about distributions of household income where the
households are obtained via an unbiased sample (the RP). These two sources of information
were matched so it was possible to determine the distribution of high-income households over
the wealth categories. Based on this information, it was possible to estimate how the 600,000
high-income households in the Netherlands are distributed over wealth categories. The areas
were categorised within six different classes of prosperity, where "l" represents the most
wealthy area. The areas which were classified as l ("high") or 2 ("above average") were
selected. These areas covered about 55% of the target population.
Selection of telephone numbers in wealthy areas
Households were selected within the wealthy areas. The Stichting TelePanel stated how many
phone numbers they needed from each wealth class. The numbers were drawn by Geo-
Marktprofiel as they had the database with all addresses and listed telephone numbers. Use of
Geo-Marktprofiel's database increased the probability of approaching a high-income house-
hold from 10% to 20%. In addition, all the drawn numbers were residential. The disadvantage
with this sampling scheme is that it does not include new and unlisted telephone numbers. As
12% of all telephone numbers in the Netherlands are not listed, this might cause a coverage
error in the sample. 20,000 households were approached based on this sampling scheme.
In addition, another 10,000 households were approached. These households were selected
using the same 4-step sampling scheme as described for the RP. This scheme covers nearly
100% of the households in the target population. The probability for hitting a high-income
household using this method was 10%.
Selection of households
In total, 30,000 households were approached. In the first interview, they were asked about
some characteristics of the household (among them, income). About 66% of the respondents
answered the questions about income. Households belonging to the target population were
asked if they were willing to participate in the panel. These households were informed about
the purpose of the study they were asked to take part in and why they were approached. 50%
of the households in the target income group were willing to participate in the panel. More
than half of the households who said they were willing to become panel members participated
in the high-income panel eventually. Inthe end, 1011 households participated in the panel.
The chance of selecting a rich household was 20% for the 20,000 households approached
using the first sampling scheme, while it was 10% for the 10,000 households approached
using the second sampling scheme. This means that about 5,000 households in the target
income group were approached. As 1,011 of these households participated in the panel, this
corresponds to a response rate of 20.2%. When data for the first wave of the ess were
collected, the HlP consisted of 2,735 people in 910 households. An overview of the response
rates for the first wave is given in Table 5.3. Selections of households when replacing the
households that drop out is achieved using the 100-banks created for the RP. Unfortunately,
more accurate information about the sampling and response rates is not available.
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A1.3 Evaluation of the applied methods
Sampling errors
The RP is meant to be the Dutch population in miniature. This goal has also been reflected in
the sampling procedures applied when the panel members were recruited. Random selection
of telephone numbers has been combined with stratification and quota sampling. Below some
possible sampling biases caused by the applied sampling frames and shortcomings of the
recruitment procedures will be discussed. These biases might represent possible threats to
validity and therefore limit the extent to which the results reported in Chapter '7 can be
generalised across populations, situations and times.
Bias caused by the sampling frame applied
Interviewing using modems requires that the respondents have a telephone. Since the panel
members also are recruited by telephone interviewing, non-telephone households are not
included in the sampling frame. The potential for coverage errors in telephone surveys
decreases as the percentage of telephone households increases. According to Stichting
TelePanel, 97% of the Dutch households have a telephone, so the sampling frame should
therefore not represent a serious threat to representativeness. It covers nearly the total target
population. However, if there are large differences between telephone and non-telephone
household populations, there still might be a chance of a significant non-coverage bias.
According to Trevin and Lee (1988), non-coverage in telephone surveys in the Netherlands is
higher for single and divorced persons, households where the head is unskilled, households
with an unemployed head, households with a young head, large households (more than six
people), and it is higher for households living in rental accommodation than owner-occupied
accommodation. Relative to other countries, the Netherlands exhibits little differences in
telephone coverage across income groups, but a tendency for noncoverage for low income
households can still be found (Trevin & Lee, 1988).
Also CBS-studies show that the young, the elderly, the unemployed, divorced people, people
with lower education levels and people in lower income groups less frequently have a
telephone than others (Snijkers, 1992). The sampling frame used might therefore be the
reason why tenants and young and old people are under-represented in the RP. The number of
students and unemployed also appears to be low in the RP, although comparable data for the
Dutch population are lacking (see Table 5.2). The applied sampling frame also excludes
people living in institutions of various kinds, those in military service and transients.
The most important sampling frame used for recruiting members for the HIP covered only
55% of the target population. These were high-income households living in areas thar can be
categorised as being wealthy (because of high prices of houses, high rent, and presence of
gardens). This means that high-income households who choose not to spend so much money
on accommodation and therefore live in less prosperous areas have a relatively low
probability of being included in the sample. They had a chance of selection due to the second
sampling frame applied (which includes all households with a telephone), but their chance of
selection is much lower than for households that live in wealthy areas. The HIP is therefore
biased with respect to the priorities households make when spending and investing their
relatively high income. In this respect, the HIP is not representative of the target population.
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Bias caused by refusals to co-operate
The samples suffer from a high level of non-response. As mentioned earlier, the unbiased
property that random sampling is supposed to provide does not necessarily apply when we
have non-response. As shown in table AI-2, non-response is high, which increases the
probability of non-response errors.
Table AI-2
Response rates for the RP and the HIP for the first wave of data collection
A B AxB
Response rate Response rate Overall Length of
sample within sample response rate membership in
% First wave First wave panel
% %
RP 18.5 94.8 17.5 Upto 4years
HIP 20.2 99.4 20.1 Up to l year
Table AI-2 shows the response rates from the first wave of data collection for the RP and the
HIP respectively. The response rate (AxB) is defined as the number of completed interviews
divided by the total number of eligible sample units. The response rates reported here are on
household level. The response rates for panel participation (A) are based on information from
the additional sampling carried out in 1992 for the RP and on certain assumptions with
respect to hitting rates of residential households in the target income group for the HIp55.
Table AI-2 shows that the response rates for panel participation are relatively low. The
response rates reported in column A are a product of two different mechanisms: 1) the
households who were approached but declined to become panel members (refusals) and 2)
households who were willing to participate in the panel but were not included in the sample
due the quota sampling (non-selection). It is not possible to separate these mechanisms'
relative contribution to non-responsiveness.
In column B, questionnaire-specific non-response is reported. This is non-response caused by
panel members who, for some reason, did not fill in the different parts of the Savings Project
questionnaire (here: the HS). The response rates within the panels were relatively high
(probably because of specifications in the contract between CentER and the field working
company); 94.8% for the RP while it was 99.4 % for the HIP (at the household level). The
overall response rates (column AxB) are a product of both refusals to participate and
questionnaire-specific non-response.
Finally, we have item non-response, which is a failure to answer specific questions in the
questionnaire. For example, certain types of debt and assets tend not to be reported. This type
of non-response might be important and should be studied further, but it will not be discussed
here. An overview of item non-response can be found in the "Variable Documentation VSB
panel 1993" (Camphuis & Ketelaars, 1995).
55 More exact information about response rates is not available. The ratio given in Table AI-2 is not actual
response rates. As some of the households that initially participated in the panel dropped out before the data for
the Savings Project were collected, the response rates in the columns A and AxB are likely to be lower.
Likewise, the response rate for the later waves of data collection is difficult to estimate, as there exists little
information about attrition, additional sampling and non-response when maintaining the panel.
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Biases caused by refusals to become panel members
Data are collected by using computers and modems and this requires that the respondents
have some insight in how to use a computer, or that they are willing and able to learn it. This
requirement might cause some biases. It is possible that elderly or people with little education
and little knowledge about computers would decline to participate in the survey, meaning that
people co-operating in the telepanel are a little better educated than others. It is not
unreasonable to expect that more highly-educated people are more aware of alternative ways
of holding assets than others, so it might be the case that panel members engage in more
complex saving behaviour than non-members.
According to Ritzema and Homan (1991), previous investigations have shown that the proce-
dure used to recruit the members to the telepanels minimises the drop-out rate that can be
attributed to the use of computers. The computers are only mentioned in the last part of the
initial recruitment interviews. According to Ritzema and Homan (1991) only 5.1% of those
who chose not to participate in the NIPO telepanel made this decision because a computer had
to be used. If this is correct, sample bias caused by the use of computers might be small.
It is possible to adjust for biases caused by refusals in the recruitment process using purposive
selection or quota sampling. However, it is only possible to estimate and adjust for biases for
variables of which we know the distribution in the target population, like income and age.
Biases with respect to psychological traits are impossible to identify, and afterwards weight-
ing or quota sampling cannot be done in order to secure representativeness for these variables.
Neyman (1934) reported that Italian statisticians who applied the method of purposive
selection did not find their results to be satisfactory. Their (Gini & Galvini, 1929) chief
purpose had been to obtain a sample that would be representative of the Italian population
with respect to important demographic, social, economic, and geographic characteristics. The
comparison between the sample and the whole country showed disappointing results. Despite
the fact that the average values of the seven control variables used when constructing the
sample were in satisfactory agreement, the agreement of average values of other variables,
which were not used as controls, were poor. The selection of respondents with respect to
socio-economic variables did not provide a sample that was representative with respect to
other variables.
Calling the RP "the representative sample" might therefore not be justifiable. People co-
operating in the panel might be different from the people who refuse. They might be more
open, have better-organised economic behaviour or not feel that they have anything to hide.
The low response rate can represent a threat to the extent results involving effects of psycho-
logical variables on economic behaviour can be generalised.
Bias caused by questionnaire-specific non-response
There are many possible causes of questionnaire-specific non-response. For example, people
may only answer the questionnaires they like. People who refuse to answer the savings
questionnaires may do so either because they have large savings or little savings, the former
do not wish to report the amount of their savings, while the latter might feel that they have
little of interest to contribute to the study or may be reluctant to disclose how little savings
they have. Panel members who perceive themselves as atypical with respect to financial
affairs might therefore drop out.
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Table AI-2 shows that the questionnaire-specific response rate is higher for the HIP than for
the RP. The reason might be that the members of this panel are all new panel members and,
consequently, might be more motivated to answer questions than people that have been
members for a longer period. There are also other differences between the HIP and RP that
might explain the difference in response rates. The HIP was recruited specifically for the ess
and the HIP members were well informed about the goal of the project and the questions that
were going to be asked before they committed themselves to co-operate. The RP members did
not receive such project-specific information before they decided to join the panel. A higher
proportion of the RP members might therefore be unmotivated to answer questions about
financial data. HIP members received better computers than the RP members, something that
might increase their feeling of commitment to the project. Finally, the HIP members get more
time to answer the questionnaires, and this increases the probability of that they will be at
home during the period the responses should be given.
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APPENDIX 2: THE DATA COLLECTION METHODS
In this appendix, the methods used when collecting the data are described and discussed.
A2.1 Computer Assisted Panel Research (CAPAR)
Computer assisted panel research is different from traditional interviewing techniques in
many ways. The questionnaires are reproduced by a computer in accordance with instructions
from the researcher and a programmer. The respondent enters the answers and the data are
processed immediately with a minimum of interface (Sikkel, 1988). Members of the telepanel
answer questions on a regular basis and supervise the interviewing themselves by starting the
data programme and answering the questions that are presented to them by typing their
responses. As all data collection methods, CAPAR has advantages and disadvantages. We
discuss them below.
Advantages
Complex routing and high control over questions flows are the two main advantages of
computerised interviewing. Answers can be edited on-line by validation of responses, the
questionnaires can be personalised and the order of the questions randomised. As there is no
interviewer present, it avoids any interviewer effects and is more convenient for the respon-
dents because they can answer the questionnaires according to their own schedule. Finally,
the respondents might also improve in their ability to answer questionnaires over time, as they
encounter fewer misunderstandings (Sikkel, 1988; Snijkers, 1992). These issues will be
outlined in more detail below.
Routing potential is important when measuring a complex variable like "assets". Household
assets may consist of components as different as money, paintings, call options and houses. In
order to get a good measure of household assets the questionnaire should include questions
about all these components. This results in a long questionnaire, and for most respondents,
many of the questions are irrelevant. The possibility of routing reduces the workload for the
respondents, as they are routed only to the questions that are relevant for them. This might
increase the response rate, and it might have a positive effect on data quality (Saris, 1991).
In computerised interviewing it is possible to ask for confirmations in order to ensure that the
respondent has answered correctly before follow-up questions are presented. Range errors are
avoided by programming checks that assess validity of answers on, for example, dates (if
people produce day indicators greater than 31 or month numbers over 12). Moreover, it is
possible to program consistency checks directly by allowing the program to compare
responses to two different questions that are intended to measure the same variable. Hence,
computerised interviewing allows interactive on-line editing which, in most cases, would not
be possible in paper and pencil interviews (Saris, 1991).
CAPAR is an impersonal form of interview. Question text is presented on screen and the
respondents are given an opportunity to enter data. As the respondents do not have contact
with interviewers, biases due to the associated interviewer effects are avoided. For example, it
has been found that interviewers do not read questions exactly as they have been formulated.
Moreover, interviewers do not always help the respondent in the same manner if questions are
misunderstood. A consequence of these differences might be that responses to questions
collected by different interviewers are not comparable (Saris, 1991).
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Another advantage of CAPAR over telephone and personal interviews is that the respondents
can, to a certain extent, control the time schedule of their answers. This can be particularly
important when collecting financial data, because respondents will not feel the pressure from
a waiting interviewer to give a quick answer. Especially in telephone interviews, a long break
in the interview while waiting for a question or an answer can be perceived as embarrassing
for both interviewer and respondent (Snijkers, 1992). Computer-based interviewing enables
the respondents to check information by verifying their records or consulting with other
members of the family. CAPAR therefore increases the probability of getting thoughtful
replies instead of some hasty estimates given under pressure.
The panel membership might have different effects on the respondents. One of these can be
that the panel members gradually improve in answering questionnaires because they obtain a
better understanding of the surveys and thus restrict answers in ways consistent with this
understanding. The Savings Project questionnaire can also make people more conscious about
how much they save and earn so that the answers might be more accurate in later waves. If
this is the case, the panel design might improve the quality of responses.
Disadvantages
Teleinterviewing also has some drawbacks. The routing might lead to missing data that is
difficult to discover. As there is nobody present during the interview, there is little control
over which person in the household actually answers the questionnaire. Moreover, panel
conditioning might have negative effect on the respondents' motivation for answering the
questions accurately. Panel membership might even cause changes in the respondents'
behaviour.
The routing in the computer aided interviewing has the drawback that a mistake made by the
respondent when answering one question might cause a chain reaction of mistakes. For
example, if a respondent gives a wrong answer to the question about whether he has one or
more checking accounts, this might lead to a lot of missing data. A respondent, who
mistakenly answers that he does not have a checking account, will not receive the questions
about how many checking accounts he has and their associated balances. These kinds of
mistakes are difficult for the users of the data files to detect. A complex routing structure also
results in a data matrix with many holes that might make the data difficult to analyse.
As with mail interviews, there is no control for who actually answers the questionnaire. It
might happen that some of the household members do not have time to fill in the
questionnaire and therefore leave it to some other household member to do it in order to fulfil
the obligation to the Stichting TelePanel or CentERdata. There is also the chance that
household members answer the questions together - not alone, as intended. This might be an
advantage for some of the questions on financial matters, but a disadvantage for questions on
psychological variables.
There is still limited knowledge about how the respondents are affected by answering
questionnaires from different researchers on a regular basis. There might, for example, exist
priming effects, in the sense that a set of questions from one organisation might affect the
answers given to questionnaires sent out the following weeks by other organisations. If two
different organisations collect data on the same matter in subsequent weeks, for example
balances on bank accounts, this might cause respondents to become bored with answering and
simply skip these questions or the whole questionnaire.
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Above, we mentioned that people might get better in answering the questionnaires as they
participate in the panel. The experience in answering questionnaires could also have negative
effects. Panel members might become fed up with answering all the questionnaires and learn
how to answer in order to minimise the workload (always choose the "I do not know -
options" or give random answers). Inaccurate data might therefore be collected because panel
members would like to keep the computer for a minimum of effort.
The panel membership itself may also cause behavioural change. Panel members might
become more conscious of their participation in the panel as time goes by, which manifests
itself in altered attitudes or behaviour (Ferber, 1966). Panel members will then become
atypical of the population that they are intended to represent. For example, answering
questions about expenditure and saving on a regular basis can make the respondents more
conscious about their own spending behaviour and self-controlling strategies. The
questionnaire can also make them more aware of saving alternatives and reasons for saving,
which might result in a change in behaviour. In some cases, we might even find that answer-
ing higher saving than the previous year can become some sort of saving goal.
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APPENDIX 3: PARTS OF THE QUESTIONNAIRE
This appendix contains some of the questions used when collecting the data. The complete
questionnaire is too long to include here, so the purpose is to give the reader some idea of
how the data collections was done. The full questionnaire and documentation can be
downloaded from CentER (http://center-ar.kub.n1/cpsl). The questions have been provided by
numbers by the author so that they can be easily found. These numbers do not indicate the
order in which the questions were asked.
Examples of question block about Assets and Liabilities:
Information to the respondent:
This part of the research project on savings concerns assets and liabilities. The following questions
concern your own ASSETS.
The following questions will also be presented to other household members aged 16 years or over.
To prevent double reporting, JOINT assets should be mentioned by one member of the household
only. The member of the household who is responsible for paying bills etc. has been selected to
report not only personal assets but also joint assets of the household.
CHECKING ACCOUNTS are private accounts with bank or giro to which, for example, your
salary or benefits-payment is transferred, and from which you can make payments. CHECKING
ACCOUNTS are sometimes called: giro bank accounts, salary accounts, or private accounts. If you
have a checking account that you mainly use for saving, please consider this account to be a
SAVINGS ACCOUNT. Savings accounts will be reported later. Do not include checking accounts
that you also use for making payments and/or to receive income for your OWN BUSINESS here.
l) Did you, on 31 December 1994, have one or more CHECKING ACCOUNTS? If applicable: do
NOT include checking accounts that you also use for making payments and/or to receive income
for your own business here.
l yes BET2
2 no BZ2
The routing is indicated for each question. People who said that they have checking accounts, where routed to
question "bet2", whereas those who said they do not have checking accounts did not receive the rest of the
questions about checking accounts but were routed directly to the next block concerning employer-sponsored
saving accounts.
2) BET2 How many CHECKING ACCOUNTS did you have on 31 December 1994?
more than 5: BET3
l thru 5: BET61
3)BEn Did you (in total) have a credit or a deficit balance on your checking accounts on 31 December
1994?
l credit BET4
2 deficit BET4
4)BET4 What was the total balance of your CHECKING ACCOUNTS on 31 December 1994? If the
balance is a deficit, just enter the amount without a minus (with the previous question you have
already answered whether the balance of your CHECKING ACCOUNTS is a credit or a deficit
balance). If you don't know the exact amount, type O (zero).
answer> O: BET61
answer = O: ..............................................................................•........................................... BETS
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5) BET5 Into which of the categories mentioned below does the total balance (either a credit or a deficit) of
your checking accounts go?
I less than Dfl. 100 BET61
2 between 100 and 1000 BET61
3 between 1000 and 3000 BET61
4 between 3000 and 5000 BET61
5 between 5000 and 10000 BET61
6 between 10000 and 15000 BET61
7 between 15000 and 20000 BET61
8 between 20000 and 25000 BET61
9 between 25000 and 30000 BET61
10 between 30000 and 35000 BET61
II between 35000 and 40000 BET61
12 between 40000 and 45000 BET61
13 between 45000 and 50000 BET61
14 50000 or more BET61
O unknown BET61
The following questions are repeated for a maximum of five checking accounts. When answering
these questions, please keep in mind the five - to you - most important CHECKING ACCOUNTS.
The questions below are repeated a maximum of five times; the last number in the variable name
indicates which checking account the question concerns.
6) BET61 thru BET65
Because we cannot ask you to give the number of your account, we would like you to indicate the
(main) purpose of your account. Our main reason for doing this is to be able to distinguish between
different checking accounts.
What is the main purpose of your [1st thru 5th] CHECKING ACCOUNT?
I to make all sorts of payments BET91
2 particular purpose BET71
Bya salary account we mean an account to which regular income (such as salary, benefit
payments, pension) is transferred. By a household account, we mean an account which is used for
paying recurring expenses (such as rent, gas and electricity costs, subscriptions, household
expenses, etc.).
7) BET71 thru BET75
For what particular purpose do you have your [1st thru 5th] CHECKING ACCOUNT?
I salary account BET91
2 household account BET91
3 government scholarship scheme BET91
4 other BET81
8) BET81 thru BET85 (string)
So, for what particular purpose do you have your [1st thru 5th] CHECKING ACCOUNT? If you
don't know, type a question mark.
any answer BET91
9) BET91 thru BET95
Who is the account holder of your [I st thru 5th] CHECKING ACCOUNT?
I the account is registered in my own name BET III
2 the account is registered in my partner'slspouse's name BETIll
3 the account is registered jointly in my own name and someone else's name
(e.g. partner/spouse) BET III
4 the account is registered in (one of) my parents' name BETIll
5 other BETIOI
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lO) BETlOI thru BETl05 (string)
So who is the account holder of your [1st thru 5th] CHECKING ACCOUNT? If you don't know,
type a question mark.
any answer '" BET III
11) BETlll thru BETll5
With which bank or fmancial institution is your [Ist thru 5th] CHECKING ACCOUNT registered?
1 ABN Amro BET13 I
2 Postbank '" BETI31
3 Rabobank BET131
4 INGBank(NMB) BETI31
5 VSB Bank BET131
6 SNS Bank BETI31
7 other BETI21
12) BETl21 thru BETl25 (string)
So with which bank or fmancial institution is your [Ist thru 5th] CHECKING ACCOUNT
registered? If you don't know, type a question mark.
any answer BET13 I
13) BETl31 thru BETl35
Did you, on 31 December 1994,have a credit or a deficit balance on your [I st thru 5th]
CHECKING ACCOUNT?
I credit BETI41
2 deficit BETI41
14) BETl41 thru BETl45
What was the balance of your [Ist thru 5th] CHECKING ACCOUNT on 31 December 1994? If
you don't know the amount, type O(zero).
15) BETl51 thru BETl55
Into which of the categories mentioned below does the balance (either a credit or a deficit) go?
I less than Dfl. 100 BETI61
2 between 100 and 1000 BETI61
3 between 1000 and 3000 BETI61
4 between 3000 and 5000 BETI61
5 between 5000 and 10000 BETI61
6 between 10000 and 15000 BETI61
7 between 15000 and 20000 BETI61
8 between 20000 and 25000 BETI61
9 between 25000 and 30000 BETI61
lObetween 30000 and 35000 BETI61
II between 35000 and 40000 BETI61
12 between 40000 and 45000 BETI61
13 between 45000 and 50000 BETI61
14 50000 or more BETI61
O unknown BETI61
16)BETl61 thru BETl65
Do you have an agreement with your bank with respect to the maximum sum you are allowed to be
in the red on your [Ist thru 5th] CHECKING ACCOUNT?
I yes, there is an agreement BZ2
2 no, no agreement BZ2
This procedure is repeated for all assets and liabilities mentioned in section 6.5.
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Examples of Question Block About Mortgages
ANNUITY MORTGAGE: With an annuity mortgage, the total amount of your periodic payments on
interest and repayment remains the same (at least) during the period for which the interest rate was
fixed. During the first part of this period, the amount due consists of a relatively large part of interest
and a relatively small part of repayment. In later years, it is the other way around.
TRADITIONAL LIFE-INSURANCE MORTGAGE: This sort of mortgage consists of a loan and a life-
insurance policy. The idea is that there is no repayment, but only paying interest on the loan, and paying
a premium for the life-insurance policy. There is no direct relation between the interest rate of the
mortgage loan and the savings interest rate of the life-insurance policy (in contrast with an improved
life-insurance mortgage, where there is a relation between those two interest rates).
IMPROVED LIFE-INSURANCE MORTGAGE: This is a modernized version of a traditional life-
insurance mortgage. An improved life-insurance mortgage consists of a loan and a life-insurance policy.
The idea is that there is no repayment, but only paying interest on the loan, and paying a premium for
the life-insurance policy. In this case, the interest rate of the mortgage-loan and the savings interest rate
of the life-insurance policy are related, which causes monthly net-costs to be rather stable.
LINEAR MORTGAGE: With this sort of mortgage, the periodic payments include paying off a fixed
percentage of the total mortgage loan, and paying interest on the loan that is left at that moment. Over
time, the amount you pay on interest becomes less and less, such that total monthly costs go down
through the years. In the first period of the term of the mortgage, the costs of a linear mortgage are
higher than the costs of an annuity mortgage.
ENDOWMENT MORTGAGE: With an endowment mortgage it is possible, during the term of the
mortgage, to get a new loan on (part of) the amount that you have already paid off.
17) HYPll thru HYPI5
Do you have a municipal mortgage guarantee for your [Ist thru 5th] mortgage?
I yes HYP21 thru HYP25
2 no HYP21 thru HYP25
18) HYP21 thru HYP25
With which fmancial institution have you taken out the [1st thru 5th] mortgage?
I ABN Amro HYP41 thru HYP45
2 Postbank HYP41 thru HYP45
3 Rabobank HYP41 thru HYP45
4 ING Bank (NMB) HYP41 thru HYP45
5 VSB Bank HYP41 thru HYP45
6 SNS Bank HYP41 thru HYP45
7 Nationale Nederlanden HYP41 thru HYP45
8 AEGON HYP41 thru HYP45
9 AMEV HYP41 thru HYP45
lO Bouwfonds Nederlandse Gemeenten HYP41 thru HYP45
II ABP HYP41 thru HYP45
12 other fmancial institution HYP31 thru HYP35
19) HYP31 thru HYP35 (string)
With which fmancial institution have you taken out the [l st thru 5th] mortgage? If you don't know the
answer, type a question mark.
any answer HYP41 thru HYP45
20) HYP41 thru HYP45
What sort of mortgage was the [Ist thru 5th) MORTGAGE?
I annuity mortgage HYP61 thru HYP65
2 traditional life-insurance mortgage HYP61 thru HYP65
3 improved traditional life-insurance mortgage HYP61 thru HYP65
4linear mortgage HYP61 thru HYP65
5 endowment mortgage HYP6l thru HYP65
6 other HYP51 thru HYP55
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21) HYP51 thru HYP55 (string)
What sort of mortgage was the [Ist thru 5th] MORTGAGE?
any answer HYP61 thru HYP65
22) HYP61 thru HYP65
When (which year) was the [1st thru 5th] MORTGAGE taken out?
any answer HYll thru HY15
MORTGAGE LOAN: the amount of the loan when you took out the mortgage.
REMAiNiNG DEBT of the mortgage: the amount that is still to be paid off.
23) HYll thru HY15
How much was the loan at the time you took out the [Ist thru 5th] MORTGAGE? If you really don't
know, type O (zero).
any answer HY21 thru HY25
24) HY21 thru HY25
How much of the loan of the [1st thru 5th] MORTGAGE is left at present? With (improved) traditional
life-insurance mortgages the mortgage loan doesn't change as a result of premium payments to the life-
insurance. If you really don't know, type O (zero).
any answer HY31 thru HY35
25) HY31 thru HY35
What is the current interest rate of the [1st thru 5th] MORTGAGE? If you really don't know, type 0.00
(zero).
any answer HY71 thru HY75
26) HY71 thru HY75
Does the [1st thru 5th] mortgage have a so-called fixed interest rate?
l yes HY81 thru HY85
2no HY41 thruHY45
27) HY81 thru HY85
For how many years is the interest of the [l st thru 5th] mortgage fixed the last time?
any answer HY91 thru HY95
28) HY91 thru HY95
Inwhat year is the interest of the [l st thru 5th] mortgage fixed?
any answer HY41 thru HY45
29) HY41 thru HY45
What is the end date (which year) of the [1st thru 5th] MORTGAGE?
any answer HY51 thru HY55
30) HY51 thru HY55
Do you pay mortgage expenses for the [l st thru 5th] mortgage:
l per month HY61 thru HY65
2 per quarter HY61 thru HY65
3 per six months HY61 thru HY65
4 per year HY61 thru HY65
Total MORTGAGE EXPENSES include interest payments, repayment, and premiums (if any).
31) HY61 thru HY65
How much do you pay now on all mortgage expenses for the [1st thru 5th] MORTGAGE on your
[property mentioned earlier] per month/quarter/six months/year? If you really don=t know, type O
(zero).
any answer W053
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Examples of questions about income
INCOME THROUGH WORK
32) U2 How many employers did you have in I 994? Note: This question concerns paid jobs on a contractual
basis. Do NOT include self-employed work here. Being the director of a public/private limited
company is employment on a contractual basis. If you didn't have an employer in 1994, type O (zero).
number of employers: U30 I
Below, questions IJ301 thru U2401 are presented. These 17 questions were presented to the respondents
at a maximum of 10 times. For each employer, a maximum of three periods could be mentioned. First,
the questions are asked, but the answers are not yet stored in the data file. Next, the respondents are
shown an overview of their answers and they have the opportunity to correct them. The program also
includes a number of checks, which makes it impossible for respondents to enter a starting date which is
LA TER THAN the end date. As soon as the respondents have completed everything and confirmed that
it is correct, the data are stored.
U301 thru IJ310
U401 thru U410
U501 thru U510
U601 thru U610
IJ70 l thru U7l O
U801 thru U810
IJ90 I thru U910
IJIOOI thru IJIOIO
IJIlOI thru IJlIlO
IJI201 thru IJI210
IJI301 thru IJ1310
IJI401 thru IJl410
IJI501 thru IJl510
IJI601 thru IJ1610
1Jl801 thru IJl810
IJ200 l thru IJ2010
name of the organization (string)
starting day period I
starting month period l
last day period l
last month period l
starting day period 2
starting month period 2
last day period 2
last month period 2
starting day period 3
starting month period 3
last day period 3
last month period 3
gross salary employer x
net salary employer x
income tax and premiums for social insurance policies IJ2401
33) IJ2401 thru IJ2410
Which source did you use to fill in the data on your salary with [EMPLOYER IJ301]?
l written annual statement IZI
2 other written source IZ l
3 no written source IZ l
Income through pensions
The program used for measuring pension income operates in the same way as the program in INCOME
THROUGH WORK. First, respondents are asked what kinds of income they received (up to a
maximum off our types), in what periods (up to a maximum of three periods for each type) they
received it, and what amounts they received from each type. The answers given by the respondents are
shown to them on the screen, and they have the opportunity to correct their answers. As soon as the
respondent has confirmed that the information shown on the screen is correct, the data are stored.
Information to the respondent:
The following questions concern the amounts you received through early retirement pension [VUT),
general old-age pension [AOW], annuities, and/or other pensions in 1994.
34) 1P20 thru IP24
Which of the pension payments mentioned below did you receive in I 994? More than l answer is
possible here.
Onone of the above-mentioned 1120
I early retirement pension [VUT] IP41
2 general old-age pension [AOW] 1P41
3 annuity .IP41
4 other pensions 1P41
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35) IP41 thru IP44
How much is the GROSS sum you received in 1994 through [SOURCE OF INCOME IP20 through
IP24]. If you really don't know, type O(zero).
amount .
0 IP71
> 0 IPIOI
36) IP71 thru IP74
Perhaps you know the NET sum you received in 1994 through [SOURCE OF INCOME]? If you really
don't know, type O(zero).
amount: IPI21
37) IPIOI thru IPI04
How much was the total amount of withheld income tax and premiums for social insurance policies in
1994 on your [SOURCE OF INCOME]? If you really don't know, type O(zero).
amount: IPI21
Please indicate the month by a number (l=January, 2=February, etc.). Ifperiods 2 and 3 are not
applicable to you, please type ENTER and proceed to the next question. You can provide information
about a maximum of 3 periods. If, in your situation, there are more than 3 periods, please record the 3
most important periods.
IPl21 thru IPl24
IP131 thru IPl34
IPl41 thru IPI44
IPlSI thru IPIS4
IPI61 thru IPI64
IPI71 thru IPl74
IPI81 thru IPI84
IPI91 thru IPI94
IP201 thru IP204
IP211 thru IP214
IP221 thru IP224
IP231 thru IP234
starting day period 1
starting month period 1
last day period 1
last month period 1
starting day period 2
starting month period 2
last day period 2
last month period 2
starting day period 3
starting month period 3
last day period 3
last month period 3 .IP271
38) IP271 thru IP274
What source did you use to answer the questions mentioned above?
1 annual statement.. 1120 thru II23
2 other statement. 1120 thru II23
3 no statement II20 thru II23
Evaluation Questions
These evaluation questions were asked at the end of the question block concerning income:
39)ANSWER
Do you think your answers are (if you really don=t know, type O (zero»:
O WRONGO
l (almost) all correct HOWMANY
2 mostly correct HOWMANY
3 mostly wrong WRONGO
4 (almost) all wrong WRONGO
40) WRONGO tim WRONG6
if ANSWER=3: Please indicate why you think most of your answers are wrong.
if ANSWER=4: Please indicate why you think all your answers are wrong.
More than l answer is possible here.
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o none of the below-mentioned HOWMANY
1 the questionnaires did not suit my situation HOWMANY
2 it was not possible to correct mistakes once they were made HOWMANY
3 my answers were wrongly recorded by the computer HOWMANY
4 the questions were too complicated HOWMANY
5 the answers were too hard to remember/too much work to look them up HOWMANY
6 other reason REASON
Economic psychological concepts
41)lNKNORM
Is this income (the net income of your household that you have just mentioned) nnusually high or low
compared to the income you would expect in a 'regular' year, or is it regular? .
I unusually low INKROND
2 regular INKROND
3 unusually high INKROND
4 don=t know INKROND
42)INKROND
How well can you manage on the total income of your household (as mentioned in the second from last
question)? .
l very hard FINSITU
2 hard FINSITU
3 neither hard nor easy FINSITU
4 easy FINSITU
5 very easy FINSITU
43) FINSITU
How is the fmancial situation of your household at the moment?
l I arnIwe are in debt INKEVEN
2 I arnIwe are drawing upon our savings INKEVEN
3 I can/we can just about manage INKEVEN
4 I can/we can save some money INKEVEN
5 I can/we can save a lot of money INKEVEN
44)INKTOE
The TOTAL NET INCOME OF YOUR HOUSEHOLD consists of the income of all members of the
household, after deduction of taxes, taken as the sum total over the past 12 months. Do you think,
taking into account possible changes within the household, the total net income of your household will
increase, remain the same, or decrease, IN THE NEXT 12 MONTHS?
1 increase , INKTOEHO
2 remain the same INKZEKER
3 decrease INKTOELA
45) INKTOEHO
By what PERCENTAGE do you think the total net income of your household will increase IN THE
NEXT 12 MONTHS?
percentage: INKZEKER
46) INKTOELA
By what PERCENTAGE do you think the total net income of your household will decrease IN THE
NEXT 12 MONTHS?
percentage: , INKZEKER
47) INKZEKER
How certain do you feel about this change of income?
1 very certain INKZEKI
2 rather certain INKZEKI
3 not very certain INKZEKI
4 not at all certain INKZEKI
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With the next few questions, you will be asked to choose a number between l and 7.
highly
unlikely
I 2 3 4 5 6
highly
likely
7
We would like to know a bit more about your expectations of the next 12 months. Below we have
presented a number of possible changes in income. Please indicate with any of those changes, how
likely you think it is that the total income of your household will change by that percentage IN THE
NEXT 12 MONTHS. If you don't know, type O (zero).
48) INKZEKI
rise in income of more than 15% INKZEK2
49) INKZEK2
rise in income between 10 and 15% INKZEK3
50) INKZEK3
rise in income between 5 and 10% INKZEK4
51) INKZEK4
no significant change in income INKZEKS
52)INKZEK5
drop in income between 5 and 10% '" INKZEK6
53)INKZEK6
drop in income between 10 and 15% INKZEK7
54) INKZEK7
drop in income of more than 15% INKS
55) INKS Do you think the total net income of your household will increase, remain the same, or decrease, in
the NEXT FIVE YEARS?
l increase INK5HO
2 remain about the same INKSZEK
3 decrease INKSLA
56)INKSHO
By what PERCENTAGE do you think the TOT AL net income of your household will increase in THE
NEXT FIVE YEARS?
percentage: INK5ZEK
57)INKSLA
By what PERCENT AGE do you think the TOTAL net income of your household will decrease in THE
NEXT FIVE YEARS?
percentage: INKSZEK
58) INKSZEK
How certain do you feel about this change in income?
l very certain INKLOON
2 rather certain INKLOON
3 not very certain INKLOON
4 not at all certain INKLOON
59) HOEVOPZY
About how much money has your household put aside IN THE PAST 12 MONTHS? If you really
don=t know, type O (zero).
l less than Dfl. 3,000 OPZIJ12
23,000 - 10,000 OPZIJ12
3 10,000 - 25,000 OPZIJ12
425,000 - 40,000 OPZIJ12
540,000 - 75,000 OPZIJ12
675,000 - 150,000 OPZIJ12
7 150,000 or more OPZIJ12
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60) SPAARGEW
Which of the statements mentioned below provides the best description of your (household's) ways to
save money?
l I do not save, usually I spend more than my income SPAARMOI
2 I do not save, usually all the income is spent SPAARMOI
3 I do not really try to save, but usually I have some money left by the end of the year SPAARMOI
4 I save whatever is left by the end of the month, no particular intention SPAARMOI
5 I save all irregular income, and spend all regular income SPAARMO l
6 I save regularly by putting money aside every month SPAARMO l
O don=t know SPAARMOI
We would now like to ask you some questions about your personal opinion about saving. People have
many different reasons for saving money for a short or for a long time. Please indicate your opinion
about each statement mentioned below. Is it to you personally of much or oflittle importance? If you
really don't know, type O (zero).
very
unimportant
l 2 3 4 5 6
very
important
7
61) SPAARMOI
to leave money to my children (or other relatives) SPAARM02
62) SPAARM02
to give presents or other gifts to my (grand)children SPAARM03
63) SPAARM03
to have some savings to cover unforeseen expenses as a consequence of illness or accidents SPAARM04
64) SPAARM04
to have some savings in case I or a member of my family get(s) unemployed SPAARM05
65) SPAARM05
to supplement (in future possibly lower) general old-age pension SPAARM06
66) SPAARM06
to supplement my retirement pension, and to have some extra money to spend when
I am retired SPAARM07
67) SPAARM07
to pay for my children's (or other relatives=) education SPAARM08
68) SPAARM08
to buy durable goods such as furniture, electric appliances, or bicycles in the future SPAARM09
69) SPAARM09
to generate income from interests or dividends SPAARMIO
70) SPAARMIO
to buy a house in the future SPAARMII
71) SPAARMll
to set up my own business SPAARMl2
72) SPAARMl2
as a reserve to cover unforeseen expenses : SPAARM13
73) SPAARM13
to have enough money in my bank account to be sure I will be able to meet my
financial liabilities STIGSBO l
The following statements are concerned with saving. Please, indicate to what extent you agree or disagree with
each statement.
74) STIGSBOl
I save to create a larger freedom of choice and to be more independent STIGSB02
75) STIGSB02
I always try to pick saving plans that yield high profits. . STIGSB03
76) STIGSB03
In general, it is a good idea to be able to buy a care on the instalments plan STIGSB04
77) STIGSB04
Being careful with money is an important character trait STIGSB05
78) STIGSB05
With financial affair, I tend to listen carefully to advice by family or friends. . STIGSB06
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79) STIGSB06
To me, the service of a bank is very important STIGSB07
80) STIGSB07
Banks are only appropriate for people who have much money STIGSB08
81) STIGSB08
It is important to always save as much as possible, and only to spend money
on tings that are strictly necessary. STIGSB09
82) STIGSB09
I try to have enough money in my bank accounts to be sure I will be
able to meet my fmancialliabilities. STIGSBIO
83) STIGSBIO
It is important to have some money left at the end of the month STIGSB 11
84) STIGSBli
People who buy on instalment are wasters. .. STIGSBI2
85) STIGSBl2
I am very interested in financial matters (insurance, investments, etc.) STIGSB13
86) STIGSBl3
It is not a good idea to borrow money to be able to go on holidays STlGSB 14
87) STIGSBl4
I reserve part of my salary to save it STIGSB 15
88) STIGSBIS
I always keep some reserve money because my income varies during the year. .. STlGSB 16
89) STIGSBl6
Saving should be encouraged in today's society STIGSBI7
90) STIGSBl7
People who are successful in saving are also successful in life STIGSB 18
91) STIGSBl8
If I compare myself with my friends, I think in general I am (fmancially) better off STlGSBI9
92) STIGSBl9
For me, there is no need to save because my income will rise significantly in the future ........ STIGSB20
93) STIGSB20
Most people in my environment are saving money STIGSB21
94) STIGSB21
Because ofthe social security system in our country, there is no need to save money .
The following questions concern your preferences with respect to future possibilities compared to the
present. We would like to know whether you prefer to receive things at once, or whether you prefer to
wait a while before receiving them. There are no right or wrong answers to these questions. We are
interested in your personal preference.
95) TUDl
Imagine you win a cash prize in a lottery. The prize is worth Dfl. 1,000 and can be paid out AT ONCE.
Imagine the lottery, which is a fmancially trustworthy organization, asks if you are prepared to wait 3
months before you get the prize. Would you agree on that proposal, or would you ask for more money if
you had to wait for 3 months?
1 I would agree on the waiting term of 3 months without the need to receive extra money for that. So,
after 3 months I receive Dfl. 1,000 TIJD3
2 I would agree on the waiting term of 3 months, but I want to receive extra money for that. TIJD2
96)TIJD2
How much EXTRA money (in guilders) do you want to receive AT LEAST, in addition to the Dfl.
1,000, to compensate for the waiting term of 3 months?
number of guilders: TIJD3
97) TIJD3
Imagine the cash prize that you win in the lottery is worth Dfl. 100,000. The lottery asks if you are
prepared to wait 3 MONTHS before you get the prize. What would you prefer?
1 I would agree on the waiting term of 3 months without the need to receive extra money for that. So,
after 3 months I receive Dfl. 100,000 TIJD5
2 I would agree on the waiting term of 3 months, but I want to receive extra money for that. TIJD4
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98) TIJD4
How much EXTRA money (in guilders) do you want to receive AT LEAST, in addition to the
Oft. I00,000, to compensate for the waiting term of 3 months?
number of guilders: TIJ05
99) TIJD5
Imagine the lottery asks if you are prepared to wait a YEAR before collecting the prize of Oft.
100,000. What would you prefer:
1 I would agree on the waiting term of a year without the need to receive extra money for that. So, after
a year I receive Oft. 100,000 TIJ07
2 I would agree on the waiting term of a year, but I want to receive extra money for that. . TOO6
100) TIJD6
How much EXTRA money (in guilders) do you want to receive AT LEAST, in addition to the Oft.
100,000, to compensate for the waiting term of a year?
number of guilders: TIJ07
101) TlJD7
Imagine you receive an assessment for tax arrears. To settle the payment, you have two options. One
option is paying Oft. 1,000 NOW. The other option is paying LATER, but in that case you have to pay
MORE. What would you prefer?
1 I would pay Oft. 1,000 now TOO9
2 I pay 3 months later, and I am prepared to pay more for that TOO8
102) TIJD8
How much EXTRA money (in guilders) would you be prepared to pay AT MOST, in addition
to the Oft. 1,000, to get the extension of payment of3 months?
number of guilders: TOO9
103) TlJD9
Imagine you could wait a YEAR with settling the tax assessment of Oft. 1,000. What would you prefer?
l I would pay Oft. 1,000 now TIJDII
2 I pay a year later, and I am prepared to pay more for that. TIJDIO
104) TIJDIO
How much EXTRA money (in guilders) would you be prepared to pay AT MOST, in addition to the
Oft. 1,000, to get the extension of payment of a YEAR?
number of guilders: TIJD 11
The following questions are similar to the questions above, but now the question is how much LESS
you would be prepared to receive, if you receive something at once compared to receiving it later.
105) TIJDll
Imagine the cash prize that you win in the lottery is worth Oft. 1,000, but is paid out only after 3
MONTHS. The lottery, however, offers to payout at once, but in that case you will receive less.
What would you prefer:
I I would wait 3 months, and receive Dfl. 1,000 TIJD13
2 I would like to have the money now, and receive less TIJDl2
106) TIJDI2
How much LESS money (in guilders) would you be prepared to receive AT MOST, if you would get
the money at once instead of Oft. 1,000 after 3 MONTHS?
number of guilders: TIJD 13
107) TlJD13
Now imagine the prize is paid out only after A YEAR. What would you prefer?
I I would wait a year, and receive Oft. 1,000 TOOI5
2 I would like to have the money now, and receive less TIJDI4
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108)TIID14
How much LESS money (in guilders) would you be prepared to receive AT MOST, if you would get
the money at once instead of Dfl. 1,000 after A YEAR?
number of guilders: TIIDI5
109) TIIDI5
Imagine the prize is worth Dfl, 100,000, but is only paid out after 3 MONTHS. What would you prefer?
I I would wait 3 months, and receive Dfl. 100,000 TIIDI7
2 I would like to have the money now, and receive less TIIDI6
110) TIIDI6
How much LESS money (in guilders) would you be prepared to receive AT MOST, if you would
get the money at once instead of Dfl, 100,000 after 3 MONTHS?
number of guilders: TIIDI7
Ill) TIIDI7
Imagine the prize is worth Dfl. 100,000, but is only paid out after A YEAR. What would you prefer?
I I would wait a year, and receive Dfl, 100,000 ROUTING VARIABLE
2 I would like to have the money now, and receive less TIID 18
112) TIIDI8
How much LESS money (in guilders) would you be prepared to receive AT MOST, if you would
get the money at once instead of'Dfl. 100,000 after A YEAR?
number of guilders: ROUTING VARIABLE
People have different opinions about planning fmancial affairs. Some people fmd it important to plan in
advance, other people manage without much planning. The following questions concern planning
financial affairs.
113) UITGEVEN
Some people spend all their income immediately. Others save some money in order to have something
to fall back on. Please indicate what you do with money that is left over after having paid for food, rent,
and other necessities. Are you the sort of person that likes to spend hislher money immediately, or are
you the sort of person that tries to save as much as possible, or are you somewhere in between those two
extremes? If you really don't know, type O (zero).
I like to spend
all my money
immediately
I 2 5
I want to save
as much as
possible
73 4 6
114) PLANNEN
Many people fmd it difficult to plan or control their expenditures. Do you fmd it difficult to control
your expenditures? If you really don't know, type O(zero).
no, very
easy
I 2 3 4 5 6
yes, very
difficult
7 PERIOOEI
115) PERIOOEI
People use different time-horizons when they decide about what part of the income to spend, and what
part to save. Which of the time-horizons mentioned below is in your household MOST important with
regard to planning expenditures and savings?
I the next couple ofmonths PERIOOE2
2 the next year PERIOOE2
3 the next couple of years PERIOOE2
4 the next 5 to lO years PERIOOE2
5 more than lO years from now PERIOOE2
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116) PERIODE2
Which time-horizon is LEAST important to you?
l the next couple ofmonths BIJHOUD
2 the next year BIJHOUD
3 the next couple of years BIJHOUD
4 the next 5 to 10 years BIJHOUD
5 more than 10 years from now BIJHOUD
1I7)GROEPI
Which group is the MOST IMPORTANT to you, with respect to the fmancial situation of your
household?
The neighbours
Friends and acquaintances
Colleagues at work
People with the same level of education as myself
People of about the same age as myself
People having the same job as I have
Brothers and sisters (or other relatives)
People that I know from the newspapers or from the TV
Other
Don't know.
1I8) ECOGRPI
If you consider how mch money you have available to spend on necesseties and luxurious goods,
what would you say is the fmancial situation of your household mocpared to the situation of
(answer to GROUP l imputed)
Much worse
l 2 3 4 5 6
Much better
7
1I9)GROEP2
And which group is the THE SECOND MOST IMPORTANT group to you, with respect to the
financial situation of your household?
The neighbours
Friends and acquaintances
Colleagues at work
People with the same level of education as myself
People of about the same age as myself
People having the same job as I have
Brothers and sisters (or other relatives)
People that I know from the newspapers or from the TV
Other
Don't know.
120) ECOGRP2
If you consider how much money you have available to spend on necessities and luxurious goods,
what would you say is the financial situation of your household compared to the situation of
(answer to GROUP 2 imputed)
Much worse
l 2 3 4 5 6
Much better
7
Now we would like to know how you would describe your personality. Below we have mentioned a
number of personal qualities in pairs. The qualities are not always opposites. Please indicate for each
pair of qualities which number would best describe your personality. If you think your personality is
equally well characterised by the quality on the left as it is by the quality on the right, please choose
number 4. If you really do not know, type O (zero).
121) TEGl l 2 3 4
oriented towards things
122) TEG2 l
slow thinker
5 6 7
2 3 4
oriented towards people TEG2
5 6 7
quick thinker TEG3
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123) TEG3 2 3 4 5 6 7
easily get worried not easily get worried .................... TEG4
124) TEG4 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
flexible, ready to adapt myself stubborn, persistent... .................... TEG5
125) TEG5 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
quiet, calm vivid, vivacious ............................ TEG6
126) TEG6 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
carefree meticulous .................................... TEG7
127) TEG7 2 3 4 5 6 7
shy dominant ...................................... TEG8
128) TEG8 2 3 4 5 6 7
not easily hurt/offended sensitive, easily hurt/offended ....... TEG9
129) TEG9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
trusting, credulous suspicious ................................... TEGIO
130) TEGlO 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
oriented towards reality dreamer ...................................... TEG 11
131) TEGll 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
direct, straightforward diplomatic, tactful... .................... TEG 12
132) TEGl2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
happy with myself doubts about myself ... '" .............. TEG 13
133) TEG13 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
creature of habit open to changes .......................... TEG 14
134) TEGl4 l 2 3 4 5 6 7
need to be supported independent, self-reliant... ........... TEGl5
135) TEGl5 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
little self-control disciplined .................................. TEG 16
136) TEGl6 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
well-balanced, stable irritable, quick-tempered .........................
137) TEGAI 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
nervous relaxed ....................................... TEGA2
138)TEGA2 2 3 4 5 6 7
like to try things conservative ............................... TEGA3
139)TEGA3 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
trained thinker untrained thinker ........................ TEGA4
140)TEGA4 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
gentle rough .......................................... TEGA5
141) TEGA5 2 3 4 5 6 7
worried unconcerned ............................... TEGA6
142)TEGA6 2 3 4 5 6 7
imaginative down to earth .............................. TEGA 7
143)TEGA7 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
aimed at proving myself indulgent .................................... TEGA8
144)TEGA8 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
friendly cold ............................................ TEGA9
145)TEGA9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
principled carefree .................................... TEGAIO
146) TEGAIO 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
critical accommodating ........................ TEGA 11
147)TEGAll 2 3 4 5 6 7
prefer to be independent prefer to be in other people's companyTEGAl2
148)TEGA12 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
artificial natural ...................................... TEGAl3
149) TEGA13 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
self-controlled moody ...................................... TEGAI4
150) TEGAl4 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
self-confident timid ........................................ TEGAI5
151) TEGAl5 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
good at handling stress not good at handling stress ........ TEGAI6
152) TEGAl6 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
always want new experiences want a quiet life
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APPENDIX 4: THE ASSET COMPONENTS
In this appendix, the definitions and construction of the savings variables will be described.
The assets questionnaire is extensive and covers many different asset components. Examples
of how the questions were asked are given in Appendix 3. Detailed questions were asked
about the following assets:
1) Checking accounts (CHAC)
Checking accounts are private accounts with a bank or giro to which salary or
benefits-payments are transferred and from which it is possible to make payments.
2) Employer-sponsored savings plans (EMPSP)
An employer-sponsored savings plan is an arrangement in which part of the salary is
withheld and saved. Employers grant premiums on the saved sum.
3) Post bank savings accounts (POSTB)
The Dutch Post bank offers a number of savings arrangements that are linked to a Post
bank account. With these arrangements, money is transferred and withdrawn by giro
bank transfer forms.
4) Deposit books and savings and deposit accounts (DEPB AND SAVAC)
A deposit book is a book in which saving deposits and savings interests are recorded.
A savings account is an account that yields interest as of the first day a deposit is
made.
Respondents are asked about balances on the accounts listed above (1-4) as of 31st of
December each year. Saving in 1994 was measured by calculating the differences in the
balance as of December 1993 and 1994.
5) Saving certificates (CERTI)
Saving certificates are securities with a set date for a set sum of repayment. The
interest is usually included in the sum of repayment. Respondents are asked about how
much they paid for the certificates and how much they are to be repaid for the
certificates. Savings in saving certificates are defined as the mean of these two figures.
If one of the values is missing, the other value is counted as the savings in saving
certificates. Saving in certificates in 1994 is measured by calculating changes in
savings in certificates between December 1993 and 1994.
6) Single-premium annuity insurance policies (ANNINS)
A single-premium annuity insurance policy is a life insurance policy taken out with a
single premium payment. At the end of the insurance term, it is possible to buy an
annuity. The premium can be deducted from the taxable income. The payment
(annuity) is taxable. The annuity entitles periodic payments that end, at the latest, with
the holder's death. Saving for 1994 is calculated as the difference in the estimated
value of the insurance polices as of31st of December 1993 and 1994 respectively.
7) Savings or endowment insurance policies (ENDINS)
A savings or endowment insurance policy is a life insurance policy that pays out an
agreed sum at the end term of the insurance or at the time of death when this is earlier
than the end term. The paid premiums cannot be deducted from the taxable income.
The single payment is tax-free as long as it does not exceed the tax-free sum and the
periods of premium payments are paid for less than 12 years. Saving in endowment
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insurance policies is measured by calculating the difference in the total sum that the
respondent had saved through their savings or endowment insurance policies as of 31st
of December each year.
8) Combined life insurance policies (LIFINS)
A combined life insurance is an insurance that is paid out at the time of death or when
the policyholder has reached a certain age. Saving in life insurance policies is
measured by calculating the difference in the total sum that the respondent had saved
through these policies as of 31 st of December each year.
9) Individual retirement pension schemes (PRVPEN)
Individual pension schemes are pension schemes with an insurance company that are
not partly paid for by the employer. Respondents are asked about how much they pay
in premium each year on their individual pension scheme. This is used as a measure of
yearly saving for this asset component.
10) Growth funds (GRWFU)
A growth fund is an investment fund that does not payout interest or dividends, but
invests dividend returns in the fund itself. Respondents were asked about the value of
their investment in growth funds as of 31st of December each year. Saving was
estimated by calculating the change in this value in 1994.
Il) Mutual funds or mutual fund accounts (MUTFU)
Mutual funds are created by institution that invest money from individual savers in
joint programs. Respondents were asked about the value of their investment in mutual
funds as of 31st of December each year. Saving was estimated by calculating the
change in this value during 1994.
12) Bonds and/or mortgage bonds (BONDS)
Bonds are loans to the government, companies, or institutions. Bonds yield interest
through a fixed interest rate. A mortgage bond is an obligation/debenture issued by a
mortgage bank. Respondents were asked about the value of their investment in bonds
as of 31st of December each year. Saving is estimated by calculating the change in this
value over l year (1994).
13) Shares (SHARES)
Respondents were asked about the market value of their shares as of 31st of December
each year. Saving was estimated by calculating the change in the market value over
one year (1994).
14) Bought or written put options and call options (BPUTOP, WPUTOP, BCALLOP,
WCALLOP)
An option is a right (with a limited period of validity) to buy shares or to make other
investments. The price of buying and selling these options is set in advance by the
option-selling institution. A put-option yields the right (not the obligation) to sell a
certain underlying value by the exercise price, to one of the writers of such an option.
A call option yields the right to (during a certain period) to buy a standard number of
the underlying value of that option by a fixed exercise price. Falcons and warrants are
comparable to call-options. The respondents are asked about the value of their bought
or written options as of 31st of December each year. Saving for 1994 is estimated by
calculating the difference in values of options between December 1993 and 1994.
15) Money lent out to family or friends (PRIVLO)
Respondents are asked about how much they had lent out to families and friends as of
31 st of December each year. Saving in 1994 is estimated by calculating the difference
in total amounts lent out in December 1993 and 1994.
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16) Other savings not mentioned before (OTHSA94)
In the end of the part of the questionnaire that concerns different types of saving, the
respondents are asked whether they have other types of saving or investments than
those already reported, and if they have, they are asked to estimate the value of these
investments. Saving is measured by calculating the difference in the value of these
assets between December 1993 and 1994.
In addition to these monetary forms of saving, the respondents are asked about the value of
the following assets:
17) Value of real estate not being used for own accommodation (REALEST)
By real estate is meant land and the buildings on that land, including goods that by
their use belong to it and the right to those goods.
18) Value of cars, motorbikes, boats, or caravans (CARS, MOTORB, BOATS,
CARAV)
The respondents are asked about estimated market value of cars, motorbikes, boats, or
caravans as of3lst of December each year.
19) Value of accommodation and value of second residence (HOUSE, HOUSE2)
In the questionnaire about accommodation and mortgages, the respondents who own
their accommodation are asked to estimate the value of their accommodation and of
any second residence. The questions do not concern a special date except ''the
present". In this study, the estimated market value given in the first wave of data
collection (May 1994) is used as an estimated of value of the respondents' residence.
Questions were asked about the following loans and mortgages:
20) Private loans (PRDEBT)
With a private loan, the whole sum is made available to the person taking out the loan
atone time.
21) Extended lines of credit (CREDIT)
An extended line of credit is an arrangement that enables the debtor to withdraw
money up to a specified limit.
22) Outstanding debts on hire-purchase contracts, debts based on payment by instalment
and/or equity-based loans (DEBTS)
This category of loans includes outstanding debts on hire-purchase contracts, debts
based on payment by instalment as well as equity loans. Debt based on payment by
instalment does not involve any reception of money, but just the object that was
bought. The object is the buyer's property from the moment the deal is made. Usually,
the loan is paid back by paying monthly amounts to cover interest and repayment.
Debt based on hire-purchase contract has similar characteristics as instalment buying,
except that the object is not the buyer's property before the whole loan (+ interest) has
been paid off. An equity-based loan means that the debtor gives an asset (like a house
or stocks) in pledge. The interest rate is usually the same as the mortgage interest rate.
23) Outstanding debts with mail order firms, shops or other sorts of retail business (INSTAL)
The respondents were also asked whether they had other outstanding debts with a
mail-order firm, shop(s) or other sorts of retail business not mentioned before.
24) Number ofloans from family or friends (FALOAN)
25) Study loans (STULOA)
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26) Credit cards debt (CRECAR)
Credit card debt was described as "being in the red" on one or more of the
respondents' credit cards.
27) Other loans not mentioned before (OTIll.,OA)
The last question about the respondents' debt concerns debt "not mentioned before in
this questionnaire", in order to cover other types of loans than those who was
specified.
Respondents were asked about the remaining debt of their loans and credit lines (described in
18-25 above) as of 31st December each year. Saving is measured as the difference in
remaining debt in December 1993 and 1994. Down payments on the loans are counted as
saving, while new loans (subtracted by possible down payments in the year the loan was taken
out) are counted as dissaving.
In addition, respondents were asked about mortgages on their accommodation:
28) Mortgages on the house, second house, and other real estate (MORTH, MORTH2,
MORTG)
The part of the questionnaire that regards accommodation and mortgages associated
with it (HS), included questions about how much of the mortgages were left at the
time of the interview. Saving in 1994 was estimated by calculating the difference in
mortgages reported in the first and second wave of data collection. This period (May
1994 - May 1995) is different from the period chosen as period of analyses, but it is
assumed here that down payments on mortgages are done on a regular basis, so that
the estimate will be sufficiently accurate.
The data sets that contain data of total amounts per asset components (e.g. the total sum of the
balances on checking accounts instead of the balance of 1-10 checking accounts) on
respondent level are used'". The variables representing saving in 1994 were constructed after
merging the files containing assets data concerning December 31st in 1993 and 1994
respectively. After merging and cleaning the files so that the file only contained complete
couples (both head of household and spouse/partner when the household consisted of a
couple), 2793 individuals in 1610 households remained.
Data Cleaning
A frequent problem when measuring assets is that respondents are reluctant to provide
information about the value of their assets (e.g. Ferber, 1966; Maynes, 1965; Wentland,
1993). Often, they might admit that they own, for example, a bank account, while they refuse
to give information about the balance of the account. Hence, fmancial data from households
often suffer from the problem with missing observations. In this section, the degree of the
missing data and the ways the missing data problem were handled are described.
As shown in Appendix 3, respondents who were unable or unwilling to answer the open-
ended questions about values of assets or balances of accounts could give an answer by
choosing one of several brackets. In this study, the mid-values of the brackets were used as a
measure of the value of the relevant components. For the last brackets, which are defined only
56 The files are called agw94en and agw95en respectively and can be downloaded from CentER. These files have
been subject to some cleaning. Documentation about the procedures followed can be found in the file HSE-
doc.txt at the same ftp-site.
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by a lower bound (e.g. Dfl. 300 000 or more), the lower bound was used as a measure of the
value of the component. The last bracket was used 21 times in the second wave and 16 times
in the third wave across all asset components. Hence, the possible underestimation of these
assets caused by the use of the lower bound does not affect many respondents.
Table A4-1
Missing values pr. asset component
Number and ratios of missing values
Dec. 1993 (Second wave) Dec. 1994 (Third wave)
ASSET Numb. of Total numb. Ratio of Numb. of Total numb. Ratio of
COMPo "Don't of "Don't "Don't of "Don't
knows" ownership knows". knows" ownership knows"
CHAC 101 3050 3,3% 153 3043 5,0%
POSTE 46 ilOS 4,2% 51 1002 5,1%
DEPBO 73 854 8,6% 57 663 8,6%
SAVAC 76 1234 6,2% 78 1106 7,1%
PRIVLO 16 180 8,9% 18 168 7,1%
MUTFU 56 468 12,0% 55 453 12,1%
GRWFU 32 231 13,9% 15 205 7,3%
CERTI 14 382 3.7% 9 360 2,5%
BONDS 19 115 16,5% 25 100 25,0%
SHARES 58 625 9,3% 125 688 18,2%
BPUTOP 10 21 47,6% 7 Il 63,6%
WPUTOP 10 16 62,5% 9 12 75,0%
BCALLOP 13 28 46,4% 12 31 38,7%
WCALLOP 15 28 53,6% 8 13 61,5%
OTHSA94 30 80 37,5% 35 99 35,4%
EMPSP 16 356 4,5% 36 748 4,8%
STULOA 3 74 4,1% 4 61 6,6%
FALOAN I 85 1,2% 4 74 5,4%
PRDEBT 5 160 3,1% 13 146 8,9%
MORTG 6 47 12,8% l 45 2,2%
MORTH 23 925 2,5% 47 1050 4,5%
MORTH2 2 16 12,5% 4 22 18,2%
CREDIT 23 382 6,0% 36 350 10,3%
lNSTAL 5 51 9,8% 8 43 18,6%
DEBTS 9 57 15,8% 9 52 17,3%
CRECAR 6 26 23,1% 8 31 25,8%
OTHLOA 2 36 5,6% 6 50 12,0%
ANNlNS 60 664 9,0% 78 681 11,5%
ENDlNS 61 244 25,0% 52 223 23,3%
LlFlNS 131 397 33,0% 143 349 41,0%
PRVPEN 53 92 57,6% 20 69 29,0%
REALEST 3 134 2,2% 6 119 5,0%
HOUSE 35 1071 3,3% 38 1082 3,5%
HOUSE2 2 58 3,4% l 58 1,7%
CARS 69 1507 4,6% 107 1526 7,0%
MOTORB 12 89 13,5% 7 82 8,5%
BOATS 25 87 28,7% 16 74 21,6%
CARAV 44 189 23,3% 56 194 28,9%
N-2679. The sample consists of heads of households and any spouses/partners who answered the wealth questionnaires in
both the second and third wave of data collection. Households lacking information from one spouse were excluded from the
sample.
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The original files containing the assets data are large and complicated. Therefore, files in
which the total sum of each asset component can be found have been constructed. In these
files, missing values have been substituted with zeros. In order to be able to distinguish
between "correct" zeros (the respondent doesn't have the asset) and zeros caused by a "don't
know" answer (respondent says s/he owns a particular asset, but does not report the balance or
value of it), separate flag variables were constructed for indicating the presence of "don't
know" answers. In table A4-1, the numbers of don't know answers associated with the
different asset components are compared with the total number of ownerships of each
component for December 1993 and 1994 respectively.
Table A4-1 shows that the ratios of missing values are quite low for different types of bank
accounts, mortgages, and loans, while for other types of assets components, there were more
missing values than valid ones (for example, different types of options). The reason why there
are so many missing values for assets such as options, pension arrangements and insurance
policies, is that these are complicated asset components for which it is difficult to assess a
present value. This difficulty with assessing a value is associated with many assets that can be
characterised as investments.
Because of any possible substitution effects between investment savings and saving in bank
accounts, it is desirable to include as many assets components as possible in the definition of
saving. However, too many missing values in a variable will lead to difficulties in assessing
the saving that took place between the two points in time at which assets were measured. A
missing value at the beginning or the end of a year might cause the estimated saving in that
asset to be highly over- or underestimated. The fact that a large portion of the respondents had
obvious problems with answering questions about a particular asset also gives doubts about
the accuracy of the valid values. For the purpose of this study, assets components for which
missing values constitute more than 35% of the total number of components owned by the
panel members are not used. Hence, the four variables containing information about the value
of options as well as the variables "other types of saving", "life insurance" and "private
pension arrangements" will not be included in the operational defmition of saving.
The exclusion of the seven assets components implies that estimates of total savings at the
end of each year are underestimated in this study. It also suggests that the degree of
underestimation is not constant across the respondents. Probably, the underestimation is
largest among respondents with the most diversified savings portfolios. The extent to which
this causes the saving that took place in 1994 to be under- or overestimated is difficult to
assess because we do not know whether the changes in the values of the assets were large and
either positive or negative.
In addition to excluding variables that contained over 30% missing values, respondents who
gave a "don't know" answer for a substantial number of asset components are also excluded.
Table A4-2 shows an overview of the frequencies of the sum of "don't know" answers across
the two waves (excluding "don't know" answers given to the seven assets components not
included in the operational definition of saving). Nearly 70% of the individuals in the sample
did not give any "don't know" answers. Over 99% of the sample had 10 "don't know"
answers or less. The results are less encouraging when counting the number of don't know
answers on the household level. Only some 56% of the households had no "don't know"
answers, while over 90% of the households had three or less. Households with more than
three "don't know" answers were excluded from the sample. After this cleaning, 2339
individuals in 1365 households remained.
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Furthermore, some of the minimum and maximum values of discretionary and contractual
saving were examined. Often these were caused by a respondent reporting a value of an asset
in only one of the years for one or several assets. Households found to give incomplete
information in one of the years were also deleted.
Table A4-2
Number of "don't know" answers at the
individual level
Table A4-3
Number of "don't know" answers at the
household level
No. Don' Frequ. Val.% Cum.%
know
O 1816 69.8 69.8
1 399 15.3 85.2
2 155 6.0 91.1
3 88 3.4 94.5
4 44 1.7 96.2
5 29 1.1 97.3
6 14 .5 97.8
7 16 .6 98.5
8 4 .2 98.6
9 6 .2 98.8
10 8 .3 99.2
11 2 .1 99.2
12 6 .2 99.5
13 2 .1 99.5
15 2 .1 99.6
16 2 .1 99.7
17 2 .1 99.8
18 2 .1 99.8
20 1 .0 99.9
22 1 .0 99.9
26 1 .0 100.0
29 1 .0 100.0
Total 2679 100.0
lNo. Don' Frequ. Val.% Cum.%
know
p 856 56.1 56.1
1 298 19, 75,7
~ 132 8, 84,3
13 79 5, 89,5
~ 44 2,S 92,4
~ 29 1,S 94,3
K> 22 l,~ 95,7
17 15 1,( 96,7
~ 8 , 97,2
~ 11 , 98,0
10 7 , 98,4
11 3 , 98,6
12 3 98,8
13 3 99,0
14 2 ,1 99,1
15 2 ,1 99,3
16 2 ,1 99,4
17 1 ,1 99,5
18 1 ,1 99,5
19 1 ,1 99,6
~O 3 , 99,8
~6 1 ,1 99,9
t19 1 ,1 99,9
~8 1 ,1 100,0
ITotal 1525 100,(
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APPENDIX 5: CONSTRUCTION OF THE HOUSEHOLD INCOME VARIABLE
DefInition of individual gross income
The income questionnaire used for collecting income information is detailed and includes a
long rage of income components (examples of the question formulations are shown in
Appendix 3). The questions are about individual income, and all panel members older than 15
years are supposed to answer them. The questionnaire also contains some questions about
taxable income and the total net income of the household. Employees at CentER have
constructed a dataset at respondent level in which different sources of incomes have been
added up. This file is used here. It is, more specifically, the aggregated income file from 1995
(agi95en.por) with some additional variables merged from the income95 file (inc95en.por)
and the household information file (hhi95en.por). The data in these files cover the fiscal year
1994. Only responses from heads of households and their spouselpartner are included in the
file used for this study (position in household is either head of household, spouse or
unmarried partnerr".
Some of the values of income and tax in the agi94en.por file were inputted based on the
computer program "Brunet". This was done for respondents who had either answered the
question about withheld income tax or net gross income. With the Brunet program, the
missing values of withheld income tax and premiums for social insurance policies can be
derived from the gross income, or the gross income can be derived from the net income.
Previous studies on the accuracy of income data indicate that detailed questions about
different income components produce more accurate income data than questions about total
income (e.g. Grondil & Michaud, 1994). This is because people forget or fail to consider
certain types of income sources and thereby underestimate their total income. For this reason,
information about different income components is used for constructing a measure of total
income for the respondents who have provided such information. Gross household income is
defmed as the sum of the following income sources:
BTOT=LOON + VUT + AOW + PENS +WW + ZW +WG + AAW +WAO + AWW +
RWW + ABW + lOAW + OG + ALIM +WINST + RENTE + HWF + HPREM - HTR
Where
LOON:
VUT:
AOW:
PENS:
WW:
ZW:
WG:
AAW:
WAO
AWW:
Gross labour income I wage
Gross early retirement benefit
Gross General old-age pension
Gross Retirement pension (incl. Disability pension)
Gross Short-term unemployment benefit
Gross Sickness benefit
Gross Reduced pay schemel Waiting money (unemployment benefit)
Gross disability benefit
Gross disability pension
Gross General widow's and orphan's pension
57 In some households, more than two household members defmed themselves as head, spouse, or partner. In
these cases, the person with the highest household member number was excluded.
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RWW:
ABW:
IOAW:
OG:
ALIM:
WINST:
RENTE:
HWF:
HPREM:
HTR:
Gross Long-term unemployment benefit
Gross General social assistance (incl. benefits for self-employed)
Gross benefit for elderly and partly disabled unemployed/self-employed
Gross income from letting rooms (or other income from real estate)
Gross alimony from/to spouse
Gross Profit (self-employed)
Gross Interest/dividends/other income
Imputed tax for homeowners/ rateable value of accommodation
Subsidy for buying a house (Government contribution to home owners)
Interest on mortgages
The BTOT variable had 3565 valid values (4327 cases). 762 (17.6%) cases had a missing
value since the respondent had not filled in a valid answer to one or more of the income
components. Most missing values were caused by a missing value for labour income. 30 cases
had a negative value for gross income. Since the number of missing cases is substantial and a
missing data analyses revealed that the missing data were not missing completely at random
intervals, missing values are replaced by alternative observations of personal or household
income and by estimating values using the methods of expectations maximisation and
maximum likelihood. The imputations are done in several steps.
Replacing missing values with observed values for taxable income
First, missing values and negative values for BTOT are replaced with valid answers to
questions about taxable income. In addition, values of BTOT below 10,000 guilders were
substituted with values for taxable income if that was higher than 10,000 guilders. The
questionnaire contained four questions about taxable income.
First, the following question was asked:
"Do you know how much your taxable income was for 1994? "
Those who answered "yes" to this question (38.8% of the sample), were asked
"How much was your taxable income for 1994?" (TIl).
Those who answered "no" to the question (22.l% of the sample), were asked
"Can you give an estimation of your taxable income for 1994?", (TI2).
If they still did not give a valid answer, they were asked
"It's unfortunate that you don't know your taxable income for 1994. Perhaps you know
(about) how much your taxable income wasfor 1993?" (TI3).
The Pearson correlation coefficients between valid values of BTOT and the valid values of
the three questions about taxable income were .93, .78, and.22 for ITl, IT2 and IT3
respectively. Hence, ITl and IT2 are used for replacing missing observations and for
substituting negative or low values for BTOT. IT3 was not used since the correlation between
valid answers to this question and the BTOT was not significant.
The highly significant correlation coefficients (both at the .01 level) between valid answers to
both BTOT and either ITl or IT2 do not necessarily mean that ITl and IT2 are good estimates
for missing observations of BTOT. Missing values of BTOT are caused by the fact that the
respondent failed to fill in the income questionnaire accurately, and their answer to ITl or IT2
might therefore be inaccurate too. Nevertheless, it seems reasonable to expect that answers
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about taxable income will provide reliable estimates of the missing value of BTOT. After
replacing missing values for BTOT with valid values for taxable income (191 cases) and
substituting negative (lO cases) and low values (22 cases) of BTOT with taxable income
when it was higher than BTOT, the number of negative values was reduced to 20 and the
number of missing to 571 (13.2%) of the sample.
Definition of household net income
Responses to another income question could also be used for replacing missing values of
income. One of the last questions in the income questionnaire is about the net income of the
household in the previous year. This question has the following wording
Do you know, approximately, how much the net income of your household would
amount to over 1994?
Those who answered ''yes'' (55.3% of the sample) received the following question:
"On the next screen you will be asked how much, approximately, the TOTAL NET
INCOME OF YOUR HOUSEHOLD AS A WHOLE has been over the period 1
January 1994 through 31. December 1994. The total net income of the household
means the sum of net incomes of all household members. By net income, we mean the
income after deduction of taxes, but before making payments for things like rent,
mortgages, and the like. Please, indicate about how much the TOTAL NET INCOME
OF YOUR HOUSEHOLD was over the period 1 JANUARY 1994 through 31
DECEMBER 1994."
Answers were given by choosing one of eleven income brackets. The mid-value of the
brackets are used for replacements of missing data. When both the head of household and the
spouse/partner had answered this question, the average of their response was used as value.
As this question concerns net income on the household level, this data cannot be used directly
for replacing missing values of BTOT, which is on individual level and concerns gross
income. A new variable is therefore constructed, ''NTOT'', which is defined as
NTOT = BTOT - lB +HTR
where lB represents calculated income tax and HTR is interest on mortgages. As lB had
missing values for some of the cases that had missing values for BTOT before the imputation
[this word has a negative (criminal) connotation] of taxable income, it was estimated for these
cases in accordance with the progressive tax system used in the Netherlands'", 133
replacements of missing values for lB were made. Three of the new values were negative, and
these were replaced with zeroes.
Aggregation to the household level
Before aggregating the income data to the household level, further cleaning of the data was
necessary. For many households (498 of 2699), information from one of the partners was
missing. These households were deleted from the sample, along with seven other households
58 The following formulas were used for calculating tax:
IfO< BTOT<Or= 43267 than cib=totinc95 *0.38125.
If 43267< BTOT<or = 86531) than cib= 0.38125*43267 + 0.5 * (totinc95-43267).
IfBTOT> 86531 than cib=0.38125*43267 + 0.5 * (86531-43267)+ 0.6 *(totinc95-86531).
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with inconsistent household information, Then NTOT was aggregated to the household level
(HNTOT). This variable contained 437 missing values (19.9 % of the sample of 2194
complete households) and two negative values. Households with a HNTOT less that 12000
guilders, in which one of the partners works more than 16 hours a week, were giving a
missing value for HNTOT (lB cases). In addition, households with negative income were
assigned a missing value for HNTOT. In total, HNTOT had 462 missing values (21.1 % of
the sample).
Replacing missing values with alternative observed values of household net income
Answers to the question about net household income were used for imputing missing ", The
correlation (Spearman's rho) coefficient between HNTOT and the mid-value of the brackets
used in the net-income question was .872 and significant at the .01 level. After filling in
missing values with the bracket information, 300 missing values remained, and 4 households
had income equal to O. In addition to using the income bracket for replacing some of the
missing values, it was also used for replacing low values of HNTOT (below Dfl. 17500). This
was done for the households who had indicated that their household net income was over
17500 when choosing an income bracket. Five replacements were made.
Definition of household disposable income
As households also have other incomes than those that are subject to taxation, a second
income variable called Household Disposable Income (HDI) is constructed. HDI is defined
as:
HDI= HNTOT+ AUK + BEURS + STUDLEN + OTOEL + FTOEL + ERF + HS + HG -
ZFP-ZKP
where
AUK:
BEURS:
STUDLEN:
OTOEL:
FTOEL:
ERF:
HS:
HG:
ZKP:
ZFP:
Net alimony for children
Scholarship or additional support through government scholarship scheme
Study loan (interest-bearing loan through government scholarship scheme)
Student grant from parents/ parental support for studies
Net allowance/support from family"
Net inheritance and/or gifts60
Rent subsidy / net rent allowance
Net subsidy for tenants (allowance to help adjusting to a new and higher rent)
Premium private health insurance
Premium national health service
HDI had two negative values and one zero, which were substituted with a missing value. HDI
had 315 missing values.
Estimation and imputation of missing values
Missing values were estimated for both variables. The natural logarithm of the two variables
was used in the rest of the analyses as the 'log transformed' variables were closer to the
59 The difference in the defmition of income between the net-income question and the NTOT may represent a
problem. If a household member, not being head of household or spouse/partner, has substantial income, they
might choose a bracket that overestimates the income of the head and spouse/partner. In this study, we use the
income of the head of household and spouse/partner only, and the inclusion of high incomes of other household
members is not adequate. However, this problem will not affect many cases.
60 Inheritance and family support are considered as net sums. The reason for this is that the data do not provide
information about the tax rate that should be applied since the tax rate depends on the relationship between the
person who gives the money and the person who receives it.
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normal distribution. Skewness and kurtosis for (LN)HNTOT were -1.306 and 4.879
respectively, while the corresponding values for (LN)HDI were -.879 and 4.313 (see Table
AS-2).
An analysis was carried out in order to check the pattern of missing data. Separate variance t-
tests showed that an observation of household income was more probable among members in
the high-income panel, and in households with two partners, in households with two earners,
in households in which the main breadwinner was a man and had high education. The
probability for observing income also increased with the age of the main breadwinner. These
results show that the observed values of income do not form a random sample of the sampled
values of income, which means that income is not Missing Completely at Random (MCAR)
(Little & Rubin, 1987). This is also indicated by Little's MCAR test, which is significant.
This means that we can reject the null hypothesis that the data are MCAR. When missing is
not MCAR, listwise or pair-wise deletion of cases with missing values for income can
produce biased estimates and are inadequate methods for handling missing values (i.e.
Arbuckle, 1996).
A weaker assumption about the missing observations of income is that they are missing at
random (MAR) in the sense that missing values depend on other variables, but not on the
value of income. That would mean that observed values of income are not a random sub-
sample of the sampled values, but they form a random sample of the sampled values within
subclasses defined by values of education, age, gender, panel and number of earners. If this
assumption holds, missing can be estimated by using regression or ML (Maximum
Likelihood) estimation (Arbuckle, 1996). According to Arbuckle (1996), ML estimation is a
more efficient way in reducing estimation bias caused by the missing data mechanism than
the commonly used listwise or pairwise deletion.
Unfortunately, there is no test that can reveal whether the data are missing at random or not
within the subclasses of variables. It is therefore difficult to assess whether the MAR
assumption holds for the missing values of the LNNTOT and LNHDI variables. However,
Little and Rubin (1987) and Muthen, Kaplan and Hollis (1987) suggest that the use of ML
will reduce bias even when the MAR condition is not strictly satisfied. Therefore, although
there are some doubts about whether missing values of income are MAR, missing values for
HNTOT are estimated and imputed by using the EM (Expectation Maximisation and
Maximum Likelihood) method provided by the software package SPSS 9.0. Estimation and
imputing of missing was also done by multiple linear regressions in order to compare the
imputed values with those estimated by the EM method. The distribution of income is not
strictly normal, but due to the large sample size, these two methods are used. Regression
imputation means that a missing observation for income is estimated by predicted values from
the regression on the known variables for income.
The following 17 variables were used for the estimation of missing values of income:
PARTPRES a dummy that indicates whether there is a partner present in the household
(l=yes)
a dummy that indicates whether there is two earners in the hb (1= two earners)
number of children
the log of number of household members
a dummy that indicates panel membership (1= member of the high
income panel)
TWOEARN
NUKlDS
LOGFAM
PANEL
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SEXKOSW
AGEKOSW
AGE2
AGE3
EDUMID
EDUHIGH
AGEMID
AGEHIGH
AGE2MID
AGE2HIGH
AGE3MID
AGE3HIGH
a dummy that indicates the sex of the main bread winner of the bh (man=O)
the age of the main breadwinner (as well as the second- and third-order terms)
2 dummies indicating the education level of the main bread winner'";
middle and high.
6 interaction terms between education and age of the main breadwinner.f
The estimates from two OLS (Ordinary Least Squares) regressions using the variables listed
above are displayed in Table A2-I. The models used are:
Yu = Xif) + ei, ei -N(O,cr\ i=I, ... ,nR,
and
Y2i = Xia + ei, ei -N(O,d), i=l ,... ,llR,
(l)
(2)
with Yli and Y2i representing the dependent variables LNNTOT and LNHDI respectively,
XiR k+ I representing the corresponding vector of auxiliary variables with the coefficient of the
first element equal to one, a and f)E Rk+1 representing a corresponding vector with first
element equal the constant term and 11Rthe number of observations (here: the households with
a valid value for the dependent variables). The auxiliary variables are the 17 variables listed
above. For the purpose of this analysis, missing data was handled by pairwise deletion.
Applying Ordinary Least Squares to equations (l) and (2) with the above described variables
results in the estimates that are summarised in Table AS-I. The results are shown in order to
give an indication of how well these variables perform as predictors of income'".
Table AS-I shows that the most important predictors of income are the presence of a partner
in the household, the presence of two earners in the household, panel membership, the sex and
education of the main bread winner and the interaction between age and education. The three
interaction terms containing the second order term of age were excluded from the analyses
because their partial F values were less than 4. Hence, the F-test does not reject the null-
hypothesis that their coefficients are equal to zero. When producing the regression estimates
for replacing missing values, the estimates are augmented with a residual from a randomly
selected complete case in order to avoid underestimation of the residual variance of lNNTOT
andLNHDI.
61 Education was missing for 18 cases. These were coded as low education for the purpose of this analysis.
62 The reason for including these interaction terms is that studies indicate a significant effect of these variables
on income (e.g. Alessie, Camphuis & Kapteyn, 1990).
63 SPSS does not report which model was used when missing values are estimated. Neither does it report how
well the predictor variables fit the data.
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Table A5-1
Estimation results of model (1) and (2)
Dependent variable: Dependent variable:
Lnntot LNhdi
Stand. Stand.
coef. coef.
Beta t Sig. Beta t Sig
(Constant) 20.605 .000 20.953 .000
PARTPRES .292 6.627 .000 .217 4.787 .000
TWOEARN .163 8.316 .000 .168 8.369 .000
NUKIDS -.031 -.590 .555 -.o?5 -1.374 .170
LOGFAM -.046 -.624 .533 .034 .444 .657
PANEL .360 20.158 .000 .373 20.415 .000
SEXKOSW -.064 -3.472 .001 -.045 -2.385 .017
AGEKOSW 2.678 4.813 .000 2.164 3.794 .000
AGE2 -5.495 -4.932 .000 -4.469 -3.913 .000
AGE3 2.178 4.753 .000 2.255 3.764 .000
EDUMID -.402 -2.558 .011 -.406 -2.518 .012
EDUHIGH -.445 -2.605 .009 -.486 -2.779 .006
AGEMID .679 2.923 .004 .658 2.764 .006
AGEHIGH .937 3.614 .000 1.030 3.817 .000
AGE3MID -.247 -2.432 .015 -.224 -2.149 .032
AGE3HlGH -.325 -2.832 .005 -.387 -3.289 .001
N 2194 2194
Adj. R" .541 .517
For the EM procedure, a distribution is assumed for the partially missing data and inferences
are based on the likelihood under that distribution (SPSS 9.0). In the present analyses, a
normal distribution is assumed. Each iteration consists of an E-step (expectations
maximisation) and an M-step (maximum likelihood). The E-step finds the conditional
expectation of the missing values, given the observed values and current estimates of the
parameters. These expectations are substitutions for the missing data. In the M-step,
maximum likelihood estimates of the parameters are computed using the current expected
values of the missing values.
Table A5-2
Descriptive statistics for income with and without imputed estimates of missing values
N Mean Median Mode Std. Skew- Kurto- Mini- Maxi-
Devia- ness sis mum mum
tion
Valid Mis-
sing
LNNTOT 1890 304 10.95 11.03 11.12 .5867 -1.306 4.879 7.00 12.75
EMLNNTOT 2194 O 10.92 10.95 11.12 .5681 -1.142 4.560 7.00 12.75
RELGNNTO 2194 O 10.91 10.97 11.12 .5818 -1.122 4.106 7.00 12.75
LNHDI 1879 315 10.92 10.97 10.34 .5863 -.879 4.313 6.73 13.40
EMLNHDI 2194 O 10.88 10.89 10.34 .5662 -.722 4.112 6.73 13.40
REGLNHDI 2194 O 10.88 10.91 10.34 .5867 -.793 3.953 6.73 13.40
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Table A5-2 displays the descriptive statistics of the two variables LNNTOT and LNHDI
before and after imputation of missing data by the EM method (denoted by EM) and the
regression method (denoted by REG) respectively. The table shows that the mean, median,
and mode are left nearly unchanged. In addition, degree of skew and kurtosis are relatively
similar for the six variables. As the underlying true values of the missing observations of
income are not known, it is difficult to assess which estimates are the best.
Figure A5-l shows plots of imputed values from the EM method against those from the
regression method with random residuals. The scatter plot shows that the estimates of the two
methods are quite similar. However, large deviations are found for a few cases. These are
probably caused by the addition of random residuals used in combination with the regression
method. For the purpose of the analyses, the values imputed by using the EM method will be
used.
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Figure 5A-l
Plots of observed and EM and regression imputed values for (LN)HNTOT
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APPENDIX 6: RESULTS
Table A6-1
OLS regressions: Financial wealth Dec. 1994, discretionary saving in 1994 and the
discretionary saving ratio 1994
Dependent variables Fin. wealth. Dec. 1994 Discr. Saving 1994 Discr. saving/inc.
Independent variables Beta Sig. Beta Sig. Beta Sig.
Constant .825 .319 .791
Secio-eeonomlc variables
Disp. Income/lOoo .316 .000 .222 .002 .221 .002
Panel .099 .035 -.151 .014 -.033 .583
Age -.600 .017 .066 .837 -.313 .323
Age squared! l 00 .806 .001 -.070 .827 .361 .257
Education level .ne .016 -.021 .710 .006 .920
Children present =l .000 .998 .077 .394 .129 .149
Log of family size .023 .827 -.045 .731 -.048 .715
Partner present =l .004 .957 -.080 .403 -.073 .443
Discount rates
Delay payment rate .002 .955 .000 .995 .013 .757
Delay reward rate -.052 .107 .025 .523 -.065 .100
Speed-up reward rate .002 .944 .069 .104 .070 .094
Future-related variables
Expectations l year .003 .916 -.023 .557 .013 .738
Expectations 5 years -.010 .775 .007 .873 -.032 .435
Time horizon .066 .039 .012 .757 .039 .321
Perceived income variability -.038 .251 -.032 .419 .004 .924
Attitudes
Thrift -.104 .006 -.026 .575 -.067 .145
Saving involvement .109 .006 -.024 .622 -.057 .241
Saving habits .015 .644 -.060 .148 -.083 .044
Shame of debt .131 .000 -.032 .453 -.085 .047
Saving motives
Importance of precautionary saving .057 .188 .064 .230 .074 .163
Importance of goal saving -.038 .316 .134 .005 .079 .098
Importance of supporting children -.086 .048 -.Oll .837 -.037 .493
Importance of leaving bequest .095 .012 -.085 .069 -.056 .226
Importance of saving for old age .066 .083 .009 .854 .062 .182
Importance of earning interest .098 .015 -.076 .130 -.024 .632
Ec. Situation compared to "others" .016 .656 .016 .720 -.071 .100
Personality factors
Emotional stability .026 .414 -.009 .826 -.033 .410
Conscientiousness .005 .874 .067 .116 .038 .370
Toughmindedness -.009 .765 -.014 .723 .Oll .785
Inflexibility .088 .009 -.022 .599 .008 .845
Extraversion .065 .047 -.013 .754 .045 .269
N 786 711 711
Adjusted R2 Model l 19.4 .000 1.3 .031 1.6 .014
A<!jystedR2 Model 2 28.7 .000 1.7 .294 2.9 .094
Note: This table reports OLS regressions of the sum of financial wealth as of December 1994, discretionary
saving during 1994, and the discretionary saving ratio on the set of variables listed in the first column. The
distribution of discretionary saving was trimmed by 5% of each tail before analysing discretionary saving and
the discretionary saving ratio. Values of fm. wealth above 400000 were not included in the analysis.
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Table A6-2
OLS regressions: Debt, December 1994, contractual saving in 1994 (mortg. excl.) and the
contractual saving ratio in 1994 (mortg. excl)
Dependent variables Debt Dec. 1994 Repayment of debt 1994 Log (Repayment of debt
lincom~
Independent variables Beta Sig. Beta Sig. Beta Sig.
Constant .215 .500 .220
Socia-economic variables
Size of debt .516 .000 .228 .002
Disp. Income/looo -.043 .629 .337 .004 -.169 .138
Panel .045 .587 -.071 .489 .023 .834
Age -.346 .496 -.290 .541 .716 .178
Age squaredilOO .368 .459 .382 .420 -.738 .166
Education level .029 .756 .156 .113 .223 .042
Children present = I -.023 .874 .316 .058 .157 .353
Log of family size .098 .628 -.499 .041 -.309 .197
Partner present = I .119 .436 .298 .Q78 .378 .028
Discount rates
Delay payment rate -.095 .122 -.048 .480 .068 .349
Delay reward rate -.062 .303 .1I8 .065 .086 .223
Speed-up reward rate -.043 .489 -.044 .518 .004 .962
Future-related variables
Expectations I year -.032 .616 .008 .919 .002 .975
Expectations 5 years .124 .058 .011 .886 -.106 .203
Time horizon .120 .054 -.041 .546 .016 .833
Perceived income variability .052 .419 -.121 .074 -.094 .218
Attitudes
Thrift -.044 .551 .130 .098 .087 .328
Saving involvement .025 .742 -.014 .858 -.214 .oJ5
Saving habits -.048 .461 -.209 .003 -.232 .003
Shame of debt -.056 .390 .006 .925 -.123 .103
Saving motives
Importance of precautionary saving .081 .320 .192 .032 .111 .270
Importance of goal saving -.145 .044 -.095 .243 -.020 .821
Importance of supporting children .Q70 .408 .008 .933 .072 .483
Importance of leaving bequest -.001 .988 .036 .667 -.Q78 .396
Importance of saving for old age -.133 .068 -.005 .948 -.021 .818
Importance of earning interest -.038 .609 .036 .655 .100 .262
Ec. Situation compared to "others" -.076 .245 -.004 .961 -.097 .217
Personality factors
Emotional stability -.072 .227 .004 .946 .031 .650
Conscientiousness -.004 .955 -.042 .546 -.049 .519
Toughmindedness .052 .398 -.1I3 .091 -.098 .188
Inflexibility .031 .616 .047 .513 -.058 .441
Extraversion -.024 .694 -.060 .368 -.042 .573
N 297 190 218
Adjusted R2 Model I 1.9 .092 33.1 .000 5.0 .020
Adjusted R2 Model 2 4.7 .127 36.3 .126 9.4 .096
Note: This table reports OLS regressions of the sum of debt as of December 1994, debt repayment ill 1994, and
debt repayment over income in 1994 on the set of variables listed in the first column.
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Table A6-3
OLS regressions: Debt, December 1994, (Log)contractual saving in 1994 (mortg. incl.) and
the contractual saving ratio in 1994 (mortg. inel)
Dependent variables Debt and mortgages Dec. Log (Repayment of debt Repaym. of debt and
1994 and mortgaj es in 1994) merta, in 1994/income
Independent variables Beta Sig. Beta Sig. Beta Sig.
Constant .948 .004 .047
Soeie-eeenemie variables
Disp. Income/1000 .486 .000 .177 .083 -.195 .073
Panel .160 .000 .104 .275 .089 .380
Age -.033 .900 .538 .292 .594 .274
Age squaredilOO -.063 .810 -.535 .292 -.340 .529
Education level .017 .726 .057 .575 .141 .197
Children present =I -.014 .852 .088 .605 .112 .535
Log of family size .101 .327 -.064 .799 -.024 .930
Partner present =I -.004 .953 .165 .370 .041 .834
Discount rates
Delay payment rate -.040 .208 -.086 .200 .057 .425
Delay reward rate -.059 .065 .011 .861 .108 .117
Speed-up reward rate .068 .037 .064 .348 .003 .962
Future-related variables
Expectations I year -.020 .551 .074 .305 .058 .453
Expectations 5 years .015 .668 -.158 .036 -.010 .899
Time horizon .070 .032 .090 .186 .026 .714
Perceived income variability -.024 .463 -.081 .255 .079 .296
Attitudes
Thrift .020 .588 .009 .905 .010 .903
Saving involvement .019 .619 -.172 .030 -.088 .293
Saving habits -.075 .027 .009 .900 -.042 .579
Shame of debt -.093 .006 .078 .283 .087 .259
Saving motives
Importance of precautionary saving .052 .224 .078 .364 .078 .395
hnportanceofgo~saving -.025 .512 -.036 .651 -.004 .959
Importance of supporting children .065 .140 -.069 .476 -.124 .228
hnportance of leaving bequest -.010 .790 -.QJ5 .858 -.066 .456
hnportance of saving for old age -.106 .005 -.094 .213 .072 .374
Importance of earning interest -.115 .004 .119 .129 .126 .131
Ec. Situation compared to "others" .044 .200 .044 .547 .092 .234
Personality factors
Emotional stability -.070 .027 -.074 .241 -.002 .972
Conscientiousness -.039 .268 -.152 .034 -.069 .363
Toughmindedness -.005 .888 .033 .633 .048 .510
Inflexibility -.061 .063 -.151 .026 .017 .817
Extraversion -.059 .070 .007 .916 .096 .170
N 552 248 248
Adjusted R2 Model I 46.1 .000 H.8 .000 2.3 .Q90
Adjusted R2 Model 2 50.1 .000 12.9 .309 1.3 .616
Note: This table reports OLS regressions on the sum of debt and mortgages, the log of changes in the sum of debt and
mortgages, and changes in debt and mortgages over income on the set of variables listed in the first column.
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Table A6-4
OLS regressions: Total wealth, December 1994, total saving in 1994 and the total saving ratio
1994
Dependent variables Total wealth Dec. 1994 Total Saving 1994 Total saving/income
Independent variables Beta Sig. Beta Sig. Beta Sig.
Constant .002 .027 .198
Socio-economic variables
Disp.Income/1000 .379 .000 .156 .013 .118 .045
Panel .104 .022 -.023 .679 .072 .173
Age .186 .422 .265 .364 .049 .866
Age squared/IOO .037 .873 -.153 .602 .021 .943
Education level .099 .018 .004 .933 .037 .475
Children present; I -.017 .800 .147 .083 .122 .151
Log of family size .039 .692 -.113 .361 -.127 .306
Partner present; I .046 .516 .01I .899 .048 .587
Discount rates
Delay payment rate -.006 .841 -.059 .107 .000 .999
Delay reward rate -.036 .213 .040 .281 .003 .928
Speed-up reward rate -.021 .478 .022 .556 .008 .838
Future-related variables
Expectations l year -.014 .646 -.029 .439 -.027 .477
Expectations 5 years .021 .518 -.007 .861 -.043 .266
Time horizon .088 .003 .080 .031 .083 .026
Perceived income variability -.077 .010 .015 .694 -.004 .920
Attitudes
Thrift -.068 .047 -.045 .307 -.081 .062
Saving involvement .069 .055 .018 .696 -.008 .863
Saving habits .035 .253 -.029 .457 -.040 .297
Shame of debt .128 .000 -.024 .555 -.030 .449
Saving motives
Importance of precautionary saving .038 .340 .002 .960 .077 .120
hnportance of goat saving -.073 .038 .061 .165 .044 .316
hnportance of supporting children -.056 .165 .018 .730 .028 .581
hnportance of leaving bequest .100 .004 .006 .891 -.047 .284
Importance of saving for old age -.002 .950 .049 .266 .049 .266
hnportance of earning interest .154 .000 .002 .966 -.008 .861
Ec. Situation compared to "others" .035 .273 .030 .460 -.030 .465
Personality factors
Emotional stability -.031 .301 -.006 .866 -.031 .409
Conscientiousness .010 .757 .023 .558 .031 .431
Toughmindedness .013 .646 -.031 .405 -.010 .784
Inflexibility .067 .029 -.038 .327 .016 .680
Extraversion .061 .041 -.002 .963 .005 .903
N 767 792 800
Adjusted R2 Model I 32.7 .000 3.2 .000 2.9 .000
Adjusted R2 Model 2 41.7 .000 3.1 .521 2.8 .548
Note: This table reports OLS regressions of total wealth as of December 1994, total savmg dunng 1994, and
total saving over income on the set of variables listed in the first column.
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Table A6-5
OLS regressions: Financial wealth, December 1994, of the three income groups
Dependent variables Low income group Middle income group High income group
Independent variables Beta Sig. Beta Sig. Beta Sig.
Constant .402 .956 .064
Socio-economic variables
Disp. Income/1000 .015 .941 -.001 .999 -.123 .574
Panel .346 .003 .031 .827 .013 .900
Age .062 .929 -1.011 .131 -1.431 .030
Age squared/IOO .056 .938 1.243 .066 1.664 .012
Education level .083 .499 .127 .183 .086 .430
Children present =1 .088 .576 -.146 .427 -.190 .327
Log of family size -.177 .513 1.081 .049 1.325 .044
Partner present =I .167 .306 -.473 .070 -.898 .081
Discount rates
Delay payment rate -.092 .332 -.035 .630 -.030 .706
Delay reward rate -.040 .618 -.133 .076 -.058 .508
Speed-up reward rate .033 .724 .044 .564 .045 .591
Future-related variables
Expectations I year -.049 .562 -.128 .108 -.065 .487
Expectations 5 years -.020 .827 .073 .364 .005 .958
Time horizon .099 .226 .213 .007 -.101 .232
Perceived income variability -.070 .396 -.073 .351 -.090 .267
Attitudes
Thrift -.164 .087 -.044 .633 -.055 .556
Saving involvement .083 .392 -.026 .766 .122 .198
Saving habits -.005 .956 -.018 .811 .134 .130
Shame of debt .187 .034 -.035 .671 .130 .129
Saving motives
Importance of precautionary saving .049 .657 .146 .149 -.149 .174
hnportance of goal saving -.043 .643 .067 .438 .069 .506
Importance of supporting children -.064 .524 -.304 .005 -.006 .953
hnportance of leaving bequest .187 .036 .089 .325 .058 .550
Importance of saving for old age .201 .027 .071 .427 .213 .036
hnportance of earning interest .054 .565 .128 .187 -.001 .992
Ec. Situation compared to "others" .163 .076 .133 .086 .019 .813
Personality factors
Emotional stability -.040 .625 -.008 .910 .164 .054
Conscientiousness .045 .598 .058 .461 -.031 .751
Toughmindedness -.138 .105 -.024 .754 .054 .498
Inflexibility .035 .693 .179 .036 .021 .803
Extraversion .000 1.000 .108 .185 .147 .059
N 150 158 164
Adjusted R2 Model l 18.3 .000 20.9 .000 16.3 .000
Adjusted R2 Model 2 29.1 .012 30.6 .013 23.1 .052
Note. This table reports OLS regressions of household financial wealth ro 1994 for three different mcome groups on the set
of variables listed in the first column ..
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Table A6-6
OLS regressions: Debt and Mortgages, December 1994, of the three income groups
Dependent variables Low income group Middle income group High income group
Independent variables Beta Sig. Beta Sig. Beta Sig.
Constant .085 .401 .849
Soclo-eeonomlc variables
Disp.lncome/IOOO .777 .000 .395 .161 .666 .002
Panel -.044 .726 .063 .590 .225 .041
Age -1.623 .054 -.426 .504 -.141 .849
Age squared/IOO 1.571 .071 .439 .482 -.047 .949
Education level .005 .973 -.141 .147 .138 .247
Children present = I -.005 .976 .110 .476 .111 .723
Log of family size .283 .299 .116 .792 -.613 .424
Partner present = I -.244 .187 -.141 .488 .417 .516
Discount rates
Delay payment rate -.078 .380 -.089 .214 .008 .925
Delay reward rate -.063 .516 -.056 .426 .010 .912
Speed-up reward rate .096 .282 .103 .166 .014 .876
Future-related variables
Expectations I year -.011 .903 .049 .532 -.056 .562
Expectations 5 years .037 .740 .010 .895 .033 .754
Time horizon -.007 .943 .110 .133 .145 .124
Perceived income variability .074 .418 -.039 .592 -.090 .336
Attitudes
Thrift .086 .409 -.214 .015 .063 .527
Saving involvement .121 .253 .096 .266 .155 .123
Saving habits .046 .622 -.084 .216 -.310 .001
Shame of debt .020 .834 -.165 .039 -.020 .812
Saving motives
importance of precautionary saving .068 .631 -.056 .562 .121 .289
importance of goal saving -.055 .596 -.061 .455 -.170 .121
importance of supporting children -.097 .369 .201 .043 -.068 .531
importance of leaving bequest .000 1.000 .092 .290 .002 .988
importance of saving for old age -.059 .574 -.057 .522 -.159 .136
importance of earning interest .008 .937 -.163 .094 -.142 .223
Ec. Situation compared to "others" .027 .786 .022 .767 .077 .404
Personality factors
Emotional stability -.071 .429 -.061 .363 -.031 .741
Conscientiousness -.014 .887 -.068 .378 -.064 .542
Toughmindedness .048 .596 -.071 .335 -.064 .472
Inflexibility -.028 .751 -.155 .047 -.044 .637
Extraversion .065 .543 -.076 .330 -.050 .544
N 101 108 249
Adjusted R1Model I 53.9 .000 52.9 .000 .090 .000
Adjusted R2 Model 2 46.7 .980 61.8 .013 .076 .616
Note: This table reports OLS regressions of the sum of debt and mortgages for three mcome groups on the set of
variables listed in the first column.
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Table A6-7
OLS regression: Debt, December 1994, of the three income groups
Dependent variables Low income group Middle income group High income group
Independent variables Beta Sig. Beta Sig. Beta Sig.
Constant .506 .527 .012
Socio-economic variables
Disp. Income/1000 .710 .211 .056 .949 .383 .384
Panel -.226 .423 .646 .027 .074 .707
Age .176 .943 1.298 .483 2.558 .038
Age squared/IOO -.107 .965 -.988 .571 -2.009 .108
Education level -.349 .356 .223 .290 .347 .142
Children present =I -.686 .093 -1.303 .063 -.205 .450
Log of family size .894 .201 1.228 .482
Partner present =I -.901 .091 -.628 .485 .192 .638
Discount rates
Delay payment rate -.086 .661 -.297 .110 -.426 .007
Delay reward rate -.105 .662 .165 .425 .109 .592
Speed-up reward rate .282 .154 .244 .133 -.186 .243
Future-related variables
Expectations I year -.029 .901 .309 .165 -.060 .776
Expectations 5 years .621 .024 .102 .584 .432 .041
Time horizon .134 .483 .116 .486 .426 .017
Perceived income variability .023 .899 -.096 .585 -.153 .413
Attitudes
Thrift -.283 .324 -.180 .409 .160 .355
Saving involvement -.477 .122 .046 .819 .115 .553
Saving habits -.283 .216 .058 .725 -.024 .893
Shame of debt -.241 .270 -.019 .916 .001 .993
Saving motives
Importance of precautionary saving .964 .024 .093 .732 .178 .391
Importance of goal saving .317 .161 -.286 .154 -.044 .802
Importance of supporting children .081 .777 .259 .302 -.188 .358
Importance of leaving bequest -.144 .576 -.124 .471 -.069 .781
Importance of saving for old age .183 .471 -.337 .129 -.365 .067
Importance of earning interest -.302 .264 .208 .321 .119 .542
Ec. Situation compared to "others" .017 .939 -.148 .513 -.059 .764
Personality factors
Emotional stability -.371 .086 .144 .341 -.524 .006
Conscientiousness -.044 .839 .125 .504 -.232 .278
Toughmindedness -.023 .904 -.017 .925 .178 .191
Inflexibility -.083 .692 -.269 .136 .409 .043
Extraversion .410 .299 -.279 .135 -.200 .204
N 48 55 63
Adjusted R2 Model I 5.6 .249 29.5 .002 2.3 .313
Adjusted R2 Model 2 34.2 .129 33.2 .403 27.3 .058
Note: This table reports OLS regressions of the sum of debt for three mcome groups on the set of variables hsted
in the first column.
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Table A6-8
OLS regressions: Total wealth, December 1994, of the three income groups
Dependent variables Low income group Middle income group High income group
Independent variables Beta Sig. Beta Sig. Beta Sig.
Constant .905 .462 .023
Socio-economic variables
Disp. Income/lOOO .023 .909 .754 .012 .214 .318
Panel .431 .000 -.062 .641 .080 .439
Age -.165 .812 -.416 .480 1.277 .061
Age squaredilOO .171 .809 .535 .364 -.900 .187
Education level .052 .649 .080 .368 .023 .830
Children present =I -.007 .968 -.077 .651 .393 .037
Log offamily size .105 .690 -.101 .840 -1.081 .091
Partner present =I .021 .893 .021 .932 1.058 .033
Discount rates
Delay payment rote -.005 .948 .021 .759 -.014 .859
Delay reward rote .086 .272 -.086 .219 -.055 .500
Speed-up reward rote .001 .994 .065 .355 .044 .587
Future-related variables
Expectations I year -.110 .177 -.093 .223 -.075 .401
Expectations 5 years .117 .174 .021 .786 .141 .149
Time horizon .022 .782 .260 .001 .023 .773
Perceived income variability -.057 .496 -.049 .503 -.078 .320
Attitudes
Thrift .018 .837 .065 .446 -.022 .813
Saving involvement .165 .D78 .030 .713 .047 .605
Saving habits .020 .816 .085 .228 .136 .106
Shame of debt .268 .002 .121 .120 -.034 .668
Saving motives
Importance of precautionary saving .110 .290 .031 .745 -.051 .637
Importance of goal saving -.099 .277 -.102 .208 -.083 .391
Importance of supporting children .085 .390 -.185 .061 .092 .313
Importance of leaving bequest .169 .051 .173 .042 -.005 .961
Importance of saving for old age -.064 .473 -.063 .460 .086 .374
Importance of earning interest .032 .726 .142 .117 .177 .083
Ec. Situation compared to "others" -.090 .312 .082 .261 .155 .047
Personality factors
Emotional stability -.063 .441 -.074 .287 -.082 .330
Conscientiousness -.015 .857 -.021 .771 .020 .826
Toughmindedness .038 .648 .036 .611 .037 .630
Inflexibility .161 .065 .089 .266 .081 .328
Extroversion .046 .575 .040 .589 .141 .062
N 149 160 158
Adjusted R2 Model I 29.1 .000 27.4 .000 27.8 .000
Ac!iusted R2 Model 2 46.5 .045 38.4 .003 31.9 .045
Note: This table reports OLS regressions of total wealth for three income groups on the set of vanables hsted ID the first
column.
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Table A6-9
Logistic regressions: Fin.wealth vs. non-wealth, debt and mortg. vs. non-debt and mortg. and
debt vs. non-debt
Dependent variables Fin.wealth Dec. 1994 >0 Debt+mortg.Dec. 1994>0 Debt Dec. 1994 >0
Independent variables Beta Sig. Beta Sig. Beta Sig.
Constant -4.781 .345 -3.617 .030 -4.329 .005
Socio-economic variables
Disp. Income/1000 .046 .021 .036 .000 .009 .027
Panel -1.552 .223 .058 .862 -.478 .054
Age .161 .400 .128 .038 .164 .007
Age squaredilOO -.209 .279 -.170 .005 -.193 .002
Education level .808 .246 .335 .097 .216 .247
Children present =I 3.266 .098 -.708 .153 -.656 .106
Log of family size -9.854 .083 2.593 .091 1.509 .228
Partner present =I 1.700 .083 -.314 .258 -.139 .565
Discount rates
Delay payment rate -.191 .840 .304 .313 .347 .116
Delay reward rate -.047 .143 -.001 .849 .010 .155
Speed-up reward rate .084 .049 .014 .132 .001 .827
Future-related variables
Expectations 1 year -.084 .041 .002 .845 -.004 .645
Expectations 5 years .035 .302 .002 .570 .002 .533
Timehorlzon -.175 .634 -.082 .452 -.252 .007
Perceived income variability -2.152 .029 .004 .986 .337 .055
Attitudes
Thrift .738 .149 .178 .240 .054 .660
Saving involvement .881 .069 -.067 .653 -.031 .795
Saving habits .731 .130 .035 .805 -.217 .051
Shame of debt 1.789 .004 -.401 .005 -.671 .000
Saving motives
Importance of precautionary saving .427 .270 -.106 .365 .Q35 .723
Importance of goal saving .113 .772 .001 .989 -.069 .371
Importance of supporting children -.590 .096 .061 .526 -.093 .253
Importance of leaving bequest .909 .018 .034 .661 .180 .008
Importance of saving for old age -.575 .042 -.126 .068 -.069 .248
Importance of earning interest .315 .497 -.008 .947 -.053 .581
Ec. Situation compared to "others" -.061 .807 .177 .021 .083 .199
Personality factors
Emotional stability -.014 .976 -.091 .520 .018 .878
Conscientiousness -1.146 .038 -.166 .234 -.266 .026
Toughmindedness .105 .830 .064 .609 .188 .081
Inflexibility -.294 .537 -.141 .303 -.150 .180
Extraversion .658 .168 .147 .289 .045 .699
N 108 800 800
Model with socio-ec. Variables: 684.28 .000 991.94 .000
-2LL 129.03 .008 80.0 61.3
% correctly predicted: 67.6 42.4 12.1
Nagelkerke R2: 23.2
Model with socio ee, + psyc variab.
-2LL 81.88 .002 646.01 888.92 .000
% correctly predicted: 86.1 47.1 .024 70.5
Nagelkerke R2: 62.2 81.9 27.0..Note: This table reports the results of logistic regression analyses of the dummies have/don't have posinve financial savmg,
have/don't have debt and mortgages, and have/don't have debt on the set of variables listed in the first column. The results
in the second and third column are based on a sample of 108 cases, where 54 had positive and 54 had zero or
negative fmancial wealth as of December 1994.
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